 This is Jeff Deist, and you're listening to the Human Action Podcast. Ladies and gentlemen, welcome back once again to the Human Action Podcast, the weekly show where we are not afraid to read and tackle and discuss serious books, generally in the realm of economics but not always. And listeners will recall that last week we took a little foray into foreign policy and US interventionism with the great Scott Horton and his new book on the war on terror, titled Enough Already. But this week we are back to core economics and catching up with the Rothbard book America's Great Depression, which we haven't covered. We went through a few of Rothbard's smaller works really two years ago on the show. And last year in 2020, we managed to work our way in a series of shows through man economy and state, his magnum opus and treatise really, on economics and economic theory. But now we are turning again in 2021 especially to some of the smaller works among our bigger names like Murray Rothbard and of course Ludwig von Mises, Hans Hermann Hoppe to try to fill in people's knowledge gaps and also to enjoy ourselves and get each and every one of you out there reading more of the foundational texts rather than just consuming all the white noise and social media that comes our way. So that's really the goal of the show. And for America's Great Depression, I thought there would be no better guest than our friend Jonathan Newman. Now Jonathan is a name many of you know he writes frequently from Mises.org. He was actually a summer fellow with the Mises Institute a few years ago and graduated right here across the street at Auburn University from their PhD program and is currently teaching up at Bryan College in Tennessee. So I get to see him occasionally since we're only a few hours apart. So Jonathan, thank you so much. It's great to talk to you. Thanks for having me. It's good to be here. Well, I was leafing through this book on my Kindle recently on an airplane and I was thinking to myself, you know, I'm going to do the show with Jonathan. There's so much going on in just the last 24 or 48 hours. We've had this GameStop short-selling Bruhaha happening. And so when I read this book, and of course it's in many ways a cautionary tale, and it is coming in at about 350 pages, I thought a good question for Jonathan would be, you know, with everything else going on in the world, what's the case for reading this book? Why should we read it today and what can we learn from it and how can we benefit from it? Well, it's an excellent book. I frequently recommend this one to students, especially ones who are interested in money and banking and the Austrian business cycle theory. I still think that it is the, especially chapter one of the book, is the best description and explanation of Austrian business cycle theory that exists today. So, I mean, it's an older book, but I don't think I've seen a better description and explanation of Austrian business cycle theory since Rothbard's America's Great Depression in chapter one. But more than that, so he goes through the theory of the Austrian business cycle theory, but then he shows how to apply it. And he does just a perfect job in my view. He refers to all of the things that he mentioned in his explanation of the theory, and he just goes step by step. So there's a cause and effect associated with the business cycle. And he points out the cause and describes the cause. He points out the inflation that happened during the 20s. And then he shows how everything that happened, especially through the first years of Hoover, he shows how none of that did anything to allow a recession to a true liquidation, I should say, to take place or allow prices to go where they should. In fact, everything that the government was doing was just sort of messing things up. And so you ask, why should we read it today? I mean, it seems like this story of booms and busts and an out of control fed and a government that sort of is stuck with the case of the do some things, intervene, always tried to fix things. And then the result is things getting worse or things at least not being allowed to be fixed on the market. So it's a great book on its own and it's still relevant today because of what we see. So Jonathan, both your host and a lot of our listeners today are lay readers of economics. And you mentioned his treatment of the Austrian business cycle theory in really a short form here. It's just between pages three and 29 on the table of content. So in very quick and dirty fashion, you get what I've heard other commenters say is one of Rothbard's best expositions of the business cycle theory. So in that sense, the book might be worthwhile just for this little part one. Yes, it's just beautiful the way he goes through it. And it's very concise as well. Like you said, it's just just a few pages. And the way he explains it is it's very easy to understand. It's very intuitive. He just sort of points out some of the features that we see in a business cycle and tries to explain where those things might come from. So really the main thing that he points out is the cluster of entrepreneurial errors. And a lot of the other business cycle theories that he goes through, he shows how they don't really explain that cluster of errors. So why is it that every now and then in our economy, we see a lot of entrepreneurs making the same kind of errors? It seems like in normal times or at least in the normal functioning of a market economy, entrepreneurs should be able to, at least on average, see down the road, see where losses are coming, see where profits can be had. And there's this automatic adjustment mechanism within the market, namely via profit and loss signals and mechanisms, such that entrepreneurs that do make correct judgments about the future are rewarded with profits and there's this incentive for profits. And not only that, but the profits actually allow them to attract more resources to their profitable endeavor, their line of production, whatever it happens to be. And losses do the opposite. So there's this automatic feedback mechanism, automatic adjustment mechanism through profit and loss. So why is it that sometimes we see all of this class of entrepreneurs, why do we see them all of a sudden just out of nowhere, it seems, make the same kinds of errors and invest in the wrong lines of production make things that consumers don't actually want, or produce things at a cost that can't be recouped by consumers paying prices that they're willing to pay. And the central cause of this, Rothbard points to, is manipulation in credit markets by a central bank. So if we have a central bank who's increasing the money supply and the money is coming into the economy through the financial sector, through the financial intermediaries, it comes into the economy in the form of an increase in loanable funds an increase in credit. And this has consequences on the structure of production. It has consequences on the way entrepreneurs decide to purchase some factors of production, but not others, or pursue some lines of production and not others. And the particular way that an increase in artificial credit like that influences the way entrepreneurs make those decisions, is it makes the longer production processes look more attractive. It also makes the riskier ones look more attractive. It makes the really long, really risky lines of production attractive like building big new houses for people. It takes a long time and it takes a lot of intermediate products and capital goods to complete that. The low interest rates and the increased incomes associated with new money coming from a central bank makes those sorts of things look attractive, but they can't be completed. We don't have the factors of production. We don't have the real resources, I guess I should say, to really complete all of these lines of production that are spurred on by manipulation by central banks. And so what we end up with, the inevitable result is a collapse in employment. Entrepreneurs get discouraged. They have to leave their projects. There's wages go down, incomes go down, lots of loss of confidence and consumer confidence in spending and that sort of thing. So Rothbard shows how really the recession or the bust period is a necessary consequence of the boom period as opposed to what other thinkers would say, which is that it just sort of comes out of nowhere or the market economy itself has some sort of inherent instability that results in a bust. Yes, and he mentions this. In fact, he titles a portion of Part I, Alternative Explanations of Depression. And so as you mentioned, this book is oldish now. The first edition was written way back in 1963. And I think it's interesting to recall that the events of 1933, for example, 3233 are only a few decades old then. So he's writing this in a much fresher voice. And what reminded me here, Jonathan, a little bit of Rothbard's writing in that period, in other words, around the same time late 50s, early 60s when he was writing Man of Economy and State, is that he seems to take greater pains to discuss or consider some of the alternative or mainstream critiques of Austrian theory. In other words, here he goes through some of the Keynesian critiques like the liquidity trap. He talks about this concept of there's been overproduction and that's why there's an economic pullback. He goes into Schumpeter's business cycle theory. So this is a little bit different Rothbard in tone and tenor. Gosh, that's almost 60 years ago now he wrote this. Yeah, but it's still entertaining to read to this day. So even though he's discussing these alternative theories as they existed and as they were propounded by economists back then, we still see economists today making the same sorts of errors. Unfortunately, Austrians and Austrian economists are still in the minority. You know, at the top influencing policy, we're not up there saying stop the printing presses, but we still see the same fallacies being presented today. In fact, I think I remember Rothbard mentioning one of the theories. I think it was the acceleration principle that he was discussing and he called it a tissue of fallacies and you really just have this mental picture of Rothbard just ripping it to shreds. And it's one of those things as somebody who reads a lot of Rothbard. It's so entertaining to read because he writes in his own particular way. There's not really another author who writes the same way that Rothbard writes where you can tell that the gloves are off. Rothbard's not afraid to say it like he thinks it is and it's just an entertaining read. What's interesting is as we shift to part two, which is more of a history, he titles it The Inflationary Boom, 1921 to 1929, is this book sort of goes from a theory section to the next two sections, history sections. So he weaves these together in one book. Yeah, I like the way he starts the part two with the inflationary factors. He starts off by defining the money supply. And the reason I like that is because the next few sections actually, like many, many pages, tens and tens of pages, he spends just going through what parts of the money supply increased and what parts decreased. And so it's really beneficial for him to go through in the very first part of this part and just define the money supply. What is the money supply? How can we conceive of the money supply? What sort of things should we include in the money supply? What shouldn't be included? And of course, Austrians have a particular take on that. In fact, Professor Salerno and Rothbard did some writing about constructing or thinking of what an Austrian money supply figure would include. And so Rothbard does that here and lo and behold, what we see is that there was dramatic inflation during this period. So during the 1921, yeah, from 1921 to 1929, there were increases in the money supply. And so you see it in a clearer way by looking at the true money supply or looking at Rothbard's view of what the money supply is. And it's not like he's coming up with his own sort of harebrained version of the money supply. He backs it up with what we know from economic theory that money is a widely accepted medium of exchange, something that's spendable at par on demand or redeemable at par on demand. And so if we take those components, we actually do see increases in the money supply during that period. The roaring 20s was a boom period for a reason. While there were advances in technology and increases in production, and also Rothbard admits there was some increase in gold during that same period, Rothbard shows that the actual amount of credit that was expanded on top of increases in productivity and increases in gold discovery and mining and minting, they were there and they explained why we had this inevitable bust that came in 29 and afterwards. Well, and the money supply definition he says is commonly used back then is basically M1 today, which is in just the last year, by the way, here in the United States has gone from $4 trillion to over $6 trillion in about eight months. So that's scary even if you accept sort of this narrowest idea of M1, basically currency and circulation plus demand deposits that people like you and I hold outside of the Fed, outside of commercial banks. But what's fascinating is, as you say, he gets into a little bit broader, or what we would consider sounder Austrian definition, especially at page 90s, that's what we need to speak more broadly about this. And if you consider part of the money supply to include anything convertible into cash on demand, Rothbard is in a sense sort of presaging the concept of shadow banking, that there's all these things out there for which people can demand cash money for in exchange, but there's far less than 100% cash reserves available to pay them, and that could even include like a life insurance policy. And so today we see certain bonds, we see a treasury assets, all kinds of things having almost a degree of money-ness. And so back then as today, the official stats don't really necessarily show the degree of the risk. Right. And what's interesting is Rothbard, he admits that including life insurance surrender liabilities is really, really controversial. It's not something that other people would consider as a part of the money supply. But like I said, he started off this section of his books, just starting with a definition of the money supply and whatever falls into that category is a part of the money supply and whatever doesn't isn't a part of the money supply. So he's not trying to avoid stepping on toes, he's trying to do real economics, just put pen down to paper and do the analysis. So even if it takes him to controversial places like including life insurance policies and the money supply. Well, another I think feature of part two is he talks about foreign lending and this idea that we need to help Britain, for example, coming out of its problems after World War I. And so gold's flowing out of Britain and so they need U.S. dollars. And so we help Britain by lending essentially U.S. dollars to them. And that's still going on today, John, and we've seen since the crash of 2008, and this is only intensified actually in the last few years, is that our modern Fed has these credit swap arrangements where we provide liquidity, not only to the ECB and the European countries, but all kinds of countries around the world so that they can have enough dollars to operate. So this sort of interventionism, which Rothbard almost posits as a form of foreign policy, this is still going on. Yeah, one thing that I've enjoyed seeing just over the past few years is this sort of a populist outcry, outrage against that sort of thing. So we see that not just with the central bank policy, but I guess it's all connected, but with the spending bills and a lot of that money is going overseas. A lot of people are really mad about that. You can see why. It's like they're tax dollars or it's their money that's being inflated and it's not even staying inside of the U.S. It's like, well, what about all the problems that we have here? Why don't I have more of my money back? Why can't I get some of my money back? Why is it going overseas? But in particular with Rothbard here, he shows how the boom was funneled into agricultural exports in the United States. So we can point to like the specific industries where the expanded credit, the artificial credit flows into and that industry, that sector has increases in incomes, increases in prices relative to other ones. And Rothbard shows how what happened during this period is that the artificial credit and the boom was really funneled into agricultural exports. And it was because of what institutional frameworks existed at the time and what politicians' incentives were at the time. And so he showed how the boom was really in that sector of the economy where I don't, at least to my knowledge, I haven't seen other economists really figure that out as to where exactly was the artificial boom in the United States and Rothbard found that Rothbard discovered that for us. And so as with today, we can view in part monetary policy as a scheme to help prop up U.S. exports, right? The rest of the world needs dollars to buy them. Now, having read the other Newman, Patrick Newman's Progressive Era, the book he edited by Mary Rothbard, you know, we get a little bit of that flavor here when he's talking about Benjamin Strong, who has had a New York Fed, and Montague Norman, who has had a Bank of England at the time, sort of colluding and conspiring together. And the sense, the takeaway one gets from Rothbard, who's always the revisionist's story, and is to say, you know, this collusion and conspiring wasn't necessarily good for the average American, although it may have benefited bankers. Yeah, that's one of the great things about Rothbard's writing. I'm currently teaching a history of economic thought class, and we're going through Rothbard's, at least some chapters from his economic thought before Adam Smith. And I just, I love the way Rothbard names names, and he goes through, you know, the connections, the relationships, the incentives that people had in the, you know, like the ties to government that they had. And Rothbard does that here in America's Great Depression. And he's probably at risk of, you know, being labeled some sort of conspiracy theorist, but, you know, he cites all of his sources, and there's nothing here that's, you know, really, that you can really point to and say, hey, wait a minute, you haven't really backed that up with the source. So Rothbard cites his sources. It's not like he's, you know, coming up with something out of the blue. But it really does make the reading interesting. If we're going to be, you know, trying to advertise this book to get people to read it, it's a great story just to read because there's characters that are playing their part, and they've got their own relationships and their own changes and their own incentives along the way. Now, toward the end of part two, he talks about 10 factors, which all led to this inflationary run-up between 21 and 29. And of course, one of them is just total bank reserves, central bank reserves. And if we look at our own Fed's balance sheet and the corresponding increase in commercial bank reserves at the Fed, since 2008, of course, with QE, successive rounds thereof, we've had a huge increases. And now, with the COVID year of 2020, the Fed's balance sheet has expanded even more rapidly. So one of the critiques we often hear as well, you Austrians are always talking about base money, but that doesn't really matter because bank reserves aren't let out. They're reserves by definition. And so it doesn't really matter. And what do you care so much about the size of the Fed's balance sheet or the amount of reserves parked in commercial bank accounts at the Fed? So give us your take on that and Rothbard's take. Exactly. What's happened since 2008 has really been unprecedented, almost spectacular to see. Something just crazy is going on with the Federal Reserve's balance sheet. We thought that the huge increase in their total assets was crazy back in 2009 and 2008. And then they just, you know, did it again. So like almost a doubling or maybe not a doubling, but a huge increase in 2020. So we talked about the relevance of Rothbard's book today. We still see massive central bank intervention today, almost like they're not heating what we have to say. But one thing that I do have to say about the size of the Federal Reserve's balance sheet is that I think that there is a categorical difference in Federal Reserve balances since, I think it was, yeah, 2009 maybe and before 2009. And the reason why is because there's this new policy at the Federal Reserve where they pay interest on reserves and they've actually since that they've abolished the minimum reserve requirement. So instead of telling banks that they have to keep a certain amount in reserve, a certain amount of deposits in reserve, what they do now is they incentivize banks to hold onto reserve. And what that does is it acts like a gate that they can open and close a little bit at a time to allow those reserves that they've created to be let out into broader circulation or into out into the economy. So I actually do think it's an area for Austrian economists today to continue researching and figure out what are the implications of that sort of policy on central bank credit expansion and what that means for the business cycle theory. So there are these massive increases in money and bank reserves and credit, but what if it's not all being released out like it was before, I guess is what I'm trying to say. Well, and there's another element here and of course Powell talks about this. Janet Yellen talked about this. There are limits to monetary policy. They call it pushing on a string. And at some point, if commercial banks are so flush with reserves that they're never really needing to lend to each other overnight to maintain reserve requirement minimums. So it doesn't really matter what the Fed funds rate is. I mean, at some point, you actually need credit worthy borrowers and collateralized projects and such for banks to lend. In other words, there's a business side to all of this. So monetary policy isn't everything. I think we have to keep sight of that. I would only add to that that there has been an institutional change, like a categorical change in the way central banks act since the 2007, 2008, 2009 crisis that happened. And so we just need to somehow take that into account, maybe not in our theory. The theory is still fine, but in terms of like telling the story of the Austrian business cycle theory or even making predictions about when a bust will come or the size of the bust that will come, we have to take the new rules into account, the new policy tools that the central bank is exercising into account. Well, so the final part of this book, the last 150-odd page, is part three is called The Great Depression itself, 1929 to 1933. And I got to say Herbert Hoover, the great capitalist, the great laissez-faire capitalist gets a little bit of rough treatment from Rothbard here. Yeah. So the whole idea that Hoover was some laissez-faire capitalist who didn't do anything, he just sort of sat on his hands while the economy was tanking is a complete myth. And that's really been shown over and over again. In fact, that myth-busting has even invaded the mainstream of economics literature today. So that's good to see. But Rothbard was sort of, he was writing in his time and not this time. And so he was sort of like a lone wolf saying, hey, look at what all the stuff that Hoover did. Really everything that FDR did in the New Deal was started by Hoover. FDR just sort of expanded and maybe a little bit of scope, but mainly in size of what Hoover started. So that's one thing about the last part of the book. But the other point that I want to make about the last part of the book here is that you'll notice that the story ends. Rothbard's book ends with talking about Hoover and the Great Depression. So the title of the book is America's Great Depression, but he didn't start talking about the years that we associate with the Great Depression until the end, until the last third of the book about. And so it really shows the different method that Rothbard and Austrians take to explaining history, explaining what actually happened. And that is that we first we start with some sort of solid theory. Start with a theory about which we can then explain what actually happened. So there's got to be some sort of relevance here. And then take the effort, which Rothbard does in part two to show that the theory does indeed apply to this time period. And Rothbard does that by actually showing, you know, he's got the numbers there. He shows that yes, there was an artificial credit expansion on a massive scale through the 1920s. And then Rothbard, now that he's got that out of the way, then he can talk through the Great Depression part of the story. He can talk about what happened from 1929 to 1933. So I just thought that was interesting the way Rothbard, if you're, you know, a typical history student, you might expect that the page one would start with October 1929. But in fact, we don't really, we don't really get to that part of the story until the very end after Rothbard has gone through the economic theory and applying the theory and then talking through the history. Well, of course, one of the great myths about the crash and then the subsequent depression or that this was a period of laissez-faire where government on both the fiscal and monetary side failed to do enough to prevent things. And on the fiscal side, on the legislative side, the congressional side, Rothbard, I think does a very good job here in chapters eight through 11, I guess, of going through all the things that we could actually sort of call Hoover's New Deal. We normally associate that term with FDR, but everything from public works and farm programs and tariff smooth holly to raising wage rates, tax increases. So, you know, there's plenty of fiscal interventionism going on throughout Hoover's term, which should disabuse us of the notion that the 20s represented a laissez-faire failure of some kind. One thing that I noticed while you were saying that is just how short those sections are. So, you mentioned the smooth holly tariff. You spent two pages talking about that or looking at voluntary relief, Hoover and the public works and wage rates. All of these are, you know, two or three pages long. So, it's almost like now that he's done all of this work explaining the theory and applying the theory and setting up the stage. Now it's just a simple task of saying, well, the government tried this and that didn't allow the unsound positions. That didn't allow all of the lines of production that need to be liquidated to be liquidated. So, and even if there wasn't, you know, a big depression, a big bus going on, this wouldn't help things anyway. So, Rothbard is able to just, you know, go one bullet point after another basically and say, this doesn't help, this couldn't help, there's no way this would help. This doesn't allow the bus to run its course and for us to discover new profitable ways of producing things. And so the task, he's made the task at the very end where he's just explaining this, the hodgepodge of Hoover policies. He's made that task a lot easier for himself because he did all of the work ahead of time. What do you think of all the indices at the end? Rothbard actually has a lot of stats and figures here. And again, this is a little earlier in his career in the 1960s. He's writing the first edition of this book. But really, I think in many ways it's impossible to be a good economist without being at least somewhat of an historian, right? Because he's dealing with all the statistics both before and after the events of the 20s. So this book is actually, you know, heavier on charts and graphs than a lot of people might think from an Austrian analysis of the Great Depression. Yeah, Austrians have this, or they're stereotyped, I guess is the best way to say it is, you know, being anti-math, anti-numbers. We're the people in the econ programs that couldn't pass the math classes or something like that. And so Rothbard dispels this right here. There are numerous tables in this book, and it's matched by qualitative, logical thinking in word as well. So he's not, you know, waving the tables and the numbers in front of your face to sort of help you miss something that he's doing somewhere else, which is something that you see in a lot of modern econ journals these days, like some big equation or some fancy chart that's really doing a lot of the work for you as opposed to you actually, you know, doing economics and talking about cost and effect and human action. So yeah, you're exactly right. Rothbard has, I think this is probably the, maybe the book with the most numbers in it out of all of the books in the Mises bookstore, perhaps. Well, yeah, you have a point there. You go to the back of this book, and there are a lot of charts and graphs, and it really is interesting because, of course, it does help you to visualize and conceptualize the words that Rothbard is putting into print. But, you know, I'm curious as to your thoughts on the staying power of this book. Now, again, it's almost 60-odd years later, we've had a lot of economic ups and downs since then. And I'm sure people like the Milton Friedman's and Anna Schwartz's of the world would say, well, the reason we haven't had another Great Depression is precisely because of proper amounts of interventionism, especially on the monetary policy side since then. And so we sort of smoothed out these terrible ups and downs. I wouldn't agree with that. I know you wouldn't agree with that. But in general, I mean, what can we learn from this book today? What's our take away? And more importantly, could this happen again? I mean, that's what's so frightening about this when I was reading, especially part one of this. And so much of it just sounds eerily similar to what's happening today. Well, we definitely have a central bank that has not learned its lessons of the past. So you ask if something like this can happen again one day, and I definitely would not rule that out. And you also mentioned Friedman and Schwartz. It's interesting. One of the videos that I show in my classes is one of Milton Friedman lecturing. And sometimes I'll show that at the same time that I'm talking about Austrian business cycle theory. And what Friedman says in the lecture, and he also said it in his book, A Monetary History of the United States, is he talks about how the central bank did not inflate enough during the crisis. So there were banks failing. And Rothbard shows this in his book. The central bank did increase the money supply. They did try to provide as much liquidity as they could. But the big difference between the Austrians and the monetarists is that the Austrians say that all of that just made matters worse. It just either kicked the can down the road or it made the recession longer than it needed to be. And you have really the opposite coming from monetarists like Friedman. He says that if the central bank had stepped in and really inflated much, much more than they actually did, then we wouldn't have had the depression that we did. I think Friedman said that we would have had a garden variety recession were his exact words. But we also see Rothbard, like you said, compare this to the Keynesian paradigm. And obviously the Keynesians take a totally different perspective on booms and busts as Austrians and including monetarists. Well, I guess that's even that's debatable in terms of the similarities between monetarists and Keynesians. But the Keynesian story is that the bus comes out of nowhere. There's this automatic, excuse me, inherent instability in investment spending. And this needs to be fixed by massive central bank expansion coupled with deficit spending and expansionary fiscal policy. So to your central question of what is the relevance for today? Why should we read this today? Unfortunately, both of those ideas, both of those macroeconomic frameworks, the monetarist one and the Keynesian one are alive and well today. So there's there's still a, you know, an intellectual battle going on between these main macroeconomic schools of thought and new ones have emerged as well. So if we can if we can go back to Rothbard and see the way he did this theory and history combined in one book and in one work and and copy him and learn from him and apply it to what we see today both in central bank actions, but also in the theories offered by the competing schools of thought like the real business cycle folks and and who knows who the new Keynesians. Rothbard's lessons in this book are extremely relevant even today, even if it's just for, you know, the intellectual battle that we have. Well, ladies and gentlemen, I want to recommend this book to you. It's Rothbard America's Great Depression. You can go to Mises.org type that into the search engine and what you're going to find is you can get it in physical form from our bookstore at a great price. But you're also going to find there a beautiful HTML format, which you can read online. There are there's a PDF and an EPUB reader available for free. So if you don't mind scrolling through a PDF and if you've got whatever EPUB reader on your device, you can read the book entirely for free that way. And I think having gone back over it this past weekend, you know, I think there's a lot you can get from it. I think I enjoyed it. And if you're a Rothbard fan, I think it's an absolute must read. Our guest today has been Jonathan Newman. You can find him on Twitter, Jonathan Newman. He's at Newman J underscore R. I guess your middle name begins with an R. And so he's been on fire lately on Twitter. So I recommend that you follow Jonathan Newman and we recommend that you check out this book and stay tuned for a lot of great books coming up in future weeks. So Jonathan, thanks so much for your time. Ladies and gentlemen, have a great weekend. The Human Action Podcast is available on iTunes, SoundCloud, Stitcher, Spotify, Google Play and on Mises.org. Subscribe to get new episodes every week and find more content like this on Mises.org.