 as being expert in your own backgrounds on the Korean Peninsula and the US-ROK relationship. My job is simple. Remind you, please turn off your cell phones. When we get to the Q&A, please ask a question and not make a statement, and please wait for the microphone and identify yourself when that time comes. And then my next job is to introduce my co-host today from the Korean Economic Institute Congressman Don Manzullo, who served with great distinction in the US Congress representing Illinois, and finished up his tour of duty on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, leading the subcommittee on East Asia Pacific Affairs. So he himself is quite expert on the subject today from his congressional experience, as well as being the CEO of the Korean Economic Institute. So Don, with that introduction, please thank you, Doug, for that introduction, and also to Carnegie for cosponsoring this event with the Korea Economic Institute of America. Ever since I began my service on the Asian Pacific Subcommittee on the House Foreign Affairs Committee back in 1993, I was always impressed by the US-Korea alliance as one of the great success stories of international relations. It was first born in the crucible of war where over 30,000 US service personnel gave their last full measure of devotion to preserve liberty and democracy on the Korean Peninsula and has evolved over the past 60 years into a more mature relationship going well beyond the security realm. The alliance has preserved the peace on the Korean Peninsula for over 60 years and resulted in one of the greatest and rapid economic transformations ever to take place in the history of the world. South Korea is now the world's 13th largest economy and as America's sixth largest trading partner, South Korea is the number five position in terms of world production of machine tools the United States is number seven. It was my honor to call two hearings on the US-Korea alliance during my tenure as chairman of the Asian Pacific Subcommittee. We're privileged today to have with us outstanding experts on Korea who can discuss the future of the US-ROK alliance and what we can expect from a rescheduled summit meeting later this year between South Korean President Park and President Obama. They are here at KEI's invitation to participate in another event and I'm pleased they agreed to they, not the two presidents, the experts speaking today are here at the KEI's invitation to participate in another event which we just finished called the Opinion Leaders Seminar and I'm pleased they agreed to participate this afternoon in another forum in order for us to benefit from their expertise. First, General Hong Jin-ha, chairman of the National Defense Committee in the North, in the Korean National Assembly will provide the keynote address. Then he will participate in a panel discussion along with Mr. Yoo Mi Young-Hwan, former foreign minister for the Republic of Korea, Evans Revere, former deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asia and Pacific Affairs and now at the Brookings Institute and the Albright Stonebridge Group and Kathleen Stevens, former US ambassador to the Republic of Korea and soon to be the William J. Perry Distinguished Fellow for the Korea program at Stanford University. We look forward to the keynote address and the follow on panel discussion on the future of the US-Korea alliance and Northeast Asia. So it's my introduction, so my introduction to General Hong is that we've become good friends over the past several years. He has two of us three children who live in the United States, one in New York and one in Washington, D.C. He's a man who is very, very familiar with the US-Korea alliance. One of the reasons that he spent so much time learning all about Americans here and we thank you for that, ladies and gentlemen, General Hong. Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen and the congressman, Manjo Low. Thank you for your kind introduction. I would like to express my heartfelt gratitude to Carnegie and the KEI for hosting this meaningful event and inviting me to give keynote remarks. It is especially my great honor to be here with you. Former foreign minister, Yu Myeonghwan, former US ambassador to Korea, Catherine Stevens, former principal deputy assistant secretary of state, Evan Zilvier, and two young Kim from Carnegie in government for international peace. This year, 2015 is very special as he marks the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II, Korea's independence, the division of Korean peninsula, and the creation of United Nations. In this historic year, it is very inspiring opportunity to discuss a future vision for making the ROK and US alliance stronger and more dynamic than ever and the bridging of stability and prosperity to the North Asian region. Since the signing of Korea-US mutual defense trade in 1953, the partnership between the two countries has evolved from a military-centric kind of alliance to a comprehensive alliance, and its geographical focus has moved from just the Korean peninsula to one original and global in scope. It is quite remarkable that this historical development has been achieved during only a short period. Today, the ROK and US alliance is a world-west strategic partnership and processes enormous potential for even greater achievements than what we have done to this day. During more than half a century in the past, as a global superpower, the United States has expanded its role and responsibilities, including its leadership for international efforts against diverse global threats, and Korea has evolved with the United States. I should be humbled to say that Korea's gross domestic products, GDP of 2014, was around 1,300 billion US dollars, which is about 1,000 times bigger than that of 1953, which was merely 1.3 billion US dollars now. Korea's market economy has grown to be the world's 10th largest economy. In addition, Korea is widely recognized as a successful and even role model in political democratization based on the liberal democracy. Now, Korea transfers its know-how to economic and political miracles to developing countries. These changes and the developments transformed the roles and the responsibilities of ROK and US alliance. Ladies and gentlemen, today, taking this opportunity as a keynote speaker for this event, I would like to introduce my recommendations for achieving a future oriented 21st century ROK and US alliance, improving each Asian stability and prosperity, and furthering a global level alliance that tackles complex world issues. First, we should change our strategic view of the ROK and US alliance to introduce new roles and responsibilities for the 21st century alliance. Recalling the 5,000 years old history of the Korean peninsula when the peninsula was instable and invaded by foreign powers, the North East Asian region as instability was also heightened. On the contrary, when the peninsula was stable, the entire region developed peacefully. The reason that the Korean peninsula has such impact on regional situations was Korea's geopolitical location breaching the continent and the sea. Although times and circumstances have changed, Korea's geostrategic location still remains a critical factor for the North East Asian security environment. Considering Korea's geopolitical location and growing capabilities, it is an accurate reason that ROK and US relationship transformation is mainly dependent on US policy changes toward Asia, particularly China and Japan at a time when we were investing our effort to move towards developing future-oriented 21st century alliance. To maintain and strengthen US leadership in Asia, the United States should view its strategic partnership with Korea as an independent and key factor. By doing so, the United States' rebalance to Asia would realize more substantial achievements. On the other hand, if we continue to explore a new leadership of ROK and US alliance without a change the strategic view in improving US-China relations and Korea-US-Japan cooperation, the alliance will be subordinate to the rapid changes in North East Asia rather than leading these changes. Second, North Korea's nuclear issue is the biggest obstacle for the ROK and US alliance and it obstacles, obstructs, greater lasting stability and prosperity in North East Asia. For the past 20 years, international efforts to resolve North Korean nuclear problem has failed. The reason is that Kim Jong-un regime views nuclear weapons as the only means available for securing its survival and economic assistance from the outside of the world. Since Kim Jong-un took power three and a half years ago, the reign of terror continues and it is reinforced. So it is uncertain how effective international sanctions and the appreciation efforts have been to this day. We should change the strategic context in which we deal with North Korea's nuclear issues. One of the key affording policy doctrine of the Obama administration is a world without nuclear weapons. Without nuclear weapons, Korea has been successful in continuing its political and economical and military developments with the provision of US nuclear umbrella. In February, at the high level dialogue between the United States and China, there was a consensus that North Korea's twin pursuit of nuclear weapons and economic developments will not succeed. Like the case between the ROK and the United States, China as a nuclear power can consider an option to provide the nuclear umbrella to ensure North Korea's security and economic assistance. These audacious decisions will change the strategic context surrounding North Korea's nuclear issue. Recently, some are publicly discussing the resplendent of technical nuclear weapons to Korea. It could be one option to consider as a military reinforcement against the North Korea's nuclear threat. But it is uncertain how effective the redeployment will be as a means for deterring North Korea's nuclear deployment itself. Third, without overcoming the division of North Korea, division of Korean Peninsula, our strategic efforts towards the global level ROK and US alliance cannot be fully successful. In 2009, the leaders of Korea and the United States announced a joint vision for the alliance in the 24th century environment. This statement stressed joint efforts through the alliance for the peaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula. The division of the Korean Peninsula is an inherent limit of the ROK and US alliance, which should be overcome. The Park Geun-hae administration have made many efforts toward achieving a peaceful reunification of the two Koreas. Countries neighboring the Korean Peninsula are seriously concerned about the potential changes by the reunification, although strategic efforts by Korea and the United States does not go beyond the level of declaratory support. At the upcoming summit talks, the two leaders should agree to a concrete roadmap for overcoming this paradoxical scandal situation. Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, today's ROK and US alliance is strongly founded on three pivotal cornerstones, such as unshakable political trust, a successful military partnership, and a robust gold class free trade agreement. The alliance affects the daily lives of peoples in both Korea and the United States. So it is an invaluable asset among the two nations and our people as well, peoples as well. Now, as we work together to overcome the challenges facing us, we should strengthen our strategic efforts to solve new seeds toward our stronger future alliance. These efforts will become a key engine, engines for more stable and prosperous in East Asia than ever before. Thank you very much for listening. Well, good afternoon. Hello, I'm Duyan Kim here at Carnegie. It is quite a delight to see a full house today. And I think that's truly a reflection of the caliber of speakers that we have here today with us to engage in a very informative and deep discussion. General Huang, we often call Chairman Huang General Huang because he's a retired Lieutenant General. Thank you for your excellent and eloquent keynote remark that really sets the stage and you give us a lot to work with today in our panel discussion. Of course, thank you, Congressman Manzullo for really setting the stage as well. Before we discuss the upcoming U.S.-Korea Summit that we are expecting later this year, I'd like to ask our distinguished speakers to take a step back a little bit, do some reflection and share with us when you first entered government service or public service, what did the alliance look like? What was the number one issue? And at the time, did you expect us to be dealing with a large array of issues that we are dealing with today, both regional and global in scope? Foreign Minister Yu. Yes, it was early 1970s that I joined foreign ministry. At that time, number one agenda was the diplomatic war against North Korea, military threat from the North, and also how to get more military and economic aid from the United States. We were carefully watching the Senate and House the resolution, so in retrospect, it's really a kind of a change now. Ambassador Stevens. Well, a lot to say, yes? I guess you could say I entered government service and also went to Korea for the first time 40 years ago in 1975 as a Peace Corps volunteer in Korea, and I'm happy to see some of my Peace Corps colleagues here today. Not only with me, but with many of us, it becomes a lifelong, I think, interest and dedication to learning more about Korea and to US-Korean affairs. Yes, I could say a lot, but certainly in the 1970s, as I look from my Peace Corps volunteer perspective at US-Korean relations, I was certainly very struck by the Korean obsession, if I could say, with education and with making life better for their children, and that certainly hasn't changed, but I saw it firsthand in very, very different circumstances in the 1970s when I was living in a rural area of Korea. Korea was still quite rural then, and seeing Korea at a pretty, still a pretty early stage but of its industrialization and its economic growth, which we have so admired over the last few decades. I was back in Korea, and as my government career continued, I'm not going to go back as, but in the 1980s, when I saw Korea as a political transformation, but at that time, in the US-Korean relationship, and that's when I first knew of Mr. Yoo, and also, of course, General Huang playing such an important role, there were issues in the relationship like trade, like human rights, and actually not human rights in North Korea, all that's an issue, human rights in South Korea, like the speed of political reform. So indeed, the agenda has not only changed a great deal, it's become much, much broader, much, much deeper. General Huang, you're a three-term lawmaker, but you started your public service in the military, and I would imagine at the time I was all about North Korea, but at the time, could you even imagine that today we would be dealing with issues like climate change and nuclear security, of global issues? As you mentioned, I began my kind of public service was the military service. As a young, fresh, as a tenant, I couldn't imagine this kind of development and the prosperity on the current peninsula, but I was concentrated with my subordinates how to repel any possible kind of commando or any get-a-lock in being to my camp out. So my concentration was there. It was very intense period, when Kim Shin-Jo and the other commando's weren't contributing to the South. And also we were dispatching our soldiers to Vietnam together with the U.S. military. And so it was very intense and a very serious situation, not simply conforming with the North, but also participating in the Vietnam war to the United States. Evans, I want to bring you into, as the principal deputy assistant secretary, so that's a key rule in governments and especially when you're dealing with Asia issues, how did the paperwork and the agenda item, the list of agenda topics, how did that evolve and grow, I can imagine, from maybe one page to maybe several pages long, if you can share some of your... Well, I didn't realize in posing the earlier question that your hidden agenda was to show this audience how old we really are on this day. But I noticed you didn't direct that question to me. How wise, why? I'm a lot older than you think and I think General Huang and I came in to this game at almost precisely the same time. 1969, host on air base in Korea. So that's how old I am in case you're interested. I was the principal deputy assistant secretary at a point where the relationship was already in full flower and taking off. And so when I look back at the issues that I was dealing with in 2003, 2004 and 2005, not that dissimilar from what we're dealing with today. So in terms of the paperwork load, in terms of the range of issues, in terms of the complexity of issues, things were already well along and the relationship was then in pretty much in full flower and it's grown even more. So I don't see a dramatic or radical difference from that period of time and now. But what I have seen is just an expansion, a great expansion, an impressive expansion of the range of issues that we're working on. We've grown a lot since then, but not dramatically different in terms of the overall content, just more of the good things that we were doing already. But to go back to your earlier question, which I find fascinating because it really puts this relationship in perspective and think about where we were in 1969 and General Wong is already touched on this. Also a fellow Vietnam veteran, a veteran of an era when I arrived at Osan Air Base in Korea and looked around, the anti-aircraft guns and sandbag emplacements were still there because folks thought just a few months earlier that we were going to war on the Korean Peninsula in the aftermath of the Pueblo incident, the Commando incident, et cetera. Cathy's already mentioned the issue of human rights but the issues of human rights and democracy or the lack thereof in South Korea were very profound issues back during this period when I arrived in Korea, the current president's father was still president and economic development, something that we haven't really talked about. Seoul was a very, very different city back then. The Arab world was a very different place in terms of the lack of economic development and it is remarkable how far we have come and how dramatically this relationship has changed in low these many years. So let's fast forward to the present day. In 2009, we had the presidential, the two presidents signed the joint vision statements and in 2013, we set the joint declaration and these two documents can be seen as the roadmap and the guiding principles of the future direction of the alliance in the 21st century. So we have the summit coming up in a few months time. If you could advise your presidents, what would be the top three agenda issues, items that you would recommend be on this upcoming summit? I'm interested in you. And first and foremost, the alliance issue, including Korea's decision to enter TPP and second issue would be North Korea issue, including the contingent's plan, knowing that the situation in the North is deteriorating day by day, month by month. And the third issue should be some regional security issue, including Korea's relations with China and also Korea's relations with Japan. It's very important issues to be discussed. A message to you, please. Well, I would, second minister, you, I think it would probably be easy to agree on an agenda and maybe just add to that. Global economic discussion of the global economy. I think certainly during my time as ambassador in Seoul, Korea, South Korea was the first chair of the G20. And I think since that time, that was in 2009 as well or 2008, all right. In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, Korea's played an important role within the G20. And I think that this is going to be a moment when our two leaders can look at how far we've come and see where we can work together, not only on the economic issues which were formed, but also on some of the other global issues, climate change is another one where I think Korea's played a particularly important role. And I know it's very much a priority of President Obama's. General Huang, top three summit agenda items. I concur with the minister use kind of a consideration. Together with that, I'd like to propose, if I could, is that what kind of strategy cooperation between Korea and the United States can do for future alliance? Even though I retrospected around 1969 and the 70, early 70 years, more capable country, more advanced country, a capable country, what you can do for future scandal, a oriented kind of relationship in between. Evans. My three issues, I would lead with North Korea. The rising threat from North Korea, particularly new developments in their nuclear weapons production program and in their missile capabilities. North Korea, the threat has certainly changed and intensified and we're dealing with a troubling new reality in terms of these new capabilities that the North Koreans are developing and have developed. And we're not in the same place that we were two, three or four years ago. And so I think it's time for us to take a hard look about where we are today and where we may be in one, two or three years time in light of this evolving North Korean threat. And I think that would be a pretty hot topic for me to put on the agenda. The second topic is Japan. With all due respect to Korean friends in the audience, this is an issue of concern to the United States. The continuing difficulties in relations between Seoul and Tokyo is a problematic element for the United States. And the United States can't resolve these issues on behalf of the two countries, but we can facilitate discussions and we can continue to make the point that we have been that a deterioration in Japan-Korea relations is not good for US strategy in the Asia Pacific region. The good news in this area is that there has been an uptick in relations between Tokyo and Seoul. And so one of the topics that I would like to see on the agenda is what more can be done to move Japan-Korea relations and Japan-ROK-US trilateral cooperations up to a new and better level. And the third issue has already been mentioned that is China from a couple of different angles. One angle is the rise of China, the implications of the rise of China for the region, particularly for our alliance system in the region. Number two subset of that would be how to encourage China to do more in terms of helping us on the Korean Peninsula with respect to North Korea. And then the third aspect of the China issue would be how to encourage, how to work together as allies to encourage China to play a more responsible role in the region. So let's go through, there seems to be a lot of overlap and a lot of agreement on the top priorities going forward. So let's start out with what Evans was recommending, the number one issue of North Korea. And we can spend days and weeks and months talking about North Korea, but let's just cut to the chase and really discuss what practical steps can we take on the North Korean nuclear issue? Anybody? Well, yeah. Really. I mean, just follow up on what's already been said. I mean, first of all, yeah, at a summit clearly, I mean, one thing again that hasn't changed in the 60 plus years of the alliance is the need to focus, whenever our leaders get together on the situation on the Korean Peninsula, for all that's been accomplished in Korea on the Korean Peninsula and in the region over the last couple of generations, the unfinished business clearly is the completely unsatisfactory situation in North Korea for the people of North Korea for their human rights, but also as Evans said so well, I mean, the worsening, if you like, security threat emanating from North Korea and the need for us as allied partners to take all the necessary steps to ensure that we're doing everything we need to to keep the Republic of Korea safe and secure to ensure security and continued prosperity in the region. So that's one part of it. I think the second part is to continue to seek a different way as difficult as that is. One thing about diplomacy is it takes a long time sometimes, but you just can't give up. There's a proverb in Korean about you fall down seven times, you get up eight, and we've gotten up at least eight times, I think when it comes to trying to address the challenges that North Korea poses. I think at this moment, I think our leaders might want to look at discussion we've been having, I know in this town earlier today and other places about signs of change in the Korean economy, what that implies. I mean, a continuing effort to understand what's going on in North Korea in every respect. And then the other thing I would suggest, so those would be in terms of our own diplomatic efforts to reflect on the fact that for all of the, as Chairman Wong rightly noted, the failures, which I think are the failure of Pyongyang to grasp the opportunities that it's had for a different future, but for all of that, we have had some progress over the years in working together not only more closely Seoul and Washington, but also together with Tokyo, Beijing, and Moscow. And this year happens to be, not that the 10th year since we agreed to the joint statement of principles in 2005, September 2005. Those principles have not been implemented, but they were principles that were agreed by all six parties, including Pyongyang at that time, and which I think still are a good summary of the alternate future that is out there, a future that provides for, that commits everyone to a Korean Peninsula without nuclear weapons, that the North Korea, between the US and North Korea, and so on, and is a road to unification. So I think this might be a moment when we reflect on the fact that the six parties did agree to it 10 years ago, and think about, in a strategic way, about reaffirming those goals, if you like, or modifying them, and putting that path forward again, and working together as much as we can, Seoul and Washington, and others in the area, notwithstanding the many, many challenges we face right now, and the need to be very realistic about those challenges vis-à-vis Pyongyang. I want to keep this question of practical next steps, but I want to add to that, and Ambassador Stevens, you briefly mentioned something very important. Trying something maybe different that hasn't been tried before, so the added question is, General Hong, you mentioned convincing China to extend a nuclear umbrella to North Korea as a way to perhaps resolve a nuclear issue. Another out-of-the-box provocative, provocative for today's context solution is one that some of our colleagues have recommended, and that's a peace treaty. So, Foreign Minister Yu, what are your reactions to all these points that are being discussed right now? Well, since 1994, when the Geneva agreement was negotiated between North Korea and the United States, the hope was very high at the time. But in retrospect, North Korea has been lying to us for more than 20 years. And now North Korea seem to be determined to develop a deliverable and miniaturized nuclear weapon to threaten South Korea and threaten the United States. So, I'm rather pessimistic to think about the negotiation for denuclearization, Cambian option, viable option. So, it's really dilemma. The American police of strategic patients doesn't seem to work at all. So, what is the alternative? We don't know. So, only ways to continue to pressure North Korea in many ways, tighten the economic sanctions and China should join us. So, we have to continue this kind of pressurizing tactics, but still I'm rather pessimistic because North Korea is accustomed to the such kind of isolated way of living for so many years. So, it's a dilemma for us. Evans, any, your reactions to everything that's been? For US administrations and for ROK administrations have been at this for a long time. And the sad news to report is no surprise to anybody in this room, we failed. We have failed to stop North Korea from developing nuclear weapons capability and the delivery means to deliver those nuclear weapons. And as I suggested earlier, North Korea's capabilities are now moving to a new level that within the next two or three years they will have a credible ability to strike a range of targets in the Western Pacific, the Central Pacific, and ultimately the West Coast of the United States. That's where their program is heading right now. And that clock is ticking and it's a very ominous ticking clock that we see. We have tried over the last 20 plus years, hard line, soft line, engagement, isolation, sanctions, removal of sanctions, you name it. And many of us on this platform have been part of the policy process that has tried every approach that we could think of. What would your solution, your silver bullet solution or recommendation be? I wish there were a silver bullet, but let me suggest that there may not be a silver bullet, but there's something that we have not yet adopted as an element of our strategy in dealing with North Korea. And that is if you look at North Korea, if you listen to North Korea, if you talk to the North Koreans as I've done for thousands of hours and I'll show you my scars later. The one thing that they treasure more than anything is their system and their regime. And so my suggestion is that one element of our approach in dealing with North Korea is to put at risk that thing that they hold most dear. I'm not suggesting regime change, I'm not suggesting inducing collapse, but increase the pressure, increase economic sanctions, do the things to North Korea that we had already done to Iran, for example, that we have not yet done to North Korea. And North Korea is a de facto nuclear weapons processor right now and Iran was not. But take our game up to a new level and the message needs to be very clear to Pyongyang, that we will hold your regime at risk if you continue down this path. Now, there are dangers inherent in the approach that I'm suggesting. We might induce collapse and chaos on the peninsula, we need to think through this very carefully, but one approach that we have not tried is that one and we ought to think about it. General Hong, current foreign minister Yoon Byung-sae has been reported to say that at this upcoming summit that the allies will come to an agreement on changing North Korea's strategic calculation. So the emphasis on changing North Korea's calculations. But in your keynote, you had recommended changing the strategic context in which we deal with the North. And one suggestion for you, your suggestion was having China extend a nuclear umbrella to North Korea. And there are many experts and colleagues who would say that that is an unrealistic recommendation. But what do you say to that? North Korea made it clear the reason why they are keeping a kind of nuclear ambition. There were two reasons. First one is for their survivability, security of their regime. Secondly, they revenge their economy. And so answer could be if we provide persuadable, persuadable kind of guarantee of the security to the Kim Jong-il regime, that can be one kind of answer. The other one is that can be the way to recover North Korean economy. And then how we can persuade North Korea to take kind of a two spectrum. Even though there were kind of a kind of objection to provide a kind of Chinese nuclear umbrella can be unacceptable, was unacceptable. But why don't you try again? Okay. And together with more reasonable and more acceptable kind of approach and also collective efforts to push China. Otherwise, we don't have any other option. And so let North Korea understand keeping a nuclear ambition is the way to survive, is the way of recovering their economy. I think that's the only way. Otherwise we can just wait and we can otherwise we should give up. Any efforts to push in North Korea. Before we move on, it sounds like, well it looks like Minister, you have your deepened thoughts if there's a reaction you'd like to. Well, I remember the period process which was introduced in 1999 and year 2000. At that time, North Koreans said that they had to develop a nuclear weapons in order to protect threat from the United States and South Korea. But I think that's an excuse. It's an excuse to develop a nuclear weapon. And their ultimate purpose of developing nuclear weapon is to communize the whole peninsula. There's all purposes. So giving nuclear umbrella by China is quite a different angle because knowing that North Koreans will intention, I don't think it will work. So that's one way to get rid of the excuse. But to my mind, North Koreans' intention is to still communize the whole peninsula. Mr. Stevens, you had. No, I just wanted to add. I mean, first of all, with respect to the role of China, I think one of the reasons that I think it would be useful to highlight again the agreement that was reached 10 years ago was because China shared those talks and China takes some ownership and some pride in the fact that that agreement was reached, notwithstanding the fact that it has not been implemented. And so this might be a moment, speaking of the summit in particular, with Xi Jinping coming to Washington and then President Park, to re-emphasize this multilateral dimension, which I think will be important going forward. However, we're able to make progress, hopefully at some point in the future. At the same time, I agree that keeping the pressure on is important. Sanctions play a role. I think we have to be realistic about the impact of sanctions on an economy that is not as engaged in the international system as Iran's is, or was, or can be. It's different. And we've tried sanctions for a long time. Sanctions is a means to an end. It's not the end in itself. And we have to think about where it's going to get us. And so far, it hasn't gotten us where we need to go, as we've all talked about. But we need to continue to look for better ways of doing it. My only, my third point in terms of trying to think of, and maybe there's nothing new here. We've obviously thought about this for a long time. But I think this is a moment where soul and where it can play a larger role, potentially. And where the inter-Korean dimension, perhaps, is something that is worth further exploring. I know there have been many efforts on the part of President Park and her government. But in sitting and looking at it from Washington, I think the level of trust and confidence between the two allies is very great now. There's a great understanding of that inter-Korean element. Again, you've got to have a dance partner. And so far, Pyongyang has not been a willing one. But I think that's worth something, another thing to kind of look at. And I think that the US should be very supportive of Seoul's efforts to try to somehow invigorate an inter-Korean element. Can I just jump in on this? I'll never get to talk about that. On this question of sanctions, there are things that could be done in the area of financial flows into and out of North Korea. And North Korea's links to the international banking system that could inflict a level of pain on North Korea that they have never experienced before. I just want to throw that out there. Like the Banco Delta Asia thing. The other thing I wanted to mention is that former Secretary Perry's name came up. I was with Secretary Perry and Pyongyang on that visit in the spring of 1999. And we did a couple of things on that visit that were very significant, one of which was for the second time, an American president provided some guarantees in writing to the North Koreans. We carried a letter with us. And that was meant to assuage North Korean concerns about possibly being attacked, et cetera. And we thought it might have some effect at the time. In retrospect, it did not. But the other thing that Perry did that was extremely effective, and this is going back to my earlier comments now about what we need to do in the future, Perry presented the North Koreans with two paths in terms of a relationship with the United States. We called them, somewhat jokingly, the light path and the dark path. And the light path was, as you might guess, a path of engagement and cooperation and economic development and normalization and all those wonderful things. And the other path, though, he didn't need to describe in much detail. But the North Koreans got our drift. And the message to the North Koreans at the time was, you don't want to go down that path. Somehow, I think we need to reconstitute that binary choice for the North Koreans in some way, shape, or form. For the interest of time, I'd like to pivot to China. I had no pun intended there. And Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Russell had recently made remarks expressing expectation for Korea to play a more active role in dealing with China. I'd like to ask our Korean speakers, does Korea have a role in teaming up with the US in dealing with a more assertive China? Does Korea should Korea play a role in dealing with China's activities in the South China Sea? Yes. The Korean government made it quite clear that the free passage through South China is very important to everybody. 80% of all international trade is going through that area also. For Korea, 90% of oil importation comes through that area. Also, 30% of trade is going through that. So it's very important for Korea as well. So we made it quite clear that China has to abide by the Declaration of Code of Conduct, which was read up between us and countries. And then I'm discussing new code of conduct. But it's not yet agreed upon, but we strongly urged China to expedite a new signing of the new code of conduct with the Asian countries. So in that way, we are also taking side with the other Western countries, including the United States. General, should Korea help in dealing with China, especially in the South China Sea, and on Taiwan? As you said, we should emphasize again and again. And also, I found our cooperation, not simply with South Asian countries and the United States and Japan, but also we can continuously cooperate with European countries. They were also very much interested in the South China Sea issues, because they are too having much interest to utilize that route, a lot of communication to make trade in the commercial and such a kind of objective. So I think we can mobilize additional international support in cooperation with the European countries as well. If our American colleagues don't have anything to add, I do also want to now pivot over to economic issues. This is a time of unprecedented economic institution building in the Asia Pacific. I'd like to ask all four of our distinguished speakers to comment on should South Korea join TPP, transport a Pacific partnership? Yes, yes, yes, and yes. I might predict the answers. TPP is not only a trade agreement, but it also carries a very important strategic meaning. So as a strong, close ally with the United States, Korea has to join the TPP. Yes, as we had a kind of already a chorus FTA and we are entertaining each other. And so TPP is another issue, not simply tightening our kind of trade or economic exchange, but also kind of the relationship to foster our relationship as a strategic point. So my government already paid in our interest. That's what happens. Well, I guess I still have, even though I'm out of government now, when a question is like, should Korea do this or that? As someone who's, I feel like my reflexive reaction is really up to the Koreans to decide, and it really is. But as someone who watched the negotiation and the ratification, the debate about in both our countries and the ratification of the Korea-US Free Trade Agreement over a period of about, how long do we count that, about seven years, I guess, it took from, it was a process. I would say this, as we think about the TPP, it really is important to remember the role that the Korea-US Free Trade Agreement played in laying the groundwork. It still, if I'm not mistaken, the most recent, I mean, big free trade agreement that the US has ratified and participated in. Again, not as a trade expert, but my understanding is the TPP is founded in many ways on the very high standards that were negotiated in that bilateral agreement. So I think Korea has a very special relationship, if you like, with the TPP. And, of course, Korea itself is a country that really pioneered, given the competitive neighborhood it's in, its desire to always try to get ahead of the curve when it comes to trade and competitiveness, really pioneered a lot of bilateral trade agreements. So I think it's a natural, this is something that's now being considered. It's really, in some ways, inspired by Korea, by Korea's energy in pursuing these agreements. I would also just add, it's fascinating to me to be back in the United States at a time when TPP and Trade Promotion Authority has attracted so much interest here, because during the Korea-US Free Trade Agreement discussions, there were times when it was very controversial in Korea. And some of the elements that are now being debated here were hotly debated in Korea. Now everyone kind of accepts it, and I think things has been a very good thing. So this is, I'm just speaking kind of as an American citizen now. I mean, I'm glad. I'm glad to see the debate in our country in many ways, because when it was going on in Korea, mostly it was a little bit, you know, just not really in the headlines here. So it's a sign of, I think, just changing, if you like, I think changing agenda in our own country. Also, the other reason that Korea should join TPP is that out of 12 member countries of TPP, we already have FTA with 10 member countries, so it's quite natural that we have to join this high standard free trade agreement. I'd like to broaden the scope even more and touch upon global issues. What are some, maybe one or two global issues that the allies should cooperate on together in the 21st century and beyond? Well, the most important issue, global issues, climate change. Korea already declared that by 2030, we'll reduce our carbon emission by 37% of BAU, business as usual. It's a daunting task for us. We have to reduce one third of the carbon emission, so we already declared our position, resisted United Nations, so we'll continue. Korea want to be an early mover, so-called. Under previous government, Lee Myung-bak, he made a very important stride in terms of our contribution to climate change, and Korea also hosted a global climate fund in Korea. So we are doing our best to contribute to the world, together with the United States. I would add. Together with you. Together with you, not simply climate issues, but also environmental issues and drug and crime kind of international efforts, which you can cooperate more comprehensively. I would add nuclear nonproliferation and the preservation of the Nonproliferation Treaty as a key priority for Korea. It makes eminent sense, particularly in light of the threat that the ROK is under today and what's happening across the border in the north. I think Korea has a special role to play and indeed has played a very helpful role in hosting the Nuclear Summit in Seoul, for example. But that, I think, should be very close to the top of the list in terms of things that we can work on very constructively together. The new agenda is the pandemic issue. Last year, the United States hosted first the Global Health Security Agenda meeting. And the second meeting will be held in Korea this year, September, which is a very important global issue to tackle together with other countries. Yeah, on all these issues, and as I think about particular regions of the world, what really strikes me now is, as it did during my time in Seoul as Ambassador, is that as I kind of looked around both that global issues and at regions, there were very few places where, and maybe almost done where, the Republic of Korea's interests and American interests were not complementary. And even more important, kind of what we brought to the table was complementary. And I think health issues is a very good example. Climate change issues is a very good example. And we found there really were ways when we could work together. And even more underlying that were similar values. And I guess that would be part of my response to the question I didn't answer about, should Korea help with China? I mean, in a way, if I may say, I don't think that's the right way to phrase it, because what we found is, we really can partner on these things and come at them from different angles, maybe with different levels of commitment or kinds of commitment, but very complementary efforts. And one additional specific, I feel like kind of area or means of doing that I would add is going one very close to my heart, which is development assistance. The fact that Korea is the one recipient P-Score country. I got to mention P-Score again. That left Korea, finished in Korea in 1981, but that now sends its own volunteers overseas. And we've found ways in which those volunteers can cooperate. And I'm not talking now about 30 or 40 years ago, I'm talking about young Koreans and not so young Koreans going out now all over the world. And finding ways in which they can work with American P-Score volunteers in the field and from other countries as well. So I think that's part of Korea's global profile. It's part of Korea's, if you like, use of its soft power. And that turns out to be very, if I may say, useful for the United States and useful for the recipient countries. So I think the potential in this whole global area is very great. I think Korea itself has only begun to explore this. And this is very much something that's welcome, I think, for the rest of the United States. I'd like to set us at enough time for the best part of the program, which is giving an opportunity for all of you to ask questions. So we do have mics that will be floating around. If you could please state your name, your affiliation, and a very concise question. We'd appreciate that. And I would actually like to give first divs to anyone who has a question on Japan, because I did not cover that. Does somebody have gentlemen right here? Yes. Actually, I just want Chairman Huang and Minister Yu to talk about what you mentioned earlier. So what's your name and your affiliation, please? I'm Chen Wenhua, China Daily. And try to align between US, Japan, and Korea. I mean, some Korean experts question whether it even exists. So what's your view on this alliance? And also I want you to comment on today's news, actually. The Japanese dies even in the past. Security registration, which would enable Japan to fight Japanese self-defense forces to fight overseas. So what's your view? What's the Koreans' view on this? Thank you. I think you said Korea-Japan alliance. Alliance is a currency of different meaning. I'd better put it, Korea, Japan, United States, trilateral cooperation. I think it's very important for us to maintain peace and stability in the Pacific area, not only in the Pacific, the whole world. Korea, Japan, United States are sharing the same value, rule of law, market economy, human rights. So we have to cooperate each other to maintain peace and stability in the region first and to the world. So it's quite natural for us. So I don't have any doubt on it. Most of Koreans believe that that's rising to do. So we have to increase our cooperation among the three countries. And the other question you raised is the Japanese kind of what we call it. Recently, Japanese diode is discussing about passing the security-related laws. And recently, when Japanese Prime Minister Abe came to the United States, both countries agreed to upgrade the defense guidelines. I think it's a benefit, beneficial to Korea as well. Because Korea has always mindful of North Korean military threat. So it will help Koreans security. So I'd rather want to perceive that in a very favorable way rather than objecting it. But some critics in South Korea saying that expressing some concerns and worries about that, I don't think it's right. It helps South Korean security. The Korean situation is divided country yet. And increasing threat from the north, upgraded threat, more complicated threat like weapons of mass destruction and the missile capabilities, a symmetric kind of threat, is increasing. And this origin formed the Korean War. And so we are still keeping to deter any contingency on the Korean peninsula. And also, should there be any kind of provocative actions from the north, we should be ready. And our kind of preparedness to deter or to repel any invasion from the north is in cooperation with United Nations and United States and Japan and Korea together. And so in terms of security, it's inevitable to strengthen our kind of cooperation in three countries. We understand that our very significant importance of Chinese kind of activity is also very much a positive role to improve our kind of region to be stable and secured, to peaceful. Chinese participation is very important. And so I think we'll be cooperating very much on these matters as a transparent manner. And also we are asking why the Japanese are revising their constitution and normalizing their country. And then we are asking the transparent of those kind of military is kind of upgrading plan in their own kind of capacity. One more point is that the important role of American forces stationed in Japan, I think more than 60%, 70% of their role is to support American forces stationed in South Korea in case of contingency. So that's the fact. Second role. Alan Romberg, Stimson Center. One comment and one question. The comment is I agree with those who said it would really be great if South Korea would join TPP. I regret that South Korea didn't have that attitude before this round of negotiation. I think it would be really good if Korea had been included. I think it may be more difficult for Korea in a second round, but I still think it'll happen. My question is for any or all the members of the panel, and it's a great panel, by the way. Thank you very much for doing this. What do you think China's attitude is toward Korean unification? Good question. Who would like to go first? Well, if you allow me. If I answer first, then. Oh, OK. We're not shy. Please. I think I should have more opportunity to ask if China is relevant to the personnel in the government or in the kind of intellectual side. I actually wanted to have a kind of buffer zone to prevent China to be safe. And so I think there's a kind of possibility of Chinese government to want to have a kind of buffer zone to maintain a kind of peace on their mainland, utilizing North Korea as a buffer zone or something like that. But we think we want to be very responsible and transparent country even after unification of Korea. It doesn't hamper at all for the security of China. And so we should make transparent manner and continuously frustrating China unification and post unification period. We are not to hamper at all to destabilizing the region. And so eventually, we hope to understand China, that kind of unification can be acceptable to China. Yeah, I don't argue with General Fang, but yes, the North Korea has been a strategic asset to China until this time, until today. But I felt that more and more, Chinese seem to feel kind of a burden in keeping North Korea in their hands for obvious reasons. For example, in the United Nations, in order to protect North Korea, China paid much price for that. For example, when North Korea sank a naval vessel in South Korea 2010, there was a security council meeting. And they were about past resolution. But China, you know, objected it. By doing so, China really paid a price for that. They lost their image as a responsible international stakeholder. So more and more, it seems to me that China feel kind of burdened. So in order to get support of China for unification, we have to make China believe that unified Korea may better serve their strategic interests. I think that they will come sooner or later. If North Korea continue to build the nuclear bomb and threaten everybody, I think North Korea can threaten even China because they are so close to each other. If North Korea has deliverable, miniaturized nuclear weapons, why not use it against China? So I don't believe China will continue to think North Korea will be a strategic asset. Yes, the gentleman on the second row was the first. Let's actually take these two questions together, please. Peter Humphrey. I'm a former diplomat and current intelligence analyst. I hear sort of a schizophrenia in which people are bending over backwards to offer the North security guarantees. And yet every single person in this room wants to see that regime simply disappear. So how about let's go on the other side of the schizophrenia and look to an international covert effort to topple the regime and this tragedy once and for all. You guys are living with some sort of delusion thinking that security guarantees to the North are going to make the nuclear weapons disappear. They're not. So let me ask you about the other side. Let's look to a coordinated effort to get rid of this regime. Gentleman in the front row, please. Yes, Ray. Thank you. I'm a great panel. I'm Andre Savozo, and I am a partner and director for Washington DC and Vietnam and Southeast Asia for the interstate travel company that makes a very good product for addressing climate change. But I'm not going to talk about that. What I want to ask is this. It's perplexing to me. And could you explain, please? The question is, why is it so hard for our wonderful friends and strategic partner in the Republic of Korea to set the past aside and orient on the future with Japan? With Japan, because it affects not only our international relations you're talking about, but it affects my state, the Commonwealth of Virginia, because our great governor has wonderful relationships with Japan and with Korea, and he has problems with American citizens of the origin from Japan or Korea battling each other in our state politics. Thank you. So two provocative questions, a lot to work with. Well, as I said all year. I mean, bilateral cooperation between Korea, Japan, and the United States is very important to South Korea. And we care very much our relations with Japan. Japan is a close country, friendly country to Korea, even though we had a very bad memory in the past. We endured 35 years of a colonial rule. It was very harsh. Yes. But sometimes Koreans are very emotional when Japanese try to deny their wrongdoings. So we want to hear an apology from real heart, not just the kind of a pro-former apology. But Japanese political atmosphere recently is quite different from the old days. Now there is some kind of revisionist, historical revisionist sentiment in the right wing political area, spear. So it really kind of a source of our concern. I don't believe that Japanese will be militarized and they would go back to old days of militarism. I don't believe it. So Koreans will sooner or later understand, because we are trying very hard. The people's people, I mean, the relationship is quite good, not that bad. We understand each other. Koreans and Japanese are most similar people in terms of culture and appearance and languages and everything. So we have every reason to live peacefully together and economically as well. So I'm rather not that much concerned about the Korea-Japan relationship, getting improved day by day. For example, two weeks ago, the prime minister appeared at the reception commemorating the 50th anniversary of the diplomatic repression. And my president also came to Japanese reception. So they exchanged a good kind of remarks. So I think it's a good sign for recovering our friendly good relations. Evans. I wanted to weigh in on the other question. Yes, the first question. If you can imagine, living here in Washington, DC, and in Reston, Virginia, there was a country of 23 million people. That was the border in Reston, Virginia. And roughly 20 million people in the greater Washington area were under the threat of a North Korean artillery attack. And this country over there in Reston, Virginia had nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, biological weapons, and 1 million-plus troops under arms and had a very hostile attitude towards those living in this area. That's the situation that exists right now in South Korea. And if you're living in Seoul, South Korea, it's very easy to say, let's get rid of North Korea. If I were to wake up tomorrow morning in North Korea, it would be gone. It would be one of the greatest benefits to the region and the world that I can think of. But virtually every scenario that people talk about in terms of the collapse of that regime, the destabilization of that regime, or the changing of that regime, involves potentially a level of violence that most South Koreans find unacceptable. And that's the problem. How do you get rid of this regime? Even if the PRC, the United States, the ROK, Japan, and the international community writ large were all to agree that this ought to be our policy, there is still this potential for violence and there is still this potential because Seoul is so close to the DMZ that there would be a tremendous humanitarian disaster that would accompany this. So the task before us is, how do we get rid of that regime in a way that minimizes and hopefully eliminates the possibility of violence? That is a very, very tall order. And if anybody has any brilliant suggestions, let me know. So we've been working at this problem a long time. But at the end of the day, we need to look to our South Korean friends and allies. For their judgment, they live next door to this country. And it is literally as far, the border is as far away as the rest is from here. And we need to basically yield to their judgment on the best way of dealing with this problem because they live next door and they're under the arcs of North Korean guns. We have two questions here. The woman right there and the gentleman over there. Marisa Lino, I'm a retired US diplomat. I now work for Northrop Grumman. I have a very specific question. It has to do with the missile technology control regime. Korea is the Republic of Korea, excuse me, is the last country that joined the MTCR in 2001. My question, and it's for anyone on the panel, but specifically for our Korean guests, is whether Korea would be, the Korean government would be open to additional members. And if yes, specifically, what would be the opinion about India joining the MTCR? Well, India has to respect their money. American position on that issue because India is a very special country for the United States. They developed missile and nuclear weapons. You didn't recognize it, but recently US accepted the status of India as a defect of nuclear power. So what is the comment? It's interesting. I just came back from leading the US mission in India for seven months. And one thing the Indians would say to us is, what are you doing to get us into these regimes? And we would say, well, we're talking with our partners and trying to find a way to move this forward. So I think it is a good example of global issues and non-proliferation issues where we look to find a common position in most cases we do, but not in every. So Korea closely in cooperation with the United States and the non-proliferation issues, especially MTCR is very important. We are joining every part of MTCR regimes. I mean, I would also, I just kind of sideways into not going to talk about India. I mean, one thing maybe the people say, why don't you buy a red car? Maybe it's too facetious. You see a red car everywhere. I mean, wherever I go, I see Korean engagement. And I was in India for seven months. And there's no particular Korea angle except that I was very impressed to see the kind of partnership that South Korea had built with the Indians over the years. So part of the answer also on the MTCR is not, is India and the Republic of Korea talking to each other and building the confidence that's necessary to take that step. That's right. This gentleman. Oh, yes. Gerald, how are you? As my colleagues, I know what panel I'm mentioned about, we Koreans really want to make a stable and a peaceful region. And so we are fully compliant with international regime to enter NPT or non-proliferation treaty or this kind of MTCR, not to provoke any instabilizing kind of factors. That was the reason why we entered MTCR in the year 2001, as you said. So likewise, the Indian case, I think it is a kind of meta of the mutual cooperation in between the United States and India for the sake of peaceful and stable region and the nearby. And I think there wasn't any as kind of stalkers to have that kind of cooperation. There was a gentleman with the pink tone. Whitey Park with the Boeing company. Since my colleague asked a question from another gentleman, I just obliged that. Be just fair, Boeing has come in and asked the question. But really, thank you very much for such distinguished panelists. And I had fortune to serve in the United States Army for 30 years and all of that 12 years I served in Korea at Evans Revere and General Hong. We kind of served together there during that time. But I want to help General Hong because he's surrounded by all the diplomats here. His comment that he made both at keynote speech and just now mentioned about how China can provide nuclear umbrella to North Korea. You know, 30 years I looked at Korea issues, and I think maybe that's one of the first time I heard that. And I think just like we did, United States provided a nuclear umbrella to Korea and Japan, and they prospered. I think what is your opinion or assessment if we were to allow? It is really China is the key player here. If we allow Chinese to put their troops in North Korea, at the same time provide nuclear umbrella, I think they'll be much more credible. And maybe we could go somewhere with that insightful thought. Do you have General Hong? We have a question right in front of you. Women with a black suit. And today we really are provocative today. This is great. Excellent question. Excellent question. My name is Kayla Orton. I'm currently intern at the Woodrow Wilson of the North Korea International Documentation Project. Earlier, you guys discussed the topic of the Six-Party Talks. You talked about the 2005 joint statement. And I was curious, as your opinion, could you talk about this idea of something new? Do you believe, well, coming back in many ways the Six-Party Talks has kind of been dead since 2009. People still talk about it. And they talk about almost like the glory days of the negotiations and communications. And I'm wondering if you guys would tell me a little bit about your thoughts about reinstating Six-Party Talks, giving me a new focus, changing Six-Party Talks, or getting rid of it completely and starting with something new. Okay, so two questions. We have Chinese troops in North Korea and reinstating Six-Party Talks, or something new? Let me try the... Why don't we try the... Let me try one and maybe the other. Okay, why don't you... The only thing that's more powerful than South Korean nationalism is North Korean nationalism. And I would find it really hard to believe that the North Korean regime would allow one Chinese soldier to cross the border onto its territory, to be very serious, very frank. I would also find it very hard to believe that the DPRK would accept the notion of putting its security in the hands of another country by allowing China to extend its defenses, its nuclear deterrent on North Korea's behalf. Even if the Chinese were to offer that, I don't think that would be on, and I doubt the Chinese would offer that. But that's the answer to that question. On the question of the Six-Party Talks, I would agree with the point that Kathy made earlier, that if you look at the content of that agreement, the September 19, 2005 agreement, you look at the participants, you look at the structure that was put together as a result of those hard and very good negotiations. Everything that needs to be said about these issues is in there, in terms of denuclearization, a path to more normal relations, a path to stability in and around the Korean Peninsula, a path to a greatly improved security environment for all, a peace treaty, everything is in there. And Kathy made the very important point that everyone, including the DPRK, agreed to that. So to step back and to throw it all away and to say we need to somehow reinvent the wheel, I think would throw away a lot of really good work. I think the important thing going forward is to hold North Korea to the agreements that it has already made, very good agreements that would give all the parties, including North Korea, what they want and what they need. And so the notion of restarting this process or breaking it down and then having one or two or more of the players leave the process, I don't think is on, all of the relevant parties were there at the table. They came up with a very good agreement. It's an agreement that if implemented, would give everybody, including North Korea, what it said, that it wants and needs. And so let's not reinvent the wheel here. That's my personal view. Nice. Well, as you said, North Korea wouldn't allow China to send their soldiers to North Korea. I agree. But hypothetically speaking, even though North Korea asked China to send troops, China wouldn't because China already had too much problem. In Xinjiang, Tibet, and they don't want to create another headache by sending their troops to North Korea. So I strongly believe that China wouldn't do so. I just, this is a general comment maybe on diplomacy that sort of touches in a way on history and negotiations. And I was involved when I wasn't involved in Korea and Northern Ireland for a number of years and the Balkans for a number of years. And speaking of history, I mean the adage about places that produce more history than they can consume. You might be able to say that about Asia. You might be able to say it about, but it takes time to address some of these historical issues. But in terms of diplomacy and a process, but in those places, the outlines of a settlement in Northern Ireland, I'm now using as an example, were well known for decades. And in fact, when finally a settlement was reached, everybody said, well, this is exactly what was negotiated 20 years ago. And it's because still the sort of strategic, if you like, and strategic interests and values involved were kind of the same, but it took a long time to get there and a lot of bloodshed and a lot of tragedy. So I think part of diplomacy is you stick with your principles, you can adjust them. I mean, in the joint statement of principles, somebody mentioned peace treaty. There's a reference to at the proper time the negotiation of a peace regime, peace treaty, whatever. It's in there. How those things play out, in what order? I mean, all remains to be seen, but I think that there's an understanding these things need to be addressed. And at the heart of it is a Korean peninsula without nuclear weapons that is reconciled with itself and with its neighbors. Yes, we're in the front. And we'll have time for just two questions. So we're in the front, and let's get someone from the very back. I see a gentleman wearing a suit. I can't see your face in the dark suits. I only see dark. I'm sorry, I can't see. I can't see that far. Yes, please. Thank you. My name is Jeanine Nguyen with Voice of Vietnamese Americans. I'd like to first thank General Hoang for your service in Vietnam. And I'd like to come back to the South China Sea issues and the relationship between the Korea and Vietnam. And I'd like to ask the panel how the case of Vietnam and the case of North Korea and South Korea can be compared, contrast, and applied in the future, given what just happened here last week, with the fact that the Secretary General of the Communist Party of Vietnam came here and has changed the directions. So there's a lot to say. But I'd like to bring in the economy part of the TPP and that, as you have said, that is also geopolitical and security. And I'd like to ask how South Korea view it and how that should be in your next five or 10 years strategy. How would Vietnam fit into the development? You talk about development of the people as well. So I think right now, South Korea has a lot already in South Vietnam. Can we just ask you to give a few strategic points that would help the current South China Sea issues and also have to develop the TPP and have to stabilize the area? Thank you. The gentleman in the back, last question. Hello, my name is Leandro. I go to Florida International University and my question is how, since previously we talked about China opposing the unification of North and South Korea, what about Russia and its role with North Korea and the possibility that they are opposing anything, any action the US has been doing in, even in the Middle East. So what about Russia's role in North Korea? Thank you. Okay. Two excellent questions. Who would like to go first? Vietnam? Vietnam? Yeah. As we mentioned already about the, our very keen interest to maintain South China Sea is kind of a free and peaceful kind of legacy, navigating that particular area is our national interest. And so we already expressed our interest and in support of international cooperation, particularly the region, the area, the four countries around to maintain kind of still peaceful kind of the path of our kind of vessels. And TPP also, as we paid interest, we are still developing our cooperation with South Asian countries as well. As you mentioned, Vietnam, Indonesia and the other South Asian countries very much. And so looking to the future, we want to prosper or explore the kind of cooperation with the South Asian countries as well. And we are, I had many opportunities to come to Vietnam and I met and we had an excellent cooperation with Vietnam, Vietnam is friends. Before we continue, Evans unfortunately has a hard stop for it because he has a train to catch. So we will say our farewell to Evans first and continue our discussion. Thank you so much, Evans. Sorry. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. We have a Vietnam question and a Russian question. Well, this one, I think if TPP is completed, Vietnam will be the most beneficiary of that agreement simply because already many companies are trying to move their factory to Vietnam. And Vietnam has good infrastructure and good governance. So I think you will benefit more than any other country. And if Korea,