 Okay. I've got this handout and a jumble of handwritten notes, etc., and I'm going to try to somehow organize it. First I thought I'd just say a few things about religion versus conscience. And I suppose I can see conscience being used in two senses. One is to refer to a strongly held belief that is not attached to any well-recognized religion or the individual does not see as being religious in nature. So it's a bit, I would call it a residual category in a sense. But then there's another sense of conscience which I think is where it's used to up the ante in a sense to make a stronger claim when we say that this belief is really a matter of my conscience. And you see that in the dissent of the Liddell case in the European Court of Human Rights where her claim is presented as based on her Christian beliefs. And then it's in a sense elevated to a matter of conscience. So actually I'll refer to them in both senses. I suppose I'll mostly talk about religion and conscience as interchangeable. But later on I'll just ask whether there is a special category of conscience claims to be treated differently. Just while I'm on this question of religion and conscience, I never could understand where the phrase religion and belief came from which appeared in the Directive 2078 of the European Union in the year 2000. And then I noticed that it's actually been in the European Convention of Rights since 1950, Article 91. But if you look at Article 91, it says here, it starts out evidently right to freedom of thought, consciousness and religion. This includes freedom to change his religion or belief. So reading it together with the first sentence, I think religion and belief means religion or other conscientious belief. And I think the case under the Equality Act has gone away too far because we're trying to maintain a distinction between religious and conscientious beliefs and political beliefs, which would generally enjoy less protection or much less likely to be accommodated. And the example I give to my students is if you say you have a political belief that no one should work on Friday, Saturday, Sunday, whichever day you choose, that is unlikely to be accommodated. The response will probably be, well that's an interesting idea, good luck campaigning for it. Go talk to the government and Parliament and see if you can get the law changed. But if you present it as a religious or conscientious belief, it will be taken more seriously. So when the Granger case talks about Marxism as being an other belief, protected by the Equality Act, I think that's going too far. When I arrived, Juliet then was just talking about conscientious beliefs being characterized as irrational and suggesting that that was inappropriate. But with great respect, I think actually, I'm not sure exactly how we phrase it, but this line between religious and conscientious beliefs and political beliefs does involve distinction between, I'd say, reason and evidence and not being required to provide reasons and evidence. So on the religious and conscientious side of the line, we don't expect people to explain their beliefs or prove them, etc., on the political side of the line we do. So in that particular sense, I would say we are talking about a distinction between the irrational or the hell on the basis of faith versus the rational and evidence-based. Okay, so turning to point one of my outline, I'd say, well, two different ways you can approach these issues under the European Convention of Human Rights. One is as a freedom of religion and conscientious question under Article 9, which I would call a liberty approach. Or you can approach it as a discrimination question under Article 14. I prefer the discrimination approach because it allows you to compare the effect on your group, people who share your belief with the effect on other groups of the apparently neutral rule. I think that often makes your argument more powerful. Now, I adopt this approach, not coincidentally, because I teach anti-discrimination laws very specifically. Possibly also because I suppose my first contact with multiculturalism was in the 1980s, when the question arose in Canada whether a Sikh man could be a member of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Now, to be a Mountie, as they're known, means wearing a ceremonial uniform, a red jacket and a broad brimmed hat. And so the initial reaction by many people in Canada was absolutely no way. This is a sacred Canadian symbol. We cannot modify it in any way. And eventually that debate was resolved and now you do see Sikh members of the Mounties, just as you see Sikh guards outside Papua and Palos, et cetera. And of course we had the assimilation in the manhood case in 1983. Now just, oh yeah, so when I was including these materials in my presentation, my initial thought was, maybe this is wrong for this conference, this has nothing to do with conscience. But I go back to my grouping of religion and conscience together. If you asked a religious individual why they had to wear their religious clothing to work or a university, et cetera, they might well say it is a matter of conscience. I cannot go to work, I cannot study, I will be excluded because it is so important to me. So I don't think we have to confine a discussion to refusal to perform an abortion, et cetera, I think it could be broader. Yeah, so that's my approach, indirect discrimination, case-by-case analysis. I've got the Maba case here as an example of a Christian woman who did not want to work on Sunday where the question of justification came up. Who was it too difficult to rearrange work schedules, et cetera? Now the area where I think this analysis should lead to a finding of indirect, prohibited indirect discrimination is generally religious clothing and symbols. Because I would say generally they have no effect on anyone else and we're not talking about taking time off work, et cetera, there are no practical problems. So this right to wear religious clothing and symbols is well entrenched in the UK law since the Mandela case, although that was in the context of the Relent Race Relations Act. So I think the tendency in the UK has been to see a combination of minority religious practices as part of respecting ethnic minorities. Which I think affected the reaction to the Awida case. Awida I think was seen as an eccentric white Christian and her claim was not taken seriously by the UK courts. So we have this well established protection in the UK and if you go to the European courts you see none. So the Flaminos case, which Ian just mentioned, should have been applied to Muslim women wearing headscarves, to Sikh men wearing turbans, et cetera. Jewish lawyers asking for rescheduling of a hearing, et cetera. And the Strasbourg Court has consistently rejected all these cases. And so actually when we look at the outcome in Awida we have to bear this in mind. One explanation would be, say, Yossi's analysis that they're saying this is the refusals of the individuals here are based on illegitimate values. But the Strasbourg Court's approach tends to be not to accommodate any religious belief generally. So it's not necessarily making the distinction I would like them to make. So this, just before I turn to the Court of Justice of the European Union, a couple of points. Yossi when you talk about religious clothing or symbols that he put under the category of misguided or irrational. I personally wouldn't do that because I find that potentially culturally insensitive. I welcome you to come to King's and run a bond like Holly Professor Saf Inderjas who wears a turban. I'm not sure how he would react. But on Monday the, what are we today, 13th, 5th of June I did an interview for France Five Television. They were very keen to know whether the terrorist attack at London Bridge would cause Britain to reconsider its approach to multiculturalism. And I said, no, absolutely not. This has been with us since at least 1983. And I said, no, it's France. You're the one to have it wrong. Your rigid approach is what should change. And I hope that will be the case in future. But unfortunately the French approach has now influenced the Court of Justice of the European Union, which has come up with two judgments in March in the context of a private company where the private company can't claim to be the state and have a duty to be neutral and secular, but even there that approach is potentially being upheld. Right. So, turning to Iwita in other case, just one thing I wanted to say in relation to Peter's presentation this morning about Iwita's view that she should wear a cross being ill founded. That's an area where I don't think the Court should not get involved. I think all it's enough that she says she's Christian, she thinks it's necessary. There's certainly a plausible link between a cross and Christianity. I don't think we should second guess that. My analysis of Iwita was that it was direct discrimination simply because the employer allowed a headscarf's turbines and skull caps, et cetera, but not crosses. I don't know why that case ever went to court. I think they should have just recognized the mistake right at the start. As for Liddell and McFarlane and conscious exemptions in the context of non-religious employment, I've argued against that in the modern law of view. And I think that is the broad trend that these exemptions are not being adopted, but there are actually three statutory exemptions I'm aware of. One is South Africa, another is Prince Edward Island, my colleague Bruce MacDougall and Vancouver drew my attention to this. And most recently Gibraltar adopted same-sex marriage and there's a conscious exemption for registrars. So personally I think these are bad policy and adopted for as a matter of political compromise but not as a matter of human rights principle. If you want to talk to someone who defends this, Alvi Sacks, former judge of the Constitutional Court of South Africa. He was speaking at King's Laster and I had a discussion with him about it and his view just seems to be, oh well, it's just not worth the fight. Why would you want a registrar who was against your relationship, et cetera, just have someone else? But I didn't have a chance to ask him so if the registrar says no I don't do Jewish ceremonies for Jewish couples, et cetera, is that okay? I don't know who might take a different view. Turning over to page 2, and here I can just try to say something quickly about conscience plays generally. I've written about the ashes baking case and I think it's actually, well on the conscience side of things, religion and conscience is indistinguishable from bull versus hall. And I don't think it will be treated any differently in the Supreme Court. The distinguishing feature is the message on the cake. And I've argued that for various reasons. It's not, it wouldn't be seen as the message of the bakery. The Northern Outer Court of Appeal noted that they would put a witch on a cake for Halloween but would not be seen as supporting witches. So yeah, I don't think the only distinguishing feature in that case is to me is the forced expression argument which I don't think is going to succeed in the European Court if you're right. Now conscience generally, I touched on this in my modern law review article and had to make some cuts and so I cut it out so maybe this is something I could develop for a piece for the book from this conference. But I'm trying to see what thread runs through these conscience flames. And I did see a list of statutory exemptions. I think it was in a third party intervention in the Ouide and others case. But the common thread seemed to me to be beginning and end of life. So there were exemptions around embryology, abortion, ending potential human life, military service being asked to shoot and kill someone. And we don't have assisted suicide yet but you can imagine conscience exemptions there. So really quite serious, dramatic, extreme situations which I would argue are quite remote from the Liddell situation. So the way I put it before is that civil partnerships registration is generally quite a happy occasion and no one dies. And so I would be interested to see to explore this further. One conscience exemption that seemed to stick out was jury service. I couldn't quite see the connection there unless I suppose jury service is a form of conscription. I did it in 2012 and the state is telling you for two weeks you have to work for the state. But maybe that's origin or maybe because juries used to impose the death penalty, I don't know what. But there were two examples mentioned this morning about inoculation and trade union membership which are not life and death events. But inoculation I would see that more as respect for family life or parental decisions and quite easily overridden. If you look at the case on Jehovah's Witness parents and blood transfusions etc. If the state were to decide that not having the inoculation was threatening the general population that would not be respected. And trade union membership I think that's better explained as freedom of association including the negative rights not to associate which the European Court of Human Rights eventually accepted. Now if we accept these as particularly strong conscience claims the question of degree of complicity arise which I believe the Dugan case addressed. And I must say here I would be quite strict on this you really have to be in the room a party to the procedure not just signing forms, supervising people etc. And I think that's where the hobby lobby case in the US really goes too far when it's a question of setting up a scheme that will cave with something which is so remote from the owners of the business. Okay and I suppose just to end with a trailer for a case to discuss at a future conference that's the Trinity Western Part 2 litigation in the Supreme Court of Canada on whether or not you can have a Christian law school that requires all students and staff to commit to not engaging in sexual activity outside of a different sex marriage. Now this is shifting from the individual to the collective almost everything I've been talking about has been an individual in a non-religious context making a conscious claim. This is a collective situation you have a religious community setting up the university etc. And I think what's happening in Canada then is that Trinity Western for many people has crossed the line because people just cannot see what legal education has to do with religion. And so although Trinity Western won its first case I think that was because of the effect on the students who were asked to do a fifth year of studying. I think it's quite possible in this case they will say no you cannot set up a law school which will effectively will certainly strongly discourage lesbian engaged staff and students from participating. Okay I'll end it there. Thank you.