 Well this is very timely of course, and under the current EU President, I think Ireland has a very important role to play in this area. You know that already, and also of course because the UK's decision to exercise blocked out, blocked off out on justice and home affairs issues will certainly have implications for Ireland, a'r dynig, i ffwrdd, fel y cyfnodigwyr geografiol, lle oherwydd, dwi'n fwrdd ar y cwrdd y sydd o'r gweithio rhan o'r pethau o'r cyfnodigwyr ymlaenon ymlaenol yma yn y UED, a'r dynig o'r dynig o gyfnodigwyr polisiol. Yn y cyfnodigwyr ymlaenol ymlaenol, yw ein cyfnodigwyr eu cyfrifoedd ymlaenol o'r cyfnodigwyr sydd, ac yn y dynig ymlaenol yw Ysgrifennu Bryddem yn y Llywodraeth yn amser i'r ťdod yn y ffordd. Pan fydden ni'n dda chi i gilydd y 20ol nationale ofri oherwydd unrhyw drwy'r pan知lwch o'r rhaglen i'r gaelirdau newyddol yn y teimlo i **** yn y gynhyrchu. Mae'r rhaglen i'r gaelirdau oherwydd iddyn nhw sy'n gristafol i'r ein lleol i'w gyfeirio i'r llunios i eu polisiadau. Nid yn fan, mae'n neud i'r Rhaglen i'r llunios i'r unionid yn y Llunaidd. Nid yn fan, mae'n gweld bod y Llunaidd yn y Llyfr gan unrhyw gynhyrch in the field of police operation in Europe at the moment. I will stress the decision to exercise the bloc opt out, I think is at odds with the pragmatic approach of the law enforcement communities in Ireland and the UK both, actually towards European police cooperation. I will conclude that the opt out therefore will make it more difficult for UK law enforcement authorities to protect British citizens. Indeed it should remain very much at the heart of international police cooperation maesias, not least in Europe. As most of you know, the creation and strengthening of a European area of freedom, security and justice is one of the main objectives of the European Union and I believe it's also one of the best examples of the EU adding value to the lives of European citizens. You can't say that perhaps for every part of the EU but in this area from what I see I have a very good view of an everyday basis. I think the EU does add real value in the fight against serious crime. So the decisions made in this field by the UK, and by Ireland, and the European partners on issues ranging from organised crime, drug trafficking, terrorism, all the way through to migration and border security, of course these directly affect millions of citizens in those countries. y bwysig, y brif Weinidog, y brifyddyn yma, a'r rhai i'r Uchael yw'r rhaid, sy'n ystafell ar y dyfu Llywodraeth ac'r Yngrifedig. Mae gennym ni'n ddechrau i'r bwysigon mewn cyfnod mewn cyfnodol, sy'n mynd i ddim byddai ysgolwr yn Llywodraeth, ac mae'n dweud i gael ei weld o'r ysgolwyd ymlaen yw Llywodraeth. Yngyrch yn mynd i'r byd i'r pwyllwyr yn cael ei ffordd o'r cyfnodol ..on fundamental rights and civil liberties. So, the Lisbon Treaty has tried to change that and brought substantial changes into the way in which these justice and home affairs measures are adopted, implemented and reviewed. Most importantly, the Court of Justice of the EU will see its jurisdiction extended over the range of these measures, making the rights of EU citizens arguably better protected as a result. Secondly, the Lisbon Treaty has also increased the role of the European Parliament. They will now be fully involved in the adoption of these measures and this has increased democratic control as a result. Lastly, the European Commission enjoys its full right of initiative and will pursue those member states which fail to comply with EU legislation. Like for the internal market, which is of course so dear to the heart of many in the UK, a consistent application of crime and policing measures in the EU means less legal uncertainty and I guarantee that British citizens will benefit from a fair judicial and police treatment when travelling in the EU. This is a good thing, not a bad thing. In the EU, we're talking about 27 member states with more than 200, maybe more than 300 separate law enforcement authorities and 30 different legal systems, so it's quite a fragmented community on police cooperation alone. This fragmentation, lack of cohesion, lack of common application of systems and processes benefits only the criminals. So we need common rules and instruments with respect of course all the while our traditional national judicial systems but also allows police officers and judges to investigate and prosecute crimes that are committed in more than one country. Now some member states have anticipated the potentially far reaching implications of this super national legislation and have included a number of safeguards in this Lisbon Treaty that we see today therefore. We have the so-called emergency break procedure which allows any member states considering that a draft legislation would affect fundamental aspects of his criminal justice system. It can suspend the legislative process and refer the matter to the European Council. Article 67 of the Lisbon Treaty provides that in establishing an area of freedom, security and justice the union shall respect fundamental rights and the different legal systems and traditions of member states. In other words when adopting rules to facilitate police cooperation in criminal matters the legislators must take into account the differences between legal traditions and systems of the member states. But in addition to these common safeguards the UK and Ireland to common law countries of course have obtained that their former opt-out arrangement in the field of immigration, asylum and civil law be extended to the entire area of justice and home affairs. This is the substance of so-called protocol 21 that decisions in this area will not apply to UK and Ireland unless they decide to opt in. But when it comes to the 130 or so measures adopted before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty the new prerogatives of the Commission and the Court of Justice will apply automatically after the end of the five year transition period and therefore from the 1st of December 2014. This is why the former UK Labour government decided to negotiate the right to a block opt-out of all justice and home affairs legislations adopted before December 2009. So this is what we're talking about this is the so-called protocol 36 opt-out. And Ireland didn't seek to have this option. On the contrary Ireland insisted to include a political declaration underlining Ireland's firm commitment to participate as much as possible in measures in the area of freedom, security and justice. And that is the fundamental difference in the attitude of the two countries. Both are close partners in the fight against serious crime and terrorism. Both share the same concerns that their common law traditions risk being undermined by the European Court of Justice but only one has sought the possibility of a mass opt-out. Last October the UK Home Secretary announced that Britain would exercise the right to opt-out even if the formal decision has yet to be made following a vote in the British Parliament. It has until June 2014 to decide finally in this issue. Now today or indeed any other day for that matter I'm not going to give any advice to the British government or parliament on how we should decide in this matter. I think personally there are rational arguments on both sides and in the end it's a political decision of course. I am bound by my profession as a public servant and I know that I should refrain from straying directly into political affairs. But I am the Europol director and I do have an interest in this matter because I have a responsibility to ensure the strongest possible cooperation between member states in the area in which Europol is competent. This means in this context demonstrating from my side that proactive and constructive engagement with EU partners is the best way to protect national interests and the safety of citizens. I don't want any of our members to leave whichever country it is. It's really important to the success of our agency in the future that we retain the full membership and active membership of every member state in the European Union. We will be weaker if we are fewer. So my motives in this debate certainly not driven by politics or any sense of establishing a great European grand design. But just by the mandate as I said given to Europol and indeed to my function to help member states fight organised crime and terrorism. Now it's obviously for the UK to decide its future in the EU also in relation to Europol but it's my firm belief that it would miss something at least by no longer being an active part of our agency and indeed many other EU anti-crime measures. I also think that the UK's decision will have a long lasting impact on the country's ability to respond to security threats and to influence the EU's internal security policies. And it will have important consequences for the future of European policing. It will affect the EU as a whole, not just the United Kingdom. So allow me to detail what I think some of those consequences will be. Firstly that the opt out that the UK may decide will affect the future of EU policing because the EU is one of the biggest players in the EU internal security arena. At a strategic level for example and despite this rather peculiar position of opt out that it's maintained for some years, the EU often sets the agenda and security related issues in the EU. A couple of examples immediately following 9-11 EU ministers urgently considered how to respond with an overall of the shengen information system for example as a priority. And it was the UK that provided the lion's share of the ideas, even the practical requirements of shengen information system at the time based on the UK's model of the police national computer and its own border protection system. Another example, during the British presidency in 2005 the UK pushed for the adoption of council conclusions on the concept of intelligence led policing and as a European intelligence model. Seven years later this concept has become the cornerstone of the serious organised crime threat assessment carried out by Europol and the cornerstone of the new EU policy cycle in this area. And a more recent example is the current proposal to establish a European passenger names record system. Initially the commission proposal excluded internal EU flights but after an EUK initiative during summer 2011 the proposal has now been amended to include them. So for a country that's not a shengen member has an opt out of most JHA common rules and possesses a minority legal system that's quite an achievement. It shows that when British civil servants engage proactively with their counterparts in Brussels they carry a considerable influence. The same is true by the way for Ireland assets recovery is a good example as many of you know of just that. It's committed engagement with these European partners and institutions was instrumental in sharing the successful Irish model of the criminal assets bureau. And indeed Ireland was at the forefront of the creation of the so-called Karen network whose first meeting took place here in Dublin in 2002. A primary focus of that network which now includes 61 members with a secretariat based at Europol was to encourage member states to establish asset recovery offices. And after the adoption of a framework decision in 2007 all member states have now established such national offices. 18 of which are directly linked by the way to Europol's main information exchange system. So to conclude on this point if the UK does indeed use the blocked opt out it will reduce its own influence certainly on the development of EUJHA policies. And I think that will be bad for the UK but also for the rest of the EU because the EU has benefited from the UK's ideas and involvement in this debate on key dossiers over the years. And I believe that this reduced influence would come at a very bad time on the horizon of very important measures in this sector. Reform of eurojust, the creation of a European public prosecutor, a possible EU terrorist financing system and of course above all in my book at least the reform of Europol. But also at the operational level the UK law enforcement community has played a leading role in very very many major transnational criminal investigations. The UK is certainly one of the most active and best supporting member states at Europol and I think derives increasing significant benefits from engagement in this area. Organised crime and terrorism are certainly becoming more transnational in nature as the director of Europol and former international director of SOC I've seen enough evidence of that. Organised crime is becoming increasing diverse in this methods and structures. The groups themselves are becoming more mobile and flexible operating in multiple jurisdictions. These new trends therefore provide a new rationale for the EU to strive for more effective coordinated action at EU level and certainly not less. So a more globalised threat surely demands a more joined up response between governments and few people doubt this. In fact the UK law enforcement community itself is acutely aware of this and traditionally therefore been at the forefront of EU police cooperation. As I said it's one of the most active and committed members of Europol sharing large amounts of criminal intelligence and cooperating in hundreds of cross border investigations each year. In the last 12 months alone for example UK law enforcement authorities have been involved in more than 300 of the 600 most important operations supported by Europol across Europe. Half of all our most important work in the whole year bears a strong British footprint. With Europol this means therefore that the UK plays an increasingly progressive role in extracting operational value from Europol's unique capabilities. The UK and indeed many other member states I should say recognise we offer something that they haven't got already and that includes for example a set of intelligence databases and organised crime and terrorism which are unique in their pan-European scope and detail. Increasingly powerful in identifying criminal connections across borders in this more globalised world of criminality that we've identified. Soccer for example now routinely interrogates these databases with all its new cases. Every new case that is established at the national level is routinely checked with our database with a hit rate somewhere between 10 and 20%. So 10% and 20% of major cases in the UK are getting a response from Europol telling that investigators something that they don't already know that their investigation of a serious criminal in the UK has links to Italy, Portugal, Germany or somewhere else. And that's a major benefit for the investigator in such cases. Also we offer a breadth of expertise in every form of crime and terrorist activity drawn from the diversity of our workforce. Eugene mentioned that we just recruited as the head of our cyber operations an outstanding investigator here from Angada Shacona. We have 800 people like him now in our building that between themselves therefore operate, offer a breadth and diversity of experience that is found nowhere else in Europe drawn from every major law enforcement agency on our continent. Our staff base includes 140 liaison officers from those countries. Again this is a unique arrangement found nowhere else in the world. They carry full operational authority of their home country co-located with each other but also with 100 or so operational analysts that Europol employs. They use a purpose made secure information exchange system that we've developed and rolled out to every agency in Europe. And they use that capability and our analysts to exchange information and to coordinate around 14,000 major cross border operations every year. So it's an operational hub that is truly different in its scale and impact to anything else that you'll find in Europe. The UK recognises the value of these unique arrangements and has greatly increased its use of them in recent years alongside nearly every other member state. Unlike so many others around Europe the UK does this for pragmatic reasons because the UK strategy to fight organised crime and terrorism is founded on a belief that international cooperation must play an essential part. Also that the other reasons for this progressive attitude by the UK is of security professionals that believe that Europol is a more cost effective way of doing international police cooperation. I think the same could be said for Ireland as well. I'm aware that the Guarda has made a strategic decision to invest more in Europol and we've seen certainly the benefits of that in the last few years. In fact several member states including for example Denmark, the UK and Belgium have now closed a number of their bilateral police liaison posts around Europe in order to invest much more in the Europol network. We offer a cheaper way of doing police business in Europe. We also offer at a stroke access for one investigator from one national agency access to a pool of 140 officers from almost 40 countries. We know that this is taken up by several member states not least Ireland as well involved in the last few months in 30 operations or international investigations. 20 of these are still ongoing. It includes for example operation Oakleaf initiated approximately two years ago by the Guarda to tackle a mobile organised crime group known as the Rathkeel Rovers. This consisted of several close knit clans based in Ireland in the United Kingdom mainly involved in the distribution of counterfeit products, organised robbery, money laundering, drug trafficking right across Europe. It attracted some media attention not for those very serious criminal activities but because of its particular specialisation in the theft and illegal trade of rhino horns and their activities were being reported in North and South America, in China, in Australia because of that novelty. But that was just one relatively small part of their overall criminal activity. This group established companies all over Europe to legitimise and cover their illegal activities and a coordinated approach was certainly necessary to tackle their activities. Ireland recognised this and invited Europol to be the principal repository for intelligence and analysis in this investigation. Several meetings were held between different investigators at Europol, analysts helped to identify several intelligence opportunities and in the end more than 30 people have been arrested in more than eight different countries in this operation. So law enforcement community both in the UK and Ireland is making the best I think of European police cooperation instruments. As I said for pragmatic reasons cooperation between member states in these areas has brought many benefits to the member states themselves. Now when we look at the list of measures that the UK must decide whether not to opt out, we notice that many measures ensure that all member states codes of criminal law provide minimum penalties. For example in the field of terrorism, drug trafficking, cybercrime and money laundering. The UK derives obvious benefit in that these measures ensure protection to British citizens when they are elsewhere in Europe. It also deters the commission of such acts in the first place. For instance the framework decision on combating trafficking in human beings and the sexual exploitation of children. They have helped to tackle these terrible activities in a consistent way in the EU and reduced the possibilities for perpetrators to escape justice and to hop between different jurisdictions. In this case there is no additional burden on the UK because these minimum penalties were already in place within the framework of EU domestic legislation. There is no real risk of compliance proceedings at the European Court of Justice. Instruments such as the European arrest warrant however are much more controversial in the United Kingdom. Having said that, I think in this area there are real benefits derived by the police. Very often the real value of this instrument is missed in the media reporting currently in the United Kingdom. Certainly the warrant is used to track down some serious British criminals overseas. But actually the real public safety interest in this warrant is the ability for police authorities in the United Kingdom to track down and to forcibly remove from the United Kingdom several hundred serious criminals every year. In the most effective and cheapest and simplest extradition arrangements that the UK has ever benefited from. So there are amongst the list of criminals that the European arrest warrant deals with some real issues of proportionality which I think should be the heart of any reform of the instrument. But also there are as I said several hundred very serious criminals, child sex offenders, drug traffickers, even murderers, even suspected terrorists that without the availability of the European arrest warrant would otherwise remain on the streets of Britain. Without the ability for the police and the justice system to track them down quickly and remove them from the UK. So that is a very large public safety interest to forego if the UK decides to opt out. So these are just some of the examples that the UK must decide over. Opting back in again is of course an option which I think the UK is minded to negotiate over. It might be difficult because the commission and member states would negotiate with the United Kingdom in that case and may decide to add their own conditions to such an opt-in. But also I think it makes the whole environment that much more complicated because a partial opt-in, opt-in to some, not an opt-in to others dilutes perhaps the overall effectiveness of the suite of measures many of which are only efficient if they are used together and as a whole. So let me just conclude with some remarks. I'm certainly not here or anywhere else to make a political comment. I'm very sensitive to that point, that's why I've said it twice already. And I'm certainly not in the position to substitute myself for the British Prime Minister or the Home Secretary. But my experience as a practitioner in this area is that in order to increase efficiency in the fight against crime and terrorism, another time for example when cybercrime is growing exponentially, we need more European cooperation in police injustice. Of course it has to be effective and balanced and proportionate, but we certainly need more and not less. I don't call for more legislation by the way. I think we have enough to be getting on with. The real challenge for all of us in this community is to make sure that we make maximum use of what is already on the statute book. This assessment I think is widely shared by the law enforcement community across Europe. I think it is in Ireland, I think it is in the UK as well, where law enforcement authorities are leading the trend in terms of international cooperation. And they do it because they're pragmatic and because Europol support delivers real benefits in terms of disrupting serious criminal gangs. And I guess they know as much as I do the value of the UK remaining closely involved in European police cooperation in order to add value in fighting crime and terrorism. And they're not doing that, they're not in this game to please the European Commission or even the British director of Europol. They're doing it simply to help themselves in their daily job of protecting the British citizen from organised crime and terrorism. I think the same logic applies to the UK's role in policy making in the field of justice and home affairs. The UK is a respected player at a strategic level. Its influence of the development of an area of freedom, security and justice has been remarkable over the last 20 years. And British citizens are safer and better protected therefore when the UK is fully engaged in policy making because EU legislation is better as a result. The announcement that the UK will opt out of all JHA measures adopted before 2009 therefore may be at odds with the pragmatic attitude of security practitioners in the UK. The UK is an essential part of the EU internal security regime. The British and EU citizens are safer also when the UK is fully engaged in operational cooperation. There's an important point here that when the UK decides on its level of participation in operational terms in Europe then it affects also other member states, not just its own authorities. If over half of our case work carries a British footprint then in every one of those cases there is at least one other European partner whose ability to cooperate with its own major international partner will be diminished in the event of a UK opt-out. So to a certain extent the British decision has major European dimensions as well. But I believe in the end that the opt-out will severely hinder the future capability of the UK to operate effectively on the international stage in combating crime and terrorism. So I think that whatever the UK decides it must remain at the heart of the decision making process in the same way I think that Ireland is. For Europe we look forward to the UK and Ireland as member states remaining very strongly involved in all our activities. Thank you.