 Rwy'n fawr, y maen nhw'n James Acton. Rydyn ni'n Tobi Daltyn. Ond mewn dweud y cyfrifolusial yng Nghyrchaf Gwmbrith-Gaithfeydau Cynigol o'r ystod yng Nghyrchaf Gwmbrith-Gaithfeydau Cynigol o'r Gwmbrith-Gaithfeydau Cynigol o'r Gwmbrith-Gaithfeydau Cynigol, o amdanoch yn cyfrifolusial, fel hynny'r ystod yng nghyrch. Rydyn ni'n rhaid i gael ei ddweud y cwrs twfenni'r cyfrifolusial, Mae'r llwyddoedd ythogau yn ymwneud. Mae'r llwyddoedd yna yn yr ystod cyfnod. Mae'r llwyddoedd yn ymwneud y 50e anniversariwr yna'r llwyddoedd. Mae'r llwyddoedd ythogau yn ymwneud ymwneud yma, ond mae'r anhygrifennu'n ddigon. Mae'r anhygrifent o'r ffrindiau'r llwyddoedd mewn gwahanol, mae'r llwyddoedd yn y ddiwedd i ymwynghwyno am ddechrau, yn y gwrthoddau sy'n gweithio'r amddangos, ond yn fwyaf ar y llythafodol, mae'r 17 ystiwn y cyfnod wedi'i bod no fyddai. Mae'r panel yma yw'r cwmffrin yn ffocwsio ar y llythafodol yn y cyfnod ar gyfer cymrydau ac mae'r cwysylltiadau yw'r cyfeirio ar gyfer cyfnod y gwaith eich arni. Mae'r panel ar gyfer ddarparu yw'r hynny'n gweithio ar y cwmpod gwleol. Mae'r cwmpod gwleol eich ymddangos gwir, gwleol yng Nghymru yn gwleol, iawn o'r ddweud i'r ddwylliant ym Mhau Ieiddiad, a'r ddweud i'r ddweud i'r ddweud i'r ddweud i south-Asia? Rydw i'n meddwl i'r hynny'r unrhyw plant o'r cyffinio'r ddweud i'r newid yn yw'r polisiau newydd. Yn ychydig i'r eu hynny'n ghrifffordd ffordd Fredrica Mogherini, Senedad Tim Kane, IA Dyrector Genol Ychee'r Amano, and National Security Council director, senior director Chris Ford, among others. This conference would not be possible without Andrew Carnegie and his legacy. And we thank the endowments trustees in management for their continued support of this endeavor. It would also be impossible without the generosity of a number of foundations and governments which support both this conference and our program. Yn ymwyneb, maen nhw wedi'u gweld ddangos dros ffordd, ond bydd y bwysig yn hwnnw i'r cyfrannu i ddimuysgau'r hynny. Rwy'n cael ei wneud i'r wneud eich ddangos, y Carneggyrchorfor Yn New York, y ffarrwn Ffarrwn Ffarrwn Ffarrwn Ffarrwn Cyllideg, y Ffarrwn Egytdyn, y Ffarrwn Ffarrwn Ffarrwn Cyllideg, y John D. Cathryn T. MacArthur, y ffarrwn Pais CC, A oedd yn ymgyrch ar gyfer y Ffaraen, Rhyw Llan, Ffaraenו Llan. Mae'r Ffaraen y Proses Y Llywodraeth, Mae'r Ysgol Gwylwyr Aerydd, Mae'r Ddweud-y-Ddysgu Llywodraeth, Mae'r Smyth-Rychyddon Ddweud-y-Ddysgu, Mae'r Stanton Ffaraen, Mae'r Ysgol Ysgol yn ymgyrch, The United Arab Emirates Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the U.S. Department of State, and the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation. If you see representatives of these organizations around the conference over the next two days, please express your appreciation as well. Now, as you came in this morning, you would have noticed that we have in the atrium a number of exhibits by organizations doing important and creative work in the field. Please stop by and chat them up. We include such exhibits in the conference to highlight a breadth of issues and range of excellent work that's being done by our peer organizations, which we hope also that the young professionals in attendance will find particularly useful. Speaking of young professionals, we initiated a new track of activity this year to provide some additional learning and networking opportunities for younger participants already in the field. Now, each conference that passes, I'm reminded that young is a relative term, and some people might find it pejorative. We certainly don't mean it in that way, but these are people who are in the first five years or so of their careers. We expect to offer this track at the next conference and would welcome your help in spreading the word. Now, one of my favorite features of the conference and let's be honest, it's what's going to get me to the reception tonight as the espresso bar that's located in the oculus just up the stairs to the right. As you exit the hall, this year we've named it the Gen 5 International Coffee Forum. It features a range of reactor themed drinks, including my personal favorite, the sugar moderated fast coffee. All of you should have received an email or two about the smartphone app for the conference. You'll hear more than a few reminders today about it and we encourage you to download it and become familiar with it before tomorrow. When we'll use it for live polling in our second iteration of the proliferation prognostication session, which James will be running. We have tech support on site to help with any questions you might have. George Perkovich, that includes you. Briefly, before I conclude, a word about the schedule this morning. It's very packed, meaning that we have no breaks. We apologize for that. We'll have a short turnaround between the first keynote address and the first plenary panel during which we ask that you stay in your seats please. Now, on to the show. I'm very pleased to invite to the stage Ambassador Bill Burns, president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. I expect he is known to most of you given the range of jobs he held during his distinguished career on the Foreign Service, whether on Iran or Russia or any number of other vexing foreign policy challenges. There are few figures in Washington as widely respected and as oft consulted as he is. We are both incredibly proud to call him boss and to have him here to open the conference. Bill. Well, good morning, everyone. Let me congratulate at the outset James, Toby and all my other Carnegie colleagues for putting together another terrific conference. With political transitions and simmering nuclear tensions dotting the international landscape, this year's conference proves to be especially challenging to pull off. But I could not be prouder of all of you. I could not be more impressed with your vision, execution and commitment to make each nukefest even better than the last. And I could not be more honored to welcome our extraordinary speakers and audience, especially those taking part in the new young professional track. You make me feel old, but you also fill me with hope and optimism. For all the new energy and purpose the next generation brings to this year's conference, I see no shortage of the more familiar ashen faces one typically sees at nuclear policy gatherings. If we're honest, we can all concede that in the nuclear crowd pessimism sometimes seems genetic. But it is also engendered some novel or in undiplomatic terms dangerous instincts in many quarters. I can understand what's behind the frustration, the plotting pace of disarmament, the impunity in the face of stark violations of treaty obligations and the desire for more security and more assurance in a world that seems more complicated and uncertain as each day passes. For most of my career in government, thinking the unthinkable meant reckoning with the consequences of nuclear use and doing everything possible to prevent it. But there were moments much like today when anxiety and fatalism ruled the day. In these moments, leaders contemplate what seemed unthinkable in the very recent past. Growing arsenals, developing new nuclear weapons, discarding treaties, abrogating agreements, hollowing out international institutions and fanning the flames of proliferation. As some of you will recall, the mood was somewhat different at our last conference. Two years ago we met during the final stages of negotiations for the comprehensive Iran nuclear agreement. Hope for a deal that would prevent a war and stop Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon was palpable. That hope was realized. That deal is now in force. All parties are in full compliance. The impending threats of a nuclear Iran and a military confrontation have been averted. And for all the debate about the agreement and for all the endless searching for a better deal, the JCPOA remains a significant diplomatic achievement and a model for how to resolve proliferation challenges. While the deal was never meant to transform Iran or the region overnight, many of us hoped it might bring renewed stability to the international nuclear order. But rather than use the momentum to make progress on other proliferation challenges and build on the agreement's innovations to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime, we've gotten distracted and diverted. Meanwhile, nuclear dangers have increased and the international consensus on non-proliferation and disarmament has only frayed further. Since we last met, North Korea has tested more nuclear weapons and made significant advances in its missile capabilities. Russia has deployed a cruise missile in violation of the INF Treaty. The arms race in South Asia has accelerated. So has the interest in and pace of nuclear weapons modernization in a number of countries, including here in the United States. The once hypothetical risk of entanglement between the cyberspace and nuclear domains is today a real and present danger. In doubt about the viability of the NPT is growing together with polarization in the NPT system. Most recently underscored by the determined effort of a group of states to push a treaty banning nuclear weapons through the United Nations. In this environment, dismantling existing structures and institutions with vague hopes of something better emerging can seem appealing. But this sort of creative destruction is nothing more than an illusion. In a world of imperfect institutions, imperfect information and imperfect solutions, the only realistic path before us is to work hard to strengthen and to revitalize the non-proliferation regime we have in the real world. Not the one we wished we had in a more perfect world. The longer we hold to the myth of creative destruction and the fantasy of perfection, the more intractable the challenges before us will become. This, to me, is one of the key lessons of the first 50 years of the NPT regime. Now is the time to shape and strengthen the future of global nuclear order, not shred it. This is precisely the spirit which motivates our work at Carnegie, and we've tried our best to give it practical meaning. This morning my colleagues released a new report detailing the elements of a nuclear firewall between civil and nuclear weapons programs that would patch some of the vulnerabilities of the treaty while strengthening all three of its pillars. Non-proliferation, peaceful use of nuclear energy and disarmament. This report is the product of several years of in-depth technical research and active outreach in key states. And it's precisely the kind of innovative thinking that can help us navigate the stormy waters we now find ourselves in. Our goal with this work is to build up, rather than tear down, the institutions that successfully manage nuclear risks in the last half century. As we work to revitalize the regime for the next 50 years, we also have to deal with the very real challenges facing it today. This means continuing to pay very careful attention to the rigorous implementation of the Iran nuclear deal. It means drawing the right lessons to deal with the immediate and even more challenging threat posed by North Korea. It means deploying our diplomatic leverage in South Asia to reduce tensions, driving strategic instability. It means maintaining what's left of the arms control infrastructure with Russia while holding Moscow accountable for its violations. And it means leading by example with our own behavior, including the decisions we make in the coming years about the future of our nuclear posture and arsenal. Over the coming days, we'll have a chance to discuss these and many other imperatives facing the non-proliferation regime on its 50th anniversary. It's a conversation that obviously requires more than two days, and I hope very much that it will engender further debate, dialogue, and collaboration in the months ahead. We are truly fortunate to kick off the conference with a keynote addressed by high representative Federico Mogherini. A remarkable diplomat whose skill, energy, and imagination are uniquely suited to this moment of reckoning for Europe. We had the good fortune to host the high representative last July to roll out the EU's new global strategy, and she's very kind to come back to give us an update on the strategy and the EU's nuclear policy priorities. We're equally fortunate to welcome my friend and former colleague Karen Donfried to moderate the conversation following the high representative's remarks. Karen, as all of you know, has been at the front lines of transatlantic partnership over the course of many years and several administrations, and she's as knowledgeable and thoughtful about this part of the world as anyone I know. So once again, let me welcome all of you to the 2017 Nuclear Policy Conference, and please join me in offering a very warm welcome to our opening keynote speaker, Federico Mogherini. Thank you all very much. Let me thank you, Bill, and let me thank Carnegie and all of you for being here and for this invitation. You know how much I care about nonproliferation and nuclear policy. Even before I chaired the negotiations on Iran nuclear program, before I was high representative or minister, I was already engaged with the comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty organisation and the broader global nonproliferation community. And I see so many friends here today. I'm really pleased to meet again. I really, really see that not only so many of you are here in the room, but I really see this nonproliferation work, a work that is key in this moment. It is a lifetime commitment, but in this precise moment it is even more important to discuss nuclear policies and to preserve the rules that were agreed in recent decades. Through so much hard work, vision and courage. So I'm particularly glad to be here with you today for at least two reasons. One is that we really need the expert community to be part of the conversation with policy makers, to explain what the current rules have achieved, what we still have to build, and why it is so important to strengthen and preserve the global nonproliferation architecture. Second, because we can never stop looking at the way forward, as new challenges arise, as Bill was mentioning, at the new tools we can develop, at the potential impact of any new agreement. The European Union organises every year a nonproliferation and disarmament conference precisely for this reason. So it's just natural for me to be here with you from a personal point of view and from an institutional one, and I would even say a political one. And let me thank Carnegie and all of you here again for this conference and for your constant contribution to this very important debate. A debate that can and must shape the direction of policymaking. Now in particular, because I see a lot of confusion in today's world and even the most basic rules of our international system seem to be called into question. In an era of power politics and real politic, I would like to be as realistic and as pragmatic as I can. Being a woman normally, this works quite well. So let me be very clear, the security of our citizens today can only be achieved through nonproliferation and disarmament. It's a matter of security. A new arms race is not the solution to any of the security challenges or threats we face. The Cold War era is over. The war today is much more complex, much more fragile than 25 years ago. The number of nuclear states has risen so that there is not just one nuclear balance to take into account, but several and overlapping nuclear balances. Henry Kissinger has explained it incredibly well. I come from very different backgrounds, but I do appreciate the wisdom of the old school republican realism, especially in these times. So in 2014 he assessed that major powers have over-invested in nuclear weapons at their own peril. I quote, the most ffarsome of weapons, commanding large shares of each superpower's defense budget, lost their relevance to the actual crisis facing leaders. As a result, Kissinger assessed, in many cases, I quote again, technological supremacy turned into geopolitical impotence. Kissinger argues that the relatively stable nuclear order of the Cold War simply belongs to a different era. And in today's world, some nuclear actors might want to show that they are ready to take apocalyptic decisions, even if they would have disastrous consequences for everyone, including themselves. So the logic of the Terence could easily become outdated. And this would definitely be the case if a criminal or terrorist group had to acquire a weapon of mass destruction. So in a fragile world like ours, a nuclear balance of terror would be incredibly dangerous. And the only way to make our citizens more secure runs through non-proliferation and disarmament. The only way forward is to invest together in a strong system of truly global rules. We Europeans aim at multilateral disarmament. We all want to guarantee non-proliferation through treaties and verification regimes. And this is stated very clearly in our global strategy for foreign security policy that I presented at Carnegie a few months ago. That was agreed by all our 28 member states, still 28 for a couple of years, including the nuclear weapon states. So the European Union will continue to be a strong, consistent, reliable, predictable partner for all those who believe that security comes through non-proliferation. And I guess in this room we're quite a majority. We will keep working as the European Union to preserve, strengthen and expand the current rules. Think of the non-proliferation treaty. It has been the cornerstone of the global security architecture and today, as it turns 50, it has become even more important, not less. Or think of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. North Korea's nuclear tests have shown once again how urgent it is to make the treaty enter into force. Its organization has provided already the work with a truly global, high-tech monitoring system for nuclear explosions. Something that no single country alone would be able to do. Not only do we need to complete this global monitoring network. We must continue to argue for all countries, including this one, the United States of America, to move towards ratification. This would be an investment in America's security and in our collective security. So the international community needs unity in its response to nuclear threats, to North Korea's threats. And unity can only be built and preserved if we all abide by the same rules, if our commitments are truly credible. Unity is also what brought us the deal with Iran. America and Europe, Russia and China working together. Whatever views you might have on the agreement, and I know here in Washington there are different views, there are some facts that no one can ignore, not opinions, facts. For five times now, five times, the international atomic energy has certified Iran's compliance with the deal. And it is constantly monitoring Iran's nuclear program. I chair regular meetings at ministerial level with the United States, Russia, China, France, Germany and the United Kingdom and Iran. And we all assess the implementation of the agreement in all its parts. And the United Nations, as you know well, has thrown its weight behind the deal, endorsing it in the Security Council. So let me state it very clearly as I always do, it's an agreement that belongs to the entire international community and that Europeans are determined to preserve because its full and strict implementation is key to our own security. Multilateral diplomacy has achieved something impossible to achieve by any other means through unity. And there is simply no doubt about it. And this is the path we Europeans want to continue to follow. A renewed confrontation among world powers will not serve anyone's interest. It will only make us more insecure, more exposed to these threats. The right path is the one marked by the new START Treaty and its implementation. This is the kind of cooperation between Russia and the United States that we Europeans would like to see. Any violation of the Intermediate Range Nuclear Force Treaty on the contrary would endanger a security architecture that since the end of the Cold War has made Europe a safer place. A logic of provocation or retaliation cannot apply to nuclear issues. The game has become far too complex and the field far too crowded. A new arms race far from being a stabilizing factor would spark new tensions, destabilize entire regions and make our world much, much more dangerous. So the answer to today's instability to a shifting global balance of power is more cooperation and stronger global governance. This is what the Europeans stand for. We need to protect the rules we have, enforce them more effectively together, work on our verification regimes, agree on better rules when the situation requires, develop new tools and mechanisms when needed. We must strengthen our partnerships, build new international alliances, new formats, new spaces for regional cooperation. This is what the European Union believes and this is our strategic interest. I know that other world powers might not share our views, but I also believe that we're going through a moment of transition, a very unsettled situation. And we have a chance to maybe influence the outcome of this transition. So we need the experts, the academia, civil society, our citizens, those that are dedicated to the nuclear policy agenda to make their voice heard, to make the arguments. We need your expertise and your engagement, not only to analyze the challenges, but also to shape our response, the policy-making, to make it more cooperative, which means to us Europeans to make it more effective. What is at stake is global security. We must have learned something from our tragic history. The war today is a dangerous place, a very dangerous place. It is definitely not the time to play with fire. What is at stake is our own security and that is why you will always find the European Union engaged and committed for nuclear non-proliferation. I thank you very much. Well, thank you so much, high representative Mogherini. While we get her mic'd, I'll just say what a privilege it is to be here under the Carnegie banner. Carnegie is so lucky to have the leadership of Ambassador Burns, whose public service is virtually unmatched in this country. It's also such a delight to be on stage with high representative Mogherini, particularly for me, who now has the privilege of leading the German Marshall Fund. I have to say that the high representative is an alumna of our Marshall Memorial Fellowship Program, and I know there are a lot of young professionals here in the audience, and it's wonderful to see what happens to folks who have been in our fellowship program. As Ambassador Burns said, high representative Mogherini has contributed so much to developing not only foreign policy in our own country of Italy, but also at the European Union level, and you just gave such a full-throated defence of this rules-based international order that Americans and Europeans truly built together in the post-war era. And I wanted to draw you out on that because I think back to the last time you were at Carnegie when you were launching the global security strategy, that you really were the lead creator of in the EU. You announced it almost simultaneously with the June referendum in the UK to leave the EU. Since then, we've had a US election that's resulted in President Trump. And I think there are a lot of questions today about the serious challenges to this rules-based order, both externally but also within our own societies, our own public's questioning, some of these foundations that have been unquestioned. That global security strategy was released back in June. Would you reassess it at all today and specifically how do you see the role of the United States in this? I was struck at the Munich Security Conference that many of the questions there seemed to be about the US role in this order as much as anything else. So I'd love to draw you out on that. Thanks. So thank you very much, first of all, for being here together again. It's great and I can confirm being part of the German Marshal Fall Fendership was one of my best experiences in my life and I've learned so much. And I've learned, I think, a lot of America beyond Washington. So that prepares you also for coming surprises in the future. But now I wouldn't reassess the global strategy at all. And actually, yes, I was presenting the global strategy after the UK referendum. If I can tell you something, it's more or less nine months now after that moment. It seems much longer, but it's only nine months. And as we have started to implement the global strategy in a number of fields, including European defence, and that has gone very fast on the European Union side with decisions that we took at unanimity at 28, including the UK, as you might have noticed the UK has not even yet started to ask to begin the negotiations nine months after the results of the referendum. So maybe it's not so true that the European Union is low and bureaucratic and the others can run because democracy needs time and procedures. And this brings me to the rules. In the global strategy we say, and I know we share this analysis here, that the only way to cope with a world that is extremely complex when power is diffused and you need to find common ground to find solutions to problems, the only way you can try to do this is first building cooperation, regional cooperation, international cooperation, through multilateralism strengthening this rules-based global order. Here I think we touch one of the big political, even existential questions of our times, which are true internally and in Europe, in America, globally. How do we see the rules? Do we perceive the rules as a constraint for an individual or an individual country? Or do we conceive the rules as a guarantee for a way of having the game played properly? A guarantee for the weaker? A guarantee for the respect of certain things we decide all together? Up to now the rules were perceived as a guarantee. My impression is that in our societies, more and more, we start to question whether the rules are not a constraint to the success of one at the detriment of maybe the other. But in the words, this creates chaos. So that's why Europeans will and will continue to stand for rules in the global system, being it on trade, being it on diplomacy, being it on security, being it on nuclear. We see this as an investment in a balanced global order. We've not yet developed a proper global order. And I think we have the maturity now to see that an investment in... I'll make an example. An investment in humanitarian aid in the Horn of Africa is also an investment in our own security. Because out of the... I don't know how many thousands of youngers and boys that suffer from hunger, a certain number of them might become radicalized, migrate, whatever, destabilize countries or regions. So we need rules. We need investments that are long-term visions. We need to cooperate with partners and friends. And we need to find this common ground, even when problems seem difficult, as we did with the Iran nuclear deal at the end of the day. So no, I wouldn't reassess the global strategy. All of that is the European way to security. Out of what we've learned from our history, that is somehow also a shared interest. But all of the United States, it's a bit surreal for me because now it's a few months that being here or in Brussels or in Munich or elsewhere, one of the first questions is, what about the US policy on this and that? And I said, you know, you don't have to ask me. Can I ask you? It's not for me to say. I see that there's still a certain degree of, let's say, review of policies ongoing. And this is one of the reasons why I'm often here in Washington in these weeks. And I was very pleased and honoured to welcome Vice President Pence for an official visit to the European Union to discuss together at an early stage what kind of direction the US policy might take in certain fields where, for us, it's priority number one to make clear for sure why the European Union stands. The non-nuclear deal. Full, strict implementation by all, in all aspects. The climate change agreement. A free and fair global trade system. And I could continue. Some crisis management we need to do together. Syria, Libya, the Middle East peace process. We strongly believe in two states still. And one last thing I would like to mention and then sorry I was too long, but I was particularly worried to see the news coming from Washington on the budget cuts. I know this is internal domestic, but I was the day before yesterday in Cairo for meetings with the Arab League. The previous day I was in Addis Ababa for meetings with the African Union. If the United States were to reduce significantly its investment, being it on humanitarian development aid, peace and security operations, the words and certain regions of the world would get completely destabilised. Don't forget that the major Syrian refugee crisis a couple of years ago started because the World Food Program was underfunded. I hope there's wisdom enough here to keep in mind that investing in America means also investing in places that are far away. It's your own interests. So power isn't just hard power. It's hard power and soft power. I'm interested. You mentioned Vice President Pence's visit to the European Union which I do think was a powerful example of US commitment to the European project. The president will be going to Europe quite a bit in the first half of this year if we think about the G7 summit in Italy, if we think about a NATO summit, a G20 meeting in Germany. Do you think there will be a US EU summit on the margins of any of those meetings? Could be. I know our teams are working on options. We had the last summit last summer at the margins of the NATO summit in Warsaw. But I have to tell you before that I think the previous one was back two years back. I'm getting suggestions from the audience. That's good. Thanks. Which means that we don't necessarily need to have a summit every year. It would be good. But what would be more important than everything for me is to come to a summit or to our regular meetings with clear ideas of what we want to do together. What is our shared interest? Why America needs Europe and Europe needs America? Us, from European side, we have it very clear in mind. We need to work together for our security. We need to work together for our economy. Millions of jobs depend on our economic relation across the Atlantic, both in Europe and in America. You probably can imagine how many millions of jobs in America depend on European investments. And also for the global order. Because America and Europe together represent by far, by far the most powerful force in the world. In any possible field. So we have clear in mind why we want and we need to work with the United States. I think that summit would be good. I don't exclude it but I don't even confirm it at this stage. Again, the important thing for me in this moment is that we keep this dialogue very much open, frequent, as it has been the case. I've seen Tillerson very often, Mattis, again Pence. I'll meet him again during my visit here for the second time in a month. That we keep this channel open, that we talk and we see together again how the new US course on some policies will develop on our side. We are quite clear on what we want. I think about challenges to the rules-based order. Certainly one country that comes to mind is Russia. And there have been concerns about Russian abrogation of the IMF treaty. Certainly if you think about the European security context there was no more fundamental challenge to the post-Covol order than Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea from Ukraine in 2014. It seems as though this is an area where we're seeing strong transatlantic cooperation continue. The EU has renewed its sanctions against Russia. The Trump administration has said it's committed to those sanctions as well. How do you see the EU's relationship with Russia moving forward? Do you see any areas to be optimistic about the implementation of the Minsk ceasefire agreements? Tell us how you see that moving forward. First of all, just a few days ago we restated our policy on the illegal annexation of Crimea. It was the anniversary just two days ago, if I'm not wrong. This is a very important thing to restate together that both America and Europe for Europe no doubt and for America as well, I understand. It is not conceivable that in our century borders are changed by the use of force. Simply unconceivable. This is a fundamental breach of international law. Having said that, the two key points I would like to underline are this. One is that yes, it's fundamental that we coordinate our sanction policy. But I would also like to get out of a black and white picture where the European policy towards Russia is purely the sanctions. That doesn't correspond to reality. We work with the Russians intensely at my level, at all levels on the Minsk implementation but also on many other things. The sanctions are an instrument to get the full Minsk implementation. For us, the objective in itself is not keeping the sanctions. For us, the objective in itself is solving the conflict and have a full implementation of Minsk. We would be happy to lift the sanctions if we had a full implementation of Minsk. Our main purpose is first to continue to coordinate with our American friends on this. We'll keep our European unity as we have done over the years, regardless of different stories that were told and then we showed that we could be more united that people expected. I think we are proving that again and again on many different files. Europe can surprise you for good sometimes. Second, we're together to have this full implementation of Minsk which means also supporting our Ukrainian friends in their reform agenda. They're going through a complicated process including on some reforms they need to undertake under the Minsk agreement. And third, the European Union and Russia have a certain what we call selective engagement. We work together on some issues very well. I give you two, three examples. We work very well on the Iran nuclear deal. Constantly, I would say daily, we work very well on the Middle East peace process. We share for sure the same kind of perspective there about the two-state solution and we work always very well within the quartet on the Middle East, but also on other issues. Think of the fact that just one year and a half ago the European Union launched its military operation in the Mediterranean to save lives at sea and dismantled the smugglers and human traffickers networks that was endorsed by a UN Security Council that Russia supported. So we have to get out of this picture that European Union and Russia are not talking to each other or not working with each other on anything. We have disagreements. We have different positions. We have a serious problem on Ukraine and with the legal annexation of Crimea that we tackle every single day because we need to work together, Europeans and Americans, but on any file, including the ones that are not necessarily the easiest, like Syria, we do work together on a daily basis. So I'm going to ask the high representative one more question and I'm going to turn to all of you and there are mic stations in the room that you can move to. When I think back to the European global strategy, one of the things that struck me was the focus there of turning vision into common action. And just earlier this month, you announced that the European Union was setting up a headquarters for military training operations, which seems to be part of turning a vision into concrete action. And I was struck by how it was reported, at least in the US press and the British press, which it was very much in the context of the European Union taking greater responsibility for its security in a post Brexit environment. So at this moment when one of the EU's militarily most capable member states is planning its exit, it seems that the other member states in the EU itself wants to step up and say it can do more. And I'd love to draw you out on what you see this new headquarters as signifying in what you expected to contribute. You know, it was indeed an historical decision. I said in that occasion we've done more in concrete terms, we've done more on European defence in the last six months than in the last six years. Those of you that are passionate about European history know that European defence was at the beginning the very start of the dream of integrating the continent. Then for different reasons we moved to something else. And as we will celebrate 60 years of the Rome Treaty that was the starting point of the European Union and just like Saturday in Rome, it is quite a reason of being proud for me to see that we bring there 60 years after the first very concrete operational steps for a European Union that is a much more reliable, credible actor on the military side because we've always been perceived and we've always perceived ourselves as a soft power, Venus and Mars and all these things. But actually we have already now 16 military or civilian operations around the world, mainly in Africa but also in the Mediterranean or elsewhere. And we do have also military power. So this decision we've taken will allow us to plan and conduct these operations in a more coordinated manner. But what strikes me the most is that you're right, media-wise it's perceived as the reaction to the UK leaving. But this decision was taken unanimously at 28. And this is going to be implemented in the coming weeks, actually days now, while the UK has not even yet started to ask to begin negotiations to exit, which means that we're moving fast together in a very concrete manner, still at 28. Why? Because this is not a reaction to the UK leaving. This is a reaction to the fact that for the European citizens security matters. We're not doing this for the UK, we're not doing this for the US, sorry to disappoint you. We're doing it for ourselves. Then if it's good also for transatlantic relations, which I believe is, great. But we're doing this because we know that there is no other way to have an efficient and effective security system and defence system in Europe, if not through European Union integration and coordination processes. I give you an example that I raised with Mattis and I think that was extremely interesting for him. We have all this 2% debate. And this is a NATO debate, I'm not going to enter that. But if you want member states, allies in NATO that are also member states of the European Union, and that's a large majority of them, to go towards better and more spending on defence, first you have to have rules on our budgets that allow that to happen, and that is EU related decisions. Second, in the meantime you can work on the output. Now here we are a security community, so we understand each other. In Europe we spend 50% of what America spends on defence. 50%. The European output on defence is 15% of the American one, 15%. So we have an output gap in Europe given by the fragmentation of our investments. We do not work on the economy of scale of a continent yet. Each and every member state has its own system for anything and sometimes more than one because we're complicated, we're Europeans. So, which is an advantage sometimes because in a complicated world being complicated yourself helps you understand things. It's true. But in the meantime the member states sort it out how and if they want to get to 2% on defence spending because let me tell you one other thing that Europeans strongly believe, investing in defence for us or security for us, it's also investing on climate change or humanitarian because this prevents conflict. That is also an investment on security, especially on the conflict prevention. But in the meantime, if you want to fill in the gap on the output you can do it through European Union instruments because the European Union can incentivise common projects, capability developments, industrial research projects that can bring together member states, spend better together and have a better output, strengthening the capabilities that then are also the disposal of NATO because its member states owned and member states are the allies. This can be done only through the European Union. So all those that question the relevance of the European Union should think twice. Also on defence. So as folks moved to the mics, would you say this is a first step to a European army? I wouldn't say that. That was a trap. I wouldn't say that. Maybe this is a women approach. My main objective is to make things advance. You can use nice, evocative, evocative is English, images and words and say 50 years from now that vision, if you say it like this, might raise so many question marks on the next step to be done that you never get there. So for sure you have to have an horizon. But I focus on the small steps that can bring us there. And again, we've discussed about the European army for decades and we've never moved forward with the joint military command. Now we've stopped talking about the army but we've decided on the common command. I would prefer going that way. Super. I'm going to come to you and I'm just going to make sure before you ask your question if you could just state your name and affiliation and keep the question brief, that would be great. So please. I'll try to keep my answer brief as well. Hello, thank you very much for being here. My name is Adlan Morgoy if I'm a consultant at Peer Centre in Moscow-based think tank on nonproliferation. My question is the following. On the 17th of March, the Global Relations Forum International Task Force on the sustainability of the JCPOA including different experts from P5 plus one countries including my organization, India, Turkey, Israel, Iran issued a unanimous statement saying that there is no alternative to the JCPOA and it should not be renegotiated. And all the parties should fulfill their obligations in good faith. But at the same time we hear that about the recent British decision to block the sale of a yellow cake to Iran and this is what really concerns Russia, really concerns a lot of experts worldwide and I wonder what could we do in order to achieve co-operation and fulfilling all the obligations of the JCPOA in a good faith in JCPOA case or in any other case in the world which would be after the JCPOA. Thank you. You want to become one by one or together one by one? So I'll try to be brief. I fully share the need to fully implement in all its parts JCPOA. Let me stress this is not a deal that can be partially renegotiated. It's well you know that for sure but maybe our audience larger audience doesn't necessarily know it's a more than 100 pages very technical deal that took several years to finalise so I do not see and as I said it belongs to the entire international community a lateral agreement that can be adjusted here or there so I do not see the possibility to have a cosmetic or a partial change here or there and I agree there is no alternative if we want to avoid that Iran develops a military nuclear program so far as I said both through the IA reports, five of them and through the joint commission assessment that looks at all the different elements of full compliance in good faith by all actors of the JCPOA we have always assessed together that there is full compliance from all sides on all aspects and I will personally and the European Union will consistently guarantee that this continues to be the case. This is for the European Union a key strategic interest and it's also for me a personal responsibility because I still keep the responsibility to chair the joint commission and monitor on the implementation and let me say that this is not only key for security reasons this is also key for a certain way of conceiving diplomacy and multilateralism. We have invested in this agreement first and foremost because we wanted Iran and we want Iran to be prevented from developing a nuclear weapon and the assessment we have is that this is effectively the case and the IA and I think Director General Amano will talk about that more today but there's also a deeper meaning in this which means that even the most difficult complicated issues can be dealt with by different global powers having different views but sitting together time and again and again for years but finally finding a solution, a common ground and implementing it together. Two years ago everybody was skeptical about us reaching the agreement and we did it. Then everybody was skeptical the agreement would have ever entered into force and we did it. Then everybody was skeptical about the deal being implemented fully and constantly so I think we will disappoint the scepticals again and again. Let's go ahead and take a couple questions at a time so we'll come over here and take the two folks who are first in line please. Good morning, my name is Smita Sharma I'm a journalist from India and I'll be speaking at the session this afternoon on the South Asian War of Words. Just a specific question given India's impressive track record on nuclear non-proliferation and the backing it has received from countries like the US itself you have also led some negotiation efforts in trying to talk with Nesa especially like China on the nuclear supplies group issue. Do you really see India being able to get a seat on the table without signing the non-proliferation treaty and a lot is being talked about the Iran nuclear deal if Iran were to be forced to walk out of it. What would you see as the biggest implication of it and what would be the way forward? Okay and the person right behind you please. My question is about the INF. We often talk about Russia's violations so my readers often ask are there concerns on the Russian side concerning the INF that Americans aren't aware of and are there certain aspects of the INF that maybe need to be renegotiated in order to fit Russia's needs in 2017. Super thank you. Even if about concerns on which Americans might be aware of I guess the question is more for you than for me again I cannot speak for the United States yet but as I said we do see the global architecture on nuclear deals as a major achievement that has to be preserved first of all which means we count on all to stick to commitments and preserve the agreements we have also because this is essential to European security. On the other question I would not comment on the part of the question on India on Iran I do not think personally that Iran can be forced to walk out of the agreement. I think Iran has invested a big deal of technical competence that they have political capital of the leadership all of the leadership from the very top in reaching this agreement that was not an easy exercise on any of our sites including theirs I think they would stay committed to full implementation of the agreement and again as I said Europeans will always be there to make sure that full implementation is taking place but also that the environment among us the 3 plus 3 and Iran or the 5 plus 1 no matter how you want to call them that the environment is constructive, respectful and that good faith applies as was mentioned by your colleague. Europe is there to guarantee this and I am confident that Iran will not neither be forced to walk away nor walk away. OK, let's take the next two over here. Good morning, Paul Cavica-Martin peace action, thanks for being here and your good work. You wisely mentioned unity and it's pretty clear there's a large unity in states that do not have nuclear weapons for states that do to quickly get rid of them that unity is culminated now into the negotiations that will start next week in the United Nations and that negotiations should finish some time in June for a possible convention to ban nuclear weapons. What do you think the outcome of these negotiations are going to be and how is this going to affect our work in moving towards a world free of nuclear weapons? It will take one more. Thank you very much. My name is Anthony Musa I'm with the Middlebury Institute of International Studies in the U.S. Congress and I have one question. You were sitting here. I was and I moved over here. You look familiar. I have a question also about unity in Europe there are a lot of anti-establishment parties that are gaining traction but not so much it appears in the Netherlands so how would you envision as a government official relaying your message to the people who are dissatisfied with the way anti-establishment has been working thus far to secure the EU? The first question is actually easier than the second and I wouldn't have expected that. There is indeed is that okay? You can hear me. Okay good thanks. There is indeed a lack of unity when it comes to the nuclear weapons ban within the other international community within the European Union, within NATO and you name it. I cannot predict how the negotiations will end up. It seems to me difficult to imagine that few months of negotiations on such an issue might come deliver as unified result. I would be surprised in that case but in Italian we have an expression that I could never translate probably in English that hope is the last to die. Do you say that in English? No. Sort of? Okay. So you never know. But indeed on that issue there is a lack of unity across different different setups, communities and indeed and that goes beyond the nuclear I think what I see that goes beyond the nuclear powers crosses a bit lines to my understanding. We always try to facilitate unity starting from our member states on common ground and again let me tell you that what I said during my remarks there are divisions or there are different views on this issue but there is inside the European Union all the member states including nuclear powers a clear common objective of going through words a multilateral disarmament on nuclear issues. So this is a common and shared goal we have in the Union. On anti-establishment first of all thank you for putting the question this way because I've always been convinced it's not about populism it's not about far right it's about establishment anti-establishment forces which is a very complicated issue to tackle I cannot say I'm glad because I'm not but finally we got out of this false narrative that this is a European thing you see it here it's everywhere it's everywhere in the world I think it's about taking responsibility from the establishment decision making I can give you the European example but I guess here the dynamics might be similar in the European Union there is no abstract entity that shows up in Brussels an alien coming from the moon materializing in a Brussels building and taking decisions that then the 28 have to implement doesn't exist. It's the 28 prime ministers presidents, chancellors whatever ministers coming together in Brussels taking decisions together most of the time by unanimity and then going back home Brussels asks and we have to do which means not taking responsibility for your own choices. The only place where this doesn't work is Brussels itself because Belgium cannot blame Brussels but apart from that it's sad but it's true so I think the answer is in us politicians or us establishment I have a difficulty in saying that but anyway not only to be a bit more concrete on things we do the concrete outcome options operational decisions we take and explain them being fast but also taking responsibility and explaining why we taking decisions, why it's good or in some cases you lose a battle and you explain why you lost a battle and you take the battle again next time but being a little bit more transparent on not only on you know the handling of the budget and things like that which is a very important thing but then sometimes you see the contradiction of anti-establishment forces that are completely non-transparent on handling the money including public money so it's not really coherence there but if we were to take more responsibility, political responsibility explaining to our citizens that in the European case Europe is us it's not a third party you are from a certain city you are from a certain country European Union and it's a third layer of identity and of political decision making that is complementary to the others we need to have to refine this political leadership that is able to exercise and explain a European responsibility also because otherwise sorry I'm too long but this is a serious thing we run the risk of leaving the most dangerous of the paradoxes that you hear the discourse in Europe being the regained sovereignty and I guess here it's a bit the same and then here from where anyway regained sovereignty from Brussels again apart from the Belgians that are fine regained sovereignty from Brussels but in the world of today in the world of today how do you regain sovereignty on a smaller national scale if then you have to go and negotiate with China or the United States if you're Austria or Ireland okay good luck but even if you're France or Germany I often say and I'm sorry I apologize friends in this room might have heard me saying this a lot of times European countries are dividing in two kinds the small ones and the ones that have not yet realized they are small in the world of today I'm afraid this is true also for other places that are a little bit bigger but still need friends because in the world of today alone you don't go far you don't go far so I think and I'll often say this the only way for Europeans to regain sovereignty is through the European Union through our unity because this increases our weight I give you a last example I'm sorry Karen trade I know it's not nuclear security related but you allow me absolutely I know it sounds strange here that single member states of the European Union cannot negotiate a trade agreement bilaterally with the third country this is a common decision we've taken why because we are much stronger if we negotiate a trade agreement at 28 we are the biggest market in the world so when we negotiate at 28 or even in the future of 27 we will be the biggest market in the world we negotiate from a position of strength so it's a matter of being at the negotiating table with more instruments to get a better deal obviously the one sitting on the other side of the table negotiating the deal might be interested in splitting us but it's not our interest to be split and this should be quite easy to understand so that's why it's not giving up to sovereignty it's exercising our sovereignty together which makes us much stronger in the world I actually think that was a very powerful statement to end on because it reminds us not so much nuclear related I'm sorry but it actually relates back to that Kissinger quote that you used about major powers having over invested in nuclear weapons it gets at this question of what is it that determines a country's strength is it your nuclear weapons is it this concept of sovereignty and what does sovereignty mean in 2017 and your comment that you know a country is much more powerful when it's working with others not when it's going it alone so I actually think that theme is highly relevant for nuclear policies and what strategies countries try to pursue and I think the demonstrated impact of Europe's experiment since the end of World War II of coming together and believing that each individual country is more powerful as part of that larger unit the European Union is a really important one for us all to consider at this moment in history I know that James and Toby gave you that really a luring concept of the espresso bar which you are not allowed to try out right now because we're going to be going straight from this session into the next so I am going to ask you all to keep your seats because next up is the plenary session on beyond the nuclear threshold which is just going to begin in a couple of minutes so before we move on to that I do want to ask you to join me in thanking High Representative Margaret for this terrific session