 It's time for the Laun Jean Chronoscope, a television journal of the important issues of the hour, brought to you every Monday, Wednesday, and Friday. A presentation of the Laun Jean Wittner Watch Company, maker of Laun Jean, the world's most honored watch, and Wittner, distinguished companion to the world-honored Laun Jean. Good evening. This is David Ross. May I introduce our co-editors for this edition of the Laun Jean Chronoscope? Mr. William Bradford Huey and Mr. Hardy Burke. Our distinguished guest for this evening is Mr. Edwin A. Locke Jr., special United States Ambassador. Mr. Locke, we and our viewers feel particularly fortunate tonight because this is your first public appearance since you have returned from the Middle East. Of course, there you were a special representative of the President, trying to help us carry on our activities in the Middle Eastern countries, particularly trying to help us in our battle with the Russians over those nations. Now, sir, from your observations in a very interesting year in those nations, how is the battle between our country and the Soviet power complex? How is it going in the Middle East? Well, sir, I'm going to speak quite truthfully and plainly because I think the American people are entitled to the facts on this situation. I believe that we are rapidly losing the Cold War in the Near East, in the very heart of the Near East, namely the Arab states. And you were particularly concerned with the Arab states in the Near East. That is right. Now, sir, you've just made a rather interesting statement and surprising one that we are losing in that area. Can you illustrate for us, sir, some of the ways in which we are losing, some of the indications that we are losing there? Well, I have never seen a situation that is more explosive, more fragile, and more fraught with dangers for the United States. Do you think there is a possibility that we could lose the Near East to the Russians completely? I think that's quite possible. What do you mean by the Near East? What countries do you mean? I mean, essentially Greece and Turkey, where things are going fairly well for us. And then the seven Arab states and Israel. It's the Arab states that you're accustomed to. And the Arab states where I'm particularly alarmed at what has been happening. Well, why do you consider, you believe this would be a bad thing for us to lose the Near East, I guess? I think it would be tragic. Why would it be tragic? It might very well spell the balance, the difference between victory or defeat if the Cold War should at any time become a hot war. Well, you were about to illustrate, sir, or to give us some examples of how the war is going against us, or how we are losing there. Yes, I can give you several examples. Just two or three days before I left the Near East, I was paying a farewell call on the Prime Minister of one of those countries. He said to me that, until recently, he felt he could control the communist situation there because he only had a few hundred communists. And having only a few hundred, those could be put in jail or in concentration camps. But now he said, I have tens of thousands of them. And he said, I can't begin to put my whole country in a concentration camp. I'll give you another example. I've been talking a great deal to Arab publishers and editors. They, of course, are subjected to very considerable pressures on the part of the communists to publish communist material and propaganda. So far, they've been able to resist those pressures for the most part. But recently, recently, they've begun to have to print communist news because their readers are demanding it. Because their readers look upon Russia as a very strong, perhaps their only strong friend in this present situation. Ambassador, just one more question to point out the importance of the Near East to the United States. Could you tell us very briefly, if we lost the Near East because of this increasing communist pressure, what would Russia gain and what would we lose? Well, everyone knows about the oil. The Near Eastern countries, the Arab countries are producing over two million barrels a day, a petroleum a day. That is more than 25% of what we produce in this country. If we lost it, I suspect it would very shortly mean gasoline rationing and fuel rationing in this country. If the Russians gained it, it would make a tremendous strategic difference in the economic balance of power. And other than oil, what else? And the Near East is the communications hub, all important communications routes, whether by land or by sea or in the air, crossover or through the Arab states. If that was in the hands of the enemy, the Eastern, the Western nations would be cut off from Asia except the other Pacific. Why are we losing there? Why are some of the reasons for our failures in the Middle East? Well, I think, first of all, we have to a large extent neglected the Near East in our preoccupation with Europe, where we have been, to be sure, quite successful. You mean financially neglected them? Financially, yes. How have we neglected the Near East in comparison with Europe? Well, in every way, but particularly politically. Our best talents, our greatest attention, our greatest efforts have been devoted to Europe. And along, as part of that neglect, with some notable exceptions, we have sent third and fourth rate people out to the Near East. Well, you mean representing the State Department there? Representing the State Department and other branches of our government. I don't mean to criticize everyone there have been some very fine people and still are. But by and large, there's been quite an unreasonable number of third and fourth rate people. Well, number one, preoccupation, and number two, we've sent third rate people there. Are there any other reasons for our failures, sir? Yes, I would say we still have learned comparatively little from the tragedy which has taken place in Iran. And we've reacted much too slowly to the situations which have been arising in such places as Egypt, in Tunis, in Morocco. Where today that a solution that is suggested, if it had been suggested a year, two years ago, might easily have worked out that problem. But today is completely unacceptable to both sides because the problem has progressed to such a point that the solution now is infinitely more difficult than it was a year or two ago. And would you say that a fourth reason derives from the emotional attitude of the Arabs toward Israel? Well, the Palestine question has been handled very unskillfully and ineptly. Who can take the blame for this whole, as you say, an aptitude on the part of the people that we have sent over there, our whole policy there? Is it the State Department? Well, largely it's the State Department. Well, sir, our viewers have heard a great number of people discuss the problems of the Near East. And not a night, sir, can you give us something positive? Can you tell us something we can do about it? Yes, I have some very definite convictions as to what can be done about it. The most important, the first and most important thing to me is for General Eisenhower, within the first few weeks of his new administration, to come out with a simple public statement on the first occasion of office emphasizing our feeling or re-emphasizing our feeling of friendship for the peoples of the Near East, particularly for the Arab peoples, indicating our interest in helping them solve their problems, in helping them work out their just grievances, showing a sympathy for them. Do you think their regard for Eisenhower would be high in the Arab world? They have great hopes that this new administration is going to bring about improvements in our attitude toward that part of the world. Well, after that statement of friendship, sir, then what would you do next? Next, I would spend great efforts in getting new, more vigorous, more able men in the key posts in the State Department, handling that part of the world, and in our missions that are located in the Near East. Does that mean we have to bring in new blood into the State Department, or can we use the career men who are there? I think it means both. I think there's some very excellent career men in the State Department, but I think at this time of crisis out there that we would do very well to bring in some new men from the outside to add to them. Ambassador, are you going to make any kind of an official or unofficial report to the new Secretary of State, or to a new mutual security administrator or anyone in positions of influence in government in the new administration? Well, I would hope so. I've only been back here for two, three days and haven't had an occasion to do so yet, but I hope to have that opportunity. Well, you were telling us what a program for action there, sir, and you're giving us two things that we can do. Number one, the statement, and number two, bring in new people. Now, what about spending our money out there? Well, I don't think it's just a question of money, and I don't think money by itself is a solution to this problem, but I do feel that we need a certain amount of both economic and military assistance. Do we need to make capital investments there? And very particularly, we need to have capital assistance available. You mean we have to build dams and roads and so forth and so on, railroads and that type of thing? Yes, and develop some of their river valleys and other such natural assets. And as a final question, sir, you think that if we do these things that you've suggested, do you think that we have a chance to win the political warfare in the Middle East? I think we have an extraordinarily good chance to do it. Well, I'm not the tallest maid at the difficulty of the situation. And you think the battle is worth fighting there? I definitely do. Well, thank you very much for being with us this evening, sir. The opinions you've heard our speakers express tonight are entirely their own. The editorial board for this edition of the Laun Jean Chronoscope was Mr. William Bradford Huey and Mr. Hardy Burke. Our distinguished guest was Mr. Edwin A. Locke Jr., Special United States Ambassador. The end of the holiday season just passed found the Laun Jean watch factory oversold. The demand having exceeded the production by many tens of thousands of watches. Why should this be sold? Why not make more of these fine Laun Jean watches? Well, the answer is simple. Only craftsmen of the highest skills and training can be employed in their manufacture. Such craftsmen are limited in number for their training requires years. Now, obviously, many more Laun Jean watches cannot be made without a sacrifice in quality. And that Laun Jean never has and never will do. Were it not so, Laun Jean would not be the world's most honored watch. The only watch in history to win 10 World's Fair Grand Prizes and 28 Gold Medal Awards and highest honors for accuracy in fields of precise timing. The perfect craftsmanship of the Laun Jean watch is evidenced in its faultless performance as a timepiece and its rare beauty as a piece of jewelry. If tomorrow you wish just about the finest watch made anywhere in the world, either for yourself or as a gift, your choice might well be Laun Jean. The world's most honored watch. The world's most honored gift. Premier product of the Laun Jean Witner Watch Company. Since 1866, maker of watches of the highest character. We invite you to join us every Monday, Wednesday and Friday evening at the same time for the Laun Jean Chronoscope, a television journal of important issues of the hour. Broadcast on behalf of Laun Jean, the world's most honored watch and Witner distinguished companion to the world honored Laun Jean. This is David Ross reminding you that Laun Jean and Witner watches are sold from coast to coast by more than 4,000 leading jewelers who proudly display this emblem. Agency for Laun Jean Witner watches. Enjoy the Betty Frenes show on the CBS television network.