 OK. Plenty of material there, I think, for some questions. What I'd like to do is take three or four questions at a time. Please would you introduce yourselves. Please would you... You can direct your question if you want. You can make a general question to the panel. You can make a very short observation. I'm going to be really brutal. I can turn the microphones off. So please be concise. No long, long speeches, and then we'll get lots and lots of questions in. So can I see where the microphones are? One there, is there just one? There's two. Perfect. OK. First hand. OK. Lady up there with the sort of turquoise top on. Sorry, it's probably not turquoise. And can I see another quick... Can we see another question, please? And the gentleman there. Can we take a microphone to this gentleman here, please? OK. Please. Thank you. Hello. Thank you very much. My name is Mihail. I'm now a PhD student at the University of Nottingham. My question is going to be very brief. Namely, at the current moment as we have the International Criminal Court, and of course I've heard the discussion and I respect the opinions of the members of the panel. There is a certain show trial element in every trial for international justice. My question is, looking at the world as it is right now, is it better to have the international court, a permanent court, already established functioning, set up on a statute that was obviously elaborated after diplomatic deliberations worldwide, obviously? Well, anyway, we's a great participation from worldwide systems, legal systems, or would it be preferable to keep the style of ad hoc tribunals of national or hybrid courts or just any other possible judicial solutions one could pick up in situations that arise and require the prosecution or investigation of international crimes? Mass atrocities. Thank you very much. Thank you very much. I'm going to take three more. So the gentleman here, can we bring the microphone down to the front as well for the next question? Hi. My name is Mohammed Khair and I was actually, I worked for a few years as an investigator with the ICC and I had a question for Professor Kay. All the issues you raised are issues I think that a lot of us who are starting to work in this field are constantly questioning and we're trying to also find out whether or not these tribunals can serve the purpose for which they were established. But in your opinion, if the, and my understanding is that the tribunals are structurally flawed from the legal perspective, the prosecution's evidence is not strong enough, the judges are not doing their job well, there's a lot of political pressure that frequently guides the investigations and also the selection of the cases because let's not forget, as you mentioned, that a lot of the cases are referred by the Security Council, for example, or the Twad hoc tribunals are operating retroactively. But the question for us is after the Second World War, we had all these goodwill conventions. Yesterday there was the Convention of the Right of the Child, the Third Four Geneva Conventions, all these agreements that everybody signed onto. I'm from Sudan, we have a less than perfect human rights record, let's say, and Sudan jumped on just about every convention under the sun. But they were all systematically violated for 50 years plus. What can we do to implement these conventions? Does international law exist? It does. How can we see that it is preserved? How can we see that those who violate it are held accountable? These cases you were mentioning, whether we agree or not on the flaws, something happened in Kenya. A thousand people got massacred in a few months in Darfur. Tens of thousands, if not more, were killed. The Lord Resistance Army for 20 years kidnapped children, raped, committed atrocious crimes. If the tribunals don't work, should they be fixed or should we get rid of them all together? If that is the case, what can be the alternative? Thank you very much. A gentleman here and then a lady down just on the edge here is great. I've got you but I'll get you in the next round at the back there. A gentleman is here. Hello. My name is Ron Jennings. I'm a fellow at LSE and I work on global criminal justice. My question is to everyone, but especially to Stephen Kay. It seems to me that there is a legal issue involved here as well as the political claims, which I agree with. I agree with all the political claims, but we haven't pushed far enough to see what's at stake in the legal claim. My decision is quite explicit that there was no legal basis for it and that it understands that it says explicitly, there's a teleological approach to law and that it understands law is expansive, it understands that the Security Council is being given the power as essentially law making power, as the legislative power for the international tribunal and the absence of the existence of any power to do that otherwise. It recognizes as an emergency power as a necessity and as not strictly a legal power. It's very explicit about that if you read that. The question is how has this become the basis for international criminal law without there being more of an attack on this and what are the implications of this? Especially when the problem is the idea that the Rome Statute is supposed to get around this, but it does not because the ICC Statute now brings in the dual jurisdictions that allow the Security Council to have dual jurisdiction. The problem is what is the role of the Security Council as the embodiment of the emergency powers in the international arena as the body that is now the body that exercises the power to make the norm of legality in the international arena and what are the implications of that for the international order? The final analysis of the question for everyone is how do we understand this new power that's being exercised in cases that involve the Security Council? Who is exercising the power to punish the criminal and what is the name of the kind of power? If it's not sovereignty, if it's not... When the prosecutor puts their name on it, what is the name and power that we should understand this being enacted? Thank you very much. I'm going to stick with the three and you'll be first, Madam, in the next round because there's plenty in those three questions. So, Stephen, I think you should go first. I'll run all three together. Richard Goldstone said to me, is the world a better place, Stephen, for having it? And he was referring to the Yugoslavia Tribunal. And I said, yeah, it is a better place because it's created a beacon of standards for human behaviour and the world is a better place for that. And everyone was wanting something to be done, answering the question, the last question that we had during the Yugoslavia Wars because we were all watching it and it was the first proper war that we'd watched each evening on the news. You're probably too young to remember that, looking at you. But I remember watching it. But my beef is this. It's honesty with the law. I don't believe in this stuff. Oh, we've got to do something about it. So therefore, you know, we have these laws but we start changing because we want to trap someone here, and we want to do it this way. I believe in a far greater honesty in the application of the rule of law and how it's dealt with. But looking at this whole problem to answer the second question and part of the third is the notion of sovereignty. And sovereignty is almost like the religion of states, isn't it? It's how we see the creation. It's how we see the structure of the universe. And that meeting in Scaveningen that I referred to in 2001 when the chap from Canada came up with the right to protect theory is an inroad into sovereignty and the notion of sovereignty. And that's what you've seen in Darfur, the second question when you referred to that is a change in the notion of sovereignty. And you've seen southern Sudan now also break away. So sovereignty is a big issue in all of this. But I'm just a defence council, right? I just like knowing when I'm going into play, like when I go to watch Tottenham, that I understand what the rules are and that we're all playing the same game. I don't like it fixed. I don't like the prosecutor going up the corridor to see Judge Jordan knock on his door and ask to have three indictments put together because the trial chamber only wanted one trial in Milosovic. And I know that happened because the clerk told me. Some of you worked at the Yugoslavia Tribune. We all know what goes on and people tell us the stories. I don't like that. That's the problem with international criminal justice, so-called. OK, thank you, Steve. Marty, you want to say a couple of things? The first question was, is the ICC better than the ad hoc criminal tribunals? Well, there is no general response to that question. You have to ask for whom it could be better. What I've learnt in international institutions, you and related institutions, is that different people use them for different purposes and that they are pretty unpredictable animals as far as they go. If you think that you are able to advance your agendas better through a permanent institution, then go for it. If a non-permanent one then go for it. Neither one is a panacea. Both, of course, have problems. Stephen Cay asked himself rhetorically, is the world a better place because of the ICTY? Then he said, slightly, nervously, yes, it is. I just don't know this, but I'm worried that there is a ready ideological response to that question. How do you measure this thing? We international lawyers, my profession, have been committed to believing precisely that sort of thing. It's an ideological, almost religious faith. Yes, of course. How many times have I sat on the plane back from New York from one of the General Assembly sessions, when after the third drink on the plane, one person in the delegation says, well, pooh, all these three months we sat there, but it's still better that it is there than it wouldn't be there. Every time I think, how do you know? Of course it brings you to New York and it gives you this drink. There was the second question about the Sudan, about the conventions, about the rights of the child, about human rights in general, international humanitarian law. It's a very sad story. It's a story to which also I think the right response is the response as the same one as the first one. Well, some of these instruments are better than others. Some of them are more efficient than others. There is no general response to the question. You also, with some despair, I thought asked, well, does international law exist? I don't think that. So I professionally called upon to ask that question, but I always think that's the wrong question. The question to ask is, is international law a good thing? I don't know. The last question related to how we should call the kind of power, I suppose, the structure of knowledge, expertise, military, and economic power that is being waged in the world. But I don't think that power is centered in New York. New York is one of the places of which the military wing or some aspects of the military wing of this new power is operated. There are many other places from which it's operated. There are also many very classical words for that kind of a thing. And if I mention hegemony here and I realize that it's an old word, it's a burdened word, it's a weak word, there's no other word I can think of as better. Let's work on a better explanation. Thank you, Marty, Polina. You wanted to say something. Yeah, this is also in response to the question of whether permanent or ad hoc kind of tribunal would work better. And I think Marty actually answered this question, well at least to me, in saying that the problem with the ICTY was that the process itself exonerated the responsibility of the broader political structure. And it's actually this I think is the problem that the ICC is a permanent tribunal solves because part of the prosecutorial policy is to examine or to investigate and go after the full range of criminality. And for better or for worse, for show trial or not, you have seen the prosecutor do that in the DRC, both the Lendu and the Hema. Crimes have been represented through the cases. You've seen it in Kenya with the government and the opposition. And I think you will also see it with Côte d'Ivoire. Right now they only have Bagbo, but there's nothing legal or there's no jurisdictional hurdle or there's no jurisdictional problem with the prosecutor opening up a case against Watara's side, and similarly in Libya. So I think that's probably one of the answers as to why a permanent tribunal is actually better. OK, thank you, please. Do you want to say something? So I want to make a comparison between the Bobby case now and the Kenya case at the ICC, which I find interesting because that's precisely what's here on the table now. So in the Bobby case it was 39 prosecutors against one person with one defense counsel venturing in there, Jacques Weigess. So when it was a show trial, and so that's the fundamental question, what do you do in such a situation? And has Jacques Weigess really done his role as a defense counsel properly by exploiting those proceedings for his own political purposes and bringing the story of French colonialism in there, which brings us to the Kenya case. And my first intuition was that actually it's a very different scenario. There you have the ICC, a far more proper scenario, and Stephen Kaye comes in as the defense counsel and gives legitimacy to the proceedings while he's quite well-recognized. But at the ICC, if you think about it, you have an office of the prosecutor with 260 people working there, whereas you have an office of the defense with just six employees. So it's the same situation rather where this inequality actually exists. So it's an interesting point. Thank you very much, Robert. You can say it in 10 seconds. Right, but not all 260 people are working on the Kenya cases. I mean it's actually pretty comparable. Of course, but still. But still what? I mean it's only so many people work on any specific case. And I'll tell you it's 15 or so. I mean. OK, all right. If you'll put your hand up, you can say something in there. The Lady in Grave, you've been very patient. And then the gentleman at the back is next. And then... My name's Kirsten Sellers and I'm just in the process of completing a book about crimes against peace, which was the charge that died out after Nuremberg and Tokyo and has now had a strange revival at the International Criminal Court. And I think that charge kind of begs probably the most important question that did arise from Nuremberg, which is why is it in apparently optimal circumstances when the Allies were united on the question of the trial where there was no other countries for them to answer to, where there was no international organisation, for example the Security Council, where a looming presence over the ICC didn't meet until after Nuremberg had started. Why, given all of those circumstances, did the prosecuting powers have such enormous difficulty persuading us that Nuremberg law was valid law? And it does seem as if this is the perennial question in international criminal justice. There is always a drumbeat of dissent surrounding all of these trials, the ad hoc trial and the ICC, where some of the criticisms made at Nuremberg that it was retroactive, and in particular that its selective law still haunts these international organisations. So why are the prosecuting powers today still having the same problems that they had in the past? Thank you very much. The gentleman at the back and then the next question is over here, I think. Thank you very much. My question is to Professor... Could you just introduce yourself? Sorry. My name is Ahol, I am a PhD student from the University of Glasgow. My question is to Professor Marty. As a critical legal scholar, do you believe there is any transformative opportunity within the law that people who are dispossessed and excluded from the political process can use the moment of, for example, the political trial to somehow intervene and transform the system. Do you believe that there is any value in pursuing a strategy of rapture, for example? Burgess might have used that strategy. He used the space that the system gave him to sort of generate certain contradiction within the system, but did that really transform power relations, power structure in the French society or would that simply allow the system to actually reconstitute itself and deal with the system? Thank you. Thank you very much. Thank you. Hi. I work for Ames International, International Justice Team, and I'm also a tutor here at SOAS. So my question is for Stephen K. Well, I'd like to know what is your view on the power of the tribunals, like the tribunals for the former Yugoslavia, to assign councils, defence councils to the accused that actually want to represent themselves. For example, you acted as a, you were assigned as a defence council to Milošević, yet he wanted to represent himself. Because I find actually a bit hypocritical to criticise the trials before the tribunals, yet you seem to be part of this short trial machinery. Okay. It's a good question. Okay. Next question is laid at the back, but I'm going to just hold that thought. I will take one more. The laid at the back with the red scarf. I'll take her and then Nabila is the next question. Just here, in the front here. Just there. My name is Kanika. I'm from Birkbeck. My question is for the panel. When we're using the term short trials and political trials, how do you define them and do you see a distinction between the two? Thank you very much. Okay. We'll take those four questions. Thank you. Marty, do you want to go first, Islam? Okay. First was the question. Why is it so difficult for the prosecution still to maintain legitimacy and legitimacy? Why is it for the international criminal law system still so difficult to speak to the world with a convincing voice? It was that after the Gutenberg, it still seems to be. I think there's just one answer to that question. That law and criminal law in particular is a reflection of the society in which it exists. In domestic societies, we have a dense system of values, procedures, facilities to which we exceed more or less. We don't feel the fact that we get a parking ticket scandal. The prosecution acts within a very dense framework of shared values. Internationally, the distance between 1945 and today is almost non-existent. There are no shared values out there. There are no shared institutions and procedural systems. But there is an enormous gap between the way in which people are treated all over the world. There can be no single system that represents in a somehow unproblematic and legitimate way a world that's on fire. The second question was to a friend from Glasgow. Is there any transformative aspect to law as a critical scholar? Is the strategy of rapture still possible? Does it lead anywhere? One traditional way to respond to that question would be to say that law cannot have a transformative potential. By definition, law is the expression of the powers that be and solidifies their power in the very many ways through which it can. Ergo, only revolution can help. That's a very traditional way of looking at the world. The dichotomy between law and revolution, I think, is watered down by what we know. I think there are bits and pieces of resistance that can be used in law. You can take parts of law and use them strategically in situations that you are able to achieve a transformative social effect through those uses. But again, I cannot give you a general formula as to what are those situations. I suppose to have that strategic sensibility needs a political assessment of the situation and therefore cannot be generally given. But I still think the strategy of rapture, that always has a role to play. It's always possible. Even in the parking ticket case, you might say, well, I just don't pay it, dammit, because I don't accept this. And well, sometimes it's ridiculous, sometimes it's less ridiculous. The parking ticket situation is something that all of us every day face in one way or another. I think the world is more complicated than the old traditional left dichotomy between legality and revolution suggests. OK, great. Thank you, Stephen. A very interesting question and I still have this same debate. I've often wondered that as well. The fact is that we crossed the Rubicon each time and Nuremberg, we crossed it and then went forward. And then the Yugoslavia tribunal in 1993, we crossed another Rubicon by establishing it and then we had the judgement when the judges didn't vote themselves out of a job and it's only been going forward. The ICC, of course, is treaty-based and it's a club, so it's a very different concept. What always fascinated me was why they didn't go to the General Assembly with the first ad hoc tribunal and establish a general power of ad hoc-ism. But that wasn't in the interests of the Security Councils. I think you probably know that that wasn't going to happen. Taking the second question about intervention. There's a lot of intervention. There's a coalition of the International Criminal Court, all these NGO groups who send me stuff every week and loads of other people saying what they're doing and disseminating ideas. That has a great influence on a general level with what people do and think. Through that medium, they're based out of the ICC, they try and shape opinion within the ICC. I had a row with the International Crisis Group a couple of weeks ago because they wrote a report that they thought they were going to lose the Kenya case. They've given a report that your side put in as evidence. They thought they were going to lose it. So they wrote this sort of apology type newsletter. And then blaming me for manipulating the media. I'd never spoken to the media in the whole time I've done the case. Ocampo is on TV every bloody night. I wrote a stinking letter back and they had to change everything how they dealt with it. Too much intervention actually. Stay away. Go and demonstrate outside in the streets is my advice because just let the law go about its business. Self-representation issue. You probably don't know this. Originally I was an amicus curiae and he got his rights taken away because he was very sick. And the last words he said after the trial chamber took his rights away and appointed me as a sign counciller was Stephen appealed this and off he went round the back. So what do I do? Do I just tell him, you know, peel off I'm not going to do that? Or do I appeal and get his rights back because he wasn't recognising the court and never filed any pleadings. So in fact he told me to file pleadings, appeal my appointment, try and overturn it and get his rights back. So what happened was I appealed it, got his rights back for him and the court kept me as a sign councill and that suited him very well. I used to go in every morning and have a cup of coffee with him and a sandwich and discuss what we were going to do in court. In fact his last phone call before he died was to my office telling me what to do the next day. So what you see on the self representation issue actually wasn't the actuality, wasn't actually what happened. But what was interesting was he wanted to present a picture of fighting his case in a particular way and it served his purpose how they presented that case against him. But he actually engaged in the legal process. He didn't rupture anything and withdraw from anything. And I always wondered on the first day whether he'd not show up to trial on February 12, 2002 but he showed up and engaged and asked us to do all the law for him and also aspects across examination. Sometimes these issues are not actually hypocritical but there was a reason behind it and I visited the mortuary and saw the body with his son when he came to Gletin and he told me about various aspects of his father's views when he spoke to him every week. So what had been given Milosevic there was a massive opportunity to play out his side of the story and people then complained about it because he was only doing what the others were doing back to him. Thank you, Stephen. Can I take another round of questions then? I just want a brief comment on this because Stephen Kay promised me that I can crack the following joke tonight on the basis of Jacques Veigès wrote to Milosevic a couple of times expecting a response from Milosevic and the correspondence was discontinued internally in the court by Stephen. Okay, I'm going to take Nabila and then the gentleman here in the light shirt and then one other and then the guy at the back there in the middle and then that will have to do, I'm afraid, and then we'll wrap up. So Nabila, this guy and then in the middle at the back. Thank you. Nabila, please. I'm Nabila Ramdani, a freelance journalist. I'm actually surprised at the name of Saif el-Islam Qaddafi, a London University alumni, hasn't come up at all tonight. I'd be fascinated to hear the panel's views on what could clearly be described as a show trial in the making. I missed it. Saif el-Islam Qaddafi, you mentioned. I missed the name, sorry. Saif el-Islam Qaddafi. Yeah, yeah, great. Thank you. Hello. My name's Usman. I'm a former SAA student. It's a question for Professor Koskenyemi who talked about shared values and questioned whether they existed. I just wanted to ask him if he thought that the International Criminal Court, with its principle of complementarity, offered the opportunity to discover any shared values that we might have, imagining international criminal justice as perhaps it does as a process of dialogue and translation. I wonder if you could comment on that. Okay, thank you very much. And then the gentleman at the back there in the middle. The last question. Hi. Saif el-Islam Qaddafi from the University of Cambridge and PhD student and a lecturer at the University of Vienna. I actually have a question for both Stephen K. and Marty. And I feel slightly guilty about actually making something quite committed and personal, such as international criminal justice, quite abstract. But it's this notion of the strategy of rupture which I'm really interested in. And I want to address from two perspectives. One is the idea that, in fact, the fact that Stephen is a defence counsel in numerous tribunals and the idea of a participant as actually contributing to the strategy of rupture. Because it strikes me as that Taddech was the strategy of rupture. The jurisdictional phase was the challenge to the hierarchy. It was that sort of discourse. So what role do you perceive yourself as having in the larger strategy of rupture? And to Marty, my question is, in terms of the progressive potential of international law, it strikes me that the strategy of rupture is fairly central. And if it is, if we can conceive it of as fairly central, what gives any strategies of rupture traction? What legitimises certain strategies of rupture and delegitimises others? And I use the language of legitimation very cautiously, but I think perhaps more accurately the term is what provides certain strategies of rupture, traction and others not. And especially international criminal justice, thank you. Thank you very much. Think about, you know, they're saying this, but is that right? So I've never sort of built myself up into being a rupturist or a believer in the temple of rupture. I remember going to Arusha and you had lots of rupturists there. I think it comes out of France. There was a lot of French-Canadian lawyers, a lot of French guys. I was the only English-speaking defence council and everyone was not cooperating. They weren't going to go to Rwanda to investigate defences. And I'm thinking, why the bloody hell use is that, mate? You're not going to get your bloke off because they're going to pot him anyway, whether you go there or not. And I decided that wasn't for me. So I said I'm going into Rwanda and went and no one beat me up or did anything nasty to me, which they're probably regretting. But I went there and came back with a load of good defence evidence, complete alibi, OK, lost the case, but the judges were absolutely stank. And there we are. And then everyone else went after that because I'm not sure it's a modern trial theory. There's some very other eminent defence council in this room tonight. And I'm not really sure we do that these days. We tend to engage and take on the cases. You've got to go for a particular kind of guy for that kind of thing and then do your time afterwards, do your 40 years thinking about his structure of rupture. Structure of rupture. Structure of rupture. It doesn't scan quite so nicely. Polina, would you like to have a minute? I just want to expand on what exactly is probably likely to happen with Saif al-Islam Qaddafi. So following the Security Council resolution, the ICC does in fact have jurisdiction over Libya. And they collected evidence, issued an arrest warrant. But the arrest warrant concerns crimes only committed over a two week span about this time last year. And Saif is being held responsible for aerial bombardments of protesters. So Libya or the NTC or whoever is holding Saif, they want to keep him there. And the Minister of Justice of the NTC has come out and said that they intend to try him in Libya. And so the only legal mechanism through which that can happen is for Libya to challenge the admissibility of the case at the ICC and to kind of take the case back. And in order to do that, they need to prove that they're charging the same person for the same conduct in Libya. And a similar situation happened with Kenya last summer. And what the pre-trial chamber ruled was that you actually had to have quite concrete investigative actions that you couldn't just announce that you were going to investigate and then not do anything about it. You actually had to collect evidence, meet with witnesses, et cetera. And obviously the situation in Libya is quite unstable. So if they were to challenge the admissibility right now, it would probably be thrown out by the pre-trial chamber. And then they would probably ask Saif Qaddafi to be sent back to the Hague. So what they've actually done is, I think it's under Article 94, they've requested for a postponement of the execution of the arrest warrant. So essentially what they're doing is they're asking for more time. So until they can actually do those concrete investigative actions that will allow them to, you know, challenge the admissibility. But in effect, it's probably just, I mean, if they don't want to give them to the Hague, the court can't really do anything. The court doesn't have any real enforcement body or function in that matter. So I mean, the question remains as to whether it's just kind of both sides trying to save face and play by the rules, but the outcome is already kind of predetermined. Thank you. Billy Nett. Robert. Sure. Just three very short points on Libya. I find it very fair from the ICC that they actually have embarked on looking into the father Qaddafi to see whether that actually was a war crime. And it was actually Qaddafi's daughter who made that submission to the court. We are an Israeli defense lawyer. And she's a lawyer herself. She was on the defense team for Saddam Hussein. So I just want to say that it's actually quite a fair thing from the prosecutor to do, so looking at both sides. Secondly, for the rupture defence, I think Milosevic was the master of all rupture defences that existed so far. I mean, he literally subverted the court in such a skillful way that many lawyers who do embark on rupture defences can learn from this. And as a third point, I just want to thank you for coming and I'm very happy that we managed to pull this event out of the bag still in the past 30 hours, and that's all for me. Thank you, Robert. Nasi, would you like to wrap up? The rupture defence, Sahib. The rupture defence has traction in those situations where the prosecution system and the accused system collide completely, where there's no shared ground whatsoever, where the prosecution is so unjust, so wrong, so absolutely out of this world that there's nothing to be done with it. So at those points, international criminal lawyers are not good as defence counsel. Stephen Kay already admitted that he's the kind of guy who would not do this but would want to have his client acquitted. In a real show trial situation, there is no chance in hell you get your client acquitted. There are more important things at issue in trials of rupture. I don't think the Milosevic trial was a rupture trial in the least because they never got into attacking the prosecution system, the international criminal tribunal for former Yugoslavia. I think of Socrates and I ask whether Socrates would want to have Stephen Kay as his counsel and I think that the effect would somehow be lacking. Second, two questions in the air, the question from the person from SOAS about shared values and the usefulness of criminal tribunals in declaring shared values. That is a very common justification we hear because we cannot rely on the preventive mechanisms of international criminal law. We use these in order to declare shared values. Dammit, who was it in this world who didn't know that genocide was not a good thing to commit? That to put people in mass graves was not a nice thing to do. Who needs being convinced of such things? The problem in this world is not at all to agree on values. The problem is why don't we act with those values? The last question which nobody responded, I also forgot that was the question about what is a definition of a show trial or a political trial? I've been thinking about that a lot and two things I want to say. One is that a trial is not a show trial or a political trial because of any property in the trial itself. Every trial is a political trial in the specific sense that I suggested at the beginning. It affirms, reaffirms and strengthens a system of power of values and preferences. It also declares those. But that's uninteresting. I suggest that a political trial or a show trial is at issue at the moment when we feel in our guts that something is taking place that should not take place. It's not there, it's in us. OK, thank you very much. I'd like you to thank panellists, Paulina, Stephen, Marty and Robert and as we thank them all I'd just like once again to thank Robert for putting this panel together. Thank you very much. Remember you're not supposed to move until we've left. I think we'll be safe so please feel free to leave.