 That's a great question, and the subject that you and I have chosen for a talk today is Britain in Europe the way ahead. Now it's a subject which is a fairly challenging one, not just because everything to do with policy towards Europe is now highly contentious in my own country, a'r ddweud o'r ffordd o'r ffordd o'r ffordd, sy'n gyfnodd y ffodol o'r union ymlaen, ac oherwydd y Prifysgol Brytyn yn ymlaen. Ac mae'n gwybod ddod o'r ffordd yn y chyfnodd Cwntinent. Mae'r ffordd yn ychydig ar y chyfnodd, ac mae'n gwybod yn Brytyn. Will the Eurozone survive with its present membership, adding to that membership from time to time with other member states, as other member states, most recently of course at the beginning of this year, Latvia, qualify to join? Will the greater economic integration that the survival of the Eurozone undoubtedly needs be agreed? Will it require no more than action within the present treaties, together with perhaps some modest tweaks in their provisions, as has been the case so far? Or will it require some much more fundamental, more wide-ranging revision of the treaties? Most recently, what will be the outcome of the German Constitutional Court's referral of the European Central Bank's OTM scheme to the European Court of Justice? And what will be the consequences of the highly probable, steep increase in the size of the present vote for anti-Euro and in some cases anti-EU parties in this May's European Parliament elections? Will the sort of reforms the European Union certainly needs, push it in a more federalist direction, or will they be accomplished largely within the existing treaties? Will it prove possible to make a reality of the principle of subsidiarity, which provides that the Union should only act when action at a national or regional level cannot achieve the objectives pursued in the legislation? Will national parliaments gain a greater say in the shaping of European Union policy? Now that's a huge list of questions, and all those and many more pretty fundamental questions are in the air, but they are as yet unsettled. And the answers to them will have important implications for Britain's own debate and its efforts to shape its future relationship within the Union or conceivably outside it. Now the fog on our side of the channel is every bit as thick and the list of so far unanswered questions every bit as daunting. Will there indeed, as David Cameron wishes, be an in-out referendum in 2017? Or will such a referendum only take place as the law currently provides and as the leader of the opposition envisages, if and when there is a significant transfer of powers to Brussels, which the government of the day is ready to accept? What kind of approach to European policy will whatever British government takes office after the 2015 general election adopt? Will it seek to promote a positive reform agenda for the European Union as a whole? Or will it seek to repatriate to the UK alone a list of powers currently exercised at EU level? Will it promote reforms and changes within the existing treaty provisions? Or will it seek treaty changes which would require not only the agreement of all the other member states, but ratification by them in some cases necessitating a referendum? Now the answer to those questions, and that's the second list of questions, will be fundamental to the prospects of success and thus to the chances of Britain's membership emerging from the period ahead strengthened or conceivably brought to an end. Now let's look first at the possible answers to the wider European list of questions. We should have no illusions about where most countries' priorities will lie. That will be ensuring up the structures of the Eurozone and protecting it against a recurrence of the crises of the last few years. And that priority is one which I would suggest Britain should not in its own interest seek to challenge. The consequences of a breakup of the Eurozone would be seriously damaging for the British economy and it is a delusion to suppose that that could occur without collateral damage to the single market whose preservation and indeed whose completion is so fundamentally in Britain's interest. It will naturally be important to ensure that those outside the Eurozone do not get marginalised in decision making on single market issues and the process of achieving that has begun in the context of the negotiations over banking union. The European Union has, after all, a good deal of experience in operating what is called variable geometry over Euro membership itself, over Schengen, over Justice and Home Affairs legislation. And it should be possible to achieve an extension of that approach to these areas of economic integration. And today's article in the Financial Times by Wolfgang Scheuble and George Osborne is an encouraging orcury in that respect. But it will be more easily done if Britain does not appear to question the survivability of the Eurozone and if it enlists the support of the Commission whose interest also will be in the integrity of the single market and the autonomy of the decision making capacity of the EU as a whole. Now it's certainly too soon to predict with any precision the outcome of the European Parliament elections in May and the consequences of that outcome. But it is high time that we faced up to the probability of a larger than ever before protest vote in many member states for an array of parties ranging from the clearly neo-fascist to the more straightforwardly populist nationalists. That will be a shock to the system if and when it comes. It may not, however, make that much of a difference to the decision making processes of the European Parliament itself since it could well result in my view is likely to result in even closer cooperation and consensus building between the three main party groups, the Christian Democrats, the Socialists and the Liberals. If it does that, the Conservative members from my own country, the only one of our three main parties not belonging to one of those groups, will need to consider carefully again their links with those groups or risk being further marginalised and finding themselves in some pretty unsavory company. A large protest vote is likely to concentrate the minds of the 28 Governments who make up the council and who have to agree to and obtain national ratification for any treaty changes. It would, I think, be reasonable to suppose that such developments would make them more supportive of reform that does not require treaty change, more conscious of the difficulties of ratifying treaty change and more interested in ensuring that their national parliaments play a larger role in shaping European legislation in the future. Now, how will this all affect the debate within the European Union on whether to pursue what I would describe as a policy-based reform agenda or an institution-based one, or indeed over whether or not a reform is needed at all? Well, that last option is reform needed at all can perhaps be rapidly dismissed. Not only can no organisation like the European Union afford simply to stand still, least of all in the face of the many challenges it's up against, but the survival of the eurozone is really incompatible with such a status quo policy. As to the main choice between an institutional approach or a policy-based approach, there is certainly a huge policy-based agenda out there waiting for decisive action, completing the single market, particularly in services and energy, building a digital level playing field, pushing ahead with enlargement in the Balkans and beyond, promoting freer and fairer world trade, both through bilateral agreements such as those being negotiated with the US, Canada, Japan and India and through a revival of the World Trade Organization, finding more effective responses to the challenge of climate change, making the common foreign and security policy work better, and here the gauntlet thrown down by Russia over the Crimea and the future of Ukraine makes, represents a major challenge. All those and finding ways of cooperating on defence in an era of austerity budgets and one where the US is expecting Europe to take more of the burden in its own neighbourhood. All those are, as you can see, a huge but perfectly coherent and I would argue perfectly doable agenda if the political will is there to do it. Now much of that agenda is essential if Europe is to remain competitive and flexible in the world we face. That means it is essential to the prosperity of both eurozone and non eurozone countries alike and certainly part of any viable eurozone policy for survival and prosperity. Now an institution based agenda is not without its powerful supporters, but they seem to me at least to be swimming a bit against the current of the times. Not only have there been in my view just too many institution based packages since the single European Act and the Maistricht Treaty laid some of the main foundations of the present variable geometry union that we have, but the appetite for passing more decision making powers to Brussels is on the way and the contradiction between that and paying proper respect to the treaty based principles of subsidiarity and proportionality is evident. No doubt the debate on those two broad choices at future European councils where these matters will be decided will be lively. Britain surely needs to be a constructive part of that debate, not standing on the sidelines merely asking for more British exceptionalism. Now I make no apology for turning back in conclusion to Britain's role in all this. Whoever forms a government after the 2015 elections will need to take proper account of the views and priorities of the 27 other member states without whom nothing can be agreed. If we are not to risk simply embarking on negotiations which are little more than a prelude to exit, an approach which I fear would gladden the heart of many euro skeptics, but not one I would suggest that is consistent with Britain's fundamental national interests. To have any chance of success, the British government of that day will need a positive policy based reform agenda of its own which addresses the challenges confronting the European Union as a whole rather than one which merely seeks to garner the support of the Euro skeptic press and Euro skeptic backbenchers in London. That does not mean for one moment that Britain should be shy of pressing for example for reform of the working time directive or indeed of any other piece of European legislation which we believe is having aberrant results. It does not mean that we should not be trying to make the practice of subsidiarity more effective for example by getting the commission to agree to a longer time limits for submitting reasoned opinions and to withdraw and to withdrawing and rethinking any proposal which attracts the yellow card of one third of the parliamentary chambers of the Member States. It does not mean that we should eschew making special arrangements for the UK in a piece of new legislation coming forward if that can be justified by evidence not just by ideological assertion. But we should be cautious indeed about heading down any road that requires treaty change for it to be implemented and we should stop tilting at windmills such as the treaty's preambler reference to an ever closer union. For one thing and I notice that most people who wax indignant about this phrase haven't taken the trouble to read the treaty before they did so for one thing what it calls for in the preamble to the original treaty was an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, not their governments. For another it has never been and could never be a legal base for decision making. That is not what preambles are for. Now you will gather from this that I am less than convinced of the case for holding an inner referendum at a fixed date in the future which owes more to the vagaries and pressures of Britain's own electoral timetable than it does to any wider European perspectives. Britain's membership of the EU I would suggest is too important a matter to play Russian roulette with in that way. But irrespective of what I as an individual independent backbencher might think there surely is a compelling case for improving the quantity and the quality of the British debate about Europe. And there must too be a case for the public debate in Britain to escape from the hyperbole of the tabloid press quite often outright lies and to address those important issues in a measured and responsible manner. And this week's debate between Nick Clegg and Nigel Farage was perhaps a first step in that direction. Only then will Britain's continued membership be properly rooted and will we avoid that sleepwalking towards the exit of which some have warned. Thank you very much.