 FILE 41 OF A TREATUS OF HUMAN NATURE by David Hume, Volume 2 This LibriVox recording is in the public domain, recording by George Yeager. Book 3 of Morals Part 2 of Justice and Injustice Section 5 of the Obligation of Promises At the rule of morality, which enjoins the performance of promises is not natural, will sufficiently appear from these two propositions which I proceed to prove, that is, that a promise would not be intelligible before human conventions had established it, and that even if it were intelligible, it would not be attended with any moral obligation. I say first that a promise is not intelligible naturally, nor antecedent to human conventions, and that a man unacquainted with society could never enter into any engagements with another, even though they could perceive each other's thoughts by intuition. If promises be natural and intelligible, there must be some act of the mind attending these words, I promise, and on this act of the mind must the obligation depend. Let us therefore run over all the faculties of the soul and see which of them is exerted in our promises. The act of the mind expressed by a promise is not a resolution to perform anything, for that alone never imposes any obligation, nor is it a desire of such a performance, for we may bind ourselves without such a desire, or even with an aversion declared and avowed. Neither is it the willing of that action which we promise to perform, for a promise always regards some future time, and the will has an influence only on present actions. It follows therefore that since the act of the mind which enters into a promise and produces its obligation is neither the resolving, desiring, nor willing any particular performance, and must necessarily be the willing of that obligation which arises from the promise. Nor is this only a conclusion of philosophy, but is entirely conformable to our common ways of thinking and of expressing ourselves when we say that we are bound by our own consent and that the obligation arises from our mere will and pleasure. The only question then is whether there be not a manifest absurdity in supposing this act of the mind and such an absurdity as no man could fall into whose ideas are not confounded with prejudice and the fallacious use of language. All morality depends upon our sentiments, and when any action or quality of the mind pleases us after a certain manner, we say it is virtuous, and when the neglect or non-performance of it displeases us after a like manner, we say that we lie under an obligation to perform it. A change of the obligation supposes a change of the sentiment, and a creation of a new obligation supposes some new sentiment to arise. But it is certain we can naturally no more change our own sentiments than the motions of the heavens, nor by a single act of our will, that is, by a promise, render any action agreeable or disagreeable, moral or immoral, which without that act would have produced contrary impressions or have been endowed with different qualities. It would be absurd, therefore, to will any new obligation, that is, any new sentiment of pain or pleasure, nor is it possible that men could naturally fall into so gross an absurdity. A promise, therefore, is naturally something altogether unintelligible, nor is there any act of the mind belonging to it. Good note 21. Were morality discoverable by reason and not by sentiment, it would be still more evident that promises could make no alteration upon it. Morality is supposed to consist in relation. Every new imposition of morality, therefore, must arise from some new relation of objects, and consequently the will could not produce immediately any change in morals, but could have that effect only by producing a change upon the objects. But as the moral obligation of a promise is the pure effect of the will without the least change in any part of the universe, it follows that promises have no natural obligation. Could it be said that this act of the will, being in effect a new object, produces new relations and new duties? I would answer that this is a pure sophism, which may be detected by a very moderate share of accuracy and exactness. To will a new obligation is to will a new relation of objects, and therefore if this new relation of objects were formed by the volition itself, we should in effect will the volition, which is plainly absurd and impossible. The will has here no object to which it could tend, but must return upon itself in infinitum. The new obligation depends upon new relations. The new relations depend upon a new volition. The new volition has for object a new obligation, and consequently new relations and consequently a new volition, which volition again has in view a new obligation, relation and volition without any termination. It is impossible, therefore, we could ever will a new obligation, and consequently it is impossible the will could ever accompany a promise or produce a new obligation of morality. End of footnote 21. But secondly, if there was any act of the mind belonging to it, it could not naturally produce any obligation. This appears evidently from the foregoing reasoning. A promise creates a new obligation. A new obligation supposes new sentiments to arise. The will never creates new sentiments. There could not naturally, therefore, arise any obligation from a promise, even supposing the mind could fall into the absurdity of willing that obligation. The same truth may be proved still more evidently by that reasoning which proved justice in general to be an artificial virtue. No action can be required of us as our duty unless there be implanted in human nature some actuating passion or motive capable of producing the action. This motive cannot be the sense of duty. A sense of duty supposes an antecedent obligation. And where an action is not required by any natural passion, it cannot be required by any natural obligation, since it may be omitted without proving any defect or imperfection in the mind and temper, and consequently without any vice. Now it is evident we have no motive leading us to the performance of promises distinct from a sense of duty. If we thought that promises had no moral obligation, we never should feel any inclination to observe them. This is not the case with the natural virtues. Though there was no obligation to relieve the miserable, our humanity would lead us to it, and when we omit that duty, the immorality of the omission arises from its being a proof that we want the natural sentiments of humanity. A father knows it to be his duty to take care of his children, but he has also a natural inclination to it. And if no human creature had that inclination, no one could lie under any such obligation. But as there is naturally no inclination to observe promises distinct from a sense of their obligation, it follows that fidelity is no natural virtue and that promises have no force antecedent to human conventions. If anyone dissent from this, he must give a regular proof of these two propositions, that is, that there is a peculiar act of the mind annexed to promises, and that consequent to this act of the mind, there arises an inclination to perform distinct from a sense of duty. I presume that it is impossible to prove either of these two points, and therefore I venture to conclude that promises are human inventions founded on the necessities and interests of society. In order to discover these necessities and interests, we must consider the same qualities of human nature which we have already found to give rise to the preceding laws of society. When being naturally selfish or endowed only with a confined generosity, they are not easily induced to perform any action for the interests of strangers except with a view to some reciprocal advantage which they had no hope of obtaining but by such a performance. Now as it frequently happens that these mutual performances cannot be finished at the same instant, it is necessary that one party be contented to remain in uncertainty and depend upon the gratitude of the other for a return of kindness. But so much corruption is there among men that generally speaking this becomes but a slender security, and as the benefactor is here supposed to bestow his favors with a view to self-interest, this both takes off from the obligation and sets an example of selfishness which is the true mother of ingratitude. Were we therefore to follow the natural course of our passions and inclinations, we should perform but few actions for the advantage of others from disinterested views because we are naturally very limited in our kindness and affection, and we should perform as few of that kind out of regard to interest because we cannot depend upon their gratitude. Here then is the mutual commerce of good offices in a manner lost among mankind and everyone reduced to his own skill and industry for his well-being and subsistence. The invention of the law of nature concerning the stability of possession has already rendered men tolerable to each other. That of the transference of property and possession by consent has begun to render them mutually advantageous. But still these laws of nature, however strictly observed, are not sufficient to render them so serviceable to each other as by nature they are fitted to become. Though possession be stable, men may often reap but small advantage from it while they are possessed of a greater quantity of any species of goods than they have occasion for and at the same time suffer by the want of others. The transference of property, which is the proper remedy for this inconvenience, cannot remedy it entirely because it can only take place with regard to such objects as are present and individual, but not to such as are absent or general. One cannot transfer the property of a particular house twenty leagues distant because the consent cannot be attended with delivery, which is a requisite circumstance. Neither can one transfer the property of ten bushels of corn or five hogseds of wine by the mere expression and consent, because these are only general terms and have no direct relation to any particular heap of corn or barrels of wine. Besides the commerce of mankind is not confined to the barter of commodities, but may extend to services and actions which we may exchange to our mutual interest and advantage. Your corn is ripe today, mine will be so tomorrow. It is profitable for us both that I should labor with you today and that you should aid me tomorrow. I have no kindness for you and know you have as little for me. I will not therefore take any pains upon your account, and should I labor with you upon my own account in expectation of a return, I know I should be disappointed, and that I should in vain depend upon your gratitude. After then I leave you to labor alone, you treat me in the same manner. The seasons change, and both of us lose our harvests for want of mutual confidence and security. All this is the effect of the natural and inherent principles and passions of human nature, and as these passions and principles are inalterable it may be thought that our conduct, which depends on them, must be so too, and that it would be in vain either for moralists or politicians to tamper with us or attempt to change the usual course of our actions with a view to public interest. And indeed did the success of their designs depend upon their success in correcting the selfishness and ingratitude of men, they would never make any progress unless aided by omnipotence, which is alone able to new mold a human mind and change its character in such fundamental articles. All they can pretend to is to give a new direction to those natural passions and teach us that we can better satisfy our appetites in an oblique and artificial manner than by their headlong and impetuous motion. Hence I learn to do a service to another without bearing him any real kindness because I foresee that he will return my service in expectation of another of the same kind, and in order to maintain the same correspondence of good offices with me or with others. And accordingly, after I have served him and he is in possession of the advantage arising from my action, he is induced to perform his part as foreseeing the consequences of his refusal. But though this self-interested commerce of men begins to take place and to predominate in society, it does not entirely abolish the more generous and noble intercourse of friendship and good offices. I may still do services to such persons as I love and am more particularly acquainted with without any prospect of advantage, and they may make me a return in the same manner without any view but that of recompensing my past services. In order, therefore, to distinguish those two different sorts of commerce, the interested and the disinterested, there is a certain form of words invented for the former by which we bind ourselves to the performance of any action. This form of words constitutes what we call a promise, which is the sanction of the interested commerce of mankind. When a man says he promises anything, he in effect expresses a resolution of performing it, and along with that, by making use of this form of words, subjects himself to the penalty of never being trusted again in case of failure. A resolution is the natural act of the mind which promises express, but were there no more than a resolution in the case, promises would only declare our former motives and would not create any new motive or obligation. They are the conventions of men which create a new motive when experience has taught us that human affairs would be conducted much more for mutual advantage were there certain symbols or signs instituted by which we might give each other security of our conduct in any particular incident. After these signs are instituted, whoever uses them is immediately bound by his interest to execute his engagements and must never expect to be trusted any more if he refuse to perform what he promised. Nor is that knowledge which is requisite to make mankind sensible of this interest in the institution and observation of promises to be esteemed superior to the capacity of human nature, however savage and uncultivated. There needs but a very little practice of the world to make us perceive all these consequences and advantages. The shortest experience of society discovers them to every mortal, and when each individual perceives the same sense of interest in all his fellows he immediately performs his part of any contract as being assured that they will not be wanting in theirs. All of them by concert enter into a scheme of actions calculated for common benefit and agree to be true to their word. Nor is there anything requisite to form this concert or convention but that everyone have a sense of interest in the faithful fulfilling of engagements and express that sense to other members of the society. This immediately causes that interest to operate upon them and interest is the first obligation to the performance of promises. Afterwards a sentiment of morals concurs with interest and becomes a new obligation upon mankind. This sentiment of morality in the performance of promises arises from the same principles as that in the abstinence from the property of others. Public interest, education, and the artifices of politicians have the same effect in both cases. The difficulties that occur to us in supposing a moral obligation to attend promises we either surmount or elude. For instance, the expression of a resolution is not commonly supposed to be obligatory and we cannot readily conceive how the making use of a certain form of words should be able to cause any material difference. Here therefore we feign a new act of the mind which we call the willing an obligation and on this we suppose the morality to depend, but we have proved already that there is no such act of the mind and consequently that promises impose no natural obligation. To confirm this we may subjoin some other reflections concerning that will which is supposed to enter into a promise and to cause its obligation. It is evident that the will alone is never supposed to cause the obligation but must be expressed by words or signs in order to impose a tie upon any man. The expression being once brought in as subservient to the will soon becomes the principal part of the promise, nor will a man be less bound by his word though he secretly give a different direction to his intention and withhold himself both from a resolution and from willing an obligation. But though the expression makes on most occasions the whole of the promise yet it does not always so and one who should make use of any expression of which he knows not the meaning and which he uses without any intention of binding himself would not certainly be bound by it. Nay, though he knows its meaning, yet if he uses it in jest only and with such signs as shoe evidently he has no serious intention of binding himself he would not lie under any obligation of performance, but it is necessary that the words be a perfect expression of the will without any contrary signs. Nay, even this we must not carry so far as to imagine that one whom by our quickness of understanding we conjecture from certain signs to have an intention of deceiving us is not bound by his expression or verbal promise if we accept of it, but must limit this conclusion to those cases where the signs are of a different kind from those of deceit. All of these contradictions are easily accounted for if the obligation of promises be merely a human invention for the convenience of society, but will never be explained if it be something real and natural arising from any action of the mind or body. I shall further observe that since every new promise imposes a new obligation of morality on the person who promises and since this new obligation arises from his will it is one of the most mysterious and incomprehensible operations that can possibly be imagined and may even be compared to transubstantiation or holy orders. Parenthetical, I mean so far as holy orders are supposed to produce the indelible character. In other respects they are only illegal qualification. End of parenthetical, where a certain form of words along with a certain intention changes entirely the nature of an external object and even of a human creature. But though these mysteries be so far alike it is very remarkable that they differ widely in other particulars and that this difference may be regarded as a strong proof of the difference of their origins. As the obligation of promises is an invention for the interest of society it is warped into as many different forms as that interest requires and even runs into direct conflict and traditions rather than lose sight of its object. But as those other monstrous doctrines are merely priestly inventions and have no public interest in view they are less disturbed in their progress by new obstacles and it must be owned that after the first absurdity they follow more directly the current of reason and good sense. Theologians clearly perceived that the external form of words being mere sound require an intention to make them have any efficacy and that this intention being once considered as a requisite circumstance its absence must equally prevent the effect whether avowed or concealed, whether sincere or deceitful. Accordingly they have commonly determined that the intention of the priest makes a sacrament and that when he secretly withdraws his intention he is highly criminal in himself but still destroys the baptism or communion or holy orders. The terrible consequences of this doctrine were not able to hinder its taking place as the inconvenience of a similar doctrine with regard to promises have prevented that doctrine from establishing itself. Men are always more concerned about the present life than the future and are apt to think the smallest evil which regards the former more important than the greatest which regards the latter. We may draw the same conclusion concerning the origin of promises from the force which is supposed to invalidate all contracts and to free us from their obligation. Such a principle is a proof that promises have no natural obligation and are mere artificial contrivances for the convenience and advantage of society. If we consider a right of the matter force is not essentially different from any other motive of hope or fear which may induce us to engage our word and lay ourselves under any obligation. A man dangerously wounded who promises a competent sum to a surgeon to cure him would certainly be bound to performance, though the case be not so much different from that of one who promises a sum to a robber as to produce so great a difference in our sentiments of morality if these sentiments were not built entirely on public interest and convenience. Second of File 41. File 42 of A Treatise of Human Nature by David Hume. Volume 2. This LibriVox recording is in the public domain. Recording by George Yeager. Book 3 of Morals. Part 2 of Justice and Injustice. Section 6. Some further reflections concerning justice and injustice. We have now run over the three fundamental laws of nature, that of the stability of possession, of its transference by consent, and of the performance of promises. It is on the strict observance of those three laws that the peace and security of human society entirely depend. Nor is there any possibility of establishing a good correspondence among men where these are neglected. Society is absolutely necessary for the well-being of men, and these are as necessary to the support of society. Whatever restraint they may impose on the passions of men, they are the real offspring of those passions, and are only a more artful and more refined way of satisfying them. Nothing is more vigilant and inventive than our passions, and nothing is more obvious than the convention for the observance of these rules. Nature has therefore trusted this affair entirely to the conduct of men, and has not placed in the mind any peculiar original principles to determine us to a set of actions into which the other principles of our frame and constitution were sufficient to lead us. And to convince us, the more fully of this truth, we may hear stop a moment, and from a review of the preceding reasonings may draw some new arguments to prove that those laws, however necessary, are entirely artificial and of human invention, and consequently that justice is an artificial and not a natural virtue. One. The first argument I shall make use of is derived from the vulgar definition of justice. Justice is commonly defined to be a constant and perpetual will of giving everyone is due. In this definition it is supposed that there are such things as right and property independent of justice and antecedent to it, and that they would have subsisted though men had never dreamt of practicing such a virtue. I have already observed in a cursory manner the fallacy of this opinion, and shall here continue to open up a little more distinctly my sentiments on that subject. I shall begin with observing that this quality which we call property is like many of the imaginary qualities of the parapetetic philosophy and vanishes upon a more accurate inspection into the subject when considered apart from our moral sentiments. It is evident property does not consist in any of the sensible qualities of the object, for these may continue invariably the same while the property changes. Property, therefore, must consist in some relation of the object, but it is not in its relation with regard to other external and inanimate objects. For these may also continue invariably the same while the property changes. This quality, therefore, consists in the relations of objects to intelligent and rational beings, but it is not the external and corporeal relation which forms the essence of property. For that relation may be the same betwixt inanimate objects or with regard to brute creatures, though in those cases it forms no property. It is, therefore, in some internal relation that the property consists. That is, in some influence which the external relations of the object have on the mind and actions. Thus the external relation which we call occupation or first possession is not of itself imagined to be the property of the object, but only to cause its property. Now it is evident this external relation causes nothing in external objects and has only an influence on the mind by giving us a sense of duty in abstaining from that object and in restoring it to the first possessor. These actions are properly what we call justice, and consequently it is on that virtue that the nature of property depends, and not the virtue on the property. If anyone, therefore, would assert that justice is a natural virtue and injustice a natural vice, he must assert that abstracting from the notions of property and right and obligation a certain conduct and train of actions in certain external relations of objects has naturally a moral beauty or deformity and causes an original pleasure or uneasiness. Thus the restoring a man's goods to him is considered as virtuous not because nature has annexed a certain sentiment of pleasure to such a conduct with regard to the property of others, but because she has annexed that sentiment to such a conduct with regard to those external objects of which others have had the first or long possession or which they have received by the consent of those who have had first or long possession. If nature has given us no such sentiment there is not naturally nor antecedent to human conventions any such thing as property. Now though it seems sufficiently evident in this dry and accurate consideration of the present subject that nature has annexed no pleasure or sentiment of approbation to such a conduct yet that I may leave as little room for doubt as possible I shall subjoin a few more arguments to confirm my opinion. First, if nature had given us a pleasure of this kind it would have been as evident and discernible as on every other occasion, nor should we have found any difficulty to perceive that the consideration of such actions in such a situation gives a certain pleasure and sentiment of approbation. We should not have been obliged to have recourse to notions of property in the definition of justice and at the same time make use of the notions of justice in the definition of property. This deceitful method of reasoning is a plain proof that there are contained in the subject some obscurities and difficulties which we are not able to surmount and which we desire to evade by this artifice. Secondly, those rules by which properties, rights, and obligations are determined have in them no marks of a natural origin but many of artifice and contrivance. They are too numerous to have proceeded from nature. They are changeable by human laws and have all of them a direct and evident tendency to public good and the support of civil society. This last circumstance is remarkable upon two accounts. First, because though the cause of the establishment of these laws had been a regard for the public good as much as the public good is their natural tendency, they would still have been artificial as being purposely contrived and directed to a certain end. Secondly, because if men had been endowed with such a strong regard for public good, they would never have restrained themselves by these rules so that the laws of justice arise from natural principles in a manner still more oblique and artificial. It is self-love which is their real origin, and as the self-love of one person is naturally contrary to that of another, these several interested passions are obliged to adjust themselves after such a manner as to concur in some system of conduct and behavior. This system, therefore, comprehending the interest of each individual is, of course, advantageous to the public, though it be not intended for that purpose by the inventors. Two, in the second place we may observe that all kinds of vice and virtue run insensibly into each other and may approach by such imperceptible degrees as will make it very difficult, if not absolutely impossible, to determine when the one ends and the other begins. And from this observation we may derive a new argument for the foregoing principle. For whatever may be the case with regard to all kinds of vice and virtue, it is certain that rights and obligations and property admit of no such insensible gradation, but that a man either has a full and perfect property or none at all, and is either entirely obliged to perform any action or lies under no manner of obligation. However civil laws may talk of a perfect dominion and of an imperfect, it is easy to observe that this arises from a fiction which has no foundation in reason and can never enter into our notions of natural justice and equity. A man that hires a horse, though but for a day, has as full a right to make use of it for that time, as he whom we call its proprietor has to make use of it any other day. And it is evident that however the use may be bounded in time or degree, the right itself is not susceptible of any such gradation but is absolute and entire so far as it extends. Accordingly we may observe that this right both arises and perishes in an instant, and that a man entirely acquires the property of any object by occupation or the consent of the proprietor, and loses it by his own consent without any of that insensible gradation which is remarkable in other qualities and relations. Since therefore this is the case with regard to property and rights and obligations, I ask how it stands with regard to justice and injustice. After whatever manner you answer this question you run into inextricable difficulties. If you reply that justice and injustice admit of degree and run insensibly into each other, you expressly contradict the foregoing position, that obligation and property are not susceptible of such a gradation. These depend entirely upon justice and injustice, and follow them in all their variations. Where the justice is entire, the property is also entire. Where the justice is imperfect, the property must also be imperfect. And vice versa, if the property admit of no such variations, they must also be incompatible with justice. If you assent therefore to this last proposition and assert that justice and injustice are not susceptible of degrees, you in effect assert that they are not naturally either vicious or virtuous, since vice and virtue, moral good and evil, and indeed all natural qualities run insensibly into each other and are on many occasions undistinguishable. And here it may be worthwhile to observe that though abstract reasoning and the general maxims of philosophy and law establish this position, that property and right and obligation admit not of degrees, yet in our common and negligent way of thinking we find great difficulty to entertain that opinion and do even secretly embrace the contrary principle. An object must either be in the possession of one person or another. An action must either be performed or not. The necessity there is of choosing one side in these dilemmas and the impossibility there often is of finding any just medium oblige us when we reflect on the matter to acknowledge that all property and obligations are entire. But on the other hand, when we consider the origin of property and obligation and find that they depend on public utility and sometimes on the propensities of the imagination, which are seldom entire on any side, we are naturally inclined to imagine that these moral relations admit of an insensible gradation. Hence it is that in references where the consent of the parties leave the referees entire masters of the subject, they commonly discover so much equity and justice on both sides as induces them to strike a medium and divide the difference betwixt the parties. Civil judges who have not this liberty but are obliged to give a decisive sentence on some one side are often at a loss how to determine and are necessitated to proceed on the most frivolous reasons in the world. Half rights and obligations, which seem so natural in common life, are perfect absurdities in their tribunal for which reason they are often obliged to take half arguments for whole ones in order to terminate the affair one way or another. Three. The third argument of this kind I shall make use of may be explained thus. If we consider the ordinary course of human actions, we shall find that the mind restrains not itself by any general and universal rules, but acts on most occasions as it is determined by its present motives and inclination. As each action is a particular individual event, it must proceed from particular principles and from our immediate situation within ourselves and with respect to the rest of the universe. If on some occasions we extend our motives beyond those very circumstances which gave rise to them and form something like general rules for our conduct, it is easy to observe that these rules are not perfectly inflexible, but allow of many exceptions. Since therefore this is the ordinary course of human actions, we may conclude that the laws of justice being universal and perfectly inflexible can never be derived from nature, nor be the immediate offspring of any natural motive or inclination. No action can be either morally good or evil unless there be some natural passion or motive to impel us to it, or deter us from it, and it is evident that the morality must be susceptible of all the same variations which are natural to the passion. Here are two persons who dispute for an estate, of whom one is rich, a fool, and a bachelor. The other poor, a man of sense, and has a numerous family. The first is my enemy, the second my friend. Whether I be actuated in this affair by a view to public or private interest, by friendship or enmity, I must be induced to do my utmost to procure the estate to the latter, nor would any consideration of the right and property of the persons be able to restrain me where I actuated only by natural motives without any combination or convention with others. For as all property depends on morality, and as all morality depends on the ordinary course of our passions and actions, and as these again are only directed by particular motives, it is evident such a partial conduct must be suitable to the strictest morality and could never be a violation of property. Were men therefore to take the liberty of acting with regard to the laws of society as they do in every other affair, they would conduct themselves on most occasions by particular judgments, and would take into consideration the characters and circumstances of the persons as well as the general nature of the question. But it is easy to observe that this would produce an infinite confusion in human society, and that the avidity and partiality of men would quickly bring disorder into the world if not restrained by some general and inflexible principles. It was therefore with a view to this inconvenience that men have established those principles and have agreed to restrain themselves by general rules which are unchangeable by spite and favor, and by particular views of private or public interest. These rules then are artificially invented for a certain purpose, and are contrary to the common principles of human nature which accommodate themselves to circumstances and have no stated invariable method of operation. Nor do I perceive how I can easily be mistaken in this matter. I see evidently that when any man imposes on himself general inflexible rules in his conduct with others, he considers certain objects as their property which he supposes to be sacred and inviolable. But no proposition can be more evident than that property is perfectly unintelligible without first supposing justice and injustice, and that these virtues and vices are as unintelligible unless we have motives independent of the morality to impel us to just actions and deter us from unjust ones. Let those motives, therefore, be what they will, they must accommodate themselves to circumstances, and must admit of all the variations which human affairs in their incessant revolutions are susceptible of. They are consequently a very improper foundation for such rigid inflexible rules as the laws of nature, and it is evident these laws can only be derived from human conventions when men have perceived the disorders that result from following their natural and variable principles. Upon the whole, then, we are to consider this distinction betwixt justice and injustice as having two different foundations. That is, that of interest when men observe that it is impossible to live in society without restraining themselves by certain rules, and that of morality when this interest is once observed, and men receive a pleasure from the view of such actions as tend to the peace of society and an uneasiness from such as our contrary to it. It is the voluntary convention and artifice of men which makes the first interest take place, and, therefore, those laws of justice are so far to be considered as artificial. After that interest is once established and acknowledged, the sense of morality in the observance of these rules follows naturally and of itself, though it is certain that it is also augmented by a new artifice, and that the public instructions of politicians and the private education of parents contribute to the giving us a sense of honor and duty in their strict regulation of our actions with regard to the properties of others. End of File 42. File 43 of a Treatise of Human Nature by David Hume, Volume 2. This LibriVox recording is in the public domain. Recording by George Yeager, Book 3 of Morals, Part 2 of Justice and Injustice, Section 7 of the Origin of Government. Nothing is more certain than that men are in a great measure governed by interest, and that even when they extend their concern beyond themselves, it is not to any great distance, nor is it usual for them in common life to look farther than their nearest friends and acquaintance. It is no less certain that it is impossible for men to consult their interest in so effectual a manner as by an universal and inflexible observance of the rules of justice, by which alone they can preserve society and keep themselves from falling into that wretched and savage condition which is commonly represented as the state of nature. And as this interest, which all men have in the upholding of society and the observation of the rules of justice is great, so is it palpable and evident even to the most rude and uncultivated of human race, and it is almost impossible for anyone who has had experience of society to be mistaken in this particular. Since therefore men are so sincerely attached to their interest and their interest is so much concerned in the observance of justice, and this interest is so certain and avowed, it may be asked how any disorder can ever arise in society, and what principle there is in human nature so powerful as to overcome so strong a passion or so violent as to obscure so clear a knowledge. It has been observed in treating of the passions that men are mightily governed by the imagination and proportion their affections more to the light under which any object appears to them than to its real and intrinsic value. What strikes upon them with a strong and lively idea commonly prevails above what lies in a more obscure light, and it must be a great superiority of value that is able to compensate disadvantage. Now as everything that is contiguous to us either in space or time strikes upon us with such an idea, it has a proportional effect on the will and passions, and commonly operates with more force than any object that lies in a more distant and obscure light. Though we may be fully convinced that the latter object excels the former, we are not able to regulate our actions by this judgment, but yield to the solicitations of our passions which always plead in favor of whatever is near and contiguous. This is the reason why men so often act in contradiction to their known interest, and in particular why they prefer any trivial advantage that is present to the maintenance of order in society which so much depends on the observance of justice. The consequences of every breach of equity seem to lie very remote and are not able to counterbalance any immediate advantage that may be reaped from it. They are, however, nevertheless real for being remote, and as all men are in some degree subject to the same weakness, it necessarily happens that the violations of equity must become very frequent in society, and the commerce of men by that means be rendered very dangerous and uncertain. You have the same propension that I have in favor of what is contiguous above what is remote. You are therefore naturally carried to commit acts of injustice as well as me. Your example both pushes me forward in this way by imitation, and also affords me a new reason for any breach of equity by shooing me that I should be the culley of my integrity if I alone should impose on myself a severe restraint amidst the licentiousness of others. This quality therefore of human nature not only is very dangerous to society but also seems on a cursory view to be incapable of any remedy. The remedy can only come from the consent of men, and if men be incapable of themselves to prefer remote to contiguous, they will never consent to anything which would oblige them to such a choice and contradict in so sensible a manner their natural principles and propensities. Whoever chooses the means chooses also the end, and if it be impossible for us to prefer what is remote, it is equally impossible for us to submit to any necessity which would oblige us to such a method of acting. But here it is observable that this infirmity of human nature becomes a remedy to itself, and that we provide against our negligence about remote objects merely because we are naturally inclined to that negligence. When we consider any objects at a distance, all their minute distinctions vanish, and we always give the preference to whatever is in itself preferable without considering its situation and circumstances. This gives rise to what in an improper sense we call reason, which is a principle that is often contradictory to those propensities that display themselves upon the approach of the object. In reflecting on any action which I am to perform a 12 month hence, I always resolve to prefer the greater good, whether at that time it will be more contiguous or remote, nor does any difference in that particular make a difference in my present intentions and resolutions. My distance from the final determination makes all those minute differences vanish, nor am I affected by anything but the general and more discernible qualities of good and evil. But on my nearer approach those circumstances which I at first overlooked begin to appear and have an influence on my conduct and affections. A new inclination to the present good springs up and makes it difficult for me to adhere inflexibly to my first purpose and resolution. This natural infirmity I may very much regret and I may endeavor by all possible means to free myself from it. I may have recourse to study and reflection within myself, to the advice of friends, to frequent meditation and repeated resolution. And having experienced how ineffectual all these are, I may embrace with pleasure any other expedient by which I may impose a restraint upon myself and guard against this weakness. The only difficulty, therefore, is to find out this expedient by which men cure their natural weakness and lay themselves under the necessity of observing the laws of justice and equity, notwithstanding their violent propension to prefer contiguous to remote. It is evident such a remedy can never be effectual without correcting this propensity. And as it is impossible to change or correct anything material in our nature, the utmost we can do is to change our circumstances and situation and render the observance of the laws of justice our nearest interest and their violation our most remote. But this being impracticable with respect to all mankind, it can only take place with respect to a few whom we thus immediately interest in the execution of justice. These are the persons whom we call civil magistrates, kings and their ministers, our governors and rulers, who being indifferent persons to the greatest part of the state have no interest or but a remote one in any act of injustice. And being satisfied with their present condition and with their part in society have an immediate interest in every execution of justice which is so necessary to the upholding of society. Here, then, is the origin of civil government and society. Men are not able radically to cure, either in themselves or others, that narrowness of soul which makes them prefer the present to the remote. They cannot change their natures. All they can do is to change their situation and render the observance of justice the immediate interest of some particular persons and its violation their more remote. These persons, then, are not only induced to observe those rules in their own conduct but also to constrain others to alike regularity and enforce the dictates of equity through the whole society. And if it be necessary they may also interest others more immediately in the execution of justice and create a number of officers, civil and military, to assist them in their government. But this execution of justice, though the principle, is not the only advantage of government. As violent passion hinders men from seeing distinctly the interest they have in an equitable behavior towards others, so it hinders them from seeing that equity itself and gives them a remarkable partiality in their own favors. This inconvenience is corrected in the same manner as that above mentioned. The same persons who execute the laws of justice will also decide all controversies concerning them. And being indifferent to the greatest part of the society will decide them more equitably than everyone would in his own case. By means of these two advantages in the execution and decision of justice, men acquire a security against each other's weakness and passion as well as against their own, and under the shelter of their governors begin to taste at ease the sweets of society and mutual assistance. But government extends farther its beneficial influence, and not contented to protect men in those conventions they make for their mutual interest, it often obliges them to make such conventions and forces them to seek their own advantage by a concurrence in some common end or purpose. There is no quality in human nature which causes more fatal errors in our conduct than that which leads us to prefer whatever is present to the distant and remote, and makes us desire objects more according to their situation than their intrinsic value. Two neighbors may agree to drain a meadow which they possess in common, because it is easy for them to know each other's mind, and each must perceive that the immediate consequence of his failing in his part is the abandoning the whole project. But it is very difficult, and indeed impossible, that a thousand persons should agree in any such action, it being difficult for them to concert so complicated a design and still more difficult for them to execute it, while each seeks a pretext to free himself of the trouble and expense, and would lay the whole burden on others. Political society easily remedies both these inconveniences. Magistrates find an immediate interest in the interest of any considerable part of their subjects. They need consult nobody but themselves to form any scheme for the promoting of that interest. And as the failure of any one piece in the execution is connected, though not immediately, with the failure of the whole, they prevent that failure, because they find no interest in it, either immediate or remote. Thus bridges are built, harbors opened, ramparts raised, canals formed, fleets equipped, and armies disciplined everywhere by the care of government, which, though composed of men subject to all human infirmities, becomes, by one of the finest and most subtle inventions imaginable, a composition which is in some measure exempted from all these infirmities. End of File 43. File 44 of A Treatise of Human Nature by David Hume. Volume 2. This LibriVox recording is in the public domain. Recording by George Yeager. Book 3 of Morals. Part 2 of Justice and Injustice. Section 8 of The Source of Allegiance. Though government be an invention very advantageous and even in some circumstances absolutely necessary to mankind, it is not necessary in all circumstances, nor is it impossible for men to preserve society for some time without having recourse to such an invention. Men, it is true, are always much inclined to prefer present interest to distant and remote, nor is it easy for them to resist the temptation of any advantage that they may immediately enjoy in apprehension of an evil that lies at a distance from them. But still this weakness is less conspicuous where the possessions and the pleasures of life are few and of little value, as they always are in the infancy of society. An Indian is but little tempted to dispossess another of his hut or to steal his bow as being already provided of the same advantages. And as to any superior fortune which may attend one above another in hunting and fishing, it is only casual and temporary and will have but small tendency to disturb society. And so far am I from thinking with some philosophers that men are utterly incapable of society without government, that I assert the first rudiments of government to arise from quarrels, not among men of the same society, but among those of different societies. A less degree of riches will suffice to this latter effect than is requisite for the former. Men fear nothing from public war and violence but the resistance they meet with, which, because they share it in common, seems less terrible. And because it comes from strangers, seems less pernicious in its consequences than when they are exposed singly against one whose commerce is advantageous to them and without whose society it is impossible they can subsist. Now foreign war to a society without government necessarily produces civil war. Throw any considerable goods among men, they instantly fall a quarreling while each strives to get possession of what pleases him without regard to the consequences. In a foreign war the most considerable of all goods, life and limbs, are at stake. And as everyone shuns dangerous ports, seizes the best arms, seeks excuse for the slightest wounds, the laws which may be well enough observed while men were calm can now no longer take place when they are in such commotion. This we find verified in the American tribes, where men live in concord and amity among themselves without any established government and never pay submission to any of their fellows except in time of war when their captain enjoys a shadow of authority which he loses after their return from the field and the establishment of peace with the neighboring tribes. This authority, however, instructs them in the advantages of government and teaches them to have recourse to it when either by the pillage of war, by commerce, or by any fortuitous inventions their riches and possessions have become so considerable as to make them forget on every emergence the interest they have in the preservation of peace and justice. Hence we may give a plausible reason, among others, why all governments are at first monarchical, without any mixture and variety, and why republics arise only from the abuses of monarchy and despotic power. Camps are the true mothers of cities, and as war cannot be administered by reason of the suddenness of every exigency without some authority in a single person, the same kind of authority naturally takes place in that civil government which succeeds the military. And this reason I take to be more natural than the common one derived from patriarchal government or the authority of a father, which is said first to take place in one family and to accustom the members of it to the government of a single person. The state of society without government is one of the most natural states of men, and must subsist with the conjunction of many families and long after the first generation. Nothing but an increase of riches and possessions could oblige men to quit it, and so barbarous and uninstructed are all societies on their first formation that many years must elapse before these can increase to such a degree as to disturb men in the enjoyment of peace and concord. But though it be possible for men to maintain a small uncultivated society without government, it is impossible they should maintain a society of any kind without justice and the observance of those three fundamental laws concerning the stability of possession, its translation by consent, and the performance of promises. These are therefore antecedent to government and are supposed to impose an obligation before the duty of allegiance to civil magistrates has once been thought of. Nay, I shall go farther and assert that government upon its first establishment would naturally be supposed to derive its obligation from those laws of nature and in particular from that concerning the performance of promises. When men have once perceived the necessity of government to maintain peace and execute justice, they would naturally assemble together, would choose magistrates, determine their power, and promise them obedience. As a promise is supposed to be a bond or security already in use and attended with a moral obligation, it is to be considered as the original sanction of government and as the source of the first obligation to obedience. This reasoning appears so natural that it has become the foundation of our fashionable system of politics and is in a manner the creed of a party amongst us who pride themselves with reason on the soundness of their philosophy and their liberty of thought. All men say they are born free and equal. Government and superiority can only be established by consent. The consent of men in establishing government imposes on them a new obligation unknown to the laws of nature. Men, therefore, are bound to obey their magistrates only because they promise it and if they had not given their word either expressly or tacitly to preserve allegiance it would never have become a part of their moral duty. This conclusion, however, when carried so far as to comprehend government in all its ages and situations, is entirely erroneous and I maintain that though the duty of allegiance be at first grafted on the obligation of promises and be for some time supported by that obligation, yet it quickly takes root of itself and has an original obligation and authority independent of all contracts. This is the principle of moment which we must examine with care and detention before we proceed any farther. It is reasonable for those philosophers who assert justice to be a natural virtue and antecedent to human conventions to resolve all civil allegiance into the obligation of a promise and assert that it is our own consent alone which binds us to any submission to magistracy. For as all government is plainly an invention of men and the origin of most governments is known in history, it is necessary to mount higher in order to find the source of our political duties if we would assert them to have any natural obligation of morality. These philosophers therefore quickly observe that society is as ancient as the human species and those three fundamental laws of nature as ancient as society, so that taking advantage of the antiquity and obscure origin of these laws, they first deny them to be artificial and voluntary inventions of men and then seek to engraft on them those other duties which are more plainly artificial. But being once undeceived in this particular and having found that natural as well as civil justice derives its origin from human conventions, we shall quickly perceive how fruitless it is to resolve the one into the other and seek in the laws of nature a stronger foundation for our political duties than interest and human conventions while these laws themselves are built on the very same foundation. On whichever side we turn this subject we shall find that these two kinds of duty are exactly on the same footing and have the same source both of their first invention and moral obligation. They are contrived to remedy like inconveniences and acquire their moral sanction in the same manner from their remedying those inconveniences. These are two points which we shall endeavor to prove as distinctly as possible. We have already shown that men invented the three fundamental laws of nature when they observed the necessity of society to their mutual subsistence and found that it was impossible to maintain any correspondence together without some restraint on their natural appetites. The same self-love therefore which renders men so incomodious to each other taking a new and more convenient direction produces the rules of justice and is the first motive of their observance. But when men have observed that though the rules of justice be sufficient to maintain any society yet it is impossible for them of themselves to observe those rules in large and polished societies. They establish government as a new invention to attain their ends and preserve the old or procured new advantages by a more strict execution of justice. So far therefore our civil duties are connected with our natural that the former are invented chiefly for the sake of the latter and that the principal object of government is to constrain men to observe the laws of nature. In this respect, however, that law of nature concerning the performance of promises is only comprised along with the rest and its exact observance is to be considered as an effect of the institution of government and not the obedience to government as an effect of the obligation of a promise. Though the object of our civil duties be the enforcing of our natural yet the first parenthetical first in time not in dignity or force and of parenthetical motive of the invention as well as performance of both is nothing but self interest. And since there is a separate interest in the obedience to government from that in the performance of promises we must also allow of a separate obligation to obey the civil magistrate is requisite to preserve order and concord in society to perform promises is requisite to beget mutual trust and confidence in the common offices of life. The ends as well as the means are perfectly distinct nor is the one important to the other. To make this more evident, let us consider that men will often bind themselves by promises to the performance of what it would have been their interest to perform independent of these promises as when they would give others a fuller security by super adding a new obligation of interest to that which they formally lay under. The interest in the performance of promises besides its moral obligation is general avowed and of the last consequence in life. Other interests may be more particular and doubtful and we are apt to entertain a greater suspicion that men may indulge their humor or passion in acting contrary to them. Here therefore promises come naturally in play and are often required for fuller satisfaction and security. But supposing those other interests to be as general and avowed as the interest in the performance of a promise they will be regarded as on the same footing and men will begin to repose the same confidence in them. Now this is exactly the case with regard to our civil duties or obedience to the magistrate without which no government could subsist nor any peace or order be maintained in large societies where there are so many possessions on the one hand and so many wants real or imaginary on the other. Our civil duties, therefore, must soon detach themselves from our promises and acquire a separate force and influence. The interest in both is of the very same kind. It is general, avowed, and prevails in all times and places. There is then no pretext of reason for founding the one upon the other while each of them has a foundation peculiar to itself. We might as well resolve the obligation to abstain from the possessions of others into the obligation of a promise as that of allegiance. The interests are not more distinct in the one case than the other. A regard to property is not more necessary to natural society than obedience is to civil society or government, nor is the former society more necessary to the being of mankind than the latter to their well-being and happiness. In short, if the performance of promises be advantageous, so is obedience to government. If the former interest be general, so is the latter. If the one interest be obvious and avowed, so is the other. And as these two rules are founded on like obligations of interest, each of them must have a peculiar authority independent of the other. But it is not only the natural obligations of interest which are distinct in promises and allegiance, but also the moral obligations of honor and conscience. Nor does the merit or demerit of the one depend in the least upon that of the other. And indeed, if we consider the close connection there is betwixt the natural and moral obligations, we shall find this conclusion to be entirely unavoidable. Our interest is always engaged on the side of obedience to magistracy, and there is nothing but a great present advantage that can lead us to rebellion by making us overlook the remote interest which we have in the preserving of peace and order in society. But though a present interest may thus blind us with regard to our own actions, it takes not place with regard to those of others, nor hinders them from appearing in their true colors as highly prejudicial to public interest and to our own in particular. This naturally gives us an uneasiness in considering such seditious and disloyal actions and makes us attach to them the idea of vice and moral deformity. It is the same principle which causes us to disapprove of all kinds of private injustice and in particular of the breach of promises. We blame all treachery and breach of faith because we consider that the freedom and extent of human commerce depend entirely on a fidelity with regard to promises. We blame all disloyalty to magistrates because we perceive that the execution of justice in the stability of possession, its translation by consent, and the performance of promises is impossible without submission to government. As there are here two interests entirely distinct from each other, they must give rise to two moral obligations, equally separate and independent. Though there was no such thing as a promise in the world, government would still be necessary in all large and civilized societies. And if promises had only their own proper obligation without the separate sanction of government, they would have but little efficacy in such societies. This separates the boundaries of our public and private duties and shows that the latter are more dependent on the former than the former on the latter. Education and the artifice of politicians concur to bestow a further morality on loyalty and to brand all rebellion with a greater degree of guilt and infamy. Nor is it a wonder that politicians should be very industrious in inculcating such notions where their interest is so particularly concerned. Lest those arguments should not appear entirely conclusive, as I think they are, I shall have recourse to authority and shall prove from the universal consent of mankind that the obligation of submission to government is not derived from any promise of the subjects. Nor need anyone wonder that though I have all along endeavored to establish my system on pure reason and have scarce ever cited the judgment even of philosophers or historians on any article, I should now appeal to popular authority and depose the sentiments of the rabble to any philosophical reasoning. For it must be observed that the opinions of men in this case carry with them a peculiar authority and are in a great measure infallible. The distinction of moral good and evil is founded on the pleasure or pain which results from the view of any sentiment or character, and as that pleasure or pain cannot be unknown to the person who feels it, it follows footnote 22. This proposition must hold strictly true with regard to every quality that is determined merely by sentiment. In what sense we can talk either of a right or a wrong taste in morals, eloquence or beauty shall be considered afterwards. In the meantime it may be observed that there is such an uniformity in the general sentiments of mankind as to render such questions of but small importance. End of footnote 22. That there is just so much vice or virtue in any character as everyone places in it and that it is impossible in this particular we can ever be mistaken. And though our judgments concerning the origin of any vice or virtue be not so certain as those concerning their degrees, yet since the question in this case regards not any philosophical origin of an obligation, but a plain matter of fact, it is not easily conceived how we enter into an error. A man who acknowledges himself to be bound to another for a certain sum must certainly know whether it be by his own bond or that of his father, whether it be of his mere good will or for money lent him, and under what conditions and for what purposes he has bound himself. In like manner it being certain that there is a moral obligation to submit to government because everyone thinks so, it must be as certain that this obligation arises not from a promise since no one whose judgment has not been led astray by too strict adherence to a system of philosophy has ever yet dreamt of ascribing it to that origin. Neither magistrates nor subjects have formed this idea of our civil duties. We find that magistrates are so far from deriving their authority and the obligation to obedience in their subjects from the foundation of a promise or original contract that they conceal as far as possible from their people, especially from the vulgar, that they have their origin from fence. Were this the sanction of government the rulers would never receive it tacitly, which is the utmost that can be pretended, since what is given tacitly and insensibly can never have such influence on mankind as what is performed expressly and openly. A tacit promise is where the will is signified by other more diffuse signs than those of speech. But a will there must certainly be in the case, and that can never escape the person's notice who exerted it, however silent or tacit. But were you to ask the far greatest part of the nation whether they had ever consented to the authority of their rulers or promised to obey them, they would be inclined to think very strangely of you and would certainly reply that the affair depended not on their consent but that they were born to such an obedience. In consequence of this opinion we frequently see them imagine such persons to be their natural rulers as are at that time deprived of all power and authority and whom no man, however foolish, would voluntarily choose, and this merely because they are in that line which ruled before, and in that degree of tacit which used to succeed, though perhaps in so distant a period that scarce any man alive could ever have given any promise of obedience. As a government then no authority over such as these because they never consented to it and would esteem the very attempt of such a free choice, a piece of arrogance and impiety. We find by experience that it punishes them very freely for what it calls treason and rebellion which it seems according to this system reduces itself to common injustice. If you say that by dwelling in its dominions they in effect consented to the established government I answer that this can only be where they think the affair depends on their choice which few or none beside those philosophers have ever yet imagined. It never was pleaded as an excuse for a rebel that the first act he performed after he came to years of discretion was to levy war against the sovereign of the state and that while he was a child he could not bind himself by his own consent and having become a man showed plainly by the first act he performed that he had designed to impose on himself any obligation to obedience. We find on the contrary that civil laws punish this crime at the same age as any other which is criminal of itself without our consent that is when the person is come to the full use of reason whereas to this crime they ought in justice to allow some intermediate time in which a tacit consent at least might be supposed. To which we may add that a man living under an absolute government would owe it no allegiance since by its very nature it depends not on consent. But as that is as natural and common a government as any it must certainly occasion some obligation and it is plain from experience that men who are subjected to it do always think so. This is a clear proof that we do not commonly esteem our allegiance to be derived from our consent or promise and the further proof is that when our promise is upon any account expressly engaged we always distinguish exactly betwixt the two obligations and believe the one to add more force to the other than in a repetition of the same promise. Where no promise is given a man looks not on his faith as broken in private matters upon account of rebellion but keeps those two duties of honour and allegiance perfectly distinct and separate. As the uniting of them was thought by these philosophers a very subtle invention this is a convincing proof that it is not a true one since no man can either give a promise or be restrained by its sanction and obligation unknown to himself. End of File 44. File 45 of a Treatise of Human Nature by David Hume Volume 2. This LibriVox recording is in the public domain. Recording by George Jaeger Book 3 of Morals. Part 2 of Justice and Injustice. Section 9 of the Measures of Allegiance. Those political writers who have had recourse to a promise or original contract as the source of our allegiance to government intended to establish a principle which is perfectly just and reasonable. Though the reasoning upon which they endeavored to establish it was fallacious and sophisticated, they would prove that our submission to government admits of exceptions and that an egregious tyranny in the rulers is sufficient to free the subjects from all ties of allegiance. Since men enter into society, say they, and submit themselves to government by their free and voluntary consent, they must have in view certain advantages which they propose to reap from it and for which they are contented to resign their native liberty. There is, therefore, something mutual engaged on the part of the magistrate, that is, protection and security. And it is only by the hopes he affords of these advantages that he can ever persuade men to submit to him. But when instead of protection and security they meet with tyranny and depression, they are freed from their promises, as happens in all conditional contracts, and return to that state of liberty which preceded the institution of government. Men would never be so foolish as to enter into such engagements as should turn entirely to the authority of others without any view of bettering their own condition. Whoever proposes to draw any profit from our submission must engage himself either expressly or tacitly to make us reap some advantage from his authority, nor ought he to expect that without the performance of his part we will ever continue in obedience. This conclusion is just, though the principles be erroneous, and I flatter myself that I can establish the same conclusion on more reasonable principles. I shall not take such a compass in establishing our political duties as to assert that men perceive the advantages of government, that they institute government with a view to those advantages, that this conclusion requires a promise of obedience which imposes a moral obligation to a certain degree, but being conditional ceases to be binding whenever the other contracting party performs not his part of the engagement. I perceive that a promise itself arises entirely from human conventions, and is invented with a view to a certain interest. Some such interest more immediately connected with government, and which may be at once the original motive to its institution and the source of our obedience to it. This interest I find to consist in the security and protection which we enjoy in political society, and which we can never attain when perfectly free and independent. As interest therefore is the immediate sanction of government, the one can have no longer being than the other, and whenever the civil magistrate carries his oppression so far as to render his authority perfectly intolerable, we are no longer bound to submit to it. The cause ceases, the effect must cease also. So far the conclusion is immediate and direct concerning the natural obligation which we have to allegiance. As to the moral obligation we may observe that the maxim would hear be false that when the cause ceases the effect must cease also. For there is a principle of human nature which we have frequently taken notice of that men are mightily addicted to general rules, and that we often see our maxims beyond those reasons which first induced us to establish them. Where cases are similar in many circumstances we are apt to put them on the same footing without considering that they differ in the most material circumstances, and that the resemblance is more apparent than real. It may therefore be thought that in the case of allegiance our moral obligation of duty will not cease even though the natural obligation of interest which is its cause has ceased, and that men may be bound by conscience to submit to a tyrannical government against their own and the public interest. And indeed to the force of this argument I so far submit as to acknowledge that general rules commonly extend beyond the principles on which they are founded, and that we seldom make any exception to them unless that exception have the qualities of a general rule and be founded on very numerous and common instances. Now this I assert to be entirely the present case. When men submit to the authority of others it is to procure themselves some security against the wickedness and injustice of men who are perpetually carried by their unruly passions and by their present and immediate interest to the violation of all the laws of society. But as this imperfection is inherent in human nature we know that it must attend men in all their states and conditions, and that those whom we choose for rulers do not immediately become of a superior nature to the rest of mankind upon account of their superior power and authority. What we expect from them depends not on a change of their nature, but of their situation when they acquire a more immediate interest in the preservation of order and the execution of justice. But besides that this interest is only more immediate in the execution of justice among their subjects. Besides this I say we may often expect from the irregularity of human nature that they will neglect even this immediate interest and be transported by their passions into all the excesses of cruelty and ambition. Our general knowledge of human nature, our observation of the past history of mankind, our experience of present times all these causes must induce us to open the door to exceptions, and must make us conclude that we may resist the more violent effects of supreme power without any crime or injustice. Accordingly we may observe that this is both the general practice and principle of mankind, and that no nation that could find any remedy ever yet suffered the cruel ravages of a tyrant or were blamed for their resistance. Those who took up arms against Dionysius or Nero or Philip II have the favor of every reader in the perusal of their history, and nothing but the most violent perversion of common sense can ever lead us to condemn them. It is certain therefore that in all our notions of morals we never entertain such an absurdity as that of passive obedience, but make allowances for resistance in the more flagrant instances of tyranny and oppression. The general opinion of mankind has some authority in all cases, but in this of morals it is perfectly infallible. Nor is it less infallible because men cannot simply explain the principles on which it is founded. Few persons can carry on this train of reasoning. Government is a mere human invention for the interest of society. Where the tyranny of the governor removes this interest it also removes the natural obligation to obedience. The moral obligation is founded on the natural, and therefore must wear that ceaseless, especially where the subject is such as makes us foresee very many occasions wherein the natural obligation may cease, and causes us to form a kind of general rule for the regulation of our conduct in such occurrences. But though this train of reasoning be too subtle for the vulgar, it is certain that all men have an implicit notion of it and are sensible that they owe obedience to government merely on account of the public interest, and at the same time that human nature is so subject to frailties and passions as may easily pervert this institution and change their governors into tyrants and public enemies. If the sense of common interest were not our original motive to obedience, I would faint ask what other principle is there in human nature capable of subduing the natural ambition of men and forcing them to such a submission? Imitation and custom are not sufficient. For the question still recurs, what motive first produces those instances of submission which we imitate, and that train of actions which produces the custom? Evidently is no other principle than common interest. And if interest first produces obedience to government, the obligation to obedience must cease whenever the interest ceases in any great degree and in a considerable number of instances. End of file 45