 The Institute was founded by the U.S. Congress to contribute to the Prevention, Resolution and Management of International Conflicts. I am Ginny Bouvier, Senior Advisor for Latin America Programs here at the USIP and the founder of the Colombian Peace Forum. Translation in English available on the headphones, so anyone that needs the headphones, hopefully you have them. We have thank you to the two translators, Marta and Marta, who will be accompanying us today. We will do the event, webcast the event in Spanish. It will be available in English in a few days, but currently it will be live in Spanish. The Colombia Peace Forum is a series of policy discussions sponsored by the USIP to support a peaceful resolution to one of the world's longest running internal armed conflicts. For today's forum, we have assembled a panel of experts to discuss how a peace accord might be implemented on the ground. It is known that with the signing of a peace accord, this does not mean that it translates into president of Feramper in Colombia. On the other hand, Marino Cordova for the Afro-Columbian Peace Council, Compa, and ex-president and founder of the Association of Displaced Afro-Columbians. On my left, Diego Bautista, Advisor for Territorial Peace and Post-Conflict Institutional Architecture, Office of the High Commissioner for Peace of the President of the Republic of Colombia. Unfortunately, two of our panelists, Adela Aguirre, from the State of Nariño, and Representative from METAC, was unable to be here, from the UNDP, were unable to be here. Before beginning, I would like to request our people joining us in the audience to introduce themselves with their name and last name, so that our panelists are aware of who they are meeting with. The interpreter is unable to hear. If there is no microphone, the interpreter is unable to hear. The interpreter is unable to hear. There's no microphone. The interpreter is unable to hear. The interpreter apologizes, but we are not able to hear without the use of a mic. Sarah Komp, I'm a teacher at George Mason University. Camilo Fonseca, from the National Federation of Ombudsmen. JesseWills.tai. I'm Miran del Carmen. Miran del Carmen, a Georgetown student, Herman Ilares, from Georgetown University, El J. Adelides, American Red Cross. The interpreter is unable to hear. Clara Bucas. Clara Bucas, Cmonix International. Don Sabo, with Cmonix International. Luciana Cmonix International. Bad Noise, Cmonix. Diana Montalegre, George Washington University student. Eric Raymond, student at Johns Hopkins University. Carolina Gomez, George Washington University. Carolina Gomez, George Washington University student, and I also work for the Democratic International Institute. Toma Genskin. Hi, Allison Mieleback, from the Institute for Inclusive Security. Jimenez Sanchez, from the Washington Office of Latin America. Joel Ortiz, representando la embajada. Joel Ortiz, representing the National Embassy on Activists for Peace. Robert Williamson, also a visitor. Robert Wood. Global Embassy of Activists for Peace. Estella, Activists for Peace. World Embassy Activists for Peace. Lisa Lungrum, with the Project, Legality Project. I'm here to check you consulting. Alex Reza. Alex Reza, OAS. I would like to welcome all of you, as well as those who are joining us virtually. I would also like to specifically thank my assistant, Maria Antonia Montes. Without her, we would not be able to hold this event. I also want to thank the USIP team that has fully supported us. For those who are tweeting, our hashtag is hashtag Columbia Peace Forum. As we meet in Washington today, the peace delegations of the FARC and the Colombian government have just completed their 34th round of talks in Havana. During the most recent session, the parties have been focusing in parallel tracks on the issue of victims and on ending the conflict. Progress at the table has been steady, and in recent months, a number of developments are worth noting. A series of measures agreed on by the parties to help reduce the intensity of the conflict. In recognition of the advances at the table and the success of the unilateral ceasefire declared in December of 2014 by the FARC, on March 10th, President Juan Manuel Santos announced that the army would temporarily cease bombing FARC camps. On March 7th, the FARC and the Colombian government announced a historic agreement to demine areas that have been particularly affected by land mines. During the last round of talks, the parties agreed that the demining project will include the participation of the FARC and the Colombian military, and will begin in selected regions of Antioquia and Mehta, two of the areas most severely affected by land mines. In February, the FARC announced that they would no longer recruit those under 17. Other important developments in past week include the naming by the Secretary of State John Kerry of a U.S. Special Envoy for Peace, Bernie Aronson. The presentation in February of the report of the historical commission on the conflict and its victims, meetings in Havana of the technical subcommission on ending the conflict, which has brought together face-to-face six active duty Colombian military officers with the FARC military leadership. The visits to the peace table of three delegations of gender experts from the women's and LGBTI organizations at the invitation of the subcommission on gender. Support for the priest process back in Colombia appears to be on the rise, with the latest polling data by Invermer Gallup indicating that some 72 percent of those surveyed support the government's decision to initiate negotiations with the FARC. This represents an increase of 10 percentage points from earlier in the year and may reflect a growing effort by the government's team to take a more aggressive stance in defense of the process inside Colombia, where skepticism of the process has been high. As talks continue in Havana, however, many are beginning to think ahead to the implications of an agreement back home. Sergio Jaramillo, the government's High Commissioner of Peace, has called for building past territorial or peace from the ground up. This idea is meant to engage regional institutions, local authorities, and diverse social sectors and communities in translating an eventual peace accord into practice. USIP has been engaged for the last decade in working to strengthen and develop the capacity of civil society to be able to contribute to peace building in the regions. In this regard, we are currently supporting projects and processes whose participants are potential allies in the development of past territorial or peace from the ground up. These include groups like the Citizens' Commission for Peace and Reconciliation, which have created a model for a multi-sectorial process to spearhead discussions on peace and reconciliation in eight departments of the North Atlantic Coast and in Arauca. This process is now expanding to Antioquia and Nariño. We are supporting Planeta Paz to generate and create proposals and agendas, peace agendas put together by different regions in the country within the conflict, within the armed conflict and the political situation and UN. And with a process that in the future will include ELN and EPL. This work, this systematic labor, is trying to align common ideas and common threads within the popular agenda that contribute to building the bridges between peace and negotiations. USIP has participated in a consortium of universities and social organizations that are currently working on a project called el día después or the day after and have facilitated dialogues in interethnic dialogues and intersectorial dialogues in Popayan and is hoping to have other get-togethers such as this in other areas of the country. We have been working with women mediators in 11 departments in Colombia. Past territorial is still undefined. Who is going to direct it and organize it? How can territorial peace be developed in a way that challenges the historic exclusions of large portions of the Colombian population? Afro-Columbians, indigenous women, youth peasants, how will it build on existing efforts? How can this be done in a way that is transformative and that creates new relationships between Bogota and the regions? And finally, what is the potential role of the international community? Today's meeting on past territorial will look at these questions and at some of the challenges and opportunities presented by the peace process. And now let us turn to our other panelists to address these questions. We begin with Andrés Santa María Garrido, president of the National Federation of Ombuds Persons, who will talk about the role of the ombudsman in the construction of past territorial. Thank you very much, Andrés. Good afternoon. First, I would like to thank USIP and Virginia for the invitation and for being able to join you and all of you for coming. First, I'm an ombudsman in Cali. The initial question, what do we understand by ombudsman and ombudsman in Colombia? Next, the ombudsman is a local institution guided by the Paris principles, very similar to the different way that ombudsmen are called. And their basic activity is to defend and promote human rights. But outside of that, and in addition to these roles and to this great responsibility, we have very specific responsibilities such as opening or allowing more access to justice, allowing for more citizen participation, opening more citizen participation, and something that is very relevant at this time is making sure that we work hand in hand with the victims of armed conflict in Colombia. Specifically, in this first slide, we see some of the duties that we have as it pertains to human rights. But realistically, we have over 1400 duties in Colombia for the ombudsmen in Colombia. Specifically regarding victims, ombudsmen in the countries are the intake for reparation. It is the ombuds persons jointly with the prosecutor's office and with the public defender's office that need to accept statements. These statements are the ones that will open the door for the Colombian government to either provide reparations for the victims of armed conflict. 87% of the total of all the statements or affidavits by victims of the armed conflict in Colombia are accepted by the municipal ombudsmen. However, the ombudsmen different from the attorney general's office have a different geographic space. In other words, they are very municipal. There is 1100 of them. In other words, each municipality in the country has an institution called the municipal ombudsmen. Just to give you some specific numbers, we have been able to identify 100,000 cases regarding human rights. And as I was saying earlier, 87% of the statements from victims of armed conflict were received at the municipal ombudsmen's offices. But this is not only the entryway for the victims to eventually enter into reparations by the government, but also they become the entity that monitors and that goes with the victim hand by hand by identifying victims in different regions in the country. Additionally, the ombudsman takes on a role of technical participation at the victims' desks since the law of victims and redistribution of land has a very specific has something very specific regarding reparations. And that is where all the different organizations of the victims are represented. And at this intake table, we will identify weaknesses as far as attention that is being sought and public policy vis-a-vis the victims of armed conflict. By providing this technical assistance, we are able to have these participation tables for victims to actually be able to participate. That the comments that the victims make are actually heard and are actually taken into account by the local authorities, such as the municipal mayors. I already explained this slide out of the total registered victims in Colombia, 7 million. 80% of them gave their statements at an ombudsman's office. I have this additional data here so that you could understand where most of the victims come from in the country. And you can see that the victims are basically in the regions in the different departments and municipalities around the country. When the victims' law actually materializes and is passed, then there is an agreement made that we have to improve the victim situation at the national level. In other words, there are more resources that are being made available by different institutions of the government and, of course, by the national government through its victims' unit. Specifically, in the municipalities, the strengthening did not exist. The strengthening process didn't exist, although they were a strategic ally for the improvement and for going hand in hand with working with the victims of armed conflict. The budget for a municipal ombudsman's office is $30,000 a year. $30,000 a year. And within those resources, most of them are to pay the ombudsman's salaries. The resources needed for the call for these participation tables. To send the statements to the capital in Bogota, that money was never appropriated. The resources for being able to host the victims in their offices or have different intake offices, those resources were never allocated. So we have many offices that are very limited, that are very small, so that they are able to provide this type of intake. We have been in proving, we are going through a process of improvement and to raise awareness by the authorities and the government as well as international communities. In the international community process, this idea of improvement and strengthening, institutional strengthening, came from Bogota to the regions and not the other way, not from the regions towards Bogota. As a consequence, up until about two years ago, we began a new phase working hand in hand with comonics and USAID for a strengthening process that would begin by providing the necessary equipment, like computer equipment so that we were able to send this information so that we were able to change the way that we were receiving victims. So we started by the basics. For example, offering computers so that you could take statements online, have chairs available so that the victims had somewhere to sit, and frankly, to improve the conditions of the local institution or the local office. One of the basic elements, which is the main reason of why we're here and the discourse that we have been giving in different places, is that if we want to concentrate on reducing human rights violations in our country, then we must improve our local structure. The conflict does not occur from the capital. It occurs in the regions and in the municipalities. The presence of armed conflict and the generators of human rights violations as part of the relationship with the state and all those matters dealing with education and with health need a local institution to be able to promote a local response. That's why we continuously insist on following the local strengthening model so that we can prevent, as an additional contribution, to assist in the local institutions that already are working. For over 100 years, we have had these types of institutions, but it's never been centralized with the Internet. It's never gone hand in hand with the international community, nor has it truly respected the promotion of human rights within the Colombian government. In addition, we believe that not only from the victim awareness point of view, but also from the post-conflict situation, we have seen the demobilization go on in different countries in Central America. There is a tendency of an increase in the violations of human rights of domestic violence towards women and children. We have seen this in other countries in Central America. Therefore, we should reflect upon this information and make sure that we have capacity building at the local level to promote the safeguard of human rights. We have become the only place of physical presence in municipalities whether there are or are not people who carry arms in that area. We have seen a change in the focus that the Colombian government has given with the National Development Plan when it decides on concentrating on past territorial. The national government has stated that there are certain important principles, the principle of participation, territorial differentiation, and to protect and guarantee rights. How is this included in the National Development Plan? It should be materialized through human rights and a culture of peace, protection of victims and allowing them for participation as a citizen, and to assist in demobilization. That is where we find ourselves now. That is where we have a specific role that is fundamental. When discussing victims, we are the point of access. We are the fourth point of entry for possible reparations. And we will be there throughout the whole process. But not only at this very beginning stages where reparations are opened, but reparations do not come only from the state. Victims have to return to society because they are changing into a different type of development, into a more urban development. As most of them has been displaced and they come from a more rural environment to a more urban environment, and the economic model in the rural region is different than that in the urban. They go from self-sustainment to having to purchase everything, water and food, and then all of a sudden they have to follow what is going on in that urban area and to be able to give a voice to the victims so that they can see how things are different in the rural versus the urban. In Cali, where I'm from, there's 158,000 victims of armed conflict. I want to give you a specific example. Most of the homicides in a city that has about 2,000 homicides a year, most of them are done by minors. So what do we see as far as juvenile delinquency? We find that many of their parents or grandparents were victims of armed conflict. So the lack of a public policy that truly reincorporates them into society and an economic model that changes them from a rural system to an urban system has generated greater poverty and has actually made the urban violent structures a place where they turn. As far as citizen participation is concerned, we make it possible for citizens to be able to express their needs. We are able to see where they are protected under the constitution and give them access to justice. We also intervene in order to have resources made available for the communities. We have it through a specific fund that if there is a specific judicial process, a certain right may be recognized and we may be able to allocate some funds. As far as our presence in the municipality, we are there for monitoring and when the early alert system was established, specifically through USAID, the main reporters for early alert systems are people who take into the entire context of their municipality. They know the people who instill violence in their community and they understand the personality of their community, which can happen in situations of human rights or in situations of infractions in the NIH, or when they are in violations that should go. It is heterogeneous. It is manifested differently in different regions. The regional manifestations can somehow be specified as, for example, because of drugs. I think that that analysis that each ombudsman can provide allows us to have more information as to why these rights may be violated. I would like to reiterate that the main thing that I wanted to show you was that the ombudsman, although they are invisible before the international community and before Colombian citizens, actually provide for a very important service. When we make this exercise regarding what is going on regionally, we have to make sure that everything begins in the region. The ombudsman are not the ones who are going to improve on the protection of human rights, but they are an additional element that can contribute to the protection, promotion, and defense, and monitoring of human rights. We would like to take this opportunity to invite everyone to a more peaceful process, a more truthful process in the long term for the government of Colombia. We ratify our commitment to peace with the government of Colombia and with President Santos. We support the process between the national government and the ombudsman that this has been the only government that it has occurred in, and we would like to reiterate that we are only at the development stages. We are facing these different challenges, but we have to make sure that we look towards the future. Small examples such as not having a chair for a victim to sit on or not having resources in order to be able to send a statement to the Capitol to not have the computers that are necessary, but to be able to improve in Bogotá, or the central government, but not at the regional level, goes against what we are searching for when we are looking for peace from the ground up. I had a presentation, but I can see now that when I bring a presentation I don't necessarily follow it and I just talk. I just wanted to provide you some numbers and some additional data. I'm very grateful for the time you've given me. Nonetheless, we've brought some information that we can give to you. If any of you are interested in specific data that is in English, Dr. Camilo would be able to give it to you. Thank you very much. Again, thank you, Andrés. We're going to request if possible to give us a copy of the PowerPoint so we can put it on our webpage here at the Institute. Thank you. And now we're going to hear statements from Marino Córdoba from the Afro-Columbian Peace Council and the National Association of Displaced Afro-Columbians. Marino. Dr. Virginia, thank you so much for inviting me here. It's certainly a pleasure to be here this afternoon with all of you sharing some of our experiences with the movement of Afro-Columbian in this peace process. To begin, I'd like to make it very clear that Afro-Columbians that have come forward for the negotiations, to come out of conflict in Colombia, perhaps one of the most affected groups in our country, and that's an important point to underline. To try to perhaps give my statements a little bit more organized, there are some things I would like to share with you. If I don't do that, then my speech will be perhaps too long. The reflections I would love to share with you this morning is based around a central issue, and that's the construction of sustainable peace in Colombia, which has to be with an implementation of the agreements. In reality, these agreements are part of the Afro-Columbian groups, which have been the victims of this armed conflict, which has made them even more excluded historically in our country and what we have suffered. There's a lot of reasons basically that I say this to you, and I'd like to mention for the moment two of the issues that are important. First of all, a sustainable peace has to have reparation for the victims. Afro-Columbians represent at least 30 percent of that whole universe of victims. Secondly, the second reason has directly to do with the subject matter that has been proposed by this forum. To construct peace from the regions directly, regions that are inhabited mainly by Afro-Columbians are not only the ones that are most affected by this conflict, but they will continue to be the most strategic for developing our country. Unfortunately, and this is something that I have stated again with these communities, these regions continue to have a high intensity of conflict. Even though the peace dialogues are going on in Havana, the direct experience of our community in this particular area shows that the dynamic, the violence that we see, the dynamics of violence that might occur even post-conflict might be either more or at least the same intensity. Recognizing the actual role, the important role that has with incorporating constructions of peace for the Afro community, unfortunately to the moment has now become a reality throughout the process of the peace talks in Havana. What has basically led a group of, this has led to a group of Afro-Columbian groups that are very well known, that have done a tremendous amount of work with the people and we've realized the Afro-Columbian Council of Peace. Before getting in depth on this particular subject, the idea that I've begun to speak to you, let me very quickly give you a summary of the initiative itself and invite you so that all of you will support it from whatever institutions you represent and whatever personnel is there. We know that the systematic commitment, the solidarity that we've had with the Afro-Columbian communities from the very minute that the violence began to bring suffering to our people is very important. The agreements that we've reached so far from the perspective of Afro-Columbians, the ones, the three of the agenda, which so far have been put out to the public for very relevant issues for the construction of regional peace. Nonetheless, the process that has already been carried out to construct and initiate these agreements and the content of them show the fact that there is not a sustainable perspective to the realities of the Afro-Columbian communities. Even though this is a critical evaluation, which I'm going to go in depth, the organizations and communities that make up the Compact, the Consejo or the Council of the African-Columbians go along with peace and the agreements that have been reached. However, particularly from the Afro-Columbian perspective, as the dialogues and peace dialogues continue, we are convinced that the government, the convenience of the government and the FARC have, that they have to publicly recognize the needs to integrate the Afro-Columbian perspective into the process. But definitely we know that the possibility of reconstruction to create restitution and the protection of our rights in a post-conflict scenario is something where we're going to see the institutional processes, social processes, that are working where they're going to be able to implement these agreements. From the point of view of our community's participation, this dialogue process has been very indifferent to the Afro-Columbian groups. It's very important to state this, because that has to be corrected. If it's some of the sessions with the victims, the possibility was given that some Afro-Columbians were present there at no point was that carried out. The conditions were mentioned so that the collective processes at the basis that bring together thousands of Afro-Columbian victims would be able to have access to provide their proposals and analysis. After the analysis of content analysis in the three agreements, we'd have to state that as far as general terms, there is not enough recognition of the Afro-Columbian perspective. The mention made for our communities and our rights, they are obviously very important, but they're much too generalized and they're much too marginalized if you compare it with the fact that the effects have been tremendous on our community as well as the impact that different proposals will have for these agreements, for the construction of peace. To give you an example, let me talk about the reform for the Agricultural Committee and that's an agreement which obviously has tremendously important effects for the construction of peace and therefore for our communities. It's true that the reform and development and participation of different communities are not completely incompatible with the concession of the development of our communities. In our communities we have been historically constructing these, but we also know that in specific issues such as the actual works of the different land grants that in no case that has been agreed will affect the acquired rights by the indigenous communities and the Afro descendants as well as the rural individuals living in the rural areas. Another issue which I've already mentioned that's important perhaps it's just too general and it has marginalized us is the fact that there's too much silence that the agreement itself has that basically leaves us in a very vulnerable position. There's also many conflicts that could arise from the implementation of these agreements if it's not explicit with a set of principles that are key. For example, where is our concession of territory included? From the collective perspective it should be stated. Other appropriations for example of land, the danger, the territories that according to the reform should go basically to the funds for different land grants. So let's keep in mind that outside these areas that we've already recognized collective properties there are many communities, African, Colombian communities that continue the process of looking recognition of their properties in these different territories that they have inhabited for since their ancestors have been there. Why the councils are not even mentioned as one of the authorities who should participate throughout all of the process that brings about this agrarian reform. It's very necessary to have this recognition that's full for all of authorities in the area of the Pacific in Colombia which is more than six million hectares, more than half of the region. The emphasis of this reform in these zones that are reserves for the peasants is perhaps ignores this reality or seems to. The fact that we have to identify priorities in some of the zones many of which will cross into our territory based on the criteria that is being stated without even mentioning the authorities. The armed conflict, the individuals participating has limited everything. It's also a vacuum that has to be improved. Apart from the agrarian reform as far as other points of the agreements referring specifically to our participation also we need to set up the fact that we need to incorporate an Afro-Columbian perspective into the process. After giving you this very quick analysis what I'd like to do speaking about the agreements that we have already reached to mention why we've decided and basically this is a job that I began to perhaps, I'm sorry, I'm sorry but I have a cold. We actually have to bring the leaders together as the ones that represent the Afro-Columbian movement. The organizations that most represent us to try to defend the proposals that are ours from the Afro-Columbian movement that we believe should be a part or should be incorporated or kept in mind at the table in Havana. What I'd like to show you here is some of the issues that I saw while I was traveling yesterday I was able to bring these points together here's a map which places us in Colombia and also in the reality of what the Afro-Columbian population is. On the map you can see that the 2005 census states that Afro-Columbians are 3.4, 4.3 million and that's a little bit different with another reality which is way before where it used to say that Afro-Columbians were 11.6 millions and this is a situation that I myself can't even understand what has happened with those two different numbers which obviously the two numbers make us think either the conflict has affected us so much so where the population is moved or there died or the census wasn't properly carried out something has happened and it's something that we don't agree with. The COMPA, the National Council, is a proposal from the leaders of the organizations that most represent the Afro-Columbian movement and as I said before what we're trying to get is to guarantee the political participation of our people and that the voice of the black Afro-Columbian people will be able to be part of the peace process and their attention will be paid to it. I think that all of you are witness to what's happening currently in the conversations in Havana. There is a subcommittee for example on gender issues. There's information that we have received that there's going to be a hearing to hear the indigenous community but they haven't said a word about the Afro-Columbians. So in a sense these organizations that are on this list here are part of the Afro-Columbian National Peace Council. The objective, the very basic objective for the council is the construction of proposals that are collective in nature within the organizing process. Starting from that point what we would like to see is that those proposals be presented at the table but at the same time it should be shared with our allies and also at the international level. The legitimacy of COMPA is based on the agreements that have already been made through the organizations that are part of the process. One of the principles that we seek to reach is to be the voice persons of those processes that we're working with in the Afro-Columbian movement. There's a lot of divergence, there's a lot of different situations that are part of it. So that principle is very important and very basic. At the same time we would like to see participation of other sectors that are not included but that they should at least identify themselves with the work that we're trying to carry out. The structure and governance of the council, they have a national team, a technical team and an international team as well and they all will be supported in local and regional works with the leaders that will strengthen our organizations, the members of our group. There's some ideas, some actions that I'd like to quickly mention as well. Regarding the territory, for example, one of the actions that we wish to take our proposal is respect for collective titles, for example in the Pacific area as well as the Atlantic coast. I had already mentioned that there are more than six million hectares that are collectively in the name of the Afro-Columbian groups. But at the same time there are many conflicts and interests that affect negatively these Afro-Columbian areas. There's a lot of illicit crops, the traffic of cocaine in the Pacific area of Colombia. There are concessions to multinational companies that basically from mining, energy, forests, many cultures, cattle, cattle raising, etc. All of this make it impossible to govern and to live together in our communities. As far as the issue of victims is concerned, humanitarian crisis and reparation. We have already taken steps forward on the process that what we really should try to do is to have an efficient realistic public policy for the attention and reparation of Afro-Columbians that have been a victim of the armed conflict. Integral inclusion in the register of victims, this is a huge problem that we have in our country. Justice collection guarantees of no repetition of the things that happened and military government, etc. That caused this crisis in the Afro-Columbian community. Guarantees that we will be receiving back with safety and dignity and security. Here you can see is that we've been affected. There's over six million forced displacements individuals in Colombia, which I've already mentioned to you. 30% of which are the Afro-Columbian population. This in comparison to the census from 2005 shows us that more than half of our population has been affected. More than half has been affected by this conflict. The victims, displaced individuals, all of those are living in that particular world of violations of human rights. As far as territories and populations, leaders and organizations which are still under threat because they try to go forth with leadership and to be able to express their proposals. As far as past with social justice, that's something that we also consider should be public policies for reparation and attention to the Afro-Columbian groups that are victims to be part of the register. I think I'm repeating myself at this point. Yes, I believe I've already mentioned this before. As far as strengthening the organizations, autonomy, participation, governance. Here what we request support to the organizations to assign budgets necessary for new development regulations or participation issues from the previous consultation according to international norms, recognition and support to the National Peace Afro-Columbian Council to have a construction of a proposal that's collective for peace, as well as the special subscriptions for communities that are Afro-Columbian. I think many of you are witnesses of the problems that we have in our country. We have two individual mestizos that represent the Afro-Columbian, which is unbelievable, but that could only happen in my country. Here you can see that these organizations, the Consejo or the Council that is limited in its free exercise of autonomy because of economic models that gives license to multinational companies without any prior consultation by drug traffickers, guerrillas, paramilitaries, any legal mining, leaders and communities that are limited by the increase of the threats, homicides, systematic homicides, impunity, displacement that is forced, forced disappearance, discrimination of natural resources and the abuse that occurs. This is serious sexual abuse and violence against women. This is a very difficult issue. Many of this is not even spoken. The agenda of Havana, they don't include the collective rights of the organizations or our groups. Another point here is the identity factor, racism and different points of view or for focuses. We propose that there has to be an integral work against racism and against racial discrimination, informed consultations regarding economic development, public politicals that are real and effective to improve the lives for these communities in these regions, structural racism that exists. Lastly, there are some recommendations that we would make trying to strengthen the recommendations. I think this is also very important to share with you and to increase the visibility of the African Colombian in conflict, peace and transition to the post-conflict and their recommendations to support politically so that Compa will be able to participate or have real participation in the negotiations at Havana. To integrate Compa in the dialogues regarding the programation of funds in order to do everything necessary for post-conflict and credits and other subjects that are related and guarantee measures of security and protection for the leaders that are constructing these proposals for peace of territories and communities, I'd like to end by saying that one of the points that most has affected us, the most serious situation that we see today is a constant amount of leaders of ours that have to constantly be moving in order to maintain their lives. The most serious issue is impunity because there is no justice on these issues and even more than impunity, there is no trust with whom they should talk to or present their problems and there's no response from the institutions. The national protection agencies haven't even responded to us and instead of offering mechanisms day to day, the guarantees are less and less to guarantee the lives and the work of these leaders in the community. Thank you. Thank you very much and if you could please leave us the PowerPoint so that we could upload it. We will now hear from Diego Bautista, the advisor for territorial peace and post-conflict institutional architecture. That's a long name of the office of the High Commissioner of Peace and the presidency of Colombia. Thank you very much Virginia. First of all, I would like to thank the U.S. Institute for Peace in the United States for this long effort and their arduous work to find ideas in order to solve the conflict in Colombia and Eugene specifically for all your cooperation and your exhaustive collaboration throughout this because the peace process in Colombia does need lots of different ideas as it is very complicated to build peace in Colombia nowadays. This is something that makes us more demanding when we face these challenges. I want to highlight this first because there are some minimum standards that I believe Colombia will meet when they sign the end of the armed conflict. First it will finish, it will terminate violence in Colombia as we have been a country that has many victims due to this. Something else is to no longer attack the social infrastructure and the economic infrastructure that helps in the development, the economic development of the country as all of us depend on that infrastructure. And third there's this disjointer in the community because there are different points of view when facing the conflict. There's lots of stigmatization going around because of what you think and also because how you see the conflict. And I think that these are minimum standards that we must meet and if we are able to reach these minimum standards then all the negotiation process or the peace talks will have been something positive. However the infrastructure will go far beyond that and the way the government sees it we are trying to take advantage of the signing of this accord to make a change and to become current with all the needs that we need in our society. This peace process has been an intermittent peace process. It began two years ago with exploration which is different to what was occurring a year ago and to what is occurring now. In fact what was occurring three months ago is different than what is happening now and in fact I would hope that in three more months we have more positive news and we see how this peace process has gained strength. As you all know the way that it has been designed this process in Havana has had certain limits on the agenda. The rules of the game have been changed and it's not by the government exclusively but also by the Colombian community that has tried to continue adding to this process and making changes. So throughout the process we have always learned and that is why we have been able to strengthen it and be more optimistic as we look towards our future. We now find ourselves at a very important point as the negotiating teams have stated. We are now facing very difficult matters such as justice. How many years how much jail time should you face versus well basically everything that we're facing because of this transitional justice. We also have the returning of weapons. This is something else that's very difficult. These peace talks are about to get even more difficult but as Jeannie was mentioning earlier the time limits that we are proposing for these conversations and the way that we are facing the process this time allows us to be more optimistic. How far are we for signing the accord and that's anybody's guess. I believe that we're months away. This allows us to take advantage of this moment that we feel that we are making strides for readiness. The government feels that it is ready. We have a team for readiness for implementation of the accords and what we're studying what it's going to mean as far as resources as far as actions and how it's going to affect Colombian society as a whole. And for the next implementation process the high commissioner of peace has shown that past territorial or peace from the grounds up is the way that we must implement this peace accord. And from this point of view we are also trying to incorporate it incorporate the best practices of what we've learned in other from other institutions throughout other peace processes in Colombia and at the international level. We have been able to work with different institutions in collaboration so that we learn from their best practices as well. We always hear about the positive ones like the M-19 process that just recently was met the 25 years that we've had this M-19 accord and this was very successful as far as political terms are concerned. And nowadays they are participants in the Colombian government. Some of them are mayors, some of them are governors, some of them work for congress, some are part of the newspaper elite in Colombia and they are very important political figures. But what occurred at the regional level where these programs were successful shows us that we need to delve a little bit deeper, that we need to go further than appropriation or licenses or assistance for those groups who turn in their weapons. We need to go beyond a level of assistance because 25 years after the fact we're seeing the same problems in the region. We still have the same gaps between urban and rural. We still lack public services in many of the same regions. The poverty indicators do not seem to have improved and in fact in some cases have worsened in these regions. So when taking into account what we consider a successful peace process we need to define as a government what this idea of past territorial is the way the High Commissioner has proposed it. If our objective is actually peace which is the objective of this accord we want to make sure that we protect the rights of all Colombians in every part of the country and that is what our end goal is with this whole process. How do we do this? It's very important and that is what we have to learn from past experiences and what we have seen is that the only way to have stable peace and long lasting peace is by transforming the region transforming the way the citizens see our new peace arena that sees the region as a whole and sees that there has to be institutional changes and there has to be a cultural change and always have the vision of peace and that is what territorial peace is. It is ensuring the protection of rights from a regional perspective so that all regions are participating and all citizens are participating in this process. For these reasons we have presented this as a joint peace process because that is specifically what it is. This is not going to be a process with public policy designed by some politicians in Bogota or by some technical advisors. This has been our tradition of the past but this time we will incorporate more citizens. The government is unable to move forward on its own. It's going to need assistance from the private sector, from academia, from churches, from social organizations who have been peace building for many years. They have found themselves in adverse and this joint process has to be from the territories and understanding the public populations of individuals that live in these different territories to understand that Marino and Andrés have already mentioned some of the special and different situations that we find. This takes us to the very first stage of peace process which is adjusting it so that it become institutionality. Our current institutional architecture is not one that functions well for peace building and it doesn't because the central environment does not understand the differences in the regions and it has a homogeneous treatment to face any issues that may arise for example in Baudo or Choco or in North Cauca or in South Nariño or South Bolívar. These are issues that each region has because of their specific situation and they're not necessarily incorporated on the public policy from Bogota so there must be some specific changes there so that we move from a planning and budgeting stage and resource allocation stage from a specific territory to the territory as a community. That's not the way it is viewed now and that is one of the things that must be changed for this idea of peace from the ground up. As far as institutions are concerned many of you know here that there is much weakness in many of the institutions for compliance specifically future compliance of the accords of what is being established by the accords for those who have been heavily touched by the conflict. There is also a very important agenda item which is the implementation of the law of victims has already taught us certain things regarding the resources that we need regarding the speed that we need to be able to respond to the community as far as land restoration we also have to see how quickly we can react to that and how we can be supportive. When you go to a certain region you say you always hear look you implemented this from the capital you signed off on this from the capital but we have to implement it and now you're doing the same thing from Havana you sign off and we have to implement it and we aren't given the additional resources or management tools to do so. This is something that we must face in this peace building process and the idea of sharing between the regions and the capital we have some departments like Antioquia Santander in Cundinamarca that are different from Arauca, Caquetá and Putumayo who have a different population number but as far as resources are concerned they're treated equally so when facing peace building we have to study the current institutionality and see how we can improve upon it kind of by a surgical method. We also need to be able that we define institutionality in order to implement any possible accord rising out of Havana how are we going to do this we have to understand what is going on right now right now we have a policy of consolidation we are consolidating territories and there are different action plans that have been brought forth by the victims unit by the agency the Colombian agency for reinsertion and there are some organizations that are working at the regional level for resolving the conflict now we have to define what the institutions will be for post-conflict or for peace building and this also occurs because there are different levels of coordination and different tools that are available so that we may continue with the peace building process institutionality will also the institution will also have to learn that we need to go work hand in hand with social organizations because of participation as we see that participation is one of the basic elements in peace building within this peace process from the grounds up we do have a participation process currently and we do have some specific tools that this participation requires a change with the new stages that we will be facing participation is a basic element of accords you can see that there are community assemblies that there are development plans regional development plans and one by one there are specific texts for the participation and we must be able to implement them but participation is also a transversal principle it it crosscuts every region on the one hand we have to adjust the institution but on the other hand we also have to include a participation model that empowers the citizens to face these issues and to be more active than passive citizens this is a different type of participation to what we currently have it has to be a participation that creates change that you are able to utilize the public resources and the municipalities that you plan ahead and that you design policy nowadays we see different ways where citizens are participating but they are not having the necessary effect on public decisions we have participation in montes de maría and el cauca we have participation by afro colombians some like in cauca come from or narinio come from the government directly and there are different peace processes within the peace programs so there are lots of participation models but they still have a long way to go as far as influencing the design of public policy and that is another challenge that we face when we look at participation we also have to be able to move above and beyond this idea of revindication and actually becoming part of society once again we must be able to show this participation this participative democracy that exists in colombia has to coexist with a challenging movement of participation this is necessary and i believe it is included in the accords and it'll be part of the very important political agenda with peace building and there's a third element within peace building and past territorial which is intangible but when we visited several regions last year we went to many regions just had discussions with governors with mayors with civil society where in these areas where we will probably begin the implementation there is this intangible and the intangible is distrust in colombia almost around the whole country in fact in areas where the conflict wasn't as intense there is a disjointer in the social fabric specifically in the even more in the areas where conflict was very high when local organizations converse with the governments they don't trust each other and then local governments don't trust the national government the organizations themselves don't trust each other as mr marino was saying within the same organizations there's distrust they are fractured and that is a task that is not a minor task within the peace building process because we can have development agendas we can have action plans we've learned a lot from our action plans but actually implementing them makes these frictions that create this distrust be reduced and that is another element that we have to really work on for this reason the government has began to state that just as there has been talks in Havana and as we all hope this will continue to be successful at the moment of implementation there should be talks on peace building that will organize the information that has emanated from the accords and the impact that it has on the regions because it will be different for each region and that it can identify any issues that are going to arise at the implementation point and that we can somehow respond to these in a more constructive manner when compared to the past this is another one of the important tasks within peace building as far as past territorial is concerned the different diversities of territory models of participation that really have the participation of the citizens in an appropriate matter they'd be part of the influence and the trust that has to be built which perhaps is the most difficult thing to do in peace building and that we see today based on the different individuals that are looking at the process skepticism pessimism in some of the territories and a series of concerns we need to say that based on all of this as a government we have a lot to improve when we go to the levels of pedagogy pedagogy when they have to implement it in these urban areas of columbia etc but there is something that's very concerning us in what's happening and the fact of this mistrust that's an obstacle to make us go even slower on these peace agenda so what you need to do having said all of this we're not naive either based on the incredible challenges that this peace building is going to hand us on the 31st of october this year we're going to have governor elections mayors and elections on the 1st of january next year in about 10 months or so they will take that those new offices new governors new mayors for a period of four years now perhaps they'll be the first governors and mayors that are going to face all of this challenge of the post-conflict amongst all of these challenges there are three that very clearly we can see the first has to do with the implementation of all of these accords and everything to do with the post-conflict and here some have been mentioned today have to do with the victims themselves has to do with the restitution of their lands that has to do with reincorporating them to their their lives on an economic and civil level for the ex-combatants and that has to do with the rural areas the zones that really have low abilities of institutions or capacity those are the challenges that these new officials are going to have to face in general these areas when they take over these offices in the first of january 2016 but there are other challenges the traditional challenges the ones that know that there's a tremendous problems in columbia in certain regions and with certain populations in columbia those that have to do with the access to public services for example in regions that are not the main parts of our municipalities the roads for example the third level roads so they can have a social economic impact in the areas areas where there's no water available where public health is not a right areas where there's a tremendous lack of presence of the state and a lack of complying with everything that they have to do in order to bring about the post-conflict accords and a third set of problems that are not least some already exist that i'm sure they will be some of them will become even larger in the future have to do with the conflicts that we were already seeing in our territory between mining for example the environment between environment and agriculture all of the series of conflicts that are emerging the different levels of development between industry based on the peasants the small producers of the country between populations that are afro columbian indigenous everyone know in the same territory and the use of the territory this will be all a source of tremendous conflicts okay so this is to say that the challenges are enormous and that they're not going to be resolved from one day to the next they're going to require not only development plan that's four years but a longer agenda and that's why this is something all of us have to work on for constructing them territorial peace or this piece from the ground up is asking to be to analyze all of these problems territory by territory and to be able to bring all this together so that everyone is aware of all these challenges additionally there are some subjects that i have to mention as well and that are structural in nature they have to do with the structural issues that affect the territory but sometimes don't really depend on it first of all safety security it's not going to be possible to set up an agenda for peace building without it it is a requirement to be able to go ahead with an agenda for peace building a mechanism participation and office is not even legitimate nor will it have any impact if we don't have everyone participating safety for the social leaders of our country which is also part of the accords safety for the politicians for the individuals that make our policies and safety in the rural areas which is perhaps going to be one of the most important challenges which the government has already been moving forward and they're thinking of how they're going to accomplish and all of this then is on the table when we talk about central america for example when we look at all the different international processes that the problem of insecurity that goes after the agreement of accords i don't know if it has to be that way necessarily or perhaps we're learning in a different way and with the intelligence we get from our history is to try to correct these problems of something that is we know are going to happen with all of the different processes we've had throughout history so this element of safety is important peace as the president said has to bring more peace it can't possibly be that peace will bring less safety and security has to be more it's necessary in order to construct peace on the other hand the subject of justice is very important if we're talking about compliance and the guarantee of rights for all columbians justice has to improve today for example the things that have been happening everyone's aware of it that they have relevant issues that happened the judicial process has to improve have more access be faster guarantee the rights of citizens that most of them will be reaffirmed with compliance with the accords that are being mentioned in havana the other point is the economic dynamics so in order to sustain the peace we require not only an effort for the first months of post-conflict and its implementation but in reality they have to be part of sustainable solutions and this happens through the dynamic economics of territories that will make peace sustainable that later on we will have more success to reinsert these combatants to the reconciliation that's necessary the economic dynamics also have to be strong and faced with this conflicts the different territories we're going to have some discussions about territories and what are the challenges and what we have to do economically finally a point which is perhaps not minor perhaps to mid or long term is the subject of political relations that agree certain decisions that are made that are politically decided in columbia it's one of the fears that we have based on the investments we're going to see for post-conflict world and generally to anything that has to do with political life in columbia we understand that we don't only have to have territorial political reform we understand that it's not enough when we look at the accords based on the statutes for the opposition etc other instruments that the accords are looking at but also the participation as i mentioned before has to be a determinant factor in how the change will occur and that's an agenda we have to follow there's many examples today in columbia regarding how to carry up politics and when you go to the communities that will not go through this sort of process of lobbying or favoritism perhaps that are occurring in columbia and that's another agenda that will have to be faced in the post-conflict time security justice economic dynamic in the territories as well as a change of political customs so these investments will have larger impact and also contribute to be able to reach peace at this moment as i said at the beginning we are months away from signing the accords and i like to say that months away because months is ambiguous isn't it it could be six months it could be a year and a half but nonetheless we have seen through all of the recent events that we mentioned before the genie mentioned that we're closer now than further away to reach the accords although we're at a critical point we're at a point where we're having to prepare starting to see everything that's being contemplated in the accords the new land situations institution just doing away with the illicit crops our participative nature we don't want to have preconceived ideas a dialogue has begun on all these different designs for organizational designs with the local authorities to be enriching the process the restrictions that the accords give us that we can't implement until they're signed is also an opportunity so we can start designing things on zero day when it all begins when the implementation begins we're going to have to be ready with everything that's been contemplated in the different points of the accord but also prepare the territories when everything has that has to do with the peace building process in the first 12 months as we know from conflicts at an international level we have to have a rapid response plan we've been working on it already with using events that have happened in other countries that it's incredibly important the first year after peace building so we're at that point of preparation we're looking at the different regions we're going there talking to the authorities talking with social organizations incorporating a lot of the lessons learned from the victims the women that have as we said before basically setting up peace building and they have a lot of information to share from one region to the other and enriching the models that we're going to construct the peace these are tremendous challenges as you can imagine they're monumental in nature we are optimists nonetheless and we think that if we are able to do this to we bring all of the different society to this peace construction efforts we have been able to survive situations that have been barbarous in our country I think if we've been able to live through that we're also capable of peace building and to set up these scenarios so that they are viable and so peace will be viable in Colombia thank you well thank you very much Diego I think we're going to ask for questions unfortunately we are at 4 30 which is the time that we had decided we were going to close the session so if you need to leave go ahead don't no problem and if any of you want to continue for a further discussion we can do that I would like to comment first and to thank all the panelists for their presentations I think that you have shown us that there is a great desire for peace in varied sectors of the government and of Colombian society and I believe that you have showed us some of the challenges that everybody faces first from the institutional standpoint from the ombudsman and the difficulties they face they have a mandate to contribute they have the desire to contribute but they lack resources they don't even have chairs for the victims when they are speaking to them we have heard that afro columbians are ready to participate but they have not be incorporated in the peace process up until now and the lack of incorporating or considering their points of view from the regions specifically community councils among others and from Diego we heard a very hopeful message that it is a process that is creating a transformation kind of like a non repetition guarantee we must have many deep changes to Colombian society from the political point to the economic and a cultural transformation and a change in attitude for peace he has spoken to us about a new institutionality a new model participation a new participation model and I can say that this lack of trust does exist among social sectors as well as the public sector and the private sector and that is always a great challenge when a conflict is ending and there's a transformation towards peace I think the distrust is perhaps the most difficult to face so that is kind of a review of the presentations up to this point but I would like to open the floor for any questions if any of you have any specific questions if you could please identify yourself and let us know what institution you're with Alfredo Rodriguez with the IDP but I'm here on a personal note welcome thank you very much the interpreters unable to hear the speakers off mic a very good question we're going to take several questions and then we will answer since we are running out of time the speaker is off mic the interpreters unable to hear and to be as the colleagues as our colleagues said that they can present their own proposals so I have the question since you expressed this wonderful political will and let me congratulate you for that if you could at least now share one or two specific action items of how how is it that you are able to do this now to strengthen this inclusion thank you any other questions or comments hi I'm Adam Isaac I have a quick question regarding resources if you think about all the commitments that you have social inclusion the victim registry for so many victims and in the accords land reform peaceful deployment I mean I mean if we were just to write all these numbers out on a napkin and we were to say okay we're all going to the government and donors are going to spend x amount of money money if we're talking of 15,000 peoples we're talking about 150 billion dollars for a peace agreement for Colombia that would be the resources that were similar to what the U.S. had to allocate after World War II or perhaps even after September 11th and maybe this is a question more for planning purposes or even for the ministry of planning or perhaps even the Department of Treasury but are you financially able to make a commitment such as that I have a question my name is Karolina Gomez from National Democratic Institute and a postgraduate student from George Washington and my question is regarding the comments that Diego Mautista was saying regarding the importance of the economic dynamics and political customs regarding patronage or clientelism and others throughout the negotiations process in Havana we have not heard hardly at all of private sector initiatives what the private sector is going to contribute for the construction and implementation of peace talks for a peace in Colombia just more recently we have heard regarding initiatives emanating from academia for peace building in Colombia and I am specifically mentioning the consortium which I believe comes from the University of Los Andes and Javeriana and they are just now beginning to create groups to work on peace building in fact I even think that in Spain they have began discussing an education initiative for those who have been demobilized but we hear nothing from the private sector so I ask myself when will we begin to comment on this participation on the private sector what does the government do in order to support this and when does the government make a comment on this thank you one more this is a question more for Virginia and it's what are the lessons learned that you see in plan Colombia from it becoming a peace plan to becoming more of a military plan and how the new cooperation by the United States is addressing the peace process okay I think that we have enough questions with this thank you very much for all the questions perhaps we won't be able to answer all of them so I invite you to continue on with this conversation outside once we're done I'm not sure if one of the panelists would like to address one of the questions I can making a huge effort and sacrificing my voice and my health I would like to mention and taking into account your question Fabiola I think it goes along with what we have been presenting in our country I go to the meetings of the National Security Council for peace that the president presides over and in that institution the president has stated that we want the members of the National Peace Council to study the peace accords which I think is very important and I must state that while being here in Washington last year for the presidential election or for the presidential elections where we feared that the proposal to continue on with the peace accords was going to be eliminated if Uriah's candidate were to win I went directly to my community so that we could support not so much the president but he was the only one who wanted to move forward with the peace accord with the peace talks and that is why we participated in the reelection campaign and that is where our commitment is born but when the president says it this way which I think is also very important I think that the government is allowing and maybe it's because it's a logical way for the talks to progress or it's a negotiation tactic or whatever they are discussing a very important factor which is organized civil society that civil society may contribute interpreter correction to the peace process not only by studying the process but building the proposals for peace that will then be accepted by the people there are two comments that I want to make here that are very important we've considered the fact that since the abolition of slavery with the law that was passed there was an indemnization of the individuals that bought the slaves and the slaves continue to be slaves in other words they were a political economic benefit for those of those that kept us as slaves when you come from that era to our times today when we reached the 90s with the new constitutional assembly afro columbians saw in columbia a very important mobilization and the fact that we were looking so that our our proposals would be brought to this national assembly by our members and we had no representative there in the national assembly that set up the new constitution in 91 we had no spokesperson present we were able to get law 70 which came through article 57 that the article the transitional would come out with an alliance that was made with the indigenous community community there is a friend who's in jail in columbia i don't know why but at the time he played a very important role francesco brojapirre was the one who was a spokesperson for the afro columbians and proposed during the assembly when the assembly was almost at its end for that article article 55 which was then talked about as law 70 those moments are not something that the afro columbia has lost but the country has lost those opportunities when they leave this very important sector of the population marginalized where they don't give them the the means where they could bring in their advice and their words to the construction of the nation it's a loss to the country it's not just a loss for the afro community those events are very important to be mentioned today we're now at a third moment as i've defined it if in the accords in havana the proposals are not included for the afro columbian community as we see the country as we see peace the post conflict era etc but our own true reality if that doesn't become a part of them then i believe those accords obviously are going to lead the country in the future afro columbians will continue to be excluded to be beggars we're going to continue to suffer for the discrimination the institutional discrimination because if you compare where we are historically in our country and the development that the population has had in those communities all of the indicators show that all of the indexes are present for poverty all of the indexes that affect a population so i have stated during the national peace council that to do pedagogy for peace is important but how can i talk about peace agreements or accords if my proposals are not included there are situations that are very complicated i'm not going to say that they're risky but they are difficult to understand the reserves for example for the peasants in the country where will they be those different areas i'm sure many will be set up in the pacific area of columbia and there's still a debate regarding the lands and whether they're going to be given to the black community or not that's not clear so from washington and from columbia i've been working since last year so that afro columbians will find themselves in the peace national council that's been my initiative and it is part of it and we're stride taking strides forward we certainly hope to reach havana not to become a barrier or to impede the process we defended that we would like to have proposals included we're asking ourselves today for example how is it possible that the government allows that in havana there is a subcommittee for gender issues and none for ethnic groups to be able to debate their affairs afro columbia columbians as well as indigenous communities that's being excluded that's something that we've seen and it's concerning in that sense i believe that there is a lot of things but i believe that we are available we want to go forward with dialogues with the government dialogues even with a gorilla there's a lot of subjects that have to be debated and let me finish with the following comment on the supposed subject of demobilization of the gorilla groups if you look not at the commanders but if you look at the soldiers the the lower ranks in the pacific area they are all black these individual upon being demobilized where will they return to those communities so what we're going to find is there's going to be a confrontation between those creating the victims and the victims so there's going to be more conflict in our areas who will resolve those issues leadership the ability to be leaders in our community our leaders on site will be able to take care of that problem i'm only mentioning that one subject to be able to live together that virginia has already said that we're going to need how our leaders will be able to receive some type of training education on conflict resolution so they at least they'll have the ability to be able to handle these types of situations and find a solution when the state does it by then it's done it's all over it's a very complex situation so i wanted to mention that subject and the last subject regarding the convocation of private sectors in columbia the conflict became very strong in the rural sections because of the businessmen in the countries that gave their support to the paramilitary groups in the Pacific area of columbia we have that experience in our past in the area of el choco in in municipality of rio sucio after 96 20 of december when there was a military incursion that was supported by the military brigadas 17 rito alejo de rio is a commander the afro columbia population left that area and a company that's called madera de still there and they were there throughout all of the time that the rest of that community was displaced that company never left the area using all of the resources at its disposal the forest resources natural resources that were available with protection from the government for and these communities were displaced so it's very important that the private sector in columbia has to say what their role is going to be throughout this process and as adam said the actual cost for reparation redress is the cost that someone's going to have to take over what is going to be the actual cost i think that's something that all of us have to work on those issues thank you marino andres and then diego and we will stop at five o'clock the question that was asked by alfredo in our specific situation we are a response that historically in its institutional response that is reflected from the beginning of regions and locals municipalities and states that didn't have financial conditions that enabled it as well as political conditions to be able to think that they're going to see an improvement for the local areas so the first thing perhaps to answer one last question and i think it's similar to what you asked alfredo is that there really has to be political will from the government to be able to strengthen and improve local conditions diego has already mentioned and i think it's very important that the mistakes the restitution of lands the victims all of that they should contribute to the second opportunity such an important phase after we reach accords and that eras shouldn't be repeated and one of those obviously is what we're talking about specifically you're going to handle the victims of the arm conflict but you have to do that but we're not going to give you any budget without a penny so i've been talking in this scenario particularly to what affects us because at this moment we want to show this as a very important focal point to a hysteric historic situation with the agreement as you know we're since we're not just a floor somewhere with no chairs with situations that generate some negative images in front of the victims of the conflict the obligation to respond to their needs are sort of judicial and it's a psycho judicial or psycho social in other words we're all the embutsments are not psychologists but we're all attorneys nonetheless we've been able to face these situations and comply with what we have to do it was very important for columbia from the scenario that it came from historically they had to recognize the conflict and they recognize the fact that they had victims first they recognized the victims before the international community and afterwards the constitutional court and during santos presidency they recognize it that there was internal conflict and that's very important nonetheless without knowing all of that that was done those errors that were committed the basic errors that were committed can cannot be or continue to continue what are we doing we're in the same conditions the same weaknesses there's technical weaknesses that still exist there's been political appreciation and institutional appreciation but what's happening is that the things that have been going on cannot continue towards the future with all of the components of the territory we're only a part of that we're not enough and let me give you the same example of the demobilization of the AUC it was a process generator perhaps it can generate a lot of debate because it's the post conflict situation but it does have impact the impacts of to have this on a local level is it a generated duplication of structures in some cities for example it generated the fact that we started to see different criminal organizations coming together from the demobilized individuals they started not by having a rural control anymore but an urban control so it's important to have a strong local institution one of the risks after post-conflict or post-agreement of the courts is that the demobilized individual will arm himself again and we have to start from the point that we know that we have urban groups that are armed that we want to come to talk to us to make them part of the situation the signature for example of the leaders of FARC is very important but at the same time we have to be aware that it's not the only violent or active structure perhaps it doesn't have an organizational structure that's very strong or with a national face but we have to say that it exists and there are structures that are there they're illegals they're part of the violence that affect the area and could become vacuums that will perhaps suck in all these other groups so it's important to have an element in the territory to prevent that from occurring and secondly as we said victim the victims have to be the the principal role that the individual the victim has to be all of his rights have to be reestablished and in order to do that is not just an exclusive reparation structure or just an amount of money but to be able to have jobs to have housing to have education to be able to exceed to all those and additionally something very important starting from one specific element that has to be there the victim doesn't go back to his original place the life that he had before really they're not going back to that they're now in a local area in a municipality where there are violence for example by other groups that are generating the violence that and those models have not been able to be incorporated like education and health etc in that municipality and the individual in that area has to have institutional capacity to improve the situation for the victims and prevent that those demobilized individuals be able to start those criminal groups again those gangs and those are two important challenges we are a very complimentary element we're not going to resolve the issues of improving the lives of these victims for example through our ombudsman's offices or exclusively we're not going to allow these people to become criminal gangs but we can monitor we can prevent if we continue the weakness the conditions of weakness that we have now then all of that institutional local component is going to be affected and the reason is the our autonomy for example allows us to evaluate whose responsibility is to improve public policies and that's the local mayors the ombudsman's the local ombudsman's like ourselves one of our functions is to monitor to do follow-up and to watch for the compliance of the mayors and the public officials within that local area so that is extremely important I think it's important that we have to talk about some elements I think that is the subject that is very important budget being able to have access to a budget and for different regions to have access to budgets and I don't necessarily think that this is just a regional matter I think it is a national matter the mistakes made at the region are not a consequence of the region there are a consequence of the government structure that must be reformed if there is patronage there in a certain region there's patronage in that certain region but if you have this government saying that well since you have a problem in your region then let's move it all to Bogota because the improvement process should actually be a reformation to change that at the local level the local level is weaker and less adequate when it has a negative arena but I think the first thing that has to be done is a political recognition and I think that the national development plan has this in some capacity and there are also more simple ways this idea of having direct transfer to the municipality with larger resources being made available for example in my department out of 10 points if I want to call it that for national taxes we only get four sent back to us in other words Bogota keeps six of the resources and four come back to the department and this happens with all departments that have national taxes such as the tax on goods and services and what has this made this has made us make certain decisions within the region and I'm giving this as an example but not as definitely something that should be followed but something as simple as this statements being able to take statements and being able to send the statement of format you're a victim here these are the facts and it was something that had to be done from a franchise point of view in other words there are certain scenarios that are so simple and that the fix is so easy that really you have to have a political will but this political will must also be part of a transformation I live in a city and I can give this as an example because we are a very important city within post-conflict we are close to the pacific area but we have an incapability to face the truth and we can't face reality among conflict if we can't face reality within the conflict we will certainly not be able to face reality post-conflict and I think that is something that's very important to clear up as far as vulnerable groups are concerned let me tell you that the local institution that is really present are the legal entities there are problems within these legal entities but that is the only way to work hand in hand with the victims and lastly to reiterate that when we discuss territorial weakness although the international community has greatly supported the columbian process I believe that there has to be a deeper solution if the resources available for pre-improvement as far as prevention is concerned and as far as human rights are concerned must we change the access from Bogota to the regions and have the access go from the regions to Bogota part of this strengthening specifically when we discuss victims was exclusively studying enlarging the national project at the capital without taking a look into the fact that the victims are in fact in the regions and that those improvements were not going to reach the regions and that legal entities shifted because there was a true imbalance that never studied the actual territories or regions thank you and Diego will have our closing comments oh I thought I wasn't going to have to answer this question about resources just to briefly respond to each of the questions first as far as institutional strengthening I think that it is a very important action item and I agree with what Andres was saying I think that as far as land development and peace from the ground up the first one that must be held responsible is the central government that does not have an understanding of the region instead of relying on this idea that it's the regions that are weak or the regions that are corrupt I think that we have to strengthen the institution at the central level to understand the region but if this strengthening must also be different in fact all this peace building has to be different we cannot have the same design for training that we have in Bogota that is non-centralized or that we have one that promotes from different organizations you know the classic let's teach them how to program how to budget how to do follow up and then the same thing over and over without incorporating additional management elements that are required by the peace building process in other words having this law this victim's law is not a PowerPoint presentation on the law and in order to comply with it y'all you have to do is go to this PowerPoint presentation that is not the way it needs to be done you have to have follow up with boots on the ground and be able to work hand in hand with the institutions in their regions as far as Afro-Columbians and indigenous peoples and their lack of presence at the table that has been a permanent concern different groups of civil society have wanted representation and I think that during the participation process and the victims and the four events that we had in Colombia and the delegation that went to Havana was able to capture some of the diversity of the victim's perspective the diversity in the country and their different interests perhaps this was not enough what has been stated though is that the reconstruction of peace must be done in a joint manner Havana is not going to solve all of the problems that the Colombian society faces it is limited to certain agendas the accords of Havana for example will not be an answer to crime which is something that arises in every single form we will not be able to discuss crime it's going to be a consequence of what is going on with the accords and they must be considered in preparedness but it's not going to solve the crime issue also we are not going to be able to build peace you can't build peace in Havana you can sign a document you can sign an accord but then the process of facing the challenges belongs to Colombians in Colombia and yes we will have this national peace council and in fact the peace council that is promoting that Marino is promoting here and he has explained what it is they are going to be extremely important at that stage at that moment nothing can be excluded but let's say that these are very complicated restrictions we have still not culminated the process and I am not the spokesperson here to be able to commit to say that all the communities will be represented but that is something that definitely should be incorporated in the reconstruction process now as far as resources that is of great concern for us as well specifically in our current situation where our economy is very complicated taken into account everything that is being stated that is going to request investments it's not just going to be a solution of signing on the dotted line and hugging each other and moving on we have to have concrete economic solutions and these solutions must be found if we were able to find resources within armed conflict we somehow have to be able to allocate resources for peace building but in order to answer your question we are working on these numbers as you can understand it is something very delicate to say oh this is how much it's going to cost because that has serious macroeconomics implications but we are studying and looking into it to say this is how much it's going to cost us if we do nothing this is how much it's going to cost us to have the action plans by such and such a date etc I can't tell you specifically how much it's going to cost but I do need to let but yes it is obvious that it is going to be costly now as far as the private sector is concerned they are being considered but as we can as I was saying earlier this is but a moment in time as I was saying earlier a year the process was under it was more confidential we couldn't discuss readiness because it was too premature and it would take the wrong message to the table even as a negotiation strategy nowadays we have moved forward we are discussing preparedness and we had different plans like reconciliation colombia working directly with the private sector and there is a specific strategy for peace building that works hand in hand with the private sector not only in the traditional manner but also in this no negative effect from the private sector and from the private sector to be able to protect human rights as far as the establishment of protocols that already exist in the international system it is of great concern we do need the private sector it must be tied to the peace building process it will contribute resources it will contribute to our economic the dynamics in our economy and it has to be seated there because they also are part of the conflict in the region or I I believe that there were no other questions for us the other question was for jenny so you have the floor okay I apologize I just wanted to answer very briefly regarding the lessons learned on the US policy towards colombia although in in caguan I believe that we weren't betting on peace in fact the arrival of the plan colombia money interrupted in a negative manner peace process it interrupted a peace process that was already ongoing perhaps if all this money went directed to peace we may have had a different solution nonetheless I believe that this time around we have more international support than before there is an international recognition that a political solution of colombia situation would be a better resolution than a military solution in fact even if this could be quote-unquote won militarily and I think that this is the time to bet on peace colombia is one of the places that has the most hope around the world as far as war and armed conflict are concerned and there is a real possibility of finding a diplomatic resolution in colombia I would like to thank all the panelists for joining us and for your comments for all your work and for your dedication on peace and I would like to thank all of you for being here very patiently as we have gone well beyond our time I wish you much luck in whatever it is that you're doing and in your work on peace in colombia thank you very much