Then he's a point about not just talking about the UK. I think it's very easy to invite the person from the UK and say, talk about your problems as if no one else has these problems. I want to talk about everybody's problems because I think it is a very wide ranging issue. I'm going to make three points to you. The first one is that opposition to EU which is probably a more useful term than Euroscepticism is something that's become very embedded, and it's persistent both nationally and at the European level. I want to explain how that's come about. Secondly, I want to talk about how that has become part of the system in effect, and that if we want to think about the long-term stability of the European integration process, then we're going to need to think about engagement. I'm going to offer some thoughts about how we might go about that. Thirdly, I want to make the point that, while sceptics might be having a rising star, that they are getting a lot of media coverage, a lot of attention, the only reason that I think they are as successful as they are is that we don't see alternative voices really coming up to match those. We need to think a bit more about the development of a meaningful debate at a European level and indeed at a national level. There's always been opposition to the European Union. It's something which has always been there in some form or other, and if we think about any event in European integration history, it's not that everyone said, this is marvellous, we must do this, there's no problem at all. There's always been different points of views, different articulations. But what we see after Maastricht really is the emergence of something much more widespread. We get a step change in the level of public awareness about the European Union. We see the emergence of different voices who are much more organised in a way that sits out of the broad consensus that the integration process has seen up until that point. What we get now is, in effect, semi-permanent opposition at pretty much any level of analysis that we care to look at. I just want to share some aspects of that. First of all, we might look at public opinion. This is from the latest Eurobrometer, which talks about positive negative images of the EU. As you can see, the blue line, which is the positive one, has dropped. The red one, which is negative, has risen. Until now, we have effectively equal-sized groups in those two areas, and the neutrals are also turning up. This is trust. Do you trust the European Union? For the last three years, which is the first time we've had this in the long run of Eurobrometer data, we've got more people who don't trust the European Union than do trust it. Public opinion, not just in the UK, particularly in the UK, but across the board, has turned more and more against the kinds of developments that we might historically have thought were very stable. Secondly, at the level of political parties, we've now got what we might term hard and soft sceptic parties across the board. Soft parties are ones who have conditional opposition to some aspect of integration. Hard parties are those which talk about withdrawal, or something that effectively means the end of the system as we know it today. We've got the classic single-issue, pro-sovereignty, UKIP-type organisations, which I'd say are relatively rare. Apart from UKIP, there aren't really many examples of single-issue parties, and even UKIP is developing a whole second issue. Secondly, you've got the radical right, which, as we all talk about, no doubt, is seeing a resurgence across Europe, whether that's in Greece or in Hungary or in France, we see radical right parties becoming more and more successful. But it's not just of the right, it's also of the left. Usually, the more radical left parties, the former communists, some of the old school socialist parties, are not quite as sceptical as those on the first two groups, but are tending that kind of way. But also in the mainstream, in the centre of the political spectrum, usually on the right, we're seeing scepticism becoming a more common feature. Most obviously with the British Conservative Party, but also with people like, I don't know, the Italian centre left, centre right rather, who are starting to have these more conditional kind of positions towards integration. And that's also reflected in the European Parliament, which I'll come back to in a minute, where you've seen a consistent growth in the size of an anti-EU oppositional bloc ever since the middle of the 1990s. And that's a trend which I don't see changing certainly in the near future. We've got a huge range of civil society groups, interest groups, pressure groups emerging. We've got a European federation, a federation, but grouping of Eurocritical groups, which has been very effective in exchanging best practice, sharing information, sometimes resources between countries. We see governments articulating more critical and conditional positions as well. And then obviously we've also got the media coverage. Again, I think the UK is the most marked example of that, but it's also true of other countries' media that sceptical position is one which is becoming more common rather than less. So across the piece at those different levels, I think we're seeing the emergence of sceptical oppositional voices that cover a whole range of positions. And I think this is a key point, that there isn't one Euroscepticism, rather there is a range of scepticisms in operation. And that breadth is something which we can see both as a strength, but also potentially as a weakness. Now we can think about so what. I'll just dress this up in academic languages, but so what? Why should we care? There are two ways of thinking about this. First of all, we say it doesn't matter that actually because it's so diverse, because it's so heterodox, because it's so marginal, these are outside of the centre consensus that we just carry on as before and we don't really worry about them. It's gritting the system as we move on and that people are sought themselves out once they see sense. The second point of view, which is one I tend towards, is that structurally the EU is going to become ever easier to criticise. There still isn't a great appetite for major structural reform, notwithstanding Angela Merkel's comments about treaty revisions. I don't know that her coalition is going to be very big on that. So we're not going to have major structural reform. We still have a very problematic eurozone in terms of its governance, in terms of its economic performance generally. So the opportunities are simply going to multiply for saying the European Union isn't working properly or at all. So this is something that's actually going to build and build over time. Historically, what I've slightly providedly called elites have ignored those oppositional voices, that they've said here is something which is nothing to worry about and we should stick with the programme. I'd argue that this redamages the democratisation project that's been rolling ever since Maastricht. That this has been the big project of Maastricht, in effect, has been making popularising integration. A system that doesn't acknowledge the range and diversity of voices is one that's always going to struggle. The longer it is that it's left, the more likely it is that opposition, scepticism, becomes normalised. It becomes part of the furniture. That here is something which, what's always been like this, we've always been unhappy. It's going to become, potentially, have everyone the opportunity to become stronger. My argument, I think really here, is that ignoring the problem isn't going to make it go away. A few words about next year's elections. I think without doubt sceptic parties are going to have their most successful elections ever next year. The difficulty is that those sceptic parties will not be of a piece. I think we could argue that there's going to be at least four sceptical groupings that will emerge. Obviously, we've got the radical rights that in the wake of the Le Penvilders' love-in earlier in the week, that that's going to be the basis of a bloc. The radical right parties are going to do more than well enough, I think, to form a meaningful group. Sceptic parties, more broadly understand, I think are also going to do well. UKIP will have a very successful election in the UK, but you're also going to see sceptical parties across Member States securing seats here and there. Probably enough to have enough to make a replacement for the EFD group that currently exists. The difficulty for the sceptics perversely is the success of the radical right, that some of their current members might well decide that the radical right grouping is going to be a more natural home for them to be. That the EFD group is very much a flag of convenience rather than anything substantive. One member once told me that the only two things they agree about are that they don't like the European Union and that they don't have to agree about anything else. Third critical group is going to be that of the Conservatives. So the ECR group based around the British Conservative Party, potentially they will have enough to form a group. I think this is the most questionable. Already they had a real struggle to form a group last time round, but potentially they might not have enough members to form something. Again, the relationship to radical right is going to be particularly important in the relative chances of those two groups. You're also likely to have a new leftist group that will again contain those more critical voices on the left, which will be a continuation of the existing arrangements. But what will happen, what's the likely impact on European Parliament policy? I'd actually argue that it's likely to be relatively small for the reason that those first three groups that I've mentioned are unlikely to be able to work together. If we think about the three critical parties in those groups, which will be the Ffhron Nacional, the UKIP and the British Conservatives, none of them will want to work, but it certainly won't want to be in the same group as each other because politically that won't work. So will they seem to be working in concert? Maybe on some things, but I think on some others they will really struggle. So the sceptics will have a lot of MEPs, however they're organised, but whether they can form a coherent bloc I think is much more questionable. And it's also likely that if they do well, that the big three, the PSC, the PPE and Aldi, are likely to form a cordon sanitaire and find some accommodation between themselves to lock this group out. So it argues that actually the success at the level of electoral politics won't necessarily be reflected in the policy positions of the parliament as a whole. Which perversely will merely reinforce the process I've already talked about, which is that we keep these people at arm's length and we don't really engage with them. Now, I'm going to be unacademic and suggest some solutions. What might you actually engage on? I've suggested some things here that we might think about the way the EU communicates with citizens through its information strategy. We might think about specific areas such as fraud, the Eurozone crisis, other sexual policies, but also the bigger issues such as democracy, legitimacy, the whole nature of the beast. And as to how we might do that, we might think about more legislative consultation, we might think about actually getting pro and anti groups to spend some time with each other, education, getting skeptics to spend time in the commission or in national parliaments and seeing how things work, thinking about who can be honest brokers between the two sides because there's a lot of mistrust, I think, on both sides. And then more ambitiously, I think there's a need for public debate and then thinking about attitudinal change and if you want to ask me about that later, I will give you a very vague answer. So some conclusions then. Firstly, I think your skepticism is something which still is seen as very marginal. However, it is something which is embedded, it's persistent, it's not going to be going away. And potentially the consequences of that might be quite marked that the gradual erosion of the system is something which can have very negative consequences. And as such, the argument that I'd make and which I'd be happy to discuss much further is that there needs to be an engagement with your skepticism. Thank you very much.