 Good afternoon. On behalf of CSS President and CEO, John Hamry, I want to welcome you all to this very special edition of our Gulf Roundtable series, featuring Deputy Secretary of State William J. Burns. I want to extend a special welcome to Ambassador Morocco, the Ambassador of Lebanon, and the Ambassador of the League of Arab States. I'm John Alterman, the Brzezinski Chair in Global Security and Geostrategy and Director of the CSS Middle East Program. We hold our much more modest Gulf Roundtable lunches monthly with support from the Embassy of the United Arab Emirates. I was hoping to thank Ambassador Yusuf Loteba in person, but I'm told he had to support an important meeting that would keep him out of town. And it looks like they're having fun. I guess some people get to have fun while our guest today, Deputy Secretary Burns and my friend, the UAE Deputy Chief of Mission, Nomura Shamsi, do the hard work of policymaking. A French writer observed in the 17th century that no man is a hero to his valet. But Deputy Secretary Bill Burns is an exception. As some of you know, I worked as Bill's special assistant 12 years ago. And in the last few days, I found myself sitting down separately with two friends who, at different times, also staffed him closely. What came through in our conversations was our shared conviction that the closer you are to Bill, the more you realize you have to learn from him. Anyone can tell from his resume, and it's in your booklets, that he's been everywhere that matters in US foreign policy for the last three decades. And anyone can tell from the newspapers that when there has been a delicate international issue from the tight circle to plan the raid on Osama bin Laden's compound, to the even tighter circle that secretly held direct discussions with Iran, people at the highest levels have insisted that Bill be in that circle too. But it takes being around him to appreciate the way in which he cultivates trust among diverse audiences. It takes being around him to understand that he really does treat everybody he encounters with courtesy and respect. It takes being around him to understand that while he speaks half as quickly and at half the volume of most of my friends, he thinks three times as quickly and three times as well as any of them. When I worked for him, I concluded that I've never met a person who was so impressive at speaking theoretically while thinking bureaucratically and so skilled at speaking bureaucratically while thinking theoretically. A reporter friend wrote a profile of Deputy Secretary Burns in early January, and he quoted former Secretary of State and current CSIS counselor and trustee, Henry Kissinger, saying this, I like to hear his judgments and can learn from them. That's not something I volunteer very often. All of us who have worked with him wonder how he's able to do all that he does and yet we're grateful that he does all the same. I'm pleased to introduce the Deputy Secretary of States of the United States, William J. Burns. Thanks. That was very nice. Thank you very much. That's very nice of you. Well, thank you very much, John, and good afternoon, everyone. It's truly an honor to be back at CSIS, an institution for which I have enormous admiration and respect. It's also an honor to visit this magnificent new building, which is a real testament to John Henry's vision and leadership. And it's an honor to be introduced by John Alterman, a wonderful scholar, colleague, and friend. President Kennedy once said that Washington is a city of Southern efficiency and Northern charm. I hope you won't feel the same way about my speech today, and I did promise John that I would try to be brief. I'm very glad to join all of you today to talk about our partnership with the Gulf during a time of profound change in the broader Middle East. The dynamics unleashed by the second Arab awakening three years ago are still very much with us today. They will continue to unfold over the course of this generation and very likely the next. These dynamics are hard to understand, let alone navigate. While humility is not our national trademark, we ought to approach this moment with great circumspection. After all, as we tend to demonstrate from time to time, we have no monopoly on wisdom or common sense. During this time of change and uncertainty, the US Gulf partnership rooted in more than seven decades of close and enduring cooperation remains crucial and it remains strong. But even among friends, there can be real differences about what this change means and how we should respond to it. There's no point in pretending otherwise, and it's important to address doubts and concerns, honestly and plainly. After a post-911 decade dominated by wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, it's not hard to see why Americans would seek to rebalance our priorities. With the United States likely to overtake Saudi Arabia as the world's leading oil producer in the next five years or so, and with the prospect of genuine energy independence in the next 20 years or so, it's also natural for Americans to wonder if we really need to pay so much attention to the Middle East. It's equally natural for some of our Gulf partners to doubt our grasp of what's happening in their region and take issue with our policies. Our warnings about the region's unsustainable status quo and our confident talk about energy independence have led some Gulf states to question our reliability as partners. Others complain that our diplomacy with Iran is naive and overly fixated on the nuclear issue. And then there is the huge problem of Syria where some of our Gulf partners believe that our concerns about the day after Assad's exit cloud our judgment about the steps that are required to get there. I wish I could offer simple answers to these concerns or new and neat prescriptions for these challenges. I cannot. But I am convinced that it would be a real mistake if we allowed our occasional doubts and differences to weaken the historic bonds between us. I am convinced that for many years to come, our strategic interests will remain far more aligned than not. And I am convinced that we have far more to gain by working together than working separately. We can and we should seize this moment to renew our partnership, strengthen it, make it more resilient and ensure that it serves our common interests and our common aspirations. As Secretary Kerry made clear in Davos last month, America's commitment to the Middle East is enduring because America's interests in the Middle East are enduring. And as President Obama will stress during his visit to Saudi Arabia next month, our partnership with the Gulf will remain a cornerstone of that commitment. The truth is that for all the talk about rebalance and retrenchment, the Gulf remains central to American national interests and partnership with the United States remains central to the national interests of Gulf states. We know that increased American energy independence doesn't free the United States from the global energy market. A rise in the price of oil anywhere means a rise in the price of oil everywhere. The impact of which neither we nor our allies can escape. While some see our Asia rebalance as a turn away from the Middle East, the exact opposite is true. The US and the Gulf both have an increasing stake in the stability and prosperity of the Asia Pacific, the most dynamic part of the global economy and the biggest consumer of Gulf oil. At the same time, our Gulf partners know that no country or collection of countries can do for the Gulf states what the United States has done and continues to do. The challenge facing both of us is whether we can make common cause in the long-term effort to enhance the odds that more moderate, responsive and responsible governments will emerge throughout the region or whether we will work at cross purposes from one another and enable hardliners and extremists of one stripe or another to erode what some analysts have termed the Arab center, the majority of people and leaderships in the region who seek a future far different than what extremists have to offer. The founding father of the United Arab Emirates, Sheikh Zayed, one of the wisest and most decent leaders I've ever met in the region, once said that the greatest natural resource of a nation is its people. The vision and drive of Sheikh Zayed and his generation have created huge opportunities for the peoples of the Gulf, despite all the challenges that lie ahead. We should harness the same spirit of imagination, courage and creativity and put it to work on behalf of this generation's aspirations and ambitions. We should try to build an affirmative agenda, an agenda that focuses on security, prosperity, easing of regional conflicts and the promotion of tolerance and pluralism. And we should work together to convey a clear sense of what we stand for, not just what we stand against, a powerful antidote to extremists who are much better at tearing things down than building anything up. So let me briefly outline some of the key elements of this agenda. From the Cold War to the Gulf War and the Tanker War to the War on Terrorism, our partnership has withstood the tests of time. And I'm confident it can withstand today's challenges as well if we continue to place security cooperation at the heart of our agenda. The President's address at the United Nations General Assembly and Secretary Hagel's speech in Manama last December reaffirmed our continued commitment to Gulf security. Indeed, our security commitments and partnerships in the Gulf are more extensive today than ever before. Our military presence includes more than 35,000 ground, air and naval personnel at more than a dozen bases in and around the Gulf. We've deployed our most advanced systems to the region, our most advanced aircraft and our most advanced munitions, our most advanced intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets and our most advanced missile defense capabilities. And we've provided to our partners some of the world's very best military equipment. Saudi Arabia recently purchased 72 F-15s, the largest purchase of F-15s by any single country ever. We recently notified Congress of sales to Saudi Arabia and the UAE of advanced munitions packages. And just this January, we notified Congress of our support for the UAE's upgrade of its F-16s and potential purchase of 30 new F-16 fighters. We've also approved sales of some of the most sophisticated missile defense systems in the world, including the Terminal High Altitude Air Defense System to FETR and the UAE and PAK-3 missiles to Kuwait. Thanks to these capabilities and decades of training and joint exercises, operations and planning, Gulf states are increasingly becoming some of our most capable military partners. From the UAE and FETR's contribution to the no-fly zone over Libya, to the GCC's participation in the counter piracy operations in the strategically important Arabian Sea, we are seeing the promise of what our enhanced partnership can achieve. While we continue to expand the depth and breadth of our bilateral security relationships, we are also working to build a more capable, unified and effective regional security architecture to address emerging threats none of us can fully address on our own. Two years ago, Secretary Clinton joined GCC foreign ministers in Riyadh to launch the US GCC Strategic Cooperation Forum. Last fall, Secretary Kerry hosted his counterparts in New York and Secretary Hagel recently announced in Minama an expansion of the forum to include, for the first time, an annual meeting of defense ministers. These high-level gatherings have allowed our senior diplomats and defense officials to define a shared set of priorities and practical steps that we can take together to address threats to our security. Building an effective regional defense against the threat of ballistic missiles is one of the forum's top priorities. Already, some of our allies have ballistic defense capabilities and others are acquiring them. But enhanced information sharing between Gulf states and interoperability between their disparate capabilities will not only be more cost efficient, it will provide the region with better early warning, better coordination, and ultimately, a more layered and effective defense. We've seen countries in other parts of the world successfully overcome the technical and political challenges of designing a regional response to the threat of ballistic missiles. Those countries are today safer and more capable U.S. allies. There is no reason the GCC cannot follow in their footsteps. To help get there, President Obama designated the GCC an international entity eligible to buy U.S. defense articles and services, a designation that will allow the GCC to invest in shared systems for mutual defense. This is the same designation we've granted to NATO and other important multilateral partners. And it demonstrates how serious we are about helping the GCC become a top tier regional security organization and a frontline partner of the United States. More capable Gulf partners and a more capable GCC will be essential to confronting the many challenges we face in the Gulf and beyond. Together through the Combined Air Operations Center in Qatar, we monitor the skies over conflict zones in the Middle East. And through the GCC Maritime Operations Center, we're working to improve information sharing and coordination on security in the Strait of Hormuz, a strategic passageway through which one-fifth of the world's oil passes every day. Together, we're also working on a unified strategy for countering the spread of violent extremism, securing national borders, combating terrorism finance, and protecting critical energy infrastructure from conventional and cyber attacks. And together, we're working to prevent the world's most dangerous weapons from getting to some of the world's most dangerous regimes and actors. The many layers of our security cooperation reflect our many shared interests. We must each do our part to maintain this momentum and to keep pace with rapidly evolving threats in a rapidly evolving international security landscape. As we look across that landscape, no challenge to Gulf security is more obvious than Iran. We have no illusions about Iran's intentions or its conduct. Our concerns with Iran extend far beyond the nuclear issue across a range of dangerous Iranian behavior that threatens our interests and those of our friends in the region and threatens the human rights of Iran citizens. While all of these concerns are important and serious, the nuclear issue remains the most urgent. Since his first day in office, President Obama has made very clear that he will do whatever it takes to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. He has also emphasized his readiness and determination to seek a negotiated resolution. To get there, we worked with Congress and our international partners to put in place an unprecedented set of sanctions whose pressures have had a dramatic impact on Iran's economy. I can assure you that we have entered this diplomatic chapter with our eyes wide open. As the President himself has said, there is probably no better than a 50-50 chance that Iran will ultimately accept an agreement that can guarantee the peaceful nature of its program. But for the first time in many years, we now have a real opportunity to test Iran's intentions and we and our partners will pursue it seriously. As we seek to negotiate a comprehensive nuclear agreement over the coming months, we will remain very mindful of Gulf concerns. We will not relent in our efforts to confront Iran's destabilizing behavior, not in Lebanon, not in Syria, not in Iraq, and not in the Arabian Peninsula itself. We will not relent in enforcing existing sanctions and we will not relent in our efforts to intensify consultations and cooperation with our Gulf partners across this whole range of issues. That is exactly why Secretary Kerry was in the UAE yesterday and it is exactly why the President will visit Saudi Arabia next month. Sustainable security in the region requires progress toward resolving some very complicated conflicts. The most poisonous and dangerous of these conflicts today is the bloody civil war in Syria. The longer the civil war grinds on, the greater the danger to Syria's people and to the region. The simple truth is that there can be no stability and no resolution of the crisis without a transition to new leadership. We have no illusions about the challenges on the road to achieving that objective or about the very difficult day after or more likely the very difficult years after. And we have no illusions about the rising extremists threat in Syria and the risks it poses to the region, to neighbors who already have more than their share of challenges. We all have an interest in supporting a capable moderate opposition that can help build a new Syria and confront Al-Qaeda. Given the strong relationship between Gulf States and many opposition groups, GCC leadership and guidance is critically important. But while continued assistance to the opposition is essential, the only viable approach to end the suffering of the Syrian people is through a negotiated transition. And we should work more closely in a more unified way with our GCC friends to help achieve that objective. As we pursue a diplomatic solution in Syria, we must also continue to coordinate our efforts to support frontline states bearing the brunt of pressure from the Syrian crisis. In Jordan, one out of 10 people is a Syrian refugee. In Lebanon, it's one out of four. The enormous strain on host governments and communities threatens to exacerbate already serious resource, security, and economic challenges across the region. The Gulf has shown real leadership in raising awareness about the human tragedy of the conflict. The Emir of Kuwait has co-hosted two high-level Syria donor conferences that collectively raised nearly $4 billion of humanitarian assistance. Given the protracted nature of this crisis, our assistance should be integrated with the region's long-term economic development efforts. We welcome the continued assistance of the Gulf to both Jordan and Lebanon. And we will continue to do our part. During King Abdullah II's visit to the United States earlier this month, we announced our intention to offer Jordan a second loan guarantee to help it sustain reforms while continuing to address the ongoing humanitarian challenge. The Palestinian issue has also taken on new urgency. Nothing is ever easy about Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. Former Secretary of State Jim Baker, for whom I worked and have great admiration, keeps a whole wall of caustic newspaper cartoons outside his office in Houston. Reminders of the skepticism surrounding his nine trips to the Middle East before the Madrid Peace Conference in 1991. But he proved his doubters wrong and diplomacy worked. That's our challenge again today. And that's the challenge Secretary Kerry has taken on to his great credit in the face of similar skepticism. As the Secretary often says, both parties stand to lose a great deal without peace. But they also stand to gain a great deal if they take the courageous steps to an agreement. The Arab Peace Initiative, stimulated by King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia's vision more than a decade ago, still offers Israel its people and its economy new partnerships with 20 members of the Arab League and 35 other Muslim-majority countries. And it offers continued financial and political support to a future Palestinian state. Keeping the promise of the Arab Peace Initiative alive and making progress toward the two-state solution which Israelis and Palestinians both need and deserve remains a significant priority for the U.S. Gulf Partnership. Finally, a renewed agenda for our partnership cannot focus exclusively on contending with external challenges. If we're serious about making our partnership more durable, our agenda should include cooperation on strategies to stem threats from the inside. Strategies that seek to bolster moderates, modernize economies and expand opportunities, encourage pluralism and tolerance, and ease the sense of popular grievance on which extremists feed. The reality is that in our conversations with our Gulf partners, we don't always see eye to eye on what has caused the revolutions and transitions spurred by the Second Arab Awakening. We don't always see eye to eye in the direction these transitions should take. And we don't always see eye to eye on how best to respond to them. But it is also a reality that when we work in concert, we can help shape outcomes that not only advance reform, but also advance stability. As the world's 11th largest economy, the GCC is increasingly a regional power, a dynamic business hub, a critical shaper of the media and culture in the Muslim world, and a force in regional politics. The GCC can now push the region away from conflict and toward a stable future. We wanna be partners in that endeavor. US-GCC cooperation in Yemen is a very good example of what we can achieve together. Our joint efforts to end the country's civil strife and help Yemen define a comprehensive transition accord, including the recently concluded National Dialogue, have given the Yemeni people a real chance to begin the hard work of reconciliation and reconstruction. Just as Yemen's transition must remain Yemeni-owned and driven, so too must Bahrain's. But we all have a role and a stake in Bahrain's success. In January, the Crown Prince took the historic step of convening senior members of Bahrain's political groups, including the leader of the opposition to inject new momentum into the national dialogue process. We welcome this step and encourage all parties to participate constructively in the dialogue, renounce violence, and uphold their commitments. With its multi-sectarian and multi-ethnic population, its vast energy resources, and its central geographic location, Iraq's success is critical to regional stability. We have an enduring commitment to a stable, secure Iraq that does not threaten its neighbors, has secure borders, and plays a constructive role in regional peace and security. We continue to support Iraq's regional integration through a series of ongoing diplomatic engagements, including a trilateral dialogue with Iraq and Turkey, and a more expansive dialogue with Jordan, UAE, and others. Iraq has made important recent progress with Kuwait. Iraq's energy resources and links to its neighbors can deepen the stake Iraqis feel in their own country's stability and in the stability of the neighborhood. The very difficult challenge posed by Al-Qaeda in Anbar makes these efforts all the more important and all the more urgent. Prime Minister Maliki has acknowledged that only a holistic approach that includes security, political, and economic elements can provide a sustainable solution to this challenge. We're working to support him in that effort, and we welcome the Gulf's constructive participation. In Egypt, despite our differences, we can work together to support similar reforms. Stable evolution in Egypt remains crucial to the stable evolution of the entire region. But no transition can succeed without a sense of respect for political pluralism and a sense of confidence in a better and more inclusive economic future. Gulf countries have been enormously generous to Egypt during its very bumpy transition, and that support has been critical. But billions of dollars of assistance will produce little sustainable effect without a more comprehensive and carefully conceived strategy. Beyond Egypt, the US and the Gulf should also align our efforts in the Maghreb. Earlier this month, for example, I visited Tunisia, a country that has experienced the full range of transition challenges and setbacks, but whose leaders demonstrated the courage to come together and put the transition back on track. Secretary Kerry was in Tunis yesterday and emphasized that Tunisia can serve as an example for the entire region of what dialogue and compromise can achieve. The United States and the Gulf States are distant neighbors. We have different histories. We come from different traditions, and we will inevitably continue to have differences of opinion. But we can and we must find common ground and build a common agenda to help shape our shared future. We have a deep stake in each other's security. We have a deep stake in ending the conflicts that allow extremists to feed on the region's bitterness and alienation. And we have a deep stake in demonstrating that reform and stability can coexist. The agenda I laid out today is undoubtedly ambitious and the obstacles are undoubtedly formidable. But I remain optimistic that much is possible in the years ahead for a renewed US Gulf partnership. Now, whenever I used to say that I was optimistic during my service in Moscow as ambassador a few years ago, one of my Russian friends would invariably remind me of one of the many typically fatalistic Russian definitions of an optimist. Someone who thinks that tomorrow will be better than the day after. I mean something a little different. I think tomorrow is actually gonna be pretty complicated for us and for our Gulf partners. But if we can find the resolve and the persistence to work together on the many problems and opportunities on the road ahead, then I'm certain that the day after tomorrow and many days and months and years beyond can be a moment of revitalization and great possibility for our partnership and for the entire region. Thank you very much. Thank you very much. I'm also grateful that you've agreed to take some questions. I'll ask you all to wait for microphones to come to you. And because we only have a very little bit of time before the deputy secretary has to dash off to the White House, we're gonna ask everybody to ask just one question. I'm gonna start if I may. I'll try to give short answers too, which is usually the problem, but. If I may. In announcing or in the article that the New York Times printed yesterday announcing Rob Malley was joining the NSC staff, the phrasing they used was Robert Malley who advised President Bill Clinton on Israeli Palestinian talks is returning to manage the fraying ties between the United States and its allies in the Persian Gulf. And I was in Saudi Arabia last month for a research trip. I'm going in a few weeks and it's striking that a number of people I've worked with in Saudi Arabia for many years have said now is a tough time to do this trip. So I'm asking what's either a one or three part question depending on how you'd like to answer it. The first part is from where you sit is are there fraying ties? Is there something going on that would need more active management? If you think there is. I was talking with somebody yesterday who I trust who said that one of the problems in our approach has been we've been a little too transactional. And as we've dealt with our Gulf allies we haven't devoted enough attention to the sort of visceral trust building activities that they often want. And if you agree with that assessment what would be your advice to the president as he prepares to go to Saudi Arabia in about six weeks to try to build a broader sense of trust in addition to this sorts of transactional new outs that I'm sure will come out of the trip. That's a very good question, John. The reality in my view anyway is that U.S.-Saudi partnership is as important today as it's ever been. I mean, many of my colleagues and former colleagues in the audience have lived through lots of challenging times in the Gulf and in the Middle East. But I think the array of challenges across the region right now that animates the efforts of both the United States and Saudi Arabia is probably as complicated at least as any I've seen in the three decades that I've been an American diplomat. Objectively, there's a great deal to be gained by working together in dealing with lots of those challenges even though we're bound to have tactical differences even though they're bound to be mutual suspicions from time to time. But whether it's in dealing, as I mentioned in my remarks, with the challenge of Gulf security, the continuing challenge posed by Iran's behavior on the nuclear issue but also well beyond it, the huge challenge of Syria and the consequences that continuing civil war has for the rest of the region, the challenge of supporting very complicated transitions in very different places across the region, whether it's in Tunisia and Egypt or in Yemen, all of those I think underscore what we have to gain by working together. The only way we're gonna be able to do that effectively is if we work at it. And that means from the very top, which is exactly what the president is demonstrating and his visit to Saudi Arabia next month, what Secretary Kerry has demonstrated intensively, including in his conversations in the Emirates yesterday and what all of us need to demonstrate. It has to be a two-way street. We both need to work at this. But again, I think if we take a step back, it seems to me at least that the realization is obvious and that is that we have a lot more to gain over the coming months and years by trying to work together and try to sort through together these kind of challenges. Thank you. Thanks, Barbara Slavin, from the Atlantic Council and lmonitor.com. Deputy Secretary Burns, how can you convince the Saudis and others that a comprehensive nuclear agreement with Iran is in their interests and that it won't increase Iran's ability to affect other developments in the region to the detriment of the Saudis and others? That's a very good question, Barbara. I mean, I think part of the answer lies in the quality of the agreement and we're determined to try to build on the first step agreement that was reached at the end of November to produce a comprehensive solution that demonstrates conclusively the exclusively peaceful purposes of Iran's program. That's a very tall order, as you know, as well as anyone. But we're determined to test that proposition because I think the quality of that agreement will go a long way toward convincing others that it's in their interests, in the broader interests of Gulf security as well. Second, as I tried to say in my opening remarks, it's very important for us not only to say, but also to demonstrate through our actions that we understand that there's a whole range of Iranian behavior and Iranian actions that concern us and that can threaten our interests and the interests of our friends, not just in the Gulf, but across the region. Lebanon, Syria to Yemen and the rest of the Arabian Peninsula itself. And so what we wanna do is try to demonstrate through our actions that we not only appreciate those kind of challenges, but that we wanna work together with our partners in the Gulf to deal with them. I think those are the only ways it seems to me to try to drive home the seriousness of our approach. Right behind where we have to drive. Thank you very much, Josh Rogan, the Daily Beast. In recent days, Secretary Kerry has spoken very publicly and openly about a new process to examine both old and new options for increasing American involvement in the Syria crisis. It's been widely reported that these options include providing greater transportation and intelligence to moderate vetted Syrian rebel groups, as well as possibly paying the salaries of some of these rebels. Is that the entire universe of options that are under consideration? There's also been some disputed reporting that the U.S. has dropped its objections to Gulf countries providing Syrian rebels with anti-aircraft weapons, including man pads. Is that true or is that not true? And is there an expectation that even if these options were pursued, that this would be enough to turn the tide or at least maintain the balance between the rebels and an increasingly aggressive regime military onslaught? Thank you. Thanks, Josh. And thanks for trying to bring my checkered career to an abrupt end. No, it's a very good question. And I can't obviously go into a lot of detail about the sorts of things that we continue as a government to try to look at, because it's been obvious for some time that the longer the civil war in Syria goes on, the greater the dangers, not just to the people of Syria, but to the wider region. And you see that in terms of the impact on Syria, Lebanon, and what's going on in Iraq today. And it becomes extraordinarily important, I think, for the United States to continue to look at everything we can do to bolster the moderate opposition, both as a means of trying to create the circumstances in which a negotiated transition of leadership are possible because there's been zero evidence so far in the Geneva process of seriousness on the part of the Syrian regime, but also bolstering the moderate opposition as an investment in the kind of Syria that ultimately Syrians deserve, a Syria that respects minority groups, that represents tolerance and pluralism, and that's gonna be able to stand against the violent extremist groups who increasingly are drawn to the magnet of Bashar al-Assad. So it's a very tall order, as I said earlier, I don't have a neat prescription to offer publicly today, but I think across the administration we do realize what's at stake and the urgency of the situation. Sorry, Andrew here. Thank you, I'm Raphael Danziger, a consultant to APEC. And my question is the following, you said that your policy is to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon acquiring, I think you said. Is it also a policy to prevent Iran from becoming a threshold nuclear weapons state? In other words, one within a few weeks can get a nuclear weapon if it wants to. As part of the challenge of negotiations, as you know very well, is to try to translate our broad objective, the one we share, I think, with our negotiating partners in the P5 plus one and the rest of the international community, and that's to ensure the exclusively peaceful purposes of Iran's program, and to translate that into what's being negotiated, which is a long-term period in which Iran, through limitations and constraints, demonstrates the seriousness of its commitment and deals with some of the questions of breakout and other kind of questions that are widely shared concerns, not just in the United States, but certainly in the Gulf as well. And so the challenge, the huge challenge of negotiations, which we began to address in the first step agreement, but now in a comprehensive solution are gonna be much, much more complicated. That's what we're gonna have to wrestle with in the coming months. And then we have room for just one more questions. I knew over here in the end, there's no very patient in the room. A question to you about Russia, which you know quite well. How can Russia be- Can you identify yourself just so everybody knows? Sorry? Would you please identify yourself? Oh, yes, hi. My name is Mindy Reiser. I'm vice president of an NGO called Global Peace Services, USA. I would like to know how, with your rich and long experience with Russia, you think that Russia can be induced to play a more helpful role in a number of the crises that a part of the world we've been discussing faces? And what do you think would inspire Mr. Putin to be more helpful? I learned something new about Russia every day. So, you know, my humility only continues to grow about that very complicated relationship. I mean, I think if you look across the range of issues that we've been talking about today, I think we've worked reasonably well with Russia on the Iran nuclear negotiations. I think we share in general terms a concern about the potential for Iran acquiring a nuclear weapon and the destabilizing effect that that would have across the region that matters to both of us. I think on the Palestinian issue, I think, you know, Russia has largely seen eye to eye with the United States on the importance of trying to revive that process. And certainly the Russians have been supportive of Secretary Kerry and President Obama's efforts over the course, especially of the past year. Syria has been a tougher challenge. And we work together on the narrower but important issue of chemical weapons, even though the pace of progress is not as fast as I think either of us would like the pace of progress toward the destruction of Syria's chemical weapons stockpile. We've had less success, to be honest, in working together on the Geneva process. As I said earlier, there's been zero evidence so far of seriousness on the part of the Syrian regime. And I think Russia has a role to play in using all of its leverage to try to move toward what is the goal of the Geneva I communique, which is to produce a transitional governing body with full executive powers reached by mutual consent. The key to the kind of negotiated transition that both of us have pledged support for. But I think it's gonna be very important for Russia to use all the influence that it can to help bring that about. And that's something that's gonna be crucial to making any kind of diplomatic progress on that issue. Russia, it seems to me anyway, objectively shares a concern about the growth of violent extremism across the Middle East, a part of the world geographically that's very proximate to Russia and that can affect security interests in Russia itself. And therefore, as you look at the growth of violent extremists, the way in which foreign fighters have been drawn to Syria over the course of the last year, there again, there should be a shared sense of urgency with Russia about trying to produce that kind of political transition because the continuation of the Assad regime is the surest way to make that problem worse. It's not the solution to the problem.