 of CSIS, Korea Chair, and the Global Peace Foundation. We want to welcome you all to another in our series of discussions on Korea, Korea Unification. My name is Victor Chom, Senior Advisor and Korea Chair here at CSIS, as well as a professor at Georgetown University. And I think we have a really interesting discussion today about the role of Russia when we look at the Korean Peninsula, both in terms of issues of economics and investment, as well as looking into the future with regard to unification. I'll introduce our featured speaker in a moment, Dr. Zebin. But before I do, I want to give an opportunity to my colleague, Mike Marshall, from the Golden Peace Foundation to say a few words of introduction. So Mike. Thank you, Victor. Good morning. I'd like to welcome you all here on behalf of the Global Peace Foundation, which is the co-sponsor of this forum series. Thank you, sorry. And thank you all for coming. I'd also like to thank Victor, Ellen Kim and all of his team for working to put together this series of forums. This is the fourth of five. We have one more coming up next month, looking at Japan's role in the region and in relation to the peninsula. The purpose of these forums is really to try and take a fresh look at certain aspects of Korean unification and also at Korea's changing place in the world, which affects issues related to unification. The Global Peace Foundation that I represent is an international nonprofit organization that's committed to exploring and promoting innovative values-based approaches to peace building and development. We're active in the US, Korea, and 14 other countries across Asia, Africa, and Latin America, promoting initiatives for community development and national transformation. We have a particularly active chapter in Korea, and their major focus over the past couple of years and through this year is the issue of Korean unification. We are very interested in creating new approaches, looking at new possibilities in thinking about the Korean unification issue. That involves three main areas. One area is a very strong effort to reach out to engage the Korean public, particularly younger people, in the issue of unification and getting them to think about it. As many of you know who track this, there's a lot of indifference and apathy towards the issue, especially among young Koreans. We're seeking to change that. Related to that, we're promoting programs to get Koreans to think more about the history, culture of their country, going way back beyond 1945 when the division happened, and really starting to consider what Korean identity is and looking at that as a basis for some type of connection with the people of the North. That beyond the ideological divisions, there's a long shared cultural history. And then also, we're looking to engage civil society groups across South Korea. We're engaged with a coalition organization for Action for Korea United that is engaging NGOs and civil society groups in the unification issue. And finally, geopolitically, we're trying to put an emphasis on thinking of the future, not just of the peninsula, but the Northeast Asia region. Because the division of the peninsula and the possible unification in the future will affect the relations of all the surrounding countries, those involved in the Six-Party Talks, and others. So in that context, I think it's very timely that we've been looking at the role of the different surrounding countries. And today we'll look at the role and the interests of Russia in Northeast Asia as a whole and in the future of the peninsula. Thank you very much indeed. Thank you, Michael. And it has been quite a good series that we've been working with GPF on this year on different aspects of Korean unification. And today it's really our distinct pleasure to welcome Dr. Alexander Zebin, who, as many of you know, is director of the Center for Korean Studies, of the Institute of Far Eastern Studies, the Russian Academy of Sciences in Moscow. He has spent 12 years in North Korea as a journalist and a diplomat. And there are not many people in Washington who could claim that, I think. So I think we have a very unique perspective with us today. He joined IFIS in 1992 and since then participated in various international seminars on Korean affairs at home and abroad. Any of you who do any work on Korea internationally will know his name well and will have seen him at various conferences and events around the world. Dr. Zebin has been the director of CKS since 2004. His fields of research include political developments in North Korea, Russia and North Korea relations, the security situation surrounding the Korean Peninsula, the nuclear problem, as well as Russia-South Korea relations. He's the author of three books, many book chapters and many articles on Korean affairs in academic journals and policy journals, as well as in influential newspapers and media. He's a graduate of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He also received his PhD from IFIS in 1998. So let me just emphasize, again, it's really a pleasure to have you with us here today. Dr. Zebin will open with some opening remarks and then we have a panel of experts that will all join on the stage and will have a discussion about his remarks as well as the issues more broadly. So on behalf of CSIS and GPF, welcome Dr. Zebin to CSIS. Thank you. I'm very pleased to have you here. No, you make the whole line look like a minor. First of all, I would like to thank you very much. Thank you very much for inviting me to the Center of Strategic International Studies. And my presentation will be mostly centered on Russia, policy towards North Korea, and of course unification of Korean issues. Since you have my paper already at the entrance, everybody can have it. I try to make some summary presentation that was written and to add a little bit what was not written in the paper. History says that any serious aggravation of situation, the more so armed conflicts on the Korean Peninsula. Always jeopardize Russia's security, compelled her to undertake additional measures to defend her national interests in the region. Several times, Russia had to use her armed forces in Korea to protect her national interests against non-continental adversaries. As it happened in 1904, 05, 1945 and on a very limited scale in 1950, 53. That's why Russia pays much attention to efforts aimed at maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. Developing constructive relations with both Korean states and promoting dialogue between North and South Korea. Moscow hopes that inter-Korean dialogue and cooperation firstly will remove the threat of military conflict right next to the Russian Far Eastern borders. And secondly, promote economic ties with two Korean states as well as will help implementation of multilateral economic projects with Russia participation in North East Asia. Absence of normal relations between North and South Korea obviously hinder realization of such projects as linking Russian trans-Siberian main lane with trans-Korean railways, construction of gas pipeline and electricity line from Russia via North Korean territory to South Korea. Why striving to promote in every way trading economic relations with South Korea? Moscow is not going to abandon her economic positions in North Korea whose economy was developed with Soviet assistance. And till now in many aspects is oriented towards Russian technological and resource base and commodity markets. More than 70 industrial enterprises were built in North Korea during Soviet period with Soviet Union assistance. I would like at the same time to bring your attention to the well-known but frequently omitted fact that Russia's turning to the East policy, including that to North Korea, was launched well before the Ukrainian events as early as in November of 2000. Six months after starting his first term in office, President Vladimir Putin outlined the major directions of the strategy in his article, Russia New Eastern Perspectives. The current situation in relations between Russia and the West just accelerated the development and proves how faceted this the Russian leadership was when it had decided to balance relations with the West with the more active ties with the East. When the Ukrainian events started to unfold, Russia was already prepared and promoting more active co-operation with major Asia Pacific economies, China, Japan, Republic of Korea, countries of Southeast Asia. Initiating a railway and gas pipeline project in Asia, establishing Ministry of Development of the Forest, it was done in May of 2012, holding a peck summit in Vladivostok September 2012, and signing the agreement on depth settlement with North Korea September 2012. All those endeavors were undertaken well before the Ukrainian events. For example, political decision to implement Hassan Rajin project was taken in 2001 during North Korean leader Kim Jong-un visit to Russia and his meeting with President Vladimir Putin. From the beginning, the project was sought as a pilot one for the Lincoln trans-Korean railways with trans-Siberian main line. Besides being economically profitable for both North and South Korea, it was expected that their joint efforts to implement the project is likely to contribute to the confidence building, reconciliation, and large scale economic exchanges between both parts of the country. Russia believed that such cooperation, I quote, will not only to be economically advantageous, but will also increase trust on the Korean Peninsula. In spite of deterioration of inter-Korean relations under President Liman Bak administration, Hassan Rajin project was launched in 2008. A joint Russian North Korean venture, Arasong Contrans, was established in 2010 to implement the project. I skip technical details and just say that Hassan Rajin project is, first of all, a business project designed to bring economic benefits to all its participants. Otherwise, Russia can hardly expect South Korea and some other countries would consider their joining the project. The participation in this project will provide the South Korea, for example, with a chance to build trust with the North and with opportunity to walk with Pyongyang within a new serilateral framework. Some experts hope that the Russian side can play an important role as a damper in kind to reconcile two Korean sides' possible conflicting views in running the project. It is also worth mentioning that the project can be viewed as a first practical step in realizing the Eurasian initiative put forward by South Korean President Park Geun-hae as one of her foreign policy priorities. President Putin in particular remarked, I quote, if South and North Korea are becoming certain political difficulties could agree to reconnect trans-Korean railways, if South Korean companies choose to join the development of rail transportation infrastructure, including port facilities in North Korea, this would be an important contribution to realization of the program proposed by President Park Geun-hae, which is indeed very interesting, a promise in one. The above mentioned developments in economic relations between Russia and North Korea and other economic plans of integration in Northeast Asia can be considered as a part of general economic integration and globalization process in Northeast Asia. Those processes provide us with new instruments for engaging North Korea. It is highly likely that more active involvement of North Korea in those processes may bring about positive changes in her international behavior. Lessons of German unification, downfall of socialism in East Europe and regime change scenarios imposed by United States and its allies on the Balkans in Iraq and Libya, alarmed North Korean leaders. Unless North Korean elite would be provided with clear guarantees of their personal safety, adequate social status and certain level of well-being after unification, it would stay united and remain very reluctant to open the country and abandon nuclear weapons. Economic cooperation will help to develop North Korean economy, to make the North Koreans more prepared to live and work in a modern society. In other words, it will help to lessen the existing gap between two parts of the country and cut unification costs. It will help to enlarge in North Korea a growing strata of people interested in sustainable, cooperative relations with the outside world. Only inviting and honest North Korea to participate in the realization of multilateral economic projects in Northeast Asia, including those proposed by Russia, it would be possible to convince Pyongyang that international community had taken on a road leading to North Korea's gradual and peaceful integration in the existing international political and economic order, instead of forcing on the country a regime change scenario. That's why I disagree with those advocating postponing practical implementation of multilateral economic projects in Northeast Asia with the North Korean participation, until the nuclear problem in Korea is resolved. Since 2014, one can see a drastic increase of various contacts between Russia and North Korea. Both countries have agreed to step up bilateral trade, bringing it in 2020 to $1 billion. Last month's Russian Minister for Development of the Forest, Alexander Galushka, traveled to Pyongyang for the seventh session of intergovernmental commission on economy, trade, science, and technology cooperation. Large-scale projects like modernization of railway and electricity transmission lines, networks in North Korea, oil and gas, and other natural resources, exploration were under discussion. Sure, so far most of those projects are at the initial stage. However, it looks like that both sides are much more interested in their fulfillment than ever before. Speaking after coming back from Pyongyang to journalist, Alexander Galushka said that canceled visit by Kim Jong-un to Moscow will not affect in any way implementation of the agreements reached at the meeting of the intergovernmental commission. Facing international sanctions and tense political relations with China, North Korea is trying to diversify your external economic ties. On the other hand, turning to the East has become one of the Russia's main foreign policy priorities. Promoting relations with North Korea is one of the important components of this strategy. Many experts in the West are underestimating the degree of Russia's influence and role of Moscow bilateral contacts with Pyongyang in recent developments in North Korea, foreign and domestic policy. For North Korea, both Russia and China too, reform experience is valuable, first of all, from the point of view of their political results and lessons. During trips to Russia, the North Korean high-ranking officials get a firsthand experience that market-oriented transformations in even political reforms not necessarily should result in a loss of power by the current ruling elite. These elites in Russia and China and Vietnam too generally have retained their positions. There were no large-scale purges, et cetera. The fact may convince North Korea leaders that a market is not so terrible as it was used to be painted, that it is possible to realize economic transformation and not to lose at all political power and retain key institution of the previous model, such as dominant position of the ruling party. A few words specifically to elaborate on Russia position on unification on Korea. Moscow position concerning inter-Korean rapprochement and possible results is determined by Russian national interests. This interest certainly will benefit, first of all, from liquidation of long-time conflict next to Russia for Eastern region and from founding in the end a unified Korean state capable of maintaining relation of friendship, good neighborhood and cooperation with Russia. Secondly, better relations between North and South Korea as I said, along with providing Russia with more favorable conditions for development of trade and economic cooperation with both parts of Korea. Would open new opportunities for economic development of the Russian forest and for linking Russia economy to integration process in Asia Pacific. So both on security and economic reasons, Russia is vitally interested in peace, reconciliation and unification of Korea. This conclusion seems especially important in view of continuing attempts by some experts to convince public opinion that none of the neighboring countries, including Russia is interested in Korea reunification. So what the problem? In my opinion, history of the Korean settlement for the past 25 years, including time and again encountered difficulties in solving the nuclear issue on the peninsula makes us to conclude that without solution of a certain key fundamental problem directly related to the region's future security architecture, we will continue incessantly stumble of minor problems and will not be capable to tackle them. This fundamental key issue which any peace process in East Asia should resolve is defining an acceptable for four big countries, Russia, China, United States and Japan, a place for a future reunited Korea and the regional security system. Short of such vision, each and every participant of the negotiating process will remain very suspicious about other plans and intentions. It's equal to attempt of six teams of construction workers to build house without agreed project. Any team will have different vision how many stories, how many windows and where they will be entrance to this house will be. Many politicians and experts in United States of America, in Republic of Korea and in Japan have already listed the reunited Korea as a member of this relateral military and political alliance between United States, Japan and Korea to which Australia has been already linked by number of agreements. However, such plans are unlikely to be welcomed in Moscow and Beijing. Both countries are likely to perceive such a triangle as a deterrence against Russia and China. Such an alliance would be tantamount to imagines on Russia Eastern borders, a body similar to NATO in Europe under the umbrella of missile defense system which is actively deployed by United States and their allies in the region. Calculations to the effect that future reunited Korea will be de facto a forward base of maritime powers the United States and Japan against continental China and Russia can hamper and is already hindering both the establishment of reliable and sustainable peace system in Northeast Asia, the solution of the nuclear problem and the reunification of Korea. Thank you very much. Well, thank you, Dr. Debbon, for your remarks. Before we continue with the discussion, I want to introduce the other members of the panel that have joined us this morning. To Dr. Debbon's immediate left is Andrew Cuchins. Andrew Andy is the senior fellow and director of the Russia and Eurasia program here at CSIS. And then to Andy's left is Gil Rosman who is the Musgrave Professor of Sociology at Princeton University, Meredith as well as in the editor of the Asan Review. The Asan Forum. The Asan Forum which is new and quite dynamic online journal with issues related to East Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia and Eurasia. And so they both agreed to join us this morning and offer some comments as well as engaging in discussion amongst us on the panel but as well as with you on the floor. So perhaps maybe Gil, could we start with you and you want to start off with some initial reactions to the conversation going? Well, I think Dr. Debbon has introduced a very important point of view for understanding what's happening in the Korean Peninsula. His comments in some ways echo what he wrote in the newspaper Niza Visumaya Gazeta, two articles in April. I've been following things he's written for many years. And basically I think as you saw the comments unfold they start with proposals for cross-border economic interaction that are long-standing and refer to the Hassan-Rajin-Rasson cross-border development which South Korea has been interested in but they go keep going and going. And essentially what I think they say is while the United States policy is centered on preventing Pyongjin, the guns and butter goal of Kim Jong-un, Russia's policy as expressed here is to help Pyongjin give the economic development in North Korea and then trust them to turn around and become a responsible state that may eventually denuclearize. So it's really the opposite approach. Beyond that, as he pointed out towards the end of his remarks, this is an approach that says if South Korea wants progress and cooperation with dealing with North Korea it's got to abandon the alliance with the United States. That the alliances are the problem in the region and a regional security structure is the solution. And that now what the US is doing with Japan is pushing it into a new Cold War in Asia where we heard there's a NATO in Asia forming that's a threat to Russia and China and now something must be done about it. I think he goes further in his articles to suggest that without North Korea getting more assistance and arms they are being left somewhat defenseless and therefore it's time for Russia to start, I get the implication, helping North Korea with armaments as well as with economics and that kind of rebalancing of the peninsula is the way to create the environment for prospects for reunification. Maybe I, he will disagree with some of what I'm reading in his remarks but that I think is the overall approach here and meanwhile there's a sense that South Korea has lost the trust of Russia because President Park did not go to the Sochi Olympics because she did not go to the 70th anniversary celebration the other day and that really South Korea is with its interest in missile defense is joining in with the containment policy that is against Russia's national interest and this goes along with a view of history that is being increasingly expressed in Russia where the Korean War was a just support for the regional structure that emerged after 1945 and that the 70th anniversary is the time to recommit Russia to the Cold War balance that still hasn't been resolved and we now need a new regional security framework that will get us beyond the Cold War and in the meantime let's assume that the Korean Peninsula is still in the Cold War and that Russia has to do what it can to balance what the United States and South Korea are doing to try to reestablish to strengthen their dominance and to bring about what is regarded as a civilizational threat, a regime change and a breakthrough that ends the agreements in Asia, the way Ukraine policies of the West and the United States have broken down the post-war agreements in Europe. I'll stop there. Okay, all right, a lot of food for thought there. Andy? Thanks Victor, it's a real pleasure to be here and also thanks to the Global Peace Foundation as the Russians are fond of saying Mirtiessen, it's a small world, and Mike Marshall, his wonderful daughter, sung in, very smart and talented, worked here with the Russian Eurasia Program for a couple of years and in fact she was just here in town and saw her a couple of days ago for a big launch of a set of programs, activities that we've been doing on Central Asia. I have just a couple of comments about contemporary events. You know, this story about the supposed executed general hit me a little bit close to home because I was in Moscow several weeks ago at the Ministry of Defense annual conference where the North Korean general, Hyeon, spoke and hearing the reports yesterday of his supposed execution, now there have been doubts cast on that. I saw it in the newspaper. Yeah, it kind of hit me a little close to home. Not that I'm great friends with the general or anything but it's such a bizarre story. But then also it kind of gets to the point of the question of whether Kim Jong-un was gonna come to Moscow for the Victory Day celebrations. And I was traveling in Tokyo to Tokyo and to Beijing earlier in the spring, excuse me, in early April and my interlocutors in Japan and China were quite skeptical that he would do so with the reasoning being that for Kim Jong-un to make a first foreign trip to Moscow and particularly to be on a podium where he would be with Xi Jinping would be a little bit maybe provocative. You know, I think where he makes his first trip is important but I defer to those on the panel here who are far more knowledgeable about these things than I am. But it does remind me of Mr. Putin's experience back when he first came to power in 2000 and his meeting with Kim Jong-un's father. And subsequently Mr. Putin then made his first major appearance on the international stage by going to the G7 at that time meeting in Okinawa. And of course, his interlocutors there were very curious about his impressions of Kim Jong-il and it was there that he made public the supposed offer that the North Korean leader had made of trading off giving up its aspects of his ballistic missile program in return for opportunities for international space launch. Several weeks later though Mr. Putin was very much embarrassed when Kim Jong-il said that was basically a joke. I don't think Mr. Putin found that joke very funny and I'm certain he did not forget it. I was reminded again, I was thought of North Korea this spring also in the context of Mr. Putin's 11 day disappearance and there are very few leaders that disappear with no explanation for 11 days. But I could imagine this happening with Kim Jong-un, North Korean leader perhaps. But I don't think that, I mean it was bizarre. Now in the spring when there was talk about the possibility of Kim Jong-un going to Moscow and the opening and what that represented I was asked on many occasions by the media was this something that the Russians were doing to kind of poke it in the eye of the United States. And the answer is basically no. It's not so much tied to the United States. Although of course in the context of the aggravated conflict between Washington and Moscow for the past 15 months with the war in Ukraine, it's easy to jump to that conclusion. But in fact I think there are very important strategic reasons for why Moscow and the DPRK have been reaching out to each other and they were illustrated pointed out by many of Dr. Jebin's remarks. Let me put it in kind of my frame. First of all if we look at the Korean-Russian relationship historically, think that four times in the first half of the 20th century Russia fought wars against Japan. 1904, 1905, 1937, 1938 and again in 1945. So I put a little context I think maybe on how Korea and Russia look at each other. Secondly, the next point I would make is when the Soviet Union, when Gorbachev normalized relations with Seoul in 1990, he, they basically sold Pyongyang down the river. And I think that that is clearly viewed by the Russians today and for a while as a significant mistake, the way they cut off ties with the DPRK. Now the reason why Gorbachev did it is because the Soviet Union was going bankrupt. He needed money, he was desperate. And that was the basic motivation for it. I mean to do it in a way that there was the potential of a possible $3 billion credit at the time. Now why is it, why was it a mistake? Well, I think it gets to, we talk about today, Russia's pivot to Asia. And you look at, well you look at Soviet and Russia engagement in Asia, even going back to the Cold War. Ever since the beginning of the, and I think it's very important for the Washington policy community to understand, particularly in today's environment where relations with Moscow are worse than they've ever been since some point in the Cold War, I would say the earlier part of the Cold War. And why are they so bad? Okay, they're basically bad because of a fundamental dispute over European security. And it's important to remember that Russia is a huge country with major interests all over its periphery. And when Moscow looks at Asia, it looks at it quite differently. And of course the fundamental factor, the starting factor there is China. And so the experience in the early 1950s of the Sino-Soviet alliance, that was not a happy experience for either Moscow or Beijing, then you had the Sino-Soviet conflict and the border conflict in 1969. And from that point on, I think that Moscow looked at US military presence in Asia in a somewhat different light than it did in a European context. I mean NATO and US military presence in Europe has always been viewed pretty much negatively. In Asia, it's different. And mostly it has to do with China. To some extent, Japan, there was the theory about the Japanese-American Security Alliance puts the cork in the bottle, possibly on Japanese remilitarization, potential return of a more nationalistic Japan that Russia contended with, with difficulty in the first half of the 20th century, et cetera. So I think it's important to keep this kind of perspective and background when we look at Moscow's relations with Seoul as well as Pyongyang today. Now, the current pivot to Asia, okay, Moscow sees exactly what the rest of the world sees, that the balance of economic power in the world is shifting to Asia. This is a more dynamic area. And for the development of Russia's eastern Siberian and Russian Far East regions and the resources there, it's gonna be primarily Asian investment, which is gonna make that happen. And it's an important thing for Russia's development into the 21st century. Russia's well aware that China is gonna be the largest investor in this, but it's very important for Russia that they do not feel over-leveraged by Chinese investment. So the way to do that is to attract other investors, other partners. And here's where Korea plays an important role, Japan plays an important role, other Asian countries, and also the United States in this context as well, as well possibly. Now, on the other, another important aspect of it and Mr. Dr. Jebin's descriptions of some of the economic projects, gas pipeline, electricity grid, railroad, connectivity, connectivity. I mean, there is a fundamentally important thing that's happening on the Eurasian continent today, and I mean Europe to Asia, Russia to India, and it's reconnecting, reconnecting. Sea trade of course is dominant, it will be dominant, but every country is looking at some version of kind of a Silk Road strategy. President Park announced it a couple of years ago. Russia as well, how are they going to be able to take advantage of and to be part of these new transit corridors, trade and investment relationships they're developing, and are having a fundamental impact on kind of changing the geo-economic landscape of Eurasia. And this is where the reunification or soft landing of the Korean conflict is important for Russia. Because none of these projects can happen unless there is some kind of rapprochement that takes place between Seoul and Pyongyang. And I think for South Korea, for North Korea, I mean every country that is on China's periphery shares some degree of concern about the concern I just mentioned that Russia has, but even a country as large as Russia about being over leveraged by Chinese economic power and thus political influence. And so they wanna have kind of a multi-vector foreign policy and they wanna have options and alternatives, that's the best way to advance their sovereignty. And I think this is the context that I see Russia's approach to the Korean Peninsula and why Russia is unequivocally supportive ultimately of the reunification of the Korean Peninsula. I'll stop. Great, both Gil and Andy, thanks so much. So I think also there are a few people in Washington who could claim to have been at a conference with General Hyun, the North Korean general who was reported in the news to have been executed yesterday, so kudos to you, Andy. So I think listening to this, there's sort of three areas and I'm gonna give Dr. Devon a chance to respond. There's sort of three areas I think that we've covered. The first is the so-called Russian pivot to Asia, the Russian pivot to the Korean Peninsula. What are the drivers of that? And there I also wanna add a specific question which was, which you addressed in your paper, you didn't go into the details in your talk, but this, in particular this coal project, this coal transport project in Najin between the Russians, North Koreans, and the South Koreans. And the specific question there, I think that, that is sort of a tangible example of the so-called pivot to the Peninsula and I guess the question there for you specifically is they did a pilot run of a few 100,000 tons of coal and I think you mentioned in the paper, a certain capacity that the Najin port needs to be able to reach in order for this to be cost profitable for as an investment. I guess the question to you is, with this as an example and more broadly in terms of Russia, interest in infrastructure and connecting the Peninsula, how much of a capacity problem is there when it comes to the North Korean peace? Like I don't think there's necessarily capacity problem on the Russian side. There's certainly not on the South Korean side. How much of it is just a political issue with regard to North Korea and how much of it is a sort of nuts and bolts capacity problem to be able to move beyond some subsidized projects to something that can actually run on its own. The second set of questions has to do obviously with North Korea and Andy really raised them with regard to all these, the cancellation, the last minute cancellation of the visit by Kim Jong-un to Moscow. I think it at least sounded to me based on what I read in the press that the Russians were quite forthcoming in announcing that the North Korean leader would be coming so they must have felt pretty confident about that. His cancellation of that, this reported execution by some means, we're not exactly sure of General Hyun. You as someone who's lived in the country and has studied the country, what do you think's going on here? Sort of what's happening? And then the last is the broader conceptual arguments that were in your presentation as well as in Gil's remarks of this whole question of how the, from a Russian perspective, how the US alliance system fits into a broader discussion of Korean unification. Gil put out that the proposition that some of your arguments here and in your past writings are basically positing that the US alliance system is actually an obstacle to unification and to increased, reduced insecurity, increased economic reform in North Korea and I was hoping that maybe you could address these three questions and then we can open it up to the audience. So, Dr. Sevin. Thank you for the question and thank you again for the Global Peace Foundation for organizing and inviting me along with the Center for Strategic International Studies. I start from the last question since Dr. Rosman also raised it concerning the United States, South Korean alliance. I never said that Russia demands abrogation or consolation with alliance. Of course, the situation should be resolved in complex. There is a China, North Korean military treaty and the United States, South Korean military treaty. My idea is that for China and Russia, United Korea with American troops and missile defense on its territory, absolutely unacceptable from strategic, political, other points of view, especially for China considering American pivot to Asia and American attempts to arrange kind of a senator cordon around China borders to orient defense and foreign policy of neighboring middle and small states around China towards Washington and achieve some kind of a military and political isolation China in Asia because economically it's not possible as I isolate China. For China, the North Korea at the current stage even more important than Taiwan. Taiwan is Chinese historically and so on, so forth but for China, North Korea strategically because most of Chinese military industrial complex in Manjuria to lose North Korea is will be huge damage to China authority and position in Asia. Who among those small and middle countries around Chinese borders will ever rely on China as a defender, as a ally if China will seed without any fighting such traditional area which was hundreds of years in China's fear of influence like Korean Peninsula. Just one example, in 2009 after North Korean second nuclear test China supported resolution of the United Nations Security Council condemning North Korea but several months later Chinese premier when they about travel to Pyongyang and lay flowers to Mao Zedong, Sun Grave, Mao Anin who died during the Korean war. Those who read oriental politics and the symbolic politics it was a clear signal to United States, to South Korea to everybody in the world that China lost one million lives in Korean war not just to let North Korea go to be the future bloods down or base for threatening China. It is absolutely clear in spite of all discussion in China among China experts and academic society that present leadership of China and maybe next leadership will consider the situation from that point of view. And one important point for me is that too many experts believe somehow that United Korea will develop according to the liberal democracy rules and market economy rules, market economy maybe but experience of China Vietnam testifies that market reforms are possible under the leadership of communist party like it happened in China and Vietnam so the even introduction of market economy in North Korea not necessarily will lead to the change of the key political institutions and ruling elite. That opens quite different perspectives for development of events on the peninsula. Let's, I move to the other points. The first question was about the Russian pivot to Asia and Russia as I said started it in early last decade and we developed relations with China very actively. Why North Korea should be an exclusion. We are working with Japan, we are working with Vietnam and of course we pivot to Asia was also the major idea was to balance relations with East, with Europe, with relations with Asia because Asia was becoming very dynamically developed economic region and we are not going to just make, exclude any country in our efforts in this area. China, Mongolia, South, North Korea, it was, everything was in due order according to necessary political, economic and other conditions. When they are ripened, they are moved in that particular direction as the same with North Korea. After President Putin came to power again in 2012, the decision to settle the debt problem was taken very quickly and the signing of the agreement was in a few months after he came to office. Concerning the Rajin Hassan project, yes, Russian feasibility study says that for the project to become profitable, it's necessary that the Rajin pot handled four, five million tons annually. For this year, the task is already 1.5 billion. It is possible to reach it and I don't see any political obstacles. 1.5 million. 1.5 for this year. Million tons, yes, million tons. And to be profitable, four to five. Four, five per year. And I don't see any political obstacles for that. We need just to, of course, there's a new project and it should compete with other pots in this area. It's necessary to win trust from, international companies who deal with logistics and cargo shipping in this area that they will start more actively using this pot. But as I said, it's purely economic problem, not political problem. The next one concerning the Kim Jong-un council visit to Moscow. The same day when there was announcement about the council visit, I published my interview to Interfax news agency in Russia and my first reason was that Mr. Kim was reluctant maybe to promise Mr. Putin that he will not test anymore. Anybody who can read this interview can find these words. And that was the key problem. And as you know, two days later, Mr. Kim visited Satellite Command Center and several days more later, they tested. So I think that that was maybe the major reason because Mr. Kim would feel himself very uncomfortable when in talks with Mr. Putin maybe he, this problem was certainly on the agenda. And to promise that, especially in view of the coming anniversaries in North Korea, 70 anniversary of liberation in August 15 and 70 anniversary of the ruling party which comes on October 10. And my personal view that it is quite possible that North Korea will try to celebrate as the 70s anniversary of the working party by launching another satellite. In October. Yeah, in October. Why not? I don't think that they spent a lot of money to construct this center, Command Center for launching satellite and just to waste money. They are preparing something. And quite possible that it event will take place in October this year. But it's my personal opinion. Well, that's interesting. I don't necessarily disagree with you on that point. Yeah, I kind of worry about October as well. Okay, I'd like to now give a chance to folks on the floor to be able to ask some questions. Yes, sir. Please wait for the mic. Thank you very much for great conversations. I'm Takahiro Mottei, the visiting fellow of Japan chair. What I'd like to ask you there is a reason of cancellation of basically came as a visit to Moscow. When it comes to the reason, there are a few views and I think more persuasive one is that because so Kim Jong-un found that there was a big gap between his request and hospitality Russia can provide. I mean, for example, when they took a picture, Kim Jong-un insisted to have to stand up by next to Mr. Putin or something like that. But I mean, Russian government doesn't cannot accept this kind of request. So do you agree with this kind of view from Russian side? Is there this kind of thing? Thank you very much. Thank you. There are some people who argue that Mr. Kim failed to come because he thought that he will be among many others and not so visible. But as far as I know, Mr. Kim invited in September to China, the same problem. Maybe among much more others, he will be. And I strongly doubt that Chinese leaders can pay much more attention to him in Beijing than he was expected to get in Moscow. So these arguments doesn't work, it seems to me. Hi, Dave Caprao with both GPF and Brookings. It seems after 70 years, we should be trying some new dynamics. I really commend you, Dr. Jebin, for your talk today. I think unlocked a lot of ideas of serendipities. And I wonder if you or any panelists might concur that there's positives in the reset that both Obama and Bush have tried with Russia. The Eastern, Western flank has been alluded to, but some possible positives of Russia's engagement in terms of the U.S. dynamic with Russia as we mutually try to find ways to enhance what President Park Gene has put forward as a top priority of unification. So I would like to think that there's some positives in the Eastern front could occur from the kinds of investments and other scenarios. And I'd also just note that we have other allies. These forums have been so wonderfully organized with Dr. Cha, looked at other angles of potential recasting of good relations or peace dividend in the so-called bonanza of Park Gene. And I see our leading mongolist here, Dr. Alicia Cappi, another forum dealt with Mongolia, which has excellent ties with both Russia, China and the U.S. We have Ye Ching Lee here next month. They'll be with UNS CAP, a joint forum on young leaders across Northeast Asia and a service alliance also examining perhaps some other track two or 1.5 possibilities. But I'm just wondering, are there any others that see positives in terms of the U.S. relations or other relations in that neighborhood through this type of Russian strategy? Thanks, David. Thank you. I just say in response, I mean, I think the, I mean, I think this coal project's very interesting because it's still at the pilot stages, but it's clearly something the Russians have been focused on. And the South Korean government has been participating very quietly, they've been participating. And, you know, in that sense, I think, you know, they're asked, I think in many ways, Russia has very unique, if you look at the surrounding powers around the Korean Peninsula, Russia has very unique economic interests on the peninsula in the sense that of all the powers surrounding the Korean Peninsula, arguably, Russia is the one whose economic interests are most about connecting the peninsula, right? Because of the infrastructure. More than, you know, China has interest in the Korean Peninsula, but it's really mining in the North and then commerce with the South. You know, Japan eventually will have investment interests in the peninsula, but Russia is the only one that actually has interests that seek to connect the peninsula. Now, you know, the 850 pound gorilla in the room, of course, is other countries are not really gonna bind onto that or support that as long as the nuclear issue remains in the state that it's in. But I think it's interesting that the South Korean government has been quietly participating in these projects, you know, with the hope that it might spur, you know, some sort of opening or reform in the North. It's, I think it's a long shot, but I still think it's interesting. Nick, I'd like to respond there too. Thank you. I think that for 20 years or so, there have been arguments that Northeast Asia is the easiest environment for the United States and Russia to find common national interests. And that the transformation of North Korea could be a really important means to accomplish this. The first problem, I think, is that Russia has not created an attractive investment environment despite the heavy use of funds in Vladivostok at the time of the APEC summit a few years ago. They really haven't done that for either the United States or Japan or even South Korea. So all of them have said, we really want to be part of some transformation. So, but Russia is now saying, I think, we're gonna rely very heavily on China and there's this important, this summit between Xi and Putin the other day is a very significant development. I think it's as significant as the Abe Obama Summit and people haven't paid enough attention to what it means. But it really is a more of a deference to China. And I think the implications that both want to restart than six-party talks without conditions in a way that's consistent with this line of analysis that we've just heard. And so I don't see how we can be optimistic about the Russian great interest in reunification and the Russian desire for a massive macro-project development going through the Korean Peninsula. Unless Russia creates the conditions for that. And those conditions just haven't been created. Rather, I think what Russia is now saying more and more is it wants to strengthen North Korea and put pressure on the others. And if they don't follow what Russia is seeking, then Russia will do things with North Korea that will make it unlikely that the others will be willing to cooperate. So I think that the door has been open. The reset I think had a lot of promise for this, but that really what Russia has chosen is North Korea over South Korea and as its means of restarting the reunification process. I'll give you some, let me get Andy to say something and then we'll go to you. You can collect all the comments. Thanks, it's a great question, David. You know, I definitely believe, for example, that Russo-Japanese rapprochement is in U.S. national interests. And that what I was alluding to or trying to state in my remarks, the outset, is that our fundamental difference, U.S., with Russia is in the European theater and in Russia's near abroad. Now, I wouldn't say that Northeast Asia is the easiest place for the United States and Russia to find common interests, but there are common interests there. But you can look at a lot of other theaters where there are common interests. The most obvious one where there was the greatest, most robust security cooperation in the 25 years since the Cold War ended was in Afghanistan in the fall of 2001 and the work to take out the Northern Alliance. One could point to other radical jihadist terrorist groups, ISIL and others where we share a common interest. On the Asia question, again, I think that as Victor was saying, the Coal Project and these other connectivity projects, if they are commercially feasible, why not? I think we need to try to walk and chew gum at the same time. I'm not saying obviously to set aside the nuclear dispute, but that's, the nuclear dispute is not the whole game. There are a lot of other aspects to the strategic environment in which this is taking place and the degree to which there is greater connectivity, a more robust economic relationship between North and South Korea seems to be the only way to make sense to kind of help to facilitate a softer landing if and when we ever get to that point. Just a couple of points. First of all, nuclear issue. The recent experience of the last 25 years starting from the agreed framework proved that it is not possible to resolve nuclear issue without addressing North Korean security concerns. Any economic inducements wouldn't work. Agreed framework, leave the ideal, layman-buck, 3,000 open as the organization, all failed because for North Korea security, for this system, security is top priority. And unless security concerns will not be addressed, there will be no progress in the resolving of the nuclear issue at one point. And we should think about it. And second point concerning the, what Dr. Rosman said about the North Korea, North East Asia and North Korea in particular as a very promising, was very promising area for Russian United States cooperation, transformation of North Korea. But what will be the result of transformation? If the result of transformation will be swallowing by South Korea and North Korea and Korean unification on South Korean conditions with American troops and missile defense moved to Russian and Chinese border, I hardly expect that China and Russia will be ready to cooperate to bring American soldiers right on Chinese and Russian borders, like it happened already in Europe. Gorbachev take it face value, value promises by the West that NATO will not be expended to the East. I'm sure that Chinese know that well and they will buy the second host, the same host as the second time as Americans say concerning dealing with North Korea. And they will not promise your, they will not believe your promises that American troops will not move north to the 38 parallel or they will move only to withdraw American, North Korean nuclear weapon and so on, so forth. It will not work. Yeah, thanks Victor. I forgot I wanted to mention one other thing. I totally agree with Gil that the biggest weakness of the Russian pivot to Asia is the failure to address the environment, investment environment challenges. But on the Sino-Russian relationship, I think it's important to keep a certain degree of skepticism about this. For example, on these so-called gas deals that go back to May of last year and the second one in the fall of this year, I think there's significant unhappiness on the Chinese part about what is viewed as delays and failure of Russia to actually deliver on the gas deal. President Xi has met Mr. Putin, not sure around ten or so times and still there is an agreement on paper. There are tremendous challenges and problems involved in the project itself and the fact that the Russians came back in the fall with the desire for the so-called Western route of an additional 30 BCM of gas, this is not really what the Chinese want. It's not the right delivery point for the gas and it's important to keep a very realistic eye. Certainly in the context of the alienation, the deterioration of Moscow's relations with the West in the last 15 months, it's natural that Moscow is going to want to make much more of this relationship with China but there are still significant problems in it and a long history of distrust and a long history of failures, I think from the Chinese perspective, the Russians to deliver on what they promise for oil and gas deals regarding China. We should divide political vision and commercial disputes. There are very strong commercial disputes between such allies as the United States and Japan concerning agriculture and automobiles. The same between the United States and South Korea, the same. American meat, American automobiles. So commercial disputes, it's one side of the matter but political vision and security is the interest. It's different and I think that if you look at the recent history of Russian-Chinese summit meetings, joint statements and practical dealings in political and security sphere, we see almost total similarity, unity and agreement. Of course, like all commercial partners, they can be, it should be differences but I think that it can be resolved and world history and world economic history knows examples of South resolution. For example, there is always dispute about which line. East coast line in Korea or west coast line of railway will be more profitable or should be built first of all. Line which goes from Seoul, Kasson, Pyongyang, Sinaiju, Dandun or from let's say Kasson and Vonsan, Chongjin and Hassan. I think that both lines will be built in the final end and experience of Europe. European integration started from the European Union of coal and steel where there was quotas for each country. The same with China and Russia. East line will get their quota and west line which goes to China will get their quota. Commercial disputes as practice and history shows can be resolved. Major point is a common strategic vision of the security and political situation in the region and from this point at the present point the positions of Russia and China as was once again testified by a recent visit by CGP into Moscow is almost endatical. The interesting thing about what you propose with regard to Russia and the Korean Peninsula is separation of politics and economics. It really takes a page out of what the South Koreans did with the Soviet Union in 1990 which was really to separate politics and economics. They had something called Nordpolitik or Northern policy where they emphasized the common economic interests with the Soviet Union and with a lot of eastern bloc countries. So as you know well from 1988 onwards the South Koreans normalized relations with Hungary, Poland and many other countries leading to the Soviet Union in 1990. That time it was easy to separate politics and economics because the larger superstructure was changing, the relationship between the US and the Soviet Union and South Korea didn't pose a direct military threat to the Soviets in any way. But the North-South also separated during Kim Tae-joon and Nomukhyeon time. It was quite successful it seems to me and I believe that if South will continue the same path now North-South relations at the moment are much more better than they are now. And of course the one challenge that remains is that the nuclear problem is not getting, it seems to be getting exponentially worse which was something that didn't exist in the early 1990s. Unfortunately I know I'm sure that this conversation sparked lots of questions and comments from the audience but unfortunately we're out of time. Dr. Zebbins paper I think is available outside and we'll have it online as well. We want to thank you very much for taking the time to come out here and be with us and I want to thank my panelists also, Gil Rosman and Andy Cushins for joining us and you as well. Thank you all and have a good day.