 Ladies and gentlemen good afternoon. Here again I really do feel we happy few we we band of brothers thank you for for being here in a way I I think we have one of the best qualified panels on a topic of this whole conference so it is my great honor to to try to moderate this group on the issues of East Asia again I'm Steve Erlinger I'm with the New York Times and I do have an ancient history in Southeast Asia and China and Japan and I've tried to keep a real interest in it there are all kinds of issues that I think are obvious from China Russia North Korea Hong Kong and there's a lot to discuss we have an hour I'm gonna try to reserve at least 15 minutes at the end maybe 20 for your questions to this panel and I think you know you can read about everyone if you like I mean this is all in all in front of you we're gonna go in order and first we're going to have Chiyuki I will who's a professor international security at the University of Tokyo Chiyuki the floor is yours thank you so much thank you Mr. chairman for your kind introduction and I'm Chiyuki I was from University of Tokyo I'm very happy to be here very honored to be here today I'm included in this panel on East Asia but my academic expertise in the international security and therefore I would like to include some more a global perspective to discuss East Asian regional issues so my lecture I mean sorry I might my talk is entitled creation of a rules-based order values and contemporary foreign security policy and I would like to first say all you spread expressed here my my own academic independent opinion and they do not represent my home institution or although I had held the other misery position for the current Japanese administration in the council on security and defense capabilities my views are my own so today I would like to stick to the order to keep the talk very short within seven eight minutes so I will discuss the following three issues first issue is that generally I would argue that most currently values play a very important role in foreign and defense policy they always have but I think for a number of reasons it's more important today and secondly I would like to discuss some key features of the ongoing current Japanese national defense program guideline and relationship that relationship between that and Japan's values driven strategy and certainly I will address some of the challenges facing values based foreign and defense policy okay foreign policies have always been implicitly explicitly linked to value so there's nothing new in this however interest including national interests have links to values values can be anything and they do not necessarily have to be liberal although we do wind up talking about material national interest and liberal values values can be anything I think so very often foreign policy and defense policy are really deeply entwined with our values as mentioned throughout this conference however it is the current of a time that liberal ideals and values are intensely challenged from within from forces favoring populism and unilateralism as opposed to multilateralism and also from outside from entities that challenge fundamentally liberal ways of managing political relations it is hence not show that the defense policies also have to come to involve defense of values because so much of a foreign defense policies have to do with the defense of values there is a need to communicate sorry there is a need to communicate well what these values are that what we are defending hence the importance of strategic communications it is particularly important to explain and justify actions because particularly actions started to involve a form of issue linkages such as the use of geoeconomics that go across traditional boundaries of strategy whether that is a preference or not very often communications replace physical force they do so by manipulating or subverting the way physical force is perceived or the way calculations are made regarding escalation and disc escalation in military confrontations of how as was so in Ukraine further democracies are particularly affected by the advent of information and communication technologies for example the spread of social media the availability of cyberspace and globalization well I hope you can see it okay I think these features that I just mentioned provide for a very important background to the ongoing Japanese National Defense Program guideline I was advisor in the council that advised a revision of the document and these documents in case you do not know this is a for example in the United Kingdom it's equivalent to the strategic and defense review this is a document doctrine that justifies the use of defense budget and in the case of Japan it sits directly below national security strategy which was adopted back in 2013 so we revised this at the end of last year so I would like to highlight some of the key features only the relevant ones in my talk so MGPD National Defense Program guideline adopted a new multi-tome strategy that encompasses a new focus on cyberspace and electromagnetic and of course these are going to be a game changer in the coming 10 years so therefore it's natural that this is included but to my view it is also important that it has the current program guidelines has redefined Japan's defense purpose purpose to have specific streamlines links with particular defense activities which I argue will have implications for Japan's value-driven strategy so Japan has now three new defense purposes first purpose is to create security environment so that's that is desirable for Japan and Japan will use a hold of government capabilities to achieve this goal a second goal is to deter threats from reaching but Japan and the third goal is counter the threat and minimize damage in case deterrence phase and these purposes are needless to say mutually reinforcing and of these the first category the first purpose the create category is new and a new one justifies the meaning for example to Japanese self-defense force that the military self-defense force activities in what is essentially defense engagement activities normally capacity building defense diplomacy peace operations wherever these before these are termed security cooperation in Japan before these activities surprisingly have no explicit link to Japanese defense purpose now they do have a proper home to belong what is important is that these these create activities now can reinforce Japan's value-driven strategy to realize its foreign policy and defense goals Japan's values driven strategies have taken many forms in the last decade and a half but currently the most important initiative is a free and open Indo-Pacific of web among European powers France and UK are major partners in this initiative in the region in the Asian Pacific region Japan's ties with India Australia as well as the US are firmly established in this context and all these partners are keen to develop mutual relations and the new I do believe that the region new regional block called the Indo-Pacific is really on the rise but it should be noted that for it is originated by the Japanese and following the decade and a half earlier of values driven initiative for art freedom initiative and so the origin of Japanese values driven strategy predates the current preoccupation with China a Japanese initiative for it approaches also difference from more military and alliance oriented approach taken currently by the United States Japan's for it comprise the principles of rules based order particularly in the maritime domain sustainability and local ownership in ODA and investment okay so my I know my time is very limited so let me jump to the discussion of challenges in lieu of conclusions so to create rules based order to talk about it is rather abstract so I think the major question that comes to everyone's minds or rules and what order are we really talking about so we must that the purpose I think the whole of values based strategy we must together we'd like my new countries and we do a local partners and others together define what these rules may entail for example there are significant disagreements among great powers in the region regarding what the orders and rules are and in bilateral relations within the region as well there are significant policy discrepancies for example policy towards Southeast Asia for example among European and Japanese and Australian US powers for example always involved tangents between the pursuit of value such as democracy human rights and so called constructive engagement specifically bilateral policy among western nations historically differs for example regarding Myanmar and secondly hence there is a challenge of coordinating policy among so-called like-minded countries lack of engagement with each other among this group and with also local partners in carrying out various policies and projects are a continuous concern for it in this context should be conceived as a main vehicle to get allies and partners on board along the common path so concrete project must be jointly managed relations with key actors in the region must be coordinated in this sense for it is a very much a shaping activity it's a multilateral activities by nature and lastly I think I'm personally concerned about the trend of regional realism which means that basically we don't have time to deal with issues that are belonging to there are concerns for other reasons for example in Asia are talking about North Korea the ascent of China as a superpower all the time while neglecting issues and challenges facing Europe and vice versa I think that's a very dangerous trend I think we need to talk to each other share our concerns and maybe perhaps together I really developed a notion of what is a rule space order because I think Europe and Japan are together in working on this notion yeah thank you okay thanks a lot very well thank you very much thank you for that broad view and I think what we'll do now is go to Korea Kim Hong-kyun has been a diplomat for a very long time he's now out of the game recently but has been the special representative for the Korean Peninsula peace dialogue and I'm sure he has some interesting things to tell us about what's going on with mr. Trump and mr. Kim thank you thank you for our kind introduction I thank what policy conference for having me here today and I thank the audience for staying late to listen to our panel what there is nothing new under the sun says in the old Bible but I see completely new foreign policy trends being developed in and around the Korean Peninsula first the US president is directly dealing with the North Korean leader including through face-to-face symmetry as well as beautiful love letters and second South Korea is on the verge of divorcing with its closest neighbor country Japan with which we share common values common security interest and the ally and third the US China rivalry expands from trade dispute into technological competition and now into security and and military area and it spills over to the Korean Peninsula let me elaborate a little bit further first on North Korean nuclear issue US North Korea working-level talks on denuclearization of North Korea finally resumed two weeks ago and quickly broke down without any any any outcome since President Trump had a historic summit meeting with the Kim Jong-un of North Korea last year in Singapore there has been no meaningful progress in the process of denuclearization of North Korea and there is no agreement on neither the definition of what denuclearization of North Korea is neither on the roadmap to achieve the fully a final fully verified denuclearization of North Korea North Korea wants key sanctions against it fully relieved in exchange for the dismantlement of Young Ben nuclear facilities which is only a part of its huge nuclear weapons program and it does not include its massive nuclear weapons arsenal President Trump completely immersed himself in the reelection campaign and he put North Korea as his biggest diplomatic achievement President Trump wishes Kim Jong-un to be his loyal lover until the election day next year but Kim Jong-un may think differently he would think his star is finally brightening and now he has the upper hand so at a certain point between now and early next year Kim Jong-un may threaten President Trump to resume an ICBM test unless President Trump agrees to a deal a good deal for Kim Jong-un but bad one for President Trump and for the world where the President Trump will succumb to this threat to save his reelection campaign or call Kim Jong-un a bluff by reintroducing foreign fury is anybody's guess either way I think the goal of denuclearization of North Korea will vanish and North Korea will become a de facto nuclear weapon country second South Korea-Japan relationship looks as bad the relationship of two countries has always been bumpy to say the least but it has never been this bad in response to Japan's economy retaliation for our historic dispute South Korean government terminated the military information sharing agreement with Japan called Jisomia and this brought about strong concern and deep disappointment on the part of United States because the agreement is the symbol of the U.S. South Korea-Japan trilateral security cooperation and the United States made great efforts to help conclude this agreement in 2016 for now the chances for the amelioration of the relationship looks very dim Prime Minister Abe seems determined to radically change the nature of Japan's relationship with South Korea once and for all in South Korea the emotion of the people and the nationalistic sentiment is so intense that it will be very difficult President Moon Jae-in to find an easy solution President Trump seems not care he has no appetite to mediate between these two countries in the meantime China-Russia coordination regarding Korean Peninsula becomes even closer and the U.S. South Korea-Japan trilateral capability to deter to respond to North Korea nuclear and boasting missile provocations becomes further weaker lastly U.S. China rivalry poses new and old headache is to South Korea U.S.-China trade dispute negatively affects South Korea by reducing export especially to China U.S.-China technological war puts us Korea in an awkward position between the two countries as shown in the case of Huawei in which U.S. request the subsequent companies not to use 5G communication equipment by Huawei if U.S.-China rivalry further deteriorates and bifurcates global supply chain South Korea could be in difficult position to take a side between the two the U.S. decision to withdraw from the intermediate nuclear forces treaty and decide to deploy land-based intermediate range boasting missile in Asia could pose a serious risk for South Korea if the U.S. wants to put these missiles in the South Korean soil. So to conclude new foreign policy trends are being developed in East Asia especially surrounding Korean Peninsula and I think South Korean needs both a well thought strategy as well as lots of luck to navigate this uncharted territory safe and sound thank you. Thank you Mr. Kim very very much it it brings one obviously to ask you know is the United States still a reliable not just partner but mediator and leader of its alliances and I think that's just part of the challenge that our next speaker Douglas Paul has Doug is known to many of you but he has been in and out of government Asia scholar now with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace let's let's use the word peace. Doug please always hopeful to talk about peace I there been at this wonderful conference there have been lots of valuable thoughts expressed and I think that most of the things that I know about have been well covered I think people walk away from this conference quite well informed Kevin Rudd yesterday at lunch presented the Chinese priorities and ways that I with which I cannot quarrel I think it was a tour de force and describing things in China as I begin my remarks today I'd like to say remind that Asia is far more diverse than Europe and other regions we tend to forget that we if you're far away from Asia you sort of lump it all together but it's a very diverse region less to dispose to coalitions than than most for a long time the United States in the post-war world managed relations in the Asia Pacific quite successfully prosperity surge peace reign for the most part except in a couple of wars we were involved in and we use the method called hub and spokes where the US was the hub and we had spoke relationships with the Republic of Korea with Japan the Philippines Thailand and others and we were the unifying force because they were not among themselves so unified well you take that hub away and then you get a lot of units out there without spokes to bring them together and my first observation today is on three broad trends in the region is that the movement of US policy with respect to China from engagement to containment is eroding those spokes and making it difficult for the various countries each of which have their own relations with China to sustain the kind of tension that will come if they also try to remain close to the United States there's a trade policy is as an example of this the US has not reconciled its trade policy between facilitating business opportunities within China which would by definition deepen the connection between the two business communities and peoples and pursuing decoupling technological suppression denial of high access to high technology parts semiconductors and the like that both are being pursued President Trump on the one hand seems to be looking for a quick gains on the trade front but he's afraid to probe deeply into China for having fears of the defense how to defend such an agreement against advocate opposition in the United States and but with below President Trump there's a very broad consensus within the government to try to dismantle the many ways in which we do cooperate with China for fear that China will overtake the US technologically militarily and economically in the decades ahead second observation this may draw some distinctions with professor how he's remarks the administration of Donald Trump has articulated with the idea emerging originally from Japan of the free and open Indo-Pacific this is a direct descendant of President Obama's rebalance to Asia which was articulated in 2011 I was a consultant on the original rebalance to Asia as an outside party and I know well that was designed to help President Obama draw down the expense and the forces of in Afghanistan in Iraq in order to shift the weight of American capability to counterbalance the rise of China I think everyone in this room knows we've never succeeded that in that period the materially you can point to a few technical changes in the American dispositions in the Asia Pacific but in fact whatever drawdowns have taken place in Southwest a Southwest Asia Mina have not been transferred to East Asia nonetheless China has been given a signal that the US intended to contain China without the US following up on I think the free and open Indo-Pacific so far is a matter of sloganeering internationally which has similarly not produced a result in fact even under Donald Trump we've doubled down we now have forces back in Saudi Arabia that we had taken out a few years ago the commitment to the the Persian Gulf region remains quite strong and new resources have not been made available to the Asia Pacific to provide the counterbalance to China's rise within the United States government there has been some adjustment it's kind of a symbolic kind of adjustment for the free and open Indo-Pacific a few offices have been created a few appointments have been made but none of this translates back into capabilities in the region and unfortunately were we to try to go transfer some of these capabilities to the region we would be stressing relations with alliance partners who under pressure from China and in deep depend co-dependency with China economically may be reluctant but mentioned was just made by Ambassador Kim of the possibility of INF dispositions in the Asia Pacific I think that's pretty remote both in time and in principle but it's a real concern that we may be asking countries to very small countries very densely populated countries to position weapons systems in their midst this would be extremely controversial and difficult to achieve under the best of circumstances and we know that China would work very hard to make it painful for anyone to accept them as US relative strength has declined across the board with the rise of other powers the the US has seen a shift in correlation of forces and it's demanding more of the allies at a time when it can offer them less or in fact it's demanding more in performance while demanding also more in support for the hosting of American forces in Korea in Japan and elsewhere a third raw trend being reflected in Asia I think is the global Balkanization which has resulted from rapid extensive globalization and people are pulling back from the the forces of globalization even in the Asia Pacific which has prospered tremendously from this Japan and Korea we've just talked a lot about this with Ambassador Kim Japan and Korea are pulling apart I'm increasingly of the mind that we're not going to be able to put this back together again someday earlier panels discussed how the choice for South Korea is particularly painful because of that very heavy economic reliance on China and the pressure China has put on them with respect to defense measures taken to protect against missiles from North Korea the Myanmar which was a few years ago seen as a emerging from dictatorship and becoming a an example of the rise of democracy in the region has gone into retreat it's a very sad example North Korea is about I think agreement with Professor Kim North Korea is about to embark on provocations in order to press Washington back into talks and into concessions on the UN Security Council sanctions which are strangling North Korea's industry North Korea is made due on its commercial economy it's getting by with some market reforms but the state on enterprises are star for resources that people are unemployed and they're not able to act as a militarized state in their normal way and they're very eager to get this back firing a few missiles and maybe even a nuclear test would be well within their interest to get the attention of President Trump before he enters the election year in January in some we've the great irony is that the US in dealing with the rising in China needs its allies and friends more than ever and yet we're making it harder for our friends and allies to work with us more than many many years and this is going to present a tremendous dilemma not just for the current Obama excuse me the current Trump administration but for whichever administration succeeds it thank you Doug thank you very very much join in that I come away with this image of the spinning bicycle wheel completely spinning apart with the spokes going in all directions China's watching this too and we have with us shall you dare who is you've heard earlier today is an excellent thinker from Shanghai so what what worries China mr. John your turn okay let me go back to the the topic of this session which is the new falling policy trend in East Asia I like first to share my some observation in the policy changing in this area I guess the major changing is US adopt American first policy in two or three years ago which more or less changing the political diplomatical landscape of this region first of all the US define China and Russia as a strategic competitor or adversary initiates trade war with China which I don't want to go detail I have a wide impact on this region second the US exists from TPP immediately after Trump take the office third Trump tried to resolve North Korea nuclear issue by establish a personal relation with the jing jen and but so far not successful force push Japan and the South Korea in economic arena including raising the payment for US Army staying these countries while of course US still keep aligned relationship with Japan and the South Korea having say that I want to emphasize the major pattern in this region and changing which mean US still share the dominance in this region in term of a number of all airlines in term of military existence and a business community in from Chinese perspective of course the major focus in this area how is how to deal with persistent US are challenging as I say in this morning but interestingly and I only you can find in past two or three years China actually now in the better position to have a good relation better relation with other countries for example they improve relation with Japan with South Korea even with North Korea of course at the same time strengthen the relation with Russia that's part of reason is due to the pressure from US you have to push China also push other countries so obviously naturally as I in Chinese saying they're bound together warming up to try to deal with the further pressure from US from uncertainty from US that's the kind of things China is now facing also I guess China also travel very hard as a Kevin described lunch speech yesterday try to keep a good relation with neighboring countries finally I guess last year I met Martin Wolf in Indonesia he said to chat with me say I'll give you three advice for China first of all play long second have good relation with the neighboring countries third one have good relation with Europe more or less China is taking these direction I stop here thank you mr. child one thing I mean when we talk about sorry yes please when we talk about new foreign policy trends obviously one trend is Donald Trump and what he's done sort of but another is the way his outreach to Kim Jong-un has changed the landscape and I wonder if I could ask you first but perhaps others has Trump's outreach to Mr. Kim has it been you said it's not successful but has it helped in China's eyes or has it made things worse I guess maybe help China to improve relation with the North Korea you know that that wasn't the idea yeah you may recall it's unusually since Jinsen and took over the office there's never top leader of visit between North Korea and China until maybe two years ago until have kind of things happened between Jinsen and and President Trump I guess from perspective of North Korea Jinsen and try improve relation with China as a leverage as a buffer to deal with with us so that's you know you can see in maybe one and a half year they have a mutual have a three maybe four time meeting between Jinsen and Xi Jinping either in China or in North Korea previously three years ago no any very correlation between North Korea I mean do you think and then I won't focus on you all the time but I mean I mean do you think I mean is it your view I mean obviously you're speaking for yourself is it your view that Kim would ever give up nuclear weapons after all partly they're meant as a deterrent against Beijing as well one presumes I I don't think so I guess North Korea set very high condition for them to give up if US meet them requirements they may give up but of course the condition they set very high and not necessary US will accept that even they may ask a not necessary agreement between two governments they want to legislation passed by Congress that's something maybe very hard for US to do that that's something they learn lesson from other countries Mr. Kim do you want to talk talk to that question I mean has Mr. Trump made things better by bringing Mr. Kim in from the cold or made it worse yes I think the approach President Trump took to have a direct deal with the North Korean leader was not bad at all because in previous negotiation for the last 30 years we dealt with North Korea for denuclearization process and there was working-level negotiation and once there is agreement on the working level it goes up to the minister level and then it goes to the leadership and it never succeeded so President Trump's approach so-called top-down approach it's not bad at all but I think the timing was very wrong in 2016 and 2017 there was unprecedented provocation on the part of North Korea in nuclear explosion and the bursting missile launch and there was strong sanctions regime was being built by international community by the end of 2017 so if the sanction could work for another year without winning you know too early then I think the US must have been in a better position to have a good deal good negotiation with North Korea but what I'm saying is that the timing was too early and that's why there was no progress in the negotiation and we lost sanctions region which means we lost our leverage on North Korea. President Trump was not known for his patience and his long-term thinking but Miss Aoi does does Japan looking at these developments does it feel that the US is is there for Japan in the same way or does Japan begin to feel a bit nervous? I think Japan has historically had a dilemma of being getting too much drone into US views US relations in global affairs and also getting abundance so I think the basic trend kind of continues but I think the fear for getting abundance is getting pronounced. Is Japan making outreaches in the region because of this? I do not. Thank you. I just it should work if you just told it. It's on. In fact that but I don't think that's the starting point Japan has pursued values driven effort to reach out to broader group of partners if not you know outright allies but I think has been a constant policy in the last decade and a half so I don't think I don't I don't think I would trace everything back to policies of President Trump although of course he has had a large impact on certain aspects. And then just just to ask others too I mean I mean it's not brand new but there is a kind of new Japanese nationalism under Mr. Abe. There's been more money spent on the self-defense forces just I think it's a word that I guess it's in the Constitution so that's what we have to call them but in the Japanese military and in the Japanese Navy. Do you think I mean is that making others in the region nervous given the past? I mean I remember this terrible phrase of Lee Kuan Yew when when Japan wanted to do did do peacekeeping in Cambodia and Lee said it's like giving the curd chocolates to an alcoholic. It's not very nice but was at the time very funny. That's very kind. That might be a question that's probably better answered by my colleagues. Okay. But from my perspective I don't think Japan has really gone over the board to when it revised the constitutional interpretation and also it upgraded some of the activities that Japan Japanese forces could do in peace and stability contingencies. Those are I would say very limited change and I think there is a legitimate academic debate among experts whether this is something that puts a stamp on that something that's already going on or whether those actually represent the fundamental break in our culture and actual policy. Right. Right. Others? Anyone? Doug? Well on the question is Japan an unwelcome guest in the region. I think for all practical and practical purposes Japan has passed that of being an unwelcome but in Korea it's a different case as we've discussed just a moment ago. The coincidence of Mr. Abe being in office and Trump taking a strong anti-China policy has probably bought Tokyo and Washington more closely together than in a long time and where Trump sets a tone that the Japanese take comfort from because someone is standing up to their big rival in Asia. At the same time Abe has been hyperactive in regenerating Japanese diplomacy so that there's Japanese competition for railway building in Indonesia and Thailand and India with China. There's a sense that Japan really is willing to put its money where its mouth is under Mr. Abe so it's been a pretty good coordination. Right. Mr. Kim. It is alarming to Korean people especially if Prime Minister Abe would like to revise the constitution to fight a war then it would be quite alarming to South Korean people and coupled with other historical disputes this gives good excuse for the people who'd like to bring about some anti-Japanese sentiment in Korea to use them for the domestic purpose so I guess that's what what happens now between Korea and Japan now. It's true it's gotten quite ugly but we see this in Europe too I have to say the same sort of same sort of politics. Mr. Chow how does China look at Japan I mean do you do you see Japan as in as in the way? I don't think so. China feel you know because couple years ago the first time China GDP took over Japan that's maybe five six years ago now is almost double for a number of GDP so for some Chinese they live over confident in terms of dealing with Japan but now I guess they keep a little cool down they know their weakness I mean Chinese weakness although they have a large GDP because so many Chinese visit Japan know their the manufacture is they have a good quality then better than China they understand that so now they have a more balanced attitude to Japan particularly in past two maybe two years the relation between Japan and China get improved for example recently the 70 anniversary of people's repatriation of people's Republic of China premier MP make a contribution also say some Chinese words they get a very positive response in China probably next year the Xi Jinping will have a state visit to Japan so yes in some way there exists the competition in term of full maker investments in Southeast Asia but at the same time they started to cooperation they have some agreement to targeting third country make a joint and make investments in infrastructure I think that's good idea good sign for coordination not only just try to you win you lose such kind of things yes Kevin Rudd yesterday talked about how China has 14 neighbors that they have to deal with and none of them wants to be an ally of China China has to deal with them all individually under the circumstances of high pressure relations with Washington it's no surprise that Japan and China would start to improve relations it suits Japanese purposes of other nature but for China it's to break the break out of isolation to make sure they're not fighting on all fronts at one time so it's understandable phenomenon it's a very good point because what I get a little tired of people in you know Washington say oh well you know we have allies and China has no allies like somehow China's no friends but that's not really the point China has countries that depend on China whether they're allies or not they're not exactly free-floating actors so before I go to the audience I have one maybe odd question provocative question as Doug you said when presidents say words and don't back them up it creates uncertainty and problems Xi Jinping has been very outspoken about China 2050 about lots of things so in a way I just want to ask all of you what do you think China really wants I mean what are the limit are their limits to what China wants or is this still unclear or should we take Xi's words as a kind of programmatic statement as opposed to an aspirational one Mr. Kim do you want to tackle that no you don't want to deal with it just to start the discussion I expect help to hear from you on this the Xi Jinping's practice has been to set big rhetorical targets and then in subsequent iterations sort of rain them in he went to the conference building conference called SICA the South Korean friends did a lot to save us from a motion being passed by a lot of countries friendly to the U.S. that would have been highly critical of America China was very ambitious of that at the second iteration of that conference they reigned their ambitions in a lot another thing is the famous Belt and Road initiative a lot of rhetoric tremendous amount of money went out on the first rush and then people started to think again there was some criticism externally but a lot criticism internally and in this latest summit of the Belt and Road initiative Xi Jinping says we have to stop painting with big brushstrokes and start using Chinese fine calligraphy and which means rules more control and things do change and so I think you shouldn't take every big programmatic statement at face value much as you would not from most politicians in the West the side do you want to respond yes before I come to the question I mean may I just take a little about just half a step back I just wanted to emphasize that I can fully understand historical sensitivities in the region but I think it would be actually want to interpret the recent change in constitution interpretation as a sign that Japan would now go fight a war anywhere and that goes for collective self-defense and that goes for collective security too Japan is not going to you know fight a war with you in the Middle East tomorrow so you know not over expectations should be not expectations should not be held too high on that ground either so without you know they think China what China wants I think can be my personal view uninformed view they can't change yes I mean can transform as situations conditions change Chinese people look to me as very pragmatic Mr. Ted do you want to respond at all yeah I guess the John in sitting the panel this morning he yesterday to describe the fact a very interesting fact is also today I chit-chat with him he he's a very interesting only two major countries never happen in in reading the history never happen system collapsing United States and Britain but only thing these two countries now popular them prevailing before hundred years ago is a so-called growing revolution after that the system almost no fundamental change but what I try to say is a so-called national memory I guess play some low in shaping the future direction back to the topic you ask the Chinese government or particularly top leaders try use these memory national memory as they say we we don't we want to take away humiliation history in past 100 years want China to be revaluate become one large power respected by the rest of the world I guess that's probably is the obvious they go but all I will say in past two or three years or maybe several years in some way little bit over which in in many ways but you see at the one-hand China claim it is still one largest car developing economy at the same time you spend so much resource effort overseas you shouldn't make a balance between overseas effort and a domestic livelihood that that's something as a doll point out because dolly the China expert to know I have to say in past one or two years that's maybe positive side of Donald Trump a pressure yes the tone of Chinese leader has been soft lot they never say something China move to the central of world arena never say that but that's I think it's good good sign for China to keep the modest in Chinese way yes or you know I mean to become again as Dung suggested a little more modest but it's it's I mean what it intrigues me is just it's it's what you're saying also China will not be backward again I think that's part of it right I mean I'm very struck by this it's also we had you know one of the great cliches now is decoupling but it is really fascinating to see China developing its own internet its own Amazon its own Facebook its own we chat I mean and and and you know even with social credit just creating a Chinese world where the outside world exists but it's it's filtered but it that way I mean that's the sort of most neutral way of putting it and and the result is going I think to be fascinating I'm very eager to see what's going to happen but I hope I don't say the wrong thing and get denied a train ticket anyway let's let's try to take a few questions Stu and then and then the person behind you and right okay so one two three one area has surprisingly not been mentioned at all and I'd like to start with you and get the comments and that is China's decision to militarize coral reefs creating really militarized zones for your jet fighters then under the extended economic zone claim claiming your sovereignty extends hundreds of nautical miles beyond that and then up with your airspace ignoring a decision by the court under the law the sea that the Philippines brought how do you justify that kind of provocation and how do you how would you expect others to react I mean the US I know I was on the defense policy board with Obama we recommended and he did and Mr. Trump has continued it to have our warships go by that to make it clear we believe it's international waters so how do you justify this it seems to be a highly provocative action could you pass the microphone right right behind you yes thank you that's almost from Japan I have a burning question to our son Mr. Kim Donald Trump I loved North Korea to test short to middle-range missiles which are very difficult to even intercept by Aegis or pack three so exposing to the threat increasingly neighbors like Japan and South Korea the point is is Japanese government taking some actions vis-à-vis the United States or just holding breath and same question to Mr. Kim about Korean government okay great thanks and then this gentleman in the front row please thank you very much yoji Suzuki from Japan like ambassador Kim I spent many years in the Japanese diplomacy not necessary in the field of security and like him I stepped aside on the sideline recently my intention is not to get into some sort of debate with ambassador Kim but I would make few observations on bio bilateral relationship I would using his expression qualify that we're not on the edge of divorce but certainly our marriage had a bumpy stages and it's another bumpy sort of tense period but I think there's a bit of a difference in perception between Japan and Korea on this issue and I think it's not that bad but I would at the same time say that in spite of a fairly close public sentiment the relationship between our two leaders are quite difficult at this moment and I think the point is that as you said Japan and South Korea to a large extent share common interest and of course I mean even we can say we share to certain extent common destiny because we are under the same threat in the past I think we are two countries had the wisdom of somewhat even having a difficult relationship on historic issues hit this aside somewhat separate this from the vital security issues and this is I think exactly what the two leaders should be doing right now to identify the longer-term interest common interest for both of us and not sort of jeopardize this at the expense of this what you qualifies as as retaliation right what we do we qualify as normalizing the export control of some material used for semiconductor production because we suspect that these semiconductors produced in South Korea ends up in the hands of people with not necessary appreciate all right thank you very very much so sorry no I have a question well I mean one question just say the question quickly then yeah some of you have referred to Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un talking as opposed to move but I think this move actually as some of you had alluded lifted somewhat the pressure on North Korea on sanctions as the question yes so I'm saying had Donald Trump not met Kim Jong-un and had this sort of easing of the sanction did not take place would it have been more conducive to produce a better move constructed move on the part of North Korea which is an excellent question but thank you so we are almost we are basically out of time so I'm gonna ask you to come down the row 30 seconds each so short and just so there was a actual question directed at you mr. child so why don't you I'm going to address the question regarding the island in South China Sea it's a big contribution I I'm not expert at these areas but the basic factor is these islands is not some territory of any international recognized sovereignty land if they are distributed built it's not peninsula of a clear me okay it's not part of that so from Chinese perspective they regarded these island belong to China part of that so obviously from their perspective they put some weapon for self-defense I don't think it's a big deal but you look at which country occupy most number of island not China other country but why US only targeting China right that that's the country also US so far have not a pool Congress not rectifies the the law United Nations see law how have legitimate reason to so strongly against China that's something very strange okay it's it is something you and mr. Issa might want to discuss more later but let's but let's go to Doug well just to follow up on Stu's question the I've always assumed that China moved on the islands initially because other states that were claimants in the same area had similarly put some facilities and China wanted to be sure it was left in the bargaining not out of the bargaining how it became so militarized as a separate question of course we were going to do freedom of navigation operations through that region with all parties when secretary defense asked me my advice I said put in five comparable facilities at low cost with seabees on five Philippine controlled islands nearby so that the military effect would be nullified and then to launch and diplomatic initiative by running constant freedom of navigation exercises the issue of response in China is left to the military sector not to the diplomatic sector foreign ministry is frozen out the military gets to call the shots that should not be in our interest we want to get the diplomats involved my proposal would have been start serious negotiations on fisheries agreements in that region they're being rapidly depleted everybody's got an interest in conservation of those capable of fish resources and we could put it in the hands of some neutral parties to take the lead but it would be a diplomatic way of getting at this issue without militarizing it thank you North Korea's launch of a short-range business is clear violation of UN Security Council resolution but Korea government didn't condemn such law because President Trump said it was just small missiles and I don't think the the President Trump met with Kim Jung-un was wrong as I said earlier the timing was wrong there was strong international sanctions regime against North Korea we should have allowed the time for these sanctions to take effect thank you miss Ali last words yes I think that the most recent North Korean trials and errors with regard to short-range missiles and SLBM it's suddenly provocative in but I my own view is that the deep set still deterrent stalemate on the core Korean peninsula supported by superior conventional nuclear capability of you know antagonizing side might be a little difficult to shake off so I think that the order these trials and errors will provide for manoeuvrability certainly for the regime I think that state deterrent stalemate I think we'll stay for the time being and I think it's very important also to think of you know you as Japan relations as needed and also it's important to develop these relations and I don't I don't think it's nothing to be ashamed of it's very important and also at the same time Japan needs to build that you know rules-based relations with China as well as developing you know partnerships broader than in the space smaller region so all these things matter those provide for critical matches great thank you so thank you to the panel I wish we had more time and this also gives me an excuse or a pretext before to thank TLE the organizers all of you your patients the incredible song name I you know I think all of us understand the work that goes into this meeting so let's give them a round of applause