 This session is on stranded assets. My name is Roberto Schaefer, professor from the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro in Brazil. I'm going to be your moderator today. We have five presentations. The idea is to have, let's say, 10 minutes for each presentation. And the session on total has 75 minutes. So the idea is to keep at least 20 minutes for discussions. And so let me introduce you for the first presenter, which is Alexandre Scrua, who happened to be from my institution from the Federal University of Rio. So Alexandre, you have 10 minutes to make your presentation. In fact, I just touched your presentation and it came to an end here. OK, Alexandre, the floor is yours. 10 minutes, please. So thank you, Roberto. Morning. And just to remember, good year for all. Sweetie, for today's new year for my family. I'm going to present some results of our analysis. These are results that come from a paper that we recently published. And the name of my presentation is stranded crude oil resources and refineries carbon lock-in. Why do climate ambitions, crude oil quality and refineries matter? Our major hypothesis here is to show that we have to represent the oil quality and the typology of refineries in order to have a better picture of the stranded assets. And to prove this hypothesis, we have run our integrated assessment model, our global integrated assessment model. The name of this integrated assessment model is COFI. This is a partial equilibrium integrated assessment model that runs both the food system and the energy system for 18 regions in the world. So we have a objective function that is minimize the cost for supply and the energy service for 18 regions in the world and also the food demand for the 18 regions of the world. To do that, we have the land use system representation and the energy system representation for these regions. This is our methodology, but I have to skip to go fast. This is, yeah, sorry. I can answer the questions later. These are the 18 regions represented in the model. But it's important to say that we have to run together the land use system to have the representation for the all GIG emissions, not only CO2, but also GIG emissions from deforestation and also from the agriculture and pasture activities. So I'm going to skip the results. It's important to say here. It's not so easy to read, so we're going to do that. First of all, we have run our model without expressing the oil quality and the typologies of refineries. And then we have run our model with the oil model on, switching on the oil model in order to show if it's important or not to represent the properties of the oil. It's different to see if you have the stranded resources. For example, we have crude, acid crude. The oil refiners are not all prepared to process this type of crude. So they may, they need to invest, to revamp, to have some investment in order to be prepared to process this type of crude. So by running our model, the oil model on and off, we were able to see if it is important. This is important. And it's somehow important for some regions in the world. For South America, because of the Venezuelan crude oil and also for the Canadian crude oil, this is important. These are the regions that should not produce oil because of the quality of the oil. For this remaining oil production, these are not the winner regions. But for the Middle East, because of the quality of the Middle East oil is mostly sweet oil, mostly light and medium crude oil, there is no change. In terms of climate ambition, it's important also to say that depending on the climate ambition, the stranded assets is less important than the revenue. It's not the integrated volume that can be produced, but the time that is important for the producing regions. If we have the climate ambition for the end of the century, the full history, some regions can produce more in the beginning and won't produce oil in the end of the century because of the negative emissions. We can have some backs, some frustration, compensating for this oil production in the beginning of the century. But if we have the climate ambition related to the peak temperature, so we have to reduce the production today, we have to reduce the production after the mid-center, these regions cannot produce oil. So for some regions, it's more important for the case of the oil rents, not the volume of oil that will be produced, but the time that is allowed to produce the oil. This is very important for rent-seek regions for the emerging countries. Our model shows that because of the CDR, the carbon dioxide removal options in the model, some nature-based solutions, some technological-based solutions, mostly related to backs, the model can compensate for some remaining oil production and this can allow some countries, some regions, to stay in producing the crude oil. Obviously, the oil production will vanish, but not so fastly and not so intensively as we see, for example, in the NETZERO report from the International Energy Agency because of this carbon dioxide removal option. In terms of refinery, some existing refiners will close. They are not prepared to process the remaining oil and these refiners cannot stay alive with these so tight margins for the refiners, but we need some green-field refiners. Actually, there are some hard-to-abate sectors that stay alive in this climate scenario. We need jet fuel, we need bunker fuels up to the mid-century, we need NAFTA, we need petrochemicals, so we still need oil and we still need some refiners and the choice of the model is to invest in some green-field refiners. Mostly to process medium crudes with hydrocrackers. Then we have this question. By investing in these new refiners, what about the carbon lock-in? The carbon lock-in related to these green-field refiners, these new refiners. Some refiners will close, some new refiners will be invested. Then we start a kind of study to understand if there are carbon lock-in in the refinery sector for these green-field refiners. We are using here the study of Ericsson and other authors to quantify lock-in risk associated with investments in a green-field refinery. We have here four parameters, equipment lifetime, most of the oil refiners have a long lifetime to moderate the investment. The over-committed emissions, the emissions that will stay because of this investment, some barriers related to financial. So how can we replace some oil derivatives, some oil products with other fuels, other liquid fuels, the difference of price and costs because of that? And some effects, some carbon lock-in related to the institutional barriers. Here we have the comparison between the oil refineries and other technologies, different technologies. And in yellow, we have the carbon lock-in because of these parameters, measured by these parameters, comparing refineries with other energy technologies. And as you can see for the lifetime, we have major several carbon lock-in related to refineries. For the financial barrier, depending on the oil product, the financial barrier can be higher or low. We've been talking about, for example, petrochemical NAFTA jet fuel, the financial barrier is very high. The cost of the CBCD of the alternative is most very expensive compared to the oil product. But for the fuel oil, also for the gasoline, there are other options that can be put in place. In terms of over-committed emission, for the reference scenario, there are a lot of expansion for the oil refineries. So oil refineries means an over-committed emission for the century. As final remarks, crude oil products, production and processing are complex and relevant to be overlooked by integrated assessment models. We need to express the quality of the oil and the oil refineries. Incorporating oil quality leads to regional change in oil production. This is important for the South America countries because of the quality of some crudes, the Mexican crudes, the Venezuelan crudes, but not so much for Brazil. Brazil has now a medium-sweet oil that is very, very suitable to produce jet fuel, for example, which is a very difficult fuel to be replaced. Oil quality matters affecting half-crude supply that relies on revamps of refineries. So these are the losers in terms of our model. Green-field refiners are still needed, mostly focused on hydrocrackers for medium distillates and or petrochemical naphtha. Actually it's interesting to see that we have a material model in our integrated assessment model and because of the energy transition, not only but also because of the energy transition, there is a increasing demand for petrochemicals. So the energy transition, for example, replacing the fleet of the light vehicles means you need plastic, you need propene, you need etchine, so you need petrochemicals. And the bio-materials, the synthetic materials can be an option but not for the mid-century. Carbon-locking metrics show high value for the refinery sector when compared to other sector technologies. So there are carbon-locking risks. Actually we have a challenge. We have to expand refineries in order to deal with this demand for some hard-for-bate sectors, but then we have to close refineries. So it's a kind of challenge. Adaptation strategies for existing refineries exist. There are some technological options for refineries, for example, co-processing and also integrating refineries with petrochemicals. So there are some strategies that can be put in place as of today, mostly to transform oil refineries as energy refineries, incorporating other feedstocks for petroleum refineries in order to have a smoothing carbon-locking. Thank you, thank you all. So we wanted to assess the stranded asset case in the coal sector and in particular coal export projects. As you might know, there are still, and if you've read the production gap report, you know there are a lot of projects still in underdevelopment. And one famous one is the, or one famous so far rather untapped basin is the Galilei basin in Australia. And we've looked at that particular case and looking at the Carmichael mine in the Galilei basin. So we wanted to know if we assess that from an economic point of view, is there a case for the investment in this mine under different scenarios, obviously? Or can we somehow consider the stranded asset risk? So we've done rather a model setup with a coal sector model of the global coal market. And we've built a couple of long-run scenarios with a particular focus on coal consuming countries that import most of the Australian coal. So that's China and South Korea, Taiwan, Japan mostly. And then we've added another note for the Galilei basin, which so the model can then decide to invest or not. Here briefly, the major Australian coal basins and so what's there in greenish and then the purple blue, that's like what's already producing and existing. And what would be added is the Galilei basin and the Carmichael mine just to get an overview. So what you already see, most of that is rather close to the coast. It's all developed, so there's infrastructure to get coal to the ports, et cetera, to ship off to the Asian market. Not so much or it's not the case for the Galilei basin or it was not the case. I'll come back to that in a second as the Carmichael mine actually started to produce some coal already. But so we are kind of before that happened or blending that out for a moment. So briefly, the model just showing an overview. The model kind of represents about 90 to 95% of steam coal production consumption. So that's thermal coal excluding lignite, which is not transported over large distances. It's a partial equilibrium setup, profit, maximizing exporters and producers, which endogenously decide to invest in new capacities or not. And on the other hand, capacities deplete over time due to like factors of lifetime and remaining reserves. And now the Galilei basin is added as a new node without production capacity and the model can decide invest or not depending on this profit maximizing scheme. And briefly the scenarios. So we came up with scenarios based on coal plant level data, coal plant data provided by a global energy monitor. And we decided to rather come up with our own scenarios there to have more details on like actual consumers of that steam coal. So in the high demand scenario, we take this kind of conservative approach. Coal plants run for about 40 years. Average capacity factors just continue and stay around 50%. And a moderate decline that's kind of like a Glasgow style scenario for the coal sector. And then we have a 1.5 degree scenario based on IPCC numbers. So yeah, if you have later questions maybe afterwards. So a brief overview on the global results and you see also in the high demand scenario, that might be the interesting thing that also their coal production and consumption declines. If you're familiar with the coal sector, it's nothing new, but China and India, that's like where most of the things happen, right? So they make up most of the consumption side there and it's only some minor shifts there. But the concentration of all coal consumption but also production is mostly in that Asian region. And now the interesting part of the results. So we've run that and we used the cost estimate ranges of all the data we found through the Carmichael mine. And we used only the most optimistic bottom estimates for costs and investment costs. And we still don't see any investment in the Galilei basin. One reason is that overall demand is so low. In other Australian regions, we also only see minor replacement investments of coal mines. So even in the high demand scenario, only minor investments in replacements in Queensland and New South Wales. So maybe also relevant for other regions than the Galilei basin. And these results for the Galilei basin are robust to another additional decrease of cost estimates by 25% only if we then decrease even lower. We have some initial investment. So I already said demand is declining. That's Australian domestic demand. But Galilei basin was meant and is meant to produce coal for export. So the Carmichael mine is apparently owned by the Adani. It was supposed to deliver coal to India and ensure supply for India. Interestingly from our model, actually none of that coal from Australia would end up in India because India is supplied else by South Africa and etc. So Australian coal would mostly go to the Chinese market. Of course that's cost optimal and profit maximizing. Politically it's then in the end of course something else often but just an impression. Interesting for the Australian case in general, exports in general decrease. So even in the high demand scenario and that is of course now we have a different situation but we have to keep in mind this is a model that goes up to 2050. That results have shown it models until 2060 and it looks at five year time steps. So if we think about those long run investments, of course it's now everyone is talking about well actually it's a very fortunate for the Carmichael mine that it already started production because now it can profit from the high prices. The other question is will it ever recover any of major part of the initial investment? Because to look at that case we've done some sensitivity analysis also based on comments from this crowd. Looking at the sunk investment case, we see that if so that set up just the model can start to produce without having any investment cost in an initial 10 megaton, 10 million ton per annum capacity or 60 so we did both of that. We see that in a high demand scenario, yes that is used. However, if we already start to go in a direction of a moderate decline scenario even this for free capacity is not used all the way up. So even now we have to consider to continue investing in making what's already there accessible or just skip that right away. No use of it in a 1.5 degree scenario. Coming to a couple final remarks, particularly for that basin it's a poor coal quality, a lot of investment in new infrastructure that's needed to get the coal out of there. Very limited and un-security demand, especially over the long run. So substantial risk of stranding those assets. No security at all to recover all the money that's went in there already. And on a global perspective kind of taking the global view there, we see that only if like we see some limited additional investment still in a high demand scenario but there's so much coal producing capacity out there already that if we go into a classical direction no more additional coal mining capacity is needed. So the risk here from that perspective is particularly high also for producers like South Africa, Colombia, Australia, Indonesia that would invest in additional capacities for exports. Particularly as we see policies and incentives in China and India to reduce or to increase their sufficiency of domestic coal supply. So yeah, thank you, I'll stop there. Okay, good morning everyone. Thank you very much for having me. So I'm Steve Pie from University College London. Actually it was meant to be Adrian Boat-Chill from the Inter-American Development Bank presenting. So if you've come to Oxford wishing to see him I'm afraid it's me. But I will do my very best to sort of portray the sort of key messages that he wanted to say and also to say that this is very much a study that UCL was involved in for the Inter-American Development Bank. But I mean the basis of the study was to look at how natural gas reserves and fiscal revenues would play out under sort of more stringent climate policy using a modelling approach. And it follows from a study we also did on oil a couple of years ago but this one's on gas. Right. Okay, so key thing is natural gas is extremely important for the region. It accounts for at least 25% of energy consumption. Really important particularly for the power sector and we've seen that recently with gas coming in to fill the gap that hydropower has left with some recent drought years particularly in Brazil. So really important energy source for power generation. But also an important energy type in terms of government revenues. So it has a sort of large fiscal impact particularly for selected countries. So not in the aggregate like oil does but particularly for certain countries like Bolivia, Trinidad and Tobago and Argentina to some extent. Government revenues from this sector are particularly important. So what we wanted to do was to basically look at the risks to investments and revenues from both climate policy coming in but also significant cost reductions across different technologies particularly renewable energy technologies. So just a bit more context on terms of gas producers in Latin America and Caribbean. So gas production is shown here. You could see a sort of peak in 2015 and then something of a decline to 2021. But with an overall gas production being quite a significantly lower than oil something like three times lower. But particularly big producers like Argentina and moving towards the unconventionals and also Trinidad and Tobago which has a large export economy through LNG. And then some of the other big oil producers like Brazil, Mexico, Venezuela a lot of gas particularly coming from associated gas from that oil production. But that gives you a sort of sense of what the sort of natural gas picture looks like in the region. So yeah so what we were trying to do was to look at prospects for natural gas production and consumption and the associated revenues from that under emerging climate regimes in LAC. I'm going to use the short form for Latin American Caribbean. And how we did this was we used a scenario framework called XLRM which many of you are probably familiar with from the RAND Corporation particularly well described in Lempert's book in 2003. But the idea is that we're looking at performance metrics on the right-hand side. So in this instance we're interested in gas production and tax revenues. And to do that we use a model or a number of models but the main model is a model called GAPTAP and I should say that the modeling here is very much the work of my colleague Dan Wellesby who developed that model as part of his PhD. And we're interested in what external factors at the bottom mean for these performance metrics. So climate policy and the impact on demand in particular. But also policy levers so what can government do in terms of fiscal regimes to sort of continue that production going forward. I mean can fiscal regimes be made more attractive and advantageous to keep production in play. Okay just something very briefly on the modeling. So GAPTAP is the primary model used in the analysis. It's a geological and economic model of the global natural gas resources at a field level. Looking at the range of factors that have impact the sort of project economics using kind of NPV type type analysis but accounting for fiscal regimes as well. So the way it works is something like contracts long term contracts get fulfilled domestic producers then look after their own domestic demand and then a spot market comes into play to meet the residual demand. And from that we get a regional price formation and we get some regional production level at the country level. There's a couple of other inputs into this framework so we need a regional demand to feed the model and that comes from an integrated assessment model called TMUCL which gives us that regional demand level. And also we need to know something about associated gas contribution from oil production so we use we use some model called WAGO which is run using similar scenarios and I should name drop here but the creation of Christoph McClade when he did his PhD. So we're all working in a very tight network here. So that's kind of the sort of modeling framework that we used for this analysis. Just to show you something of the production on the left-hand side in the consumption that comes out of the TMUCL model. No surprises here but you can see the blue trend line show the below two degrees Celsius production and consumption whereas the red and black lines look at NDC in reference type scenarios. So you can see that obviously stringent climate policy obviously has an impact both on production and consumption in the region and it's interesting also to say that gas production doesn't exceed consumption significantly. I mean there's not a lot of exports going outside of the region and a limited amount of imports through LNG and pipelines into Mexico. So that's the kind of general basic overview of the sort of integrated assessment modeling results that are feeding in and then we can look at some of the sort of country-level projections from the GAPTUP model out to 2035 so just some selected countries here Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, Mexico, hopefully you remember the colours but red and black are the sort of NDC reference case and blue and green are the sort of climate policy cases and you can see at the country level that obviously there's quite a spread particularly for Argentina and that sort of reflects the sort of weather in terms of how fast those sort of unconventionals get exploited in that country. The Brazil and Venezuela and Mexico cases are to some extent a factor in the sort of oil production profile as well but I mean the key point of this was to show the sort of difference in terms of production levels at the country level under climate policy and under reducing technology costs. One of the things that came out which is also interesting was that particularly in the climate policy cases you can't see a lot of variation between the trend lines there and that shows the limited impact of changing tax rates or changing the fiscal regime in those countries because of the tightness of the climate policy constraint that was in play. Another sort of key conclusion of the analysis was that cumulative revenue take across the region was between 25 to 100 billion up to the period of 2035 excluding Venezuela for certain reasons that skewed the analysis. Basically with the climate policy in play this revenue base drops considerably so it's at the lower end of that 25 to 100 billion dollar number. The other thing to say is that we also looked at unextractable reserves which vary significantly under a 2 degrees C scenario so that's what this table shows the various ranges of unburnable reserves using a 3P reserve categorization. You can see that some countries it's relatively robust so for Trinidad and Tobago it's an unextractable reserve number of 7 to 8 percent whereas for some of the other major producers it's a lot higher but the regional range is between the 40 to 50 percent of unextractable reserves for the region. As I see I'm getting beyond 10 minutes a quick summary of some of the key points that came out that the Inter-American Development Bank were very interested in so governments should not bet on revenues from gas or oil based on our previous analysis due to strengthening climate policy but also technology shifts in terms of cost reductions. Sporting gas except for those already in the game is not a cost effective strategy that can maintain gas production under those climate policy constraints. There's no real evidence that gas in terms of our analysis can be used as a transition fuel under ambitious climate policy but it's interesting to look at the current reality which sees gas coming through as a key source of electricity generation in the absence of strong investment in renewables. Also finance energy and environment ministry so this is a key thing for the bank need to work together to bring a just transition through internal things like internalizing risks in tax regimes but also aligning investments to that longer term net zero goal. And also finally international funders who may be more inclined to support gas also need to start orientating support towards renewable energy projects and grid capacity. Okay just to say there's some additional information there at the end for more deeper reading of the topic but thank you very much. Okay good morning I'm Sara from the King Abdullah Petroleum Studies and Research Center based in Riyadh and this morning I have the tedious task of presenting a review paper which is based on a collection of modeling papers. So this is a paper that I have been working on with my previous colleague Aisha who is now with the Middle East Institute in Singapore and we try to answer basically two questions. The first one is how much cost for the probably the most focal and one of the most important regions for the energy transition which is the Middle East oil exporters and second what to do in case things get really serious and the transition is moving fast. So as you know this topic have been there for the last three decades since the first treaty of the UNFCCC which is recognizing the unique situation of fossil fuel producers and exporters and the fact that the transition should be global and that no one should be left behind and we have to consider all national circumstances up to the latest IPCC report again highlighting the risk of a transition for these countries. This is in a snapshot why it seems as a factor of risk for the oil exporters in the Middle East basically it's the share in GDP and share in revenue, in export revenue and another aspect which is linked also to the stranded asset question that is the purpose of the session and was discussed previously is the amount of reserves that these countries hold and especially the horizon over which they can keep producing oil in terms to sustain their development. So they have to solve for a tricky question which is how to meet the local or domestic climate pledges while at the same time sustaining and keeping driving a significant rent which is important to continue their development. The factor of risk comes basically from the important regions of this fuel, China, Europe, India, Japan, South Korea and the United States which are the biggest markets or the biggest buyers of the Middle East oil. If they embark on their transition we estimate that around 40 percent there would be around 40 percent cut in oil imports coming from the Middle East oil exporters towards these countries. So we have conducted a review to bridge this gap a lot of the literature that is available focuses on global models with a regional breakdown that is not really taken into consideration the national context. So we have conducted this review to see what are the elements of discrepancy across these modeling frameworks and how to estimate the losses for the Middle East oil exporters and what is the quantity or what is the risk or the cost for these countries and finally what to do, what are the strategies that these countries can adopt in order to also embark in a sustainable future. So this is basically an extensive review of the papers that we have reviewed including two that I have provided recently and were published recently for Saudi Arabia most of the literature focuses on global models and the regional breakdown. I will move directly to the conclusions of these papers. The estimates range between 1 and 4% of GDP in terms of economic losses for the Middle East oil exporters. This is the first key message. The second key message is that across all the models that we have reviewed most of them conclude that the Middle East exporters will bear the highest cost across all the other natures. So this is an important factor that should be considered and linked also to the question of equity and the question of just transition and the question of stranded assets. Another thing is that models are models so you have to account for a lot of mythological approach, the assumptions that are used, the framework the regional breakdown that is considered for these papers and this is the key or the main factor of difference of divergence across these results that we have reviewed. Interestingly two or three papers actually conclude quite old but the outcome is really interesting and worth highlighting is that two or three actually find that the opaque countries might end up gaining rather than losing if we embark in a fast transition because they are first in the cost curve we will still need significant amounts of fossil fuel and of oil and gas which can lead to an overshoot in terms of prices there will be still volatility but the prices will be higher than in a normal transition which is will be orderly synchronized across all countries which will lead to a high revenue for these countries rather than losses compared to a strange climate policy scenario. Now we move to the second part which is what to do. There are basically a few key instruments or few tools that these countries might adopt in case to mitigate the losses on their economies. The problem is that for each one of these tools you have a certain range of challenges. They come with pros and cons and for most of them the cons factors are much more or have much more or a higher weight than the pros one. Of course you have exchanges of experiences basically it's just deriving what other countries adopted and try to implement them in the Middle East context which is basically we cite often as the Norway experience which cannot be basically translated or duplicated in the Middle East context. The second one is to have a unilateral action which means just to implement our own policies and just not to withdraw but to not provide or give big attention to what's going on in other countries. The third one is the quota agreement across the Middle East oil exporters which is again hard to enforce and the recent or the history of the topic have proven that. The price war is not something that everyone is willing to take and a lot of countries might end up losing given that they have small amounts of reserves, small amounts of production, small amounts of exports compared to the rest of countries. Requesting financial compensation is extremely hard to get especially for these countries and most of the indices that were submitted recently the one for Saudi Arabia for example clearly mentions that it is not conditional to receiving financial compensation. Economic diversification is the key highlights or the ultimate strategy to adopt and this one is the one that I will focus on in the next slide. So in the next slide here I'm providing just a highlight about economic diversification and how it is hard to implement and how it is hard to quantify. It is often cited as probably the best option for these countries that is a wide agreement in the literature regarding that but finally we found few case studies that are centered on specific countries we have conducted recently an analysis for Saudi Arabia showing how economic diversification can be implemented and what can be achieved in order to offset the risk of low oil price that will be generated through lower demand caused by the implementation of a stringent climate policy. There is another attempt for Kuwait as well which highlights also the role of economic diversification including some policy tools or policy instruments such as reforming domestic energy prices in the case of Kuwait. Moving forward we have identified four key research avenues. The first one is the regional breakdown. All of what have been presented before except few studies are global integrated models with a regional breakdown but once we start digging into the national context the results can very significantly across countries even within the same region such as the case of the Middle East countries. The second one is we need to update and account for more stringent climate pledges including accounting for net zero scenarios in many of the oil importing countries. Third is we don't have to be really limited to a certain set of policies or tools we have to consider all potential frameworks including a higher role of carbon capture and storage which is mentioned in the this is my ten minutes it's not it's the last time. Such as the framework that was presented and adopted recently considering the concept of the circular carbon economy which accounts for the national circumstances of oil exporting countries. The third one or the fourth one is to account for higher role of technology and finance so those are the key two gap in terms of analyzing the cost of transition for these countries there is a huge gap missing in analyzing the role of technology upgrading technology and the role of finance which mostly focused for these two tools on developed countries rather than developing and emerging countries especially for oil exporters. That's it. Thank you. Thank you very much Salah. Well we have some 22-23 minutes left so let's open for questions now. I would like to ask you to be short in your questions so that you can have more questions being raised and respond. You can go first please. Thank you. I have a question for Steve. I think this is really fascinating work. Thank you. Can you hear me? Yes. I have a question for Steve. So my question is in the past as well you've found this research on how how much of those fossil fuel reserves have to stay in the ground and where and my question to you is with this type of research do you reach policy makers, politicians, governments in those countries where you say that some amount of fossil fuel reserves have to remain in the ground and what are their reactions to this? Because you were talking about Trinidad and Tobago for example they have to leave 8% of their gas reserves in the ground. If you go to the government there how would they respond to that? Yes sorry Steve Yes, let's be fast and then we can move and then I move to you. Mathieu, thank you very much for the question. I mean to be honest I haven't been involved in those discussions but I think it's a really interesting question and what is interesting about the analysis is this kind of diversity in terms of what countries and the ranges or how they're impacted essentially in terms of the sort of range that so-called has to stay in the ground. Yeah I mean Trinidad and Tobago I'm sure they'll be quite happy with the results but yeah I mean I think it's an interesting starting point for a discussion just to particularly at the regional level to sort of start to sort of open up those questions about you know what does the dependency look like on this industry and how might this play out in the future you know is it going to be a climate policy focus future or is it going to be one that is on a sort of NDC trajectory but I think showing that level of uncertainty showing what the impact could be I think is a useful starting point but to be honest I don't know how it's landed and that's where Adrian would have been a better panelist than me but yeah thank you for the question Thank you, very brief and then we have five questions already and then we're going to stop Just to say something from someone from Brazil and from South America maybe I think there are two major responses for your question some governments will try to anticipate the rent so to anticipate the production or the auctioning for the blocks I don't know Trinidad and Tobago but Brazil and other countries maybe they will anticipate it's not the question of the volume but to anticipate the revenues is a kind of green paradox and maybe other countries will also these are another possibility another alternative they will pledge for some criteria for allocation criteria some equity criteria so they will pledge that they may be allowed to produce more oil and gas because they will they have to have this revenue so I think there are two responses in the region for that Thank you Alessandro you and then we have three on the front here please go ahead with your questions Thank you very much for also Australia National University question for Salaheddin I think you said your review shows GDP cost of three to four percent in that region I would put to you just as a proposition that that's actually quite moderate for the fundamental restructuring of the resource sector of oil rich countries and that perhaps the emphasis should be on how to compensate that through productivity gains in fact economic diversification and perhaps we can see three to four percent GDP cost as somewhat good news if that's in fact what the research shows Yes please go ahead Thank you just to address this Very briefly yeah one to four might might seem quite moderate but this is due to two factors using the real GDP is a quite rigid major once we move to the exports or the rent itself the percentage change is quite higher than this and second it's again due to this aggregation of all the countries into one region and we do not account for the variety and a cost is a cost and it should be perceived as such and of course there are many ways to mitigate the losses and this is the second part and the most exciting and most challenging part of our work is to look for solutions that will not harm the exporters and the importers Thank you Salah we have three questions here in the front one yeah you first and then here in the front and let's see then if we have time please go ahead Thank you very much Brendan Devin from the European Commission I've actually done what you asked gone to states and said you need to keep things in the ground and we have had some reactions not not for public use yet but I wanted to challenge you on some of the fundamental terms that you use because for example Salah Di uses the phrase that keeping things in the ground and meeting climate targets is classified as an economic loss that's a rather strange use of terms for something which has planetary significance and also in using the word stranded asset I think you rather presuppose the case for getting these things out the ground stranded asset is used by energy companies to the European Commission as foregone profits and all of these terms lead through in general ways to legal challenges under for example the energy charter treaty and in other ways to these claims that the European Union or the Paris Agreement states are somehow taking things which are properly the property of countries when in fact we are just doing something to maintain planetary stability so I would ask the all the panel could you think of some other terms to use which does not presuppose that we're going to wreck the planet thank you for the questions I know who and they start Steve do you like to start just because I saw you taking some notes I saw you preparing yourself for that yeah I think it's a good point I mean I'm slightly uncomfortable with the term stranded asset and I can't remember how many times I used it in the presentation but I mean what we're looking at is projections of what the reserve value might be going forward under a range of different scenarios and I think for the purposes of that it's a useful exercise just to highlight the point that governments you know basically can't bank on having those reserves going forward and the revenues that flow from them so I don't know if prospective stranded value might be a better terminology I don't know but no value thank you very briefly on the use of stranded assets I remember that we had this discussion with Christophe several years ago when he first presented a version of his paper and basically there is no consensus still on the use and what is the best approach to look at stranded assets on the use of the term loss I still believe that this is more or less an accurate term especially for if we take into account the national circumstances this is again compared to a business as usual or a reference scenario that's why we refer to this as potential losses but foregone revenue is a term that I personally prefer and they tend to use rather than losses but in comparing two business plans one with generating higher sales or higher rent and one with a lower rent this is a potential loss for these countries thank you Alessandro that was a tough question I fully agree with you when you talk about resources because actually they are in ground the best word is unburnable resources that was used for Steve and we tried to use it too but for the case of the assets for the refiners for example I think we have a strong message for the financial sector by using stranded assets we have this experience for example in Brazil talking to the financial sector in Brazil and the stranded assets is a strong message to not finance the type of investment of companies so I think the stranded assets for the companies and for the financial sector is a strong message Christian thank you very much for that question it's great we had that discussion a lot and I was very hesitant to call also especially in the coal sector stranded assets and another work that's kind of related to that in the coal sector now we see kind of not recovered overnight investment costs for infrastructure is one thing and that's rather small compared to socioeconomic effects and the risk of unstructured transition so it's really if we target maybe a peer group going towards investments something like investment risk or something so it's a risk for investors if they continue investing that but it's not a claim that it should be compensated because we know since 50 years so since the 70s it's out so who still continues to invest I mean they have to consider that risk but then a reframing in the other end towards politicians should be going towards what's actually the risk for society if we continue to stick to that model and then have chaotic changes happening once maybe global north is not importing as much oil or coal anymore and then local communities are left to whatever is left but no revenues thanks we have 10 minutes left so let me collect the truth questions here on the front and then if I have time we go back here on the front please let's see if we can get there this side here I think we have okay thank you my name is Max Amar from Lone University I have a question to Saladin I agree that economic diversification is perhaps I mean the one road to go for these oil producing producer economies but economic diversification also usually comes with quite big political risks if you're going to do it do you have any comments of that actually might be a more difficult problem than the loss of income and rent actually the political tensions in these countries let's collect the next next question please and then you go here yeah so this is for Alexander and I was thinking about how changing of the refinery output portfolio changes sort of the costs so if you reduce the demand for road transport fuels for example then I'm thinking that a larger share of the cost of oil will have to be covered by the remainder of the products of petrochemicals and stuff like that have you looked at sort of what how this changing in the oil market and refinery portfolio changes the cost of the fine products thank you was that my question so my question was then also in terms of a lot of what we're talking about here is about policy action and it builds on the question around losses from policy action actually if we look at the energy transition becoming more inevitable from the role of new technology in the role out of new technology sources would you still use the same kind of loss phrases and sort of look for recompense if you like from the wider community where in fact it's coming increasingly technology driven so I suppose that was just kind of quite a broad question thank you let's go to response and then if we have time we collect more questions please I think the first one here was to Sara, Sara you have two questions and then Alicia one thank you very much about the policy tools or policy side of this I unfortunately do not have a clear answer coming from a more or less purely quantitative background but we try to capture this in our models through the fiscal reforms, energy prices reforms, energy efficiency measures and this is purely directed in a modeling framework but we do provide some insights based on international experiences on how to move with subsidies, removal with the taxation reforms and basically we argue that this is the best way to go if we would like to be not completely independent but lower our reliance on fossil fuel which if we have that perception it will be perceived as loss rather than opportunity for transition so we do touch upon some of the policy instruments but we do not go that deep in our analysis unfortunately how can you go directly to your second question yeah so the second question is regarding technology right? yeah I mean it's basically rather looking for a more positive perspective rather than loss would you more say we would start submitting these to other people to start looking to also have a more forward or other actual vehicle manufacturers as an example yes so as I said previously the question of composition is quite tricky and from an oil expert perspective this is something that we believe is really hard to enforce and as I mentioned previously it's clearly stated in the national climate policy program that it's not conditional to receiving international finance but rather into receiving help and assistance in implementing technological tools we have CCS green hydrogen as very important and key pillars to support our national transition so those are two key factors that we are focusing on and of course they are technology technology heavy and in the kingdom there is now one of the largest green hydrogen sites that will be coming online I think within the next few years as well as probably two or three of the largest CCS plants which will help support the transition of the kingdom as a global oil supplier and a key actor in terms of advancing the climate policy agenda I think we need to see the least cost optimization results with some caution it shows a trend but actually for these ambitious scenarios for these climate ambitious scenarios oil prices are moderate so we have a challenging situation because we need to invest in some oil refineries in the retrofit of some oil refineries or in the repopers of some oil refineries but with moderate oil prices I think now we have an interesting situation as of today because the refineries margins are very high I don't know if you know that but refineries margins as of today because of Russian invasion of Ukraine and also the recovery after Covid the refineries margins are 40 dollars per barrel very high in the history of the refineries these are very very very high but there are no investments as of today no big no large investments as of today in green fuel refineries only 2 million barrels per day and 1 million barrels per day of green fuel refineries integrated with petrochemical in China and these other major refineries in Nigeria that is being somehow delayed this means that the transition and the fear of stranded assets that is delaying the investment in oil refineries is already impacting the investment in oil refineries there are no major investments so the result of our model is a very challenge result because we need some fuel investment but the margin will be low and this means that maybe there are possibilities of a chemical transition some price volatility related to some fuels that are needed during the transition and then that are hardly replaced after that fuel as I told you before and also diesel maybe diesel too we have time for two more questions so one here one there and the lady there you should have higher hands so let's start with you and that's it my question is for Alexandra my name is Kathy Harris and I'm from the University of British Columbia I am particularly interested in hearing more about the division between Canada and the US which would lump together but maybe that's something for offline one of the things I'm also struck by is the role of investments in CCF especially for some of the high carbon intensive oils when you're modeling it how do you take into account the fact that governments are now significantly subsidizing that and thus making some of those lower quality crude oils more price competitive than they would be otherwise thank you then let me collect your question here here on the front just raise your hand so that he can see where you are thanks I'm very happy to see the engaged discussion with Salah because at a previous conference I said let's get more people from the Middle East here and so I have another question for you and that is I like the way how you look at both sides you know the pros and the cons and I'm wondering in the sense of the reframing that Brendan called for if we call these things risky bets you bet on something you invest money and you may get a return on it there also there is a benefit in earning money but there is also a downside and those are the climate costs you know there is death and damage associated with fossil fuels and colleagues have quantified that you may have seen the cost of carbon which means for each 4400 tons of carbon you get one that human being and the climate costs it's about 420 dollars per ton and that translates into 175 dollars of damages per barrel of oil so those are distributed around the world but in Saudi Arabia it's 20 so for each barrel of oil that you extract you get 20 damages in Saudi Arabia over the course of the century so I wonder if you have been looking at these downsides we've also had the news of 5 degrees warming in the region over the course of the century which will I'm sure be very hard to bear so I'm wondering whether these climate damages are you're also putting them on the scale in the models maybe costing them in and if that changes the picture thank you Anthony I think we have one final question somewhere in here oh yes and that's done and then we move to the presenters thank you Patrizio Cayas from SEI Latin America I was just wondering about your perspectives on reserve ownership because especially with the Middle East and Latin America a lot of the policy outputs that we would like would be aimed at national governments but in other regions by national governments especially Trinidad and Tobago when you talk about Trinidad and Tobago exporting is actually shell exporting out of Trinidad and Tobago so I mean governments own most of the conventional resources or not marginal resources probably lower cost and stuff like that so I was wondering whether making a distinction between the kind of oil that's likely to continue to be produced by state owned enterprises that challenge the international owned companies and majors that have very clear avenues and might just shut up production rather quickly in these regions thank you so let's go to Alessandro first and then for the final question I know who wants to answer Alessandro so thank you for the question and I'm sorry for putting together USA and Canada actually we have results for both countries because of all there is the possibility for CCS in the oil production actually Brazil is already doing CCS in the case of the Brazilian oil production offshore because of the CO2 in the natural gas associated production but I show you the results for a scenario related to the 1.5 degree therefore I think there is no space more for the CCS in the half crude production because of the price first of all we have a moderate oil price so for this moderate oil price the cost of the CCS will impact the competitiveness of these half crudes so this is a major problem and also if you have these half crudes going to refineries you have to revamp the refineries investing in existing refineries but the refineries are some of the refineries are stranded assets so in our results for the 1.5 degree scenario CCS goes to the biomass conversion we need some negative emissions so there are some CCS for example in the ethanol production this is a easily captured CO2 the fermentation of the glucose so this is easily captured and there are some CCS in terms of advanced biofuel production so fisiotroppers, synthesis and so on but this comes because we need negative emissions for compensating the emissions that are still existing because of some fossil fuel production thank you Alessani thank you that's a very good question and of course it's a risky bet as you know the Middle East is one of the regions that would be hardly hit by extreme weather in case we advance in the climate, unfortunately climate change but again this is a risky bet from a purely business perspective if we look at it also from a social perspective and this is an excellent point that was raised, social considerations should be also should be also considered one of the key issues is of course current emission levels but also historical emissions but now moving forward we can focus on solutions and one of the optimal solutions is to expand on CCS it will strike the right balance between the interests of consumers and the interests of producers and exporters and I don't think we're doing pretty well in terms of expanding on the solutions side rather than just pointing what is the problem CCS and hydrogen can be really a big breakthrough in having all these spectrum covered social, economic just transition, equity and so on so I think that rather than having a pure focus on perceiving things as a risky bet we can focus on solutions and what could be the key enablers to protect the interests of everyone not only the energy consumers but also the energy producers and exporters Thank you Ala Ana-Reef, Steve or Kristen want to address the final question Sure, no I can go for that I think it's a great point in terms of ownership on reserves and I think quite useful actually to make decisions between NOCs and IOCs due to the different strategies that might be in play certainly the modelling we did we do have the ability to make those distinctions and pull those out I think it would be interesting to do that and then to think about the different incentives or disincentives that are needed across those two quite distinctive sets of owners Thanks Steve, Kristen do you want to say something? You don't need to Well, I'm not an expert on oil but it's certainly I guess for all fossil fuels one question about the reserves it might be also if you look at it the other way around in the coal sector you don't have a lot of reserves private hands in that sense which might make it easier if governments are committed to keeping those reserves in the ground it's really not much about compensating private companies that have earned the right somehow to extract already so as one leverage point maybe in the coal sector to look at Thanks Kristen, so with that we end the session here, thank you very much for all the presenters, all questions and we are six minutes late but I did that on purpose so to avoid crowding too much of the line for the food so now I think everything is going good Thank you very much