 Question 69 of Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde – Triatis on the Cardinal of Virtues – The Virtue of Justice. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde – Triatis on the Cardinal of Virtues – The Virtue of Justice by St. Thomas Aquinas, translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Question 69 of Sins Committed Against Justice on the Part of the Defendant in four articles. We must now consider those sins which are committed against justice on the part of the defendant. Under this head, there are four points of inquiry. First, whether it is a mortal sin to deny the truth which would lead to one's condemnation. Second, whether it is lawful to defend oneself with columnaries. Third, whether it is lawful to escape condemnation by appealing. Fourth, whether it is lawful for one who has been condemned to defend himself by violence if he be able to do so. First article. Whether one can, without a mortal sin, deny the truth which would lead to one's condemnation. Objection one. It would seem that one can, without a mortal sin, deny the truth which would lead to one's condemnation. For Chrysostom says in his homily thirty-one on the letter to the Hebrews, I do not say that you should lay bare your guilt publicly, nor accuse yourself before others. Now if the accused were to confess the truth in court, he would lay bare his guilt and be his own accuser. Therefore, he is not bound to tell the truth, and so he does not sin mortally if he tell a lie in court. Objection two. Further, just as it is an officious lie when one tells a lie in order to rescue another man from death, so it is an officious lie when one tells a lie in order to free oneself from death, since one is more bound towards oneself than towards another. Now an officious lie is considered not a mortal but a venial sin. Therefore, if the accuser denies the truth in court in order to escape death, he does not sin mortally. Objection three. Further, every mortal sin is contrary to charity, as stated above in Question 24, Article 12. But that the accused lie by denying himself to be guilty of the crime laid to his charge is not contrary to charity, neither as regards the love we owe God, nor as to the love due to our neighbor. Therefore, such a lie is not a mortal sin. On the contrary, whatever is opposed to the glory of God is a mortal sin, because we are bound by precept to do all to the glory of God, according to 1 Corinthians 10.31. Now it is to the glory of God that the accused confess that which is alleged against him, as appears from the word of Joshua to Achan. My son, give glory to the Lord God of Israel, and confess and tell me what thou hast done. Hide it not. Joshua 7.19 Therefore it is a mortal sin to lie in order to cover one's guilt. I answer that whoever acts against the due order of justice sins mortally, as stated above in Question 59, Article 4. Now it belongs to the order of justice that a man should obey his superior in those matters to which the rights of his authority extend. Again, the judge, as stated above in Question 67, Article 1, is the superior in relation to the person whom he judges. Therefore, the accused is in duty bound to tell the judge the truth, which the latter exacts from him according to the form of law. Hence, if he refuse to tell the truth, which he is under obligation to tell, or if he mendiciously deny it, he sins mortally. If, on the other hand, the judge asks of him that which he cannot ask in accordance with the order of justice, the accused is not bound to satisfy him, and he may lawfully escape by appealing or otherwise. But it is not lawful for him to lie. Reply to Objection 1. When a man is examined by the judge according to the order of justice, he does not lay bare his own guilt, but his guilt is unmasked by another, since the obligation of answering is imposed on him by one whom he is bound to obey. Reply to Objection 2. To lie with injury to another person in order to rescue a man from death is not a purely officious lie, for it has an admixture of the pernicious lie. And when a man lies in court in order to exculpate himself, he does an injury to one whom he is bound to obey, since he refuses him his due, namely, an avowal of the truth. Reply to Objection 3. He who lies in court by denying his guilt acts both against the love of God to whom judgment belongs, and against the love of his neighbor, and this not only as regards the judge to whom he refuses his due, but also as regards his accuser, who is punished if he fail to prove his accusation. Hence it is written in Psalm 140 verse 4, Incline not my heart to evil words, to make excuses in sins, on which words a gloss says, Shameless men are want by lying to deny their guilt when they have been found out. And Gregory in expounding upon Job 31 verse 33, If as a man I have hid my sin says, It is a common vice of mankind to sin in secret, by lying to hide the sin that has been committed, and when convicted to aggravate the sin by defending oneself. Second article, Whether it is lawful for the accused to defend himself with columnies Objection 1. He would seem lawful for the accused to defend himself with columnies, because, according to civil law, when a man is on trial for his life, it is lawful for him to bribe his adversary. Now this is done chiefly by defending oneself with columnies. Therefore the accused who is on trial for his life does not sin if he defend himself with columnies. Objection 2. Further an accuser who is guilty of collusion with the accused is punishable by law. Yet no punishment is imposed on the accused for collusion with the accuser. Therefore it would seem lawful for the accused to defend himself with columnies. Objection 3. Further it is written in Proverbs 1416, A wise man feareth and declineeth from evil. The fool leapeth over and is confident. Now what is done wisely is no sin. Therefore no matter how a man declines from evil he does not sin. On the contrary, in criminal cases an oath has to be taken against columnius allegations. And this would not be the case if it were lawful to defend oneself with columnies. Therefore it is not lawful for the accused to defend himself with columnies. I answer that it is one thing to withhold the truth and another to utter a falsehood. The former is lawful sometimes, for a man is not bound to divulge all truth, but only such as the judge can and must require of him according to the order of justice. As for instance, when the accused is already disgraced through the commission of some crime, or certain indications of his guilt have already been discovered, or again when his guilt is already more or less proven. On the other hand it is never lawful to make a false declaration. As regards what he may do lawfully, a man can employ either lawful means, and such as are adapted to the end in view, which belongs to prudence. Or he can use unlawful means, unsuitable to the proposed end, and this belongs to craftiness, which is exercised by fraud and guile, as shown above in question 55, articles 3 and following. His conduct, in the former case, is praiseworthy. In the latter, sinful. Accordingly it is lawful for the accused to defend himself by withholding the truth that he is not bound to a vow, by suitable means, for instance, by not answering such questions as he is not bound to answer. This is not to defend himself with columnies, but to escape prudently. But it is unlawful for him, either to utter a falsehood, or to withhold a truth that he is bound to a vow, or to employ guile or fraud, because fraud and guile have the force of a lie, and so to use them would be to defend oneself with columnies. Reply to Objection 1. Human laws leave many things unpunished, which according to the divine judgment are sins, as, for example, simple fornication. Because human law does not exact perfect virtue from man, for such virtue belongs to few, and cannot be found in so great a number of people as human law has to direct. That a man is sometimes unwilling to commit a sin in order to escape the death of the body, the danger of which threatens the accused who is on trial for his life, is an act of perfect virtue, since death is the most fearful of all temporal things, according to Ethics 3.6. Wherefore, if the accused, who is on trial for his life, bribes his adversary, he sins indeed by inducing him to do what is unlawful, yet the civil law does not punish this sin, and in this sense it is said to be lawful. Reply to Objection 2. If the accuser is guilty of collusion with the accused, and the latter is guilty, he incurs punishment, and so it is evident that he sins. Wherefore, since it is a sin, to induce a man to sin, or to take part in a sin in any way, for the Apostle says in Romans 132 that they are worthy of death that consent to those who sin. It is evident that the accused also sins if he is guilty of collusion with his adversary. Nevertheless, according to human laws, no punishment is inflicted on him for the reason given above. Reply to Objection 3. The wise man hides himself not by slandering others, but by exercising prudence. Third article. Third article. Whether it is lawful for the accused to escape judgment by appealing. Objection 1. It would seem unlawful for the accused to escape judgment by appealing. The Apostle says in Romans 131, Let every soul be subject to the higher powers. Now the accused by appealing refuses to be a subject to a higher power, notably the judge. Therefore he commits a sin. Objection 2 further. Ordinary authority is more binding than that which we choose for ourselves. Now according to the decretals, it is unlawful to appeal from the judges chosen by common consent. Much less therefore is it lawful to appeal from ordinary judges. Objection 3 further. Whatever is lawful once is always lawful. But it is not lawful to appeal after the tenth day, nor a third time on the same point, according to the canons. Therefore it would seem that an appeal is unlawful in itself. On the contrary, Paul appealed to Caesar. Confer Acts Chapter 25. I answer that. There are two motives for which a man appeals. First, through confidence in the justice of his cause, seeing that he is unjustly oppressed by the judge, and then it is lawful for him to appeal, because this is a prudent means of escape. Hence it is laid down in the decretals. All those who are opposed are free, if they so wish, to appeal to the judgment of the priests, and no man may stand in their way. Secondly, a man appeals in order to cause a delay, lest a just sentence be pronounced against him. This is to defend oneself columnarously, and is unlawful as stated above in Article 2. For he inflicts an injury both on the judge, whom he hinders in the exercise of his office, and on his adversary, whose justice he disturbs as far as he is able. Hence it is laid down. Without doubt, a man should be punished if his appeal be declared unjust. Reply to Objection 1. A man should submit to the lower authority insofar as the latter observes the order of the higher authority. If the lower authority departs from the order of the higher, we ought not to submit to it, for instance. If the proconsul order one thing and the emperor another, according to a gloss on Romans 13 too. Now when a judge oppresses anyone unjustly, in this respect he departs from the order of the higher authority, whereby he is obliged to judge justly. Hence it is lawful for a man, who is oppressed unjustly, to have recourse to the authority of the higher power, by appealing either before or after sentence has been pronounced. And since it is to be presumed that there is no rectitude where true faith is lacking, it is unlawful for a Catholic to appeal to an unbelieving judge, according to the decretal Cattolicus. The Catholic, who appeals to the decision of a judge of another faith, shall be excommunicated, whether his case be just or unjust. Hence the apostle also rebuked those who went to law before unbelievers, in 1 Corinthians 6.6. Reply to Objection 2. It is due to a man's own fault or neglect that, of his own accord, he submits to the judgment of one in whose justice he has no confidence. Moreover, it would seem to point to levity of mind for a man not to abide by what he has once approved of. Hence it is with reason that the law refuses us the faculty of appealing from the decision of judges of our own choice, who have no power saved by virtue of the consent of the litigants. On the other hand, the authority of an ordinary judge depends not on the consent of those who are subject to his judgment, but on the authority of the king or prince who appointed him. Hence, as a remedy against his unjust oppression, the law allows one to have recourse to appeal, so that even if the judge be at the same time ordinary and chosen by the litigants, it is lawful to appeal from his decision, since seemingly his ordinary authority occasioned his being chosen as arbitrator. Nor is it to be imputed as a fault to the man who consented to his being arbitrator, without adverting to the fact that he was appointed ordinary judge by the prince. Reply to Objection 3. The equity of the law so guards the interests of the one party that the other is not oppressed. Thus it allows ten days for appeal to be made, this being considered sufficient time for deliberating on the expediency of an appeal. If on the other hand there were no fixed time limit for appealing, the certainty of judgment would ever be in suspense, so that the other party would suffer an injury. The reason why it is not allowed to appeal a third time on the same point is that it is not probable that the judges would fail to judge justly so many times. Fourth article. Whether a man who is condemned to death may lawfully defend himself if he can. Objection 1. He would seem that a man who is condemned to death may lawfully defend himself if he can, for it is always lawful to do that to which nature inclines us, as being of natural right, so to speak. Now, to resist corruption is an inclination of nature not only in men and animals, but also in things devoid of sense. Therefore, if he can do so, the accused, after condemnation, may lawfully resist being put to death. Objection 2 further. Just as a man by resistance escapes the death to which he has been condemned, so does he by flight. Now, it is lawful seemingly to escape death by flight, according to Ecclesiastica's 918, keep thee far from the man that hath power to kill and not to quicken. Therefore, it is also lawful for the accused to resist. Objection 3 further. It is written in Proverbs 24-11, Deliver them that are led to death, and those that are drawn to death for bear not to deliver. Now, a man is under greater obligation to himself than to another. Therefore, it is lawful for a condemned man to defend himself from being put to death. On the contrary, the apostle says in Romans 13 verse 2, He that resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God, and they that resist purchase to themselves damnation. Now, a condemned man, by defending himself, resists the power in the point of its being ordained by God, for the punishment of evildoers and for the praise of the good. Confer first Peter 2-14. Therefore, he sins in defending himself. I answer that, a man may be condemned to death in two ways. First, justly, and then it is not lawful for the condemned to defend himself, because it is lawful for the judge to combat his resistance by force, so that on his part the fight is unjust, and consequently without any doubt he sins. Secondly, a man is condemned unjustly, and such a sentence is like the violence of robbers, according to Ezekiel 2221. Her princes in the midst of her are like wolves, ravening the prey to shed blood. Wherefore, even as it is lawful to resist robbers, so is it lawful, in a like case, to resist wicked princes, except perhaps in order to avoid scandal, when some grave disturbance might be feared to arise. Reply to Objection 1. Reason was given to man that he might ensue those things to which his nature inclines, not in all cases, but in accordance with the order of reason. Hence, not all self-defense is lawful, but only such as is accomplished with due moderation. Reply to Objection 2. When a man is condemned to death, he has not to kill himself, but to suffer death. Wherefore, he is not bound to do anything from which death would result, such as to stay in the place whence he would be led to execution. But he may not resist those who lead him to death, in order that he may not suffer what is just for him to suffer. Even so, if a man were condemned to die of hunger, he does not sin if he partakes of food brought to him secretly, because to refrain from taking it would be to kill himself. Reply to Objection 3. This saying of the wise man does not direct that one should deliver a man from death in opposition to the order of justice. Wherefore, neither should a man deliver himself from death by resisting against justice. Summa Theologica, Secunda Secunde, Triatis on the Cardinal of Virtues, The Virtue of Justice, by St. Thomas Aquinas, translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Question 70. Of injustice with regard to the person of the witness in four articles. We must now consider injustice with regard to the person of the witness. Under this head there are four points of inquiry. First, whether a man is bound to give evidence. Second, whether the evidence of two or three witnesses suffices. Third, whether a man's evidence may be rejected without any fault on his part. Fourth, whether it is a mortal sin to bear false witness. First article. Whether a man is bound to give evidence. Objection 1. It would seem that a man is not bound to give evidence. Augustine says in his Questions on Genesis 126, that when Abraham said of his wife, in Genesis chapter 20 verse 2, She is my sister, he wished the truth to be concealed and not a lie be told. Now by hiding the truth a man abstains from giving evidence. Therefore a man is not bound to give evidence. Objection 2 further. No man is bound to act deceitfully. Now it is written in Proverbs 1113. He that walketh deceitfully revealeth secrets. But he that is faithful concealeth the thing committed to him by his friend. Therefore a man is not always bound to give evidence, especially on matters committed to him as a secret by a friend. Objection 3 further. Clerics and priests more than others are bound to those things that are necessary for salvation. Yet clerics and priests are forbidden to give evidence when a man is on trial for his life. Therefore it is not necessary for salvation to give evidence. On the contrary Augustine says, Both he who conceals the truth and he who tells a lie are guilty. The former, because he is one willing to do good. The latter, because he desires to hurt. I answer that we must make a distinction in the matter of giving evidence. Because sometimes a certain man's evidence is necessary and sometimes not. If the necessary evidence is that of a man subject to a superior whom, in matters pertaining to justice, he is bound to obey. Without doubt he is bound to give evidence on those points which are required of him in accordance with the order of justice. For instance, on manifest things or when ill report has preceded. If, however, he is required to give evidence on other points, for instance, secret matters and those of which no ill report has preceded, he is not bound to give evidence. On the other hand, if his evidence be required by authority of a superior whom he is bound to obey, we must make a distinction. Because if his evidence is required in order to deliver a man from an unjust death or any other penalty, or from false defamation or some loss, in such cases he is bound to give evidence. Even if his evidence is not demanded, he is bound to do what he can to declare the truth to someone who may profit thereby. For it is written, in Psalm 81 verse 4, Rescue the poor and deliver the needy from the hand of the sinner, and in Proverbs 24-11, Deliver them that are led to death, and in Romans 1 verse 32, They are worthy of death, not only they that do them, but they also that consent to them that do them. On which words a gloss says, To be silent when one can disprove is to consent. In matters pertaining to a man's condemnation, one is not bound to give evidence, except when one is constrained by a superior in accordance with the order of justice. Since if the truth of such a matter be concealed, no particular injury is inflicted on anyone. Or, if some danger threatens the accuser, it matters not since he risked the danger of his own accord, whereas it is different with the accused who incurs the danger against his will. Reply to Objection 1, Augustine is speaking of concealment of the truth in a case when a man is not compelled by his superior's authority to declare the truth, and when such concealment is not specially injurious to any person. Reply to Objection 2, A man should by no means give evidence on matters secretly committed to him in confession, because he knows such things not as man, but as God's minister. And the sacrament is more binding than any human precept. But as regards matters committed to man in some other way under secrecy, we must make a distinction. Sometimes they are of such a nature that one is bound to make them known as soon as they come to our knowledge. For instance, if they conduce to the spiritual or corporal corruption of the community, or to some grave personal injury. In short, any like matter that a man is bound to make known either by giving evidence or by denouncing it. Against such a duty, a man cannot be obliged to act on the plea that the matter is committed to him under secrecy, for he would break the faith he owes to another. On the other hand, sometimes they are such as one is not bound to make known, so that one may be under obligation not to do so on account of their being committed to one under secrecy. In such a case, one is by no means bound to make them known, even if the superior should command, because to keep faith is of natural right, and a man cannot be commanded to do what is contrary to natural right. Reply to Objection 3. It is unbecoming for ministers of the altar to slay a man or to cooperate in his laying, as stated above, in Question 64, Article 4. Hence, according to the Order of Justice, they cannot be compelled to give evidence when a man is on trial for his life. Second Article. Whether the evidence of two or three persons suffices? Objection 1. It would seem that the evidence of two or three persons is not sufficient, for judgment requires certitude. Now, certitude of the truth is not obtained by the assertions of two or three witnesses, for we read that Naboth was unjustly condemned on the evidence of two witnesses in 3 Kings 21. Therefore, the evidence of two or three witnesses does not suffice. Objection 2. Further, in order for evidence to be credible, it must agree. But frequently the evidence of two or three disagrees in some point. Therefore, it is of no use for proving the truth in court. Objection 3. Further, it is laid down in the decretals. A bishop shall not be condemned, save on the evidence of seventy-two witnesses, nor a cardinal priest of the Roman Church, unless there be sixty-four witnesses, nor a cardinal deacon of the Roman Church, unless there be twenty-seven witnesses, nor a sub-deacon, an acolyte, an exorcist, a reader or a derker without seven witnesses. Now the sin of one who is of higher dignity is more grievous, and consequently should be treated more severely. Therefore, neither is the evidence of two or three witnesses sufficient for the condemnation of other persons. On the contrary, it is written in Deuteronomy 17.6. By the mouth of two or three witnesses shall he die that is to be slain. And further on, in Deuteronomy 19.15, in the mouth of two or three witnesses every word shall stand. I answer that, according to the philosopher in Ethics 1.3, we must not expect to find certitude equally in every matter, for in human acts, on which judgments are passed and evidence required, it is impossible to have demonstrative certitude, because they are about things contingent and variable. Hence the certitude of probability suffices, such as may reach the truth in the greater number of cases, although it fail in the minority. Now it is probable that the assertion of several witnesses contains the truth rather than the assertion of one, and since the accused is the only one who denies, while several witnesses affirm the same as the prosecutor, it is reasonably established, both by divine and by human law, that the assertion of several witnesses should be upheld. Now all multitude is comprised of three elements, the beginning, the middle, and the end. Therefore, according to the philosopher in On the Heavens 1.1, we reckon all and whole to consist of three parts. Now we have a triple voucher when to agree with the prosecutor, hence two witnesses are required, or for the sake of greater certitude three, which is the perfect number. Therefore it is written in Ecclesiastes 4.12, a threefold chord is not easily broken. And Augustine, commenting on John 8.17, the testimony of two men is true, says in his tract 36 that, There is here a mystery by which we are given to understand that trinity wherein is perpetual stability of truth. Reply to Objection 1. No matter how great a number of witnesses may be determined, the evidence might sometimes be unjust, since it is written in Exodus 23.2, Thou shalt not follow the multitude to do evil. And yet the fact that in so many it is not possible to have certitude without fear of error is no reason why we should reject the certitude which can probably be had, through two or three witnesses, as stated above. Reply to Objection 2. If the witnesses disagree in certain principle circumstances, which change the substance of the fact, for instance in time, place, or persons, which are chiefly in question, their evidence is of no weight, because if they disagree in such things, each one would seem to be given distinct evidence and to be speaking of different facts. For instance, one say that a certain thing happened at such and such a time or place, while another says it happened at another time or place, they seem not to be speaking of the same event. The evidence is not weakened if one witness says that he does not remember, while the other attests to a determinant time and place. And if on such points as these, the witness for prosecution and defense disagree altogether, and if they be equal in number on either side and have equal standing, the accused should have the benefit of the doubt, because the judge ought to be more inclined to acquit than to condemn, except perhaps in favorable suits, such as pleading for liberty and the like. If, however, the witnesses for the same side disagree, the judge ought to use his own discretion in discerning which side to favour, by considering either the number of witnesses, or their standing, or the favourableness of the suit, or the nature of the business and of the evidence. Much more ought the evidence of one witness to be rejected if he contradict himself when questioned about what he has seen and about what he knows. Not, however, if he contradicts himself when questioned about matters of opinion and report, since he may be moved to answer differently according to the different things he has seen and heard. On the other hand, if there be discrepancy of evidence in circumstances not touching the substance of the fact, for instance, whether the weather were cloudy or fine, whether the house were painted or not, or such like matters, such discrepancy does not weaken the evidence, because men are not want to take much notice of such things, wherefore they easily forget them. Indeed, a discrepancy of this kind renders the evidence more credible as Christus film states in his first homily on Matthew, because if the witnesses agreed in every point, even in the minutest of details, they would seem to have conspired together to say the same thing, but this must be left to the prudent discernment of the judge. Reply to Objection 3. This passage refers especially to the bishop's priests, deacons and clerics of the Roman Church on account of its dignity, and this for three reasons. First, because in that church those men ought to be promoted, whose sanctity makes their evidence of more weight than that of many witnesses. Secondly, because those who have to judge other men often have many opponents on account of their justice, wherefore those who give evidence against them should not be believed indiscriminately, unless they be very numerous. Thirdly, because the condemnation of any one of them would detract in public opinion from the dignity and authority of that church, a result which would be more fraught with danger than if one were to tolerate a sinner in that same church unless he were very notorious and manifest, so that a grave scandal would arise if he were tolerated. Third article. Whether a man's evidence can be rejected without any fault of his? Objection 1. It would seem that a man's evidence ought not to be rejected except on account of some fault, for it is inflicted as a penalty on some that their evidence is inadmissible, as in the case of those who are branded with infamy. Now a penalty must not be inflicted save for a fault. Therefore it would seem that no man's evidence ought to be rejected save on account of a fault. Objection 2. Further, God is to be presumed of everyone unless the contrary appear. Now it pertains to a man's goodness that he should give true evidence. Since therefore there can be no proof of the contrary unless there be some fault of his, it would seem that no man's evidence should be rejected save for some fault. Objection 3. Further, no man is rendered unfit for things necessary for salvation except by some sin. But it is necessary for salvation to give true evidence, as stated above in article 1. Therefore no man should be excluded from giving evidence save for some fault. On the contrary, Gregory says, As to the bishop who is said to have been accused by his servants, you are to know that they should by no means have been heard. Which words are embodied in the decretals. I answer that, as stated above in article 2. The authority of evidence is not infallible but probable, and consequently the evidence for one side is weakened by whatever strengthens the probability of the other. Now the reliability of a person's evidence is weakened, sometimes indeed on account of some fault of his, as in the case of unbelievers and persons of evil repute, as well as those who are guilty of a public crime and who are not allowed even to accuse. Sometimes, without any fault on his part, and this owing either to a defect in the reason, as in the case of children, imbeciles and women, or to personal feeling as in the case of enemies or persons united by family or household ties, or again owing to some external condition, as in the case of poor people's slaves and those who are under authority, concerning whom it is to be presumed that they might easily be induced to give evidence against the truth. Thus it is manifest that a person's evidence may be rejected either with or without some fault of his. Reply to Objection 1. If a person is disqualified from giving evidence, this is done as a precaution against false evidence rather than as a punishment, hence the argument does not prove. Reply to Objection 2. Good is to be presumed of everyone unless the contrary appear, provided this does not threaten injury to another, because in that case, one ought to be careful not to believe everyone readily, according to 1 John 4.1, believe not every spirit. Reply to Objection 3. To give evidence is necessary for salvation, provided the witness be competent, and the order of justice observed. Hence nothing hinders certain persons being excused from giving evidence if they be considered unfit, according to the law. 4. Whether it is always a mortal sin to give false evidence Objection 1. It would seem that it is not always a mortal sin to give false evidence, for a person may happen to give false evidence through ignorance of fact. Now such ignorance excuses for mortal sin. Therefore, the giving of false evidence is not always a mortal sin. Objection 2. Further, a lie that benefits someone and hurts no man is officious, and this is not a mortal sin. Now sometimes a lie of this kind occurs in false evidence, as when a person gives false evidence in order to save a man from death, or from an unjust sentence which threatens him through other false witnesses or a perverse judge. Therefore, in such cases, it is not a mortal sin to give false evidence. Objection 3. Further, a witness is required to take an oath in order that he may fear to commit a mortal sin of perjury. But this would not be necessary if it were already a mortal sin to give false evidence. Therefore, the giving of false evidence is not always a mortal sin. On the contrary, it is written in Proverbs 19.5. A false witness shall not be unpunished. I answer that false evidence has a threefold deformity. The first is owing to perjury, since witnesses are admitted only on oath, and on this count it is always a mortal sin. Secondly, owing to the violation of justice, and on this account it is a mortal sin generically, even as any kind of injustice. Hence, the prohibition of false evidence by the precept of the Decalogue is expressed in this form when it is said in Exodus 20.16, Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor. For one does nothing against a man by preventing him from doing someone an injury, but only by taking away his justice. Thirdly, owing to the falsehood itself by reason of which every lie is a sin. On this account, the giving of false evidence is not always a mortal sin. Reply to Objection 1. In giving evidence, a man ought not to affirm as certain, as though he knew it, that about which he is not certain. And he should confess his doubt in doubtful terms, and that which he is certain about in terms of certainty. Owing however to the frailty of the human memory, a man sometimes thinks he is certain about something that is not true, and then if after thinking over the matter with due care he deems himself certain about that false thing, he does not sin mortally if he asserts it, because the evidence which he gives is not directly and intentionally, but accidentally contrary to what he intends. Reply to Objection 2. An unjust judgment is not a judgment, wherefor the false evidence given in an unjust judgment, in order to prevent injustice, is not a mortal sin by virtue of the judgment, but only by reason of the oath violated. Reply to Objection 3. Men abhor chiefly those sins that are against God as being most grievous, and among them is perjury, whereas they do not abhor so much sins against their neighbor. Consequently, for the greater certitude of evidence, the witness is required to take an oath. End of Question 70. Read by Michael Shane Greg Lambert, LC. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. The Virtue of Justice by St. Thomas Aquinas, translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Question 71 of Injustice in Judgment on the Part of Council in four articles. We must now consider the injustice which takes place in judgment on the part of council, and under this head there are four points of inquiry. First, whether an advocate is bound to defend the suits of the poor. Second, whether certain persons should be prohibited from exercising the office of advocate. Third, whether an advocate sins by defending an unjust cause. Fourth, whether he sins if he accepts a fee for defending a suit. First article. Whether an advocate is bound to defend the suits of the poor. Objection one. It would seem that an advocate is bound to defend the suits of the poor. For it is written in Exodus 23.5, If thou see the donkey of him that hateeth thee, underneath his burden, thou shalt not pass by, but shall lift him up with him. Now, no less a dangerous retains the poor man whose suit is being unjustly prejudiced, than if his donkey were to lie underneath its burden. Therefore, an advocate is bound to defend the suits of the poor. Objection two. Further, Gregory says in Homily, his ninth homily on the Gospel, Let him that hath understanding beware lest he withhold his knowledge. Let him that hath abundance of wealth watch lest he slacken his merciful bounty. Let him who is a servant to art share his skill with his neighbour. Let him who has an opportunity of speaking with the wealthy plead the cause of the poor. For the slightest gift you have received will be reputed a talent. Now, every man is bound not to hide, but faithfully to dispense the talent committed to him, as evidenced by the punishment inflicted on the servant who hid his talent. Matthew 25.30 Therefore, an advocate is bound to plead for the poor. Objection three. Further, the precept about performing works of mercy, being affirmative, is binding according to time and place, and this is chiefly in cases of need. Now, it seems to be a case of need when the suit of a poor man is being prejudiced. Therefore, it seems that in such a case an advocate is bound to defend the poor man's suit. On the contrary, he that lacks food is no less in need than he that lacks an advocate. Yet he that is able to give food is not always bound to feed the needy. Therefore, neither is an advocate always bound to defend the suits of the poor. I answer that, since defence of the poor man's suit belongs to the works of mercy, the answer to this inquiry is the same as the one given above with regard to the other works of mercy. Question 32, Articles 5 and 9. Now, no man is sufficient to bestow a work of mercy on all those who need it. Wherefore, as Augustine says in On Christian Doctrine 128, Since one cannot do good to all, we ought to consider those chiefly, who by reason of place, time, or any other circumstance, by a kind of chance are more closely united to us. He says, by reason of place, because one is not bound to search throughout the world for the needy that one may succour them. And it suffices to do works of mercy to those one meets with. Hence, it is written in Exodus 23.4, If thou meet thy enemy's donkey going astray, bring it back to him. He says also, by reason of time, because one is not bound to provide for the future needs of others, and it suffices to succour present needs. Hence, it is written in 1 John 3.17, He that shall see his brother in need, and shall put up his bowels from him, how doth the charity of God abide in him. Lastly, he says, or any other circumstance, because one ought to show kindness to those especially who are, by any time, whatever united to us, according to 1 Timothy 5.8. If any man have not care of his own, and especially of those of his house, he hath denied the faith and is worse than an infidel. It may happen, however, that these circumstances concur, and then we have to consider whether this particular man stands in such a need that it is not easy to see how he can be suckered otherwise, and then one is bound to bestow the work of mercy on him. If, however, it is easy to see how he can be otherwise suckered, either by himself or by some other person still more closely united to him, or in a better position to help him, one is not bound so strictly to help the one in need that it would be a sin not to do so, although it would be praiseworthy to do so, or one is not bound to. Therefore, an advocate is not always bound to defend the suits of the poor, but only when the aforesaid circumstances concur, else he would have to put aside all other business and occupy himself entirely in defending the suits of poor people. The same applies to a physician with regard to attendance on the sick. Reply to Objection 1. So long as the donkey lies under the burden, there is no means of help in this case, unless those who are passing along come to the man's aid, and therefore they are bound to help. But they would not be so bound if help were possible from another quarter. Reply to Objection 2. A man is bound to make good use of the talent bestowed on him according to the opportunities afforded by time, place, and other circumstances as stated above. Reply to Objection 3. Not every need is such that it is one's duty to remedy it, but only such as we have stated above. Second article. Whether it is fitting that the law should debar certain persons from the Office of Advocate. Objection 1. You would seem unfitting for the law to debar certain persons from the Office of Advocate, for no man should be debarred from doing works of mercy. Now it belongs to the work of mercy to defend a man's suit, as stated above in Article 1. Therefore no man should be debarred from this office. Objection 2. Further, contrary causes have not, seemingly, the same effect. Now to be busy with divine things and to be busy about sin are contrary to one another. Therefore it is unfitting that some should be debarred from this Office of Advocate on account of religion, as monks and clerics, while others are debarred on account of sin, as persons of ill repute and heretics. Objection 3. Further, a man should love his neighbour as himself. Now it is a duty of love for an advocate to plead a person's cause. Therefore it is unfitting that certain persons should be debarred from pleading the cause of others, while they are allowed to advocate their own cause. On the contrary, according to the canon infames of the decretals, many persons are debarred from the Office of Advocate. I answer that, in two ways a person is debarred from performing a certain act. First, because it is impossible to him. Secondly, because it is unbecoming to him. But, whereas the man to whom a certain act is impossible is absolutely debarred from performing it, he to whom an act is unbecoming is not debarred altogether, since necessity may do away with its unbecomingness. Accordingly, some are debarred from the Office of Advocate because it is impossible to them through lack of sense, either interior, as in the case of madmen and minors, or exterior, as in the case of the deaf and dumb. For an advocate needs to have both interior skill so that he may be able to prove the justice of the cause he defends, and also speech and hearing, that he may speak and hear what is said to him. Consequently, those who are defective in these points are altogether debarred from being advocates either in their own or in another's cause. The becomingness of exercising this Office is removed in two ways. First, through a man being engaged in higher things, wherefor it is unfitting that monks or priests should be advocates in any cause whatever, or that clerics should plead in a secular court because such persons are engaged in divine things. Secondly, on account of some personal defect either of body, for instance a blind man whose attendance in a court of justice would be unbecoming, or of soul, for it ill becomes one who has disdained to be just himself to plead for justice of another. Wherefor it is unbecoming that persons of ill repute, unbelievers, and those who have been convicted of grievous crimes should be advocates. Nevertheless, this unbecomingness is outweighed by necessity, and for this reason such persons can plead either their own cause or that of persons closely connected with them. Moreover, clerics can be advocates in the cause of their own church, and monks in the cause of their own monastery, if the abbot directs them to do so. Reply to Objection 1. Certain persons are sometimes debarred by unbecomingness, and others by inability from performing works of mercy, for not all the works of mercy are becoming to all persons. Thus it ill becomes a fool to give counsel, or the ignorant to teach. Reply to Objection 2. Just as virtue is destroyed by too much and too little, so does a person become incompetent by more and less. For this reason some, like religious and clerics, are debarred from pleading in causes because they are above such and such an office, and others because they are less than competent to exercise it, such as persons of ill repute and unbelievers. Reply to Objection 3. The necessity of pleading the causes of others is not so pressing as the necessity of pleading one's own cause, because others are able to help themselves otherwise, hence the comparison fails. Third Article Whether an advocate sins by defending an unjust cause Objection 1. It would seem that an advocate does not sin by defending an unjust cause. For just as a physician proves his skill by healing a desperate disease, so does an advocate prove his skill if he can defend an unjust cause. Now a physician is praised if he heals a desperate malady. Therefore an advocate also commits no sin but ought to be praised if he defends an unjust cause. Objection 2 further. It is always lawful to desist from committing a sin. Yet an advocate is punished if he throws up his brief. Therefore an advocate does not sin by defending an unjust cause, when once he is undertaken its defense. Objection 3 further. It would seem to be a greater sin for an advocate to use unjust means in defense of a just cause, for example by producing false witnesses or alleging false laws, than to defend an unjust cause. Since the former is a sin against the form, the latter against the matter of justice. Yet it is seemingly lawful for an advocate to make use of such underhand means, even as it is lawful for a soldier to lay ambushes in a battle. Therefore it would seem that an advocate does not sin by defending an unjust cause. On the contrary it is said, Thou helpest the ungodly, and therefore Thou didst deserve the wrath of the Lord. Now an advocate by defending an unjust cause helps the ungodly. Therefore he sins and deserves the wrath of the Lord. I answer that it is unlawful to cooperate in an evil deed by counseling, helping, or in any way consenting, because to counsel or assist in action is in a way to do it. And the Apostle says in Romans 132 that They are worthy of death, not only they that do a sin, but they also that consent to them that do it. Hence it was stated above in Question 62, Article 7, that all such are bound to restitution. Now it is evident that an advocate provides both assistance and counsel to the party for whom he pleads. Wherefore, if knowingly he defends an unjust cause, without doubt he sins grievously, and is bound to restitution of the loss unjustly incurred by the other party by reason of the assistance he has provided. If, however, he defends an unjust cause unknowingly, thinking it just, he is to be excused according to the measure in which ignorance is excusable. Reply to Objection 1. The physician injures no man by undertaking to heal a desperate malady, whereas the advocate who accepts service in an unjust cause unjustly injures the party against whom he pleads unjustly. Hence the comparison fails. For though he may seem to deserve praise for showing skill in his art, nevertheless he sins by reason of injustice in his will, since he abuses his art for an evil end. Reply to Objection 2. If an advocate believes from the outset that the cause is just, and discovers afterwards while the case is proceeding that it is unjust, he ought not to throw up his brief in such a way as to help the other side, or so as to reveal the secrets of his client to the other party. But he can, and must give up the case, or induce his client to give way, or make some compromise without prejudice to the opposing party. Reply to Objection 3. As stated above in Question 40, Article 3, It is lawful for a soldier, or a general, to lay ambushes in a just war by prudently concealing what he has a mind to do, but not by means of fraudulent falsehoods, since we should keep faith even with a foe, as Tully says. Hence it is lawful for an advocate, in defending his case, prudently to conceal whatever might hinder its happy issue, but it is unlawful for him to employ any kind of falsehood. Fourth Article Whether it is lawful for an advocate to take a fee for pleading Objection 1 It would seem unlawful for an advocate to take a fee for pleading. Works of mercy should not be done with a view to human renumeration, according to Luke 14-12. When thou makest a dinner or a supper, call not thy friends, nor thy neighbours who are rich, lest perhaps they also invite thee again, and a recompense be made to thee. Now it is a work of mercy to plead in others' causes stated above in Article 1. Therefore it is not lawful for an advocate to take payment and money for pleading. Objection 2 Further Spiritual things are not to be bartered with temporal things. But pleading a person's cause seems to be a spiritual good, since it consists in using one's knowledge of law. Therefore it is not lawful for an advocate to take a fee for pleading. Objection 3 Further, just as the person of the advocate concurs towards the pronouncement of the verdict, so do the persons of the judge and of the witnesses. Now, according to Augustine in his Letter 153 to the Macedonian, the judge should not sell a just sentence, nor the witness true evidence. Therefore neither can an advocate sell a just pleading. On the contrary, Augustine says in the same Letter 153 to the Macedonian that an advocate may lawfully sell his pleading and a lawyer his advice. I answer that a man may justly receive payment for granting what he is not bound to grant. Now it is evident that an advocate is not always bound to consent to plead, or to give advice in other people's causes. Therefore, if he sell his pleading or advice, he does not act against justice. The same applies to the physician who attends on a sick person to heal him, and to all like persons. Provided, however, they take a moderate fee, with due consideration for persons, for the matter in hand, for the labour entailed, and for the custom of the country. If, however, they wickedly extort an immoderate fee, they sin against justice. Hence Augustine says in his Letter 153 to the Macedonian that it is customary to demand from them restitution of what they have extorted by a wicked excess, but not what has been given to them in accordance with a commendable custom. Reply to Objection 1. Man is not bound to do gratuitously whatever he can do from motives of mercy, else no man could lawfully sell anything, since anything may be given from motives of mercy. But when a man does give a thing out of mercy, he should seek not a human, but a divine reward. In like manner an advocate, when he mercifully pleads the cause of a poor man, should have in view not a human, but a divine mead. In like manner an advocate, when he mercifully pleads the cause of a poor man, should have in view not a human, but a divine mead. And yet he is not always bound to give his services gratuitously. Reply to Objection 2. Though knowledge of law is something spiritual, the use of that knowledge is accomplished by the work of the body. Hence it is lawful to take money in payment of that use, else no craftsmen would be allowed to make profit by his art. Reply to Objection 3. The judge and witnesses are common to either party, since the judge is bound to pronounce a just verdict, and the witness to give true evidence. Now justice and truth do not incline to one side rather than to the other, and consequently judges receive out of the public funds a fixed pay for their labor, and witnesses receive their expenses, not as payment for giving evidence, but as a fee for their labor, either from both parties or from the party by whom they are adduced, because no man serveth as a soldier at any time at his own charge, according to 1 Corinthians 9.7. On the other hand, an advocate defends one party only, and so he may lawfully accept fee from the party he assists. End of Question 71. Read by Michael Shane Craig Lambert, LC Question 72 of Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde Triaties on the Cardinal of Virtues The Virtue of Justice This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde Triaties on the Cardinal of Virtues The Virtue of Justice by St. Thomas Aquinas Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province Question 72 of Reviling in 4 Articles We must now consider injuries inflicted by words uttered extrajudicially. We shall consider 1. Reviling 2. Backbiting 3. Tail-Bearing 4. Derision 5. Cursing Under the first head there are four points of inquiry. First, what is reviling? Second, whether every reviling is a mortal sin. Third, whether one ought to check revilers. Fourth, of the origin of reviling. First article, whether reviling consists in words. Objection 1 It would seem that reviling does not consist in words. Reviling implies some injury inflicted on one's neighbor, since it is a kind of injustice. But words seem to inflict no injury on one's neighbor, either in his person or in his belongings. Therefore, reviling does not consist in words. Objection 2 Further, reviling seems to imply dishonor. But a man can be dishonored or slighted by deeds more than by words. Therefore, it seems that reviling consists not in words, but in deeds. Objection 3 Further, a dishonor inflicted by words is called a railing or a taunt. But reviling seems to differ from railing or a taunt. Therefore, reviling does not consist in words. On the contrary, nothing, save words, is perceived by the hearing. Now, reviling is perceived by the hearing, according to Jeremiah 2010. I heard reviling on every side. Therefore, reviling consists in words. I answer that. Reviling denotes the dishonoring of a person, and this happens in two ways. For since honor results from excellence, one person dishonors another, first by depriving him of the excellence for which he is honored. This is done by sins of deed, whereof we have spoken above in question 64 and following. Second, when a man publishes something against another's honor, thus bringing it to the knowledge of the latter and of other men. This is reviling properly so-called, and is done by some kind of signs. Now, according to Augustine, in On Christian Doctrine 23, Compared with words, all other signs are very few, for words have obtained the chief place among men for the purpose of expressing whatever the mind conceives. Hence, reviling, properly speaking, consists in words. Wherefore, Isidor says in his etymologies 10, that a reviler, con tumeliosus, is hasty and bursts out, tumet, in injurious words. Since, however, things are also signified by deeds, which on this account have the same significance as words, it follows that reviling, in a wider sense, extends also to deeds. Wherefore, a gloss on Romans 130, con tumeliosus, proud, says, The con tumeliosus are those who by word or deed revile and shame others. Reply to Objection 1. Our words, if we consider them in their essence, that is, as audible sounds, injure no man, except perhaps by jarring of the ear, as when a person speaks too loud. But considered as signs conveying something to the knowledge of others, they may do many kinds of harm. Such is the harm done to a man to the detriment of his honor, or of the respect due to him from others. Hence, the reviling is greater if one man reproach another in the presence of many, and yet there may still be reviling if he reproach him by himself, insofar as the speaker acts unjustly against the respect due to the hearer. Reply to Objection 2. One man slights another by deeds, insofar as such deeds cause or signify that which is against that other man's honor. In the former case, it is not a matter of reviling, but of some other kind of injustice, of which we have spoken above in Questions 64, 65, and 66, where, as in the latter case, there is reviling, insofar as deeds, have the significant force of words. Reply to Objection 3. Railing and taunts consist in words, even as reviling, because by all of them a man's faults are exposed to the detriment of his honor. Such faults are of three kinds. First, there is the fault of guilt, which is exposed by reviling words. Secondly, there is the fault of both guilt and punishment, which is exposed by taunts, convictium. Because vice is commonly spoken of in connection with not only the soul, but also the body. Hence, if one man says spitefully to another that he is blind, he taunts but does not revile him, whereas if one man calls another a thief, he not only taunts but also reviles him. Thirdly, a man reproaches another for his inferiority or indigence, so as to lessen the honor due to him for any kind of excellence. This is done by upbraiding words, and properly speaking, occurs when one spitefully reminds a man that one has suckered him when he was in need. Hence it is written in Ecclesiasticus, 2015. He will give a few things and upbraid much. Nevertheless, these terms are sometimes employed one for the other. Second article. Whether reviling or railing is a mortal sin. Objection one. It would seem that reviling or railing is not a mortal sin. For nor mortal sin is an act of virtue. Now railing is an act of virtue, notably of wittiness, to which it pertains to rail well according to the philosopher in Ethics 4.8. Therefore railing or reviling is not a mortal sin. Objection two further. Mortal sin is not to be found in perfect men, and yet these sometimes give utterance to railing or reviling. Thus the apostle says in Galatians 3.1, O senseless Galatians, and our Lord said in Luke 24.25, O foolish and slow of heart to believe. Therefore railing or reviling is not a mortal sin. Objection three further. Although that which is a venial sin by reason of its genus may become mortal, that which is mortal by reason of its genus cannot become venial, as stated above in the Pars Prima Secundae, Question 88, Articles 4 and 6. Hence, if by reason of its genus it were a mortal sin to give utterance to railing or reviling, it would follow that it is always a mortal sin. But this is apparently untrue, as may be seen in the case of one who udders a reviling word indeliberately or through slight anger. Therefore reviling or railing is not a mortal sin by reason of its genus. On the contrary, nothing but mortal sin deserves the eternal punishment of hell. Now railing or reviling deserves the punishment of hell, according to Matthew 5.22. Whosoever shall say to his brother, Thou fool shall be in danger of hellfire. Therefore railing or reviling is a mortal sin. I answer that, as stated above in Article 1. Words are injurious to other persons, not as sounds but as signs, and this signification depends on the speaker's inward intention. Hence, in sins of word, it seems that we ought to consider with what intention the words are uttered. Since then railing or reviling essentially denotes a dishonoring. If the intention of the utterer is to dishonor the other man, this is properly and essentially to give utterance to railing or reviling. And this is a mortal sin no less than theft or robbery. Since a man loves his honour no less than his possessions. If, on the other hand, a man says to another a railing or reviling word, yet with the intention not of dishonoring him, but rather perhaps of correcting him or with some like purpose, he utters a railing or reviling not formally and essentially, but accidentally and materially, insofar to which, as he says, that which might be a railing or a reviling. Hence, this may be sometimes a venial sin and sometimes without any sin at all. Nevertheless, there is need of discretion in such matters, and one should use such words with moderation. Because the railing might be so grave that being uttered inconsiderately, it might dishonor the person against whom it is uttered. In such a case, a man might commit a mortal sin, even though he did not intend to dishonor the other man. Just as were a man incautiously to injure grievously another by striking him in fun, he would not be without blame. Reply to Objection 1 It belongs to wittiness to utter some slight mockery, but not with intent to dishonor or pain the person who is the object of the mockery, but rather with intent to please and amuse. And this may be without sin, if the due circumstances be observed. On the other hand, if a man does not shrink from inflicting pain on the object of his witty mockery, so long as he makes others laugh, this is sinful, as stated in the passage quoted. Reply to Objection 2 Just as it is lawful to strike a person or damnify him in his belongings for the purpose of correction, so too for the purpose of correction may one say a mocking word to a person whom one has to correct. It is thus that our Lord called the disciples foolish, and the apostle called the Galatians senseless. Yet, as Augustine says in his commentary on the Sermon on the Mount, to 19, seldom and only when it is very necessary should we have recourse to invectives, and then so as to urge God's service, not our own. Reply to Objection 3 Since the sin of railing or reviling depends on the intention of the utterer, it may happen to be a venial sin if it be a slight railing that does not inflict much dishonor on a man, and be uttered through lightness of heart or some slight anger without the fixed purpose of dishonoring him, for instance when one intends by such a word to give but little pain. Third Article Whether one ought to suffer oneself to be reviled Objection 1 It would seem that one ought not to suffer oneself to be reviled, for he that suffers himself to be reviled encourages the reviler, but one ought not to do this. Therefore, one ought not to suffer oneself to be reviled, but rather reply to the reviler. Objection 2 Further One ought to love oneself more than another. Now one ought not to suffer another to be reviled, wherefore it is written in Proverbs 26-10, He that putteth a fool to silence a peaseth anger. Therefore, neither should one suffer oneself to be reviled. Objection 3 Further A man is not allowed to revenge himself for it is said, Vengeance belongeth to me I will repay, as quoted in Hebrews 10-30. Objection 4 Now by submitting to be reviled, a man revenges himself according to Chrysostom in his 22nd homily on the letter to the Romans. If thou wilt be revenged, be silent. Thou hast dealt him a fatal blow. Therefore one ought not by silence to submit to reviling words, but rather answer back. On the contrary, it is written in Psalm 37 verse 13, They that sought evils to me spoke vain things, and afterwards he says, But I as a deaf man heard not, and as a dumb man not opening his mouth. I answer that, just as we need patience in things done against us, so do we need it in those said against us. Now the precepts of patience in those things done against us refer to the preparedness of the mind according to Augustine's exposition on our Lord's precept. If one strike thee on thy right cheek, turn to him also the other. That is to say, a man ought to be prepared to do so if necessary. But he is not always bound to do this actually, since not even did our Lord do so, for when he received a blow he said, Why strikeest thou me? Consequently, the same applies to the reviling words that are said against us, for we are bound to hold our minds prepared to submit to be reviled if it should be expedient. Nevertheless, it sometimes behooves us to withstand against being reviled, and this chiefly for two reasons. First, for the good of the reviler, namely, that his daring may be checked, and that he may not repeat the attempt according to Proverbs 265. Answer a fool according to his folly, lest he imagine himself to be wise. Secondly, for the good of many who would be prevented from progressing in virtue on account of our being reviled. Hence Gregory says, in his ninth homily, on Ezekiel, Those who are so placed that their life should be an example to others, ought, if possible, to silence their detractors, lest their preaching be not heard by those who could have heard it, and they continue their evil conduct through contempt of a good life. Reply to Objection 1. The daring of the reviling reviler should be checked with moderation, that is, as a duty of charity, and not through lust for one's own honour. Hence it is written in Proverbs 264. Answer not a fool according to his folly, lest thou be like him. Reply to Objection 2. When one man prevents another from being reviled, there is not the danger of lust for one's own honour, as there is when a man defends himself from being reviled. Indeed, rather would it seem to proceed from a sense of charity. Reply to Objection 3. It would be an act of revenge to keep silence with the intention of provoking the reviler to anger, but it would be praiseworthy to be silent in order to give place to anger. Hence it is written in Ecclesiasticus 8.4. Strive not with a man that is full of tongue, and heap not wood upon his fire. Fourth article. Whether reviling arises from anger. Objection 1. You would seem that reviling does not arise from anger, for it is written in Proverbs 11.2. Where pride is, there shall also be reviling. But anger is a vice distinct from pride. Therefore reviling does not arise from anger. Objection 2. Further it is written in Proverbs 20.3. All fools are meddling with revilings. Now folly is a vice opposed to wisdom, as stated above in question 46 article 1. Whereas anger is opposed to meekness. Therefore reviling does not arise from anger. Objection 3. Further no sin is diminished by its cause. But the sin of reviling is diminished if one gives vent to it through anger, for it is a more grievous sin to revile out of hatred than out of anger. Therefore reviling does not arise from anger. On the contrary, Gregory says in his commentary on Job 3145 that. Anger gives rise to revilings. I answer that, while one sin may arise from various causes, it is nevertheless said to have its source chiefly in that one from which it is want to arise most frequently through being closely connected with its end. Now reviling is closely connected with anger's end which is revenge. Since the easiest way for the angry man to take revenge on another is to revile him. Therefore reviling arises chiefly from anger. Reply to Objection 1. Reviling is not directed to the end of pride which is excellency. Hence reviling does not arise directly from pride. Nevertheless pride disposes a man to revile, insofar as those who think themselves to excel are more prone to despise others and inflict injuries on them because they are more easily angered, through deeming it an affront to themselves whenever anything is done against their will. Reply to Objection 2. According to the philosopher in Ethics 7.6. Anger listens imperfectly to reason. Wherefore an angry man suffers a defective reason and in this he is like the foolish man. Hence reviling arises from folly on account of the latter's kinship with anger. Reply to Objection 3. According to the philosopher in Rhetoric 2.4. An angry man seeks an open offense, but he who hates does not worry about this. Hence reviling which denotes a manifest injury belongs to anger rather than to hatred.