 We see a very similar baseline growth trends of the last 10 years, production consumption growth of about 1% a year. Baseline expansion and trading stocks on the range of about 3%, increased year-to-year variation in production and prices. The driver here, I think, on the year-to-year variation is going to be effects of climate change, extreme weather phenomena. The increasing linkage to biofuels, the US biofuels mandate, and just the growth in that sector, volatility in energy prices. And then secondly, I think differential on lumpy adoption and acceptance of new technologies, hybrids and biotech varieties are down the line. So, a relatively boring slide here, again, suggesting production and consumption out to 2019, 2020, projecting about a 1% growth in supply and use. More or less keeping up with each other, but with trade expanding up to about 40 million. We think this is possible, and it would imply about a 3.2% growth. So, if you look at this year's projections, we're looking at about a 25 million metric time increase in yield output, and about a 43 million increase in total supply. A fairly significant expansion in trade, but certainly relatively consistent with what we've seen at least over the last 15 years. Total use of 474, and in these stocks, actually, this number might as well be 115. In terms of uncertainties and challenges for trading prices, variability based on random disturbances in yields are simulated in our models through price and trade adjustments. It allows us then to look at impacts of policy reforms as well as institutional reforms. If we look at the stochastic simulation of the world reference price over this 10-year period, this was our baseline projection actually a year ago. But the key point I want to make is that we get a confidence interval of 10% up to 90% here with a variation only by holding policies constant but only looking at yield, random yield disturbances of this difference here of over $100 per member of China within that confidence interval. The variability in the stochastic simulation for Thailand has a range of about a million, a little bit over a million, in terms of capturing this 90% confidence interval for trade. But we see a relatively continued growth in trade up to a little over a 12-metre tense up by the end of this decade. One of the significant sources of instability that we see based upon the empirical yield distributions and the response within our model is India right exports with a variation of essentially zero exports with a potential up to 10 or 12 million depending upon their production and the rest of the world's yields. We simulate this model with correlated yields across countries and across time to capture this stochastic variation here in terms of... But you can imagine that this kind of variation here is a significant source of shock for prices. Finally, on the imported side, we see again a fairly significant range here in the confidence interval for Philippines. This should be rice imports. Sorry about that. It's a net profit of two and a half of the 4 million depending upon. So, basically, another issue of course that I think that what lies ahead is whether or not we'll have a conclusion to the Doha reforms, any of these multilateral approaches to trade. As we know, the dominant distortion in world rice trade is market access, ITRs and limiting TRQs. In the previous session about the South conflicts, major beneficiaries to trade reform with rice trade, market access reform would be Southeast Asian long grain rice exporters and Asian and African rice consumers. Medium grain trade, North-North conflicts, essentially US, Australia, Northeast China and Egypt, and the consumers benefiting in Japan, Korea and Taiwan. This is a somewhat dated analysis, but it suggests there should be about 5 million agricultural expansion in trade if we were to experience any movement towards opening up market reform. I looked at three different series of narrows here, opening up market access with the reductions of tariffs, the elimination of subsidies, subsidies and global rice are really becoming relatively insignificant in terms of trade distortion. In fact, domestic support is similar, relatively insignificant, but the aggregate again, if you were to look at reform and all three policies, an expansion of about 5 million above the current baseline levels. For prices, we would see maybe about a $50 premium for exporters and about a $30 reduction for importers and that's probably for long grain and for the medium grain markets that make this high as an $80 discount over current prices. I want to close with just a bit of a discussion of what I do to be needed in institutional and information reforms. When we look at sort of how the global rice market is performing, there's clearly a need for a group transparency. My view is that a major source of instability in the global rice market is the presence and continued interaction of state trading in a number of Asian countries. As a substitute to the state trading, there's clearly a need for increased role in the private sector and certainly following the circumstances of the 2008 rice prices, I think improved reporting and market analysis by Asian and global media would be a significant help in terms of providing improved transparency. Regional market stabilization institutions, I think there certainly is a role for that, but I think a considerable amount of research needs to be done. One, to look at what is the potential role for futures markets, this needs to be explored. Right now I can say that the US futures market in rice is performing extremely poorly. It's being bought into heavily by speculators and we see a huge, very unreliable delivery margin for farmers and so it's really not a very useful hedge tool at this point. Suggesting significant problems, one of the fundamental problems with the US rice futures market is a relatively poorly designed set of delivery points for that futures market. Secondly, in terms of regional institutions, I think we need to explore a more effective regional rice reserve system. It needs to be looked at from alternative trigger mechanisms and implementation issues. Needed institutional productivity reforms, the GRISP, which is just to be announced, I think will go a long way to addressing and funding the R&D gap that has resulted in the low yield growth in recent years. You'll hear more about that here in I think over the next couple of days, but there's clearly a need for the research to focus on climate change for different systems that address higher temperatures and weather events. This year certainly the US had significant problems with drought and heat, which had a very dramatic effect upon the supply of our market. And I think another important issue of looking at productivity gains is to explore the roles of public and private research institutes in the development and provision of hybrid varieties. So in summary, I think we can say that the current environment is that it's a very thinly traded rice market. It remains vulnerable to market policy shocks. The current record production exists, but the prices of strengthening in large part are again to this thinness within the market and the importance of weather events in terms of driving price behavior. The near-term outlook implies modest growth in production consumption, trading stocks, but also the higher prices. Primary challenges in the global rice market is looking at variability in yields and consequently prices in trade as a result of weather. Addressing this policy framework I think it looks as if we need to explore again and push for expanded market access, improved market transparency, including reducing the role of state trading, improving market information by the media, and research to focus on adaptation, mitigation to climate change, and improved understanding of the linkages of rice and other great markets to the energy markets. So I'll end with that.