 I think we've just, I did not need any caffeine today after two very provocative conversations. I'm really quite pleased to introduce our closing keynote speaker, Anne-Marie Slaughter, who is the Director of Policy Planning at the U.S. State Department. Many of you know that Anne-Marie Slaughter is extremely busy. I think folks in this room are aware that she is shepherding what's known in town as the QDDR, the Quadrennial Diplomatic and Development Review, which was reflected, the experience that Senator Clinton had when she was on the hill and saw that we have the Quadrennial Defense Review and asked the question, why don't we have something similar for our diplomacy and development work. The QDDR is actually being submitted today at five o'clock, so we're extremely lucky to have Anne-Marie Slaughter. And CSIS is extremely grateful to her for taking time out of her very busy schedule to do this, so thank you very much. I just want to say a word about Dr. Slaughter. Dr. Slaughter is a former professor and former dean of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs and made the jump to Washington in 2009. Her role as Director of Policy Planning, which is the State Department's think tank, is, allows her to take a long-term view and think about the challenges here in the United States, both from a foreign policy and national security perspective. She's the first woman to hold one of the most important jobs in U.S. foreign policy. Many of you read her work in the New York Times, the Washington Post, and Talking Points memo, among others. I particularly like the title of her most recent book, which is the idea that is America, keeping faith with our values in a dangerous world. I'm going to, without further ado, hand over the podium to Dr. Anne-Marie Slaughter. Thank you. Dan wasn't exaggerating. It is exaggerating. It is going in at five o'clock, and if I stumble, just attribute it to very little sleep. But I'm happy to be here. I will look forward to talking to you, and then I will race back, and we're going to get it in. And I guess it sounds like I'm sorry I missed the last speaker. I should probably say the Q2DR will fix all those problems without any problem. And of course, the minutes it's released, it'll be implemented, and we shall have no more USAID state problems. Seriously, of course, it is unfortunately now the PowerPoint summary of it is now available on the Washington Post website. I can't talk about it, but it is actually trying to address a number of the problems that you all have been talking about here. So perhaps next year, or in the next conference, we can talk about how that works. I actually, I was very sorry, if I were an academic again, I would have come to this entire conference because I find the idea of expeditionary economics very interesting. It seems to me exactly where, how we need to be thinking. So in the Q2DR, we've been thinking a great deal about expeditionary capabilities in state building and conflict prevention and response. We have not included an economic dimension, and I remember when I first saw this title, it was a conference somewhere else, and I thought I would love to be able to include that. We couldn't, but there is a, I think, a nice dovetail. What I wanted to do is, I'm going to give you a much bigger frame. I want to sort of step back and talk about the national security strategy and then focus specifically on where I think that connects to some of the themes that you've been talking about. So let me just, I'm going to give you the, obviously the short version, the sort of four basic interests, and then the four elements of a strategy. And then what I really want to focus on are what I think is distinctive about this national security strategy and how it connects to the private sector, to public-private partnerships. So the interests are pretty straightforward. The first is security, that's not a surprise. The second is prosperity, prosperity including an open international economy, which is not always the case. The third and the fourth interests, I think, are more distinctive and worth noting. The third is respect for universal values, which is not always what people expect of this administration. Note respect for universal values, not promotion of and certainly not imposition of, and universal values rather than American values. There are obviously American values, are universal values, but very carefully crafted. And then the fourth, national interests. These are, you know, this is the administration defining America's four basic interests. It's definitely not one that you see in national security strategies often, and it is international order. So we start from the proposition that a rules-based international order is a national, is a fundamental national interest of the United States. So again, security and prosperity are pretty obvious, but respect for universal values and international order. So let me do the four elements of the strategy itself. And here, I have to stand back to say I think it's actually honest and smart of the administration not to try to have one strategy. I always say that anyone in my position, in my position as a foreign policy person, much less someone who's doing policy planning, we always, you know, we aim for containment. We aim for that one word that is going to be the Kenan equivalent for whatever era we're in. That's completely impossible in the environment we are in. I mean, if I list the top seven threats in no necessary order, but from proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear weapons, biological weapons, to terrorism and the spread of violent extremism, the arc of crisis from Israel, Palestine, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, instability or worse in the global economy, climate change, global pandemics, energy security and resource scarcity. Those all meet the test of possibly being able to kill up to millions of Americans. So they're all threats that we have to worry about. There is no possible way you could have one strategy that is going to respond to all of those threats. And of course, if we were to parse those specific threats we would see that there's still state to state threats, traditional geopolitics as we've always had, rising powers, shifting powers. But then we have all the threats from non-state actors as well and we have the threats from nature herself or at least man's interaction with nature. So there's no effort to have one strategy. Instead, there are four elements of a strategic approach. And the bumper sticker here is national, renewal and global leadership. And the first element is national renewal. It's rebuilding our domestic foundation, which really focuses not only on the economy but on our domestic infrastructure, physical, educational, health, rebuilding the foundation of our economy and our society. That's the first element of a national security strategy. Second is exactly what I have been spending the last 14 months on, which is building, starting with preserving our military advantage but then building the elements of civilian power. Building diplomacy, development, law enforcement, intelligence. I think you could go further. Indeed, I think one of the things we're seeing is the range of formerly domestic agencies that are now engaged in global civilian operations. But the second element of the national security strategy is to build the civilian dimension of our power that has been allowed to decline or atrophy in specific areas. The third element is the one I think everybody associates with the Obama administration, which is comprehensive engagement. And obviously, people think about engagement in terms of the president's efforts to engage Iran, to make clear that we are willing to talk to all of our adversaries and engagement in that context. But this is actually a broader concept of engagement. And it starts from the idea that we engage most intensively with our allies and partners. Then it moves to emerging regional centers of influence. That was a very carefully crafted phrase. That's not rising powers. It's not even emerging powers. It obviously addresses China and India and Russia and Brazil, even what you could say returning powers just as well. But it also, and I think this is important, addresses Indonesia, Turkey, Mexico, South Africa, a number of middle powers that are very important in their regions. So the second ring of engagement is intensifying our relationships with those powers. And if I look at what Secretary Clinton has done over the past almost two years, a huge amount of our time has been spent working on strategic dialogues with many of these countries and intensifying and deepening our relations. Then there is a discussion of engaging, developing countries through really prioritizing development, and then a talk about we also are willing to engage with our adversaries. But the last part of comprehensive engagement is comprehensive engagement beyond the state. It is comprehensive engagement with non-state actors, the civic sector, the corporate sector, exactly the kinds of partnerships you've been talking about. And that is built in to the very idea of comprehensive engagement. So if you think about the first two elements of the strategy, first domestic foundation and then our capabilities to engage the world and then comprehensive engagement, the fourth element is building a just and sustainable international order based on rights and responsibilities. So, you know, nations that honor their sovereign obligations, entitled Full Rights, we welcome them to flourish, nations that don't face responsibilities. This is, it's not surprising, if our national interest is international order, it's hardly surprising that our strategy would be to build a just and sustainable international order. But I think it is, it's been characteristic of the president since his first speech at the UN General Assembly that he essentially has the same message for the world as he did for the American people in his inaugural address, which is effectively, you know, with power comes responsibility. You have to take responsibility for your actions, otherwise you suffer the consequences. I will just say as an aside, I am the mother of a 14 year old and a 12 year old and I spend most of my weekends telling them to take responsibility for their actions and every time I hear the president, I think he had a very good mother. So, building a just and sustainable international order. So that's the 10 minute version of the national security strategy. What I want to spend more time on is what's really distinctive about this national security strategy and you know, many of us read them when they come out. And I think there are again four things. And the first for me is this domestic focus. I think it's right. You know, it's when you have the chairman of the joint chief saying that the deficit is our greatest national security threat, it's not a particular surprise. If we look at our position in the world, absolutely we have to rebuild our economic credibility. We have to rebuild our physical infrastructure. You know, when the fast train from Shanghai to Nanjing is infinitely better than Amtrak, we've got a ways to go. And that's not even talking about some of the trains in further reaches of China. And then obviously the basic intellectual and social capital of health and education. And so that to me is distinctive. It's important. It tells you that for the president passing health care is as important as the START treaty in terms of our national security. And that's an interesting way to think about it. The second unusual dimension is this emphasis on international order. I'm an international lawyer. I've written about global governance. I have often argued for the values of rule-based international order. So you could say, well, this is the kind of Wilsonian dimension of the Obama administration. This is respect for universal values. We subscribe to the rule of law at home. We subscribe abroad. The sort of standard Wilsonian and Rooseveltian argument for why we want a just and sustainable international order. But particularly because this is CSIS, the first place I saw the phrase American grand strategy is building a just and sustainable international order. And I saw it exactly in that way. Grand strategy order building. First place I saw that was in the draft of the QDR, the Quadrennial Defense Review. That is not coming from the sort of standard arguments about the value of international institutions. It's coming from the military. It is coming. They actually converge. I don't mean to say it's only coming from the military. But it's the basic proposition that when you're in a world of rising powers, you want to make sure that the rules are clear and enforceable. And you want to adapt that order to make it as representative as possible. So move from the G8 to the G20. The President's now declared his support for a reformed security council, reforming the IMF and the World Bank. But more specifically in the South China Sea, a discussion of a rules-based process for resolving border disputes, maritime disputes peacefully. So it is, I think, worth emphasizing that whether you are thinking from a values-based perspective or a power-based perspective, you actually come out in the same place here. Okay, the third thing that is distinctive, and here we will come closer to what you all have been talking about, is that if you search the phrase public-private partnerships in the national security strategy, it appears over 30 times. That is definitely a first. I'd have to go back to see if it's ever mentioned, but 32 times there is a huge emphasis in every part of our foreign policy on essentially connecting what we do as a government to the private sector, to the civic sector, to all of American society. This has been an important dimension of the President's policy in the White House. It's been an enormous part of what Secretary Clinton has been focusing on. And the way I think about it is to juxtapose what happens in New York in late September. So we have on the one hand the UN General Assembly, which is kind of the epitome of classic diplomacy. Every head of state in the world shows up and as Lady Ashton, the new high representative for European foreign and security policy, described it, she said, UNGA is speed-dating for diplomats. So it is. They're all doing bilaterals over and over. So that's happening on one side, on the east side of New York. On Seventh Avenue, the Clinton Global Initiative is taking place. And they're talking about many of the same things. They're talking about development problems. They're talking about the environment. They're talking about global health. They're talking about energy. But it's a very different cast of characters. Every panel has one or two CEOs, a head, a government official, sometimes two, a head of a major NGO, and often a thinker or two, somebody from this think tank from a university. That's, or and people from foundations. That's the coalition. That's the kind of public-private partnership that the President and the Secretary are talking about. And fundamentally, if you focus on the problems that I was talking about at the outset, not all of them, because something like proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, not so much, but most of them, health, climate, economic stability, development broadly, have to be done on the ground within states. And to do that, you have to get beyond traditional diplomacy and traditional development. You have to harness the entire society, or as much of the society as you can, both on this side, but also making connections to the society that we are engaging. So that is a distinctive feature of this administration's approach to foreign policy. I think it's in many ways also the way the President was elected in terms of mobilizing lots of different kinds of actors. I wanted to say a few things about how we're making that commitment more concrete. And there are two particular areas that my office has been engaged in at the State Department. One is called Partners for a New Beginning. And it is a follow-up to the Cairo speech. It is a structure that we created, and it took us forever to get it through the legal department, where it's a partnership between the State Department, the Aspen Institute, and a board of about 15 top CEOs, heads of foundations, heads of universities, and NGOs. The chair is Madeleine Albright, the co-chairs are Walter Isaacson and Mutar Kent, the CEO of Koch. That's an unusual configuration, at least for the State Department, to be working with a foundation that is the secretariat, and then to have a group of people rather than one entity. Generally, a public-private partnership is you have one project and you're partnering with one business or foundation to get the job done. The model is to have the board of the Partners for a New Beginning parallel invest or co-invest with the government on Cairo follow-up, and Cairo follow-up includes science, education, and entrepreneurship is one of the major categories that the President talked about in terms of reaching out in the Muslim world to encourage entrepreneurship. So what we're saying to this group of people is we're running programs. We are taking our own funds and running programs in different countries. If you are Coca-Cola and you have an environmental program, a entrepreneurship program, we would like you to parallel invest with us so we leverage what we're doing or co-invest if you actually, if we're close enough, then you invest and we invest in a more traditional public-private partnership. And beyond that, this group, this board, is now standing up local chapters of the same composition, business leaders, civic sector leaders, educational leaders in multiple countries. I focus on this because it really, we talk about it as a public-private partnership, but it's actually much closer to a web of collaboration or a network of collaboration much more broadly where you take a number of actors who are working in the same space and you create a broad network and then you make the connections between the individuals within them. So that's the partners for a new beginning. We rolled it out at the Clinton Global Initiative in September. We have about 15 or 16 projects going, but we're also tweaking the model as we go. And the second program that my office has been engaged in is the Global Entrepreneurship Program. And here there's an overlap because a lot of the work that is being done in the Global Entrepreneurship Program are precisely the kinds of investments that we are asking our partners to co-invest or parallel invest with us. But this program is being run by Steve Koltai who is a venture capitalist from the West Coast and has had a certain amount of adjusting to do to the State Department culture, I think it's fair to say. But he has really been remarkable in terms of working on the ground, identifying how we can foster entrepreneurship primarily in Muslim majority countries, but not exclusively. And that program is embedded in the Bureau for Economics, Agriculture and Energy. And so effectively what he's doing is tying his entrepreneurship programs to other things that the State Department is doing and reaching out to missions to identify promising entrepreneurs in the countries where we work. So those are two examples not only of where we're trying to foster entrepreneurship in the countries we're in, but where we're trying to pioneer a different model of doing business. And one of the things that QDDR will conclude is that we need to make this much easier for people in state and we need to find ways to change the culture so that people in state are more comfortable reaching out to the private sector or to the civic sector. They often don't have the contacts. They don't know the culture. They're really just two different worlds. Last thing to return to the National Security Strategy. This is the only National Security Strategy I have ever seen that is not organized in terms of regions. It is normally you talk about our policy to Latin America, our policy toward Europe, our policy toward Africa. This National Security Strategy is organized in terms of circles of engagement as we went through our allies and our partners, emerging regional centers of influence, developing countries generally, our adversaries, and in not exactly order, the private and public sector, meaning they're not behind our adversaries but thinking about how you reach out. I think that's very, that's important in terms of the way our mindset is shifting that we are thinking about the density of connections instead of, you know, here's the United States and here are all these different regions. We're thinking about ourselves in the center of global networks and global relationships and we're talking about how we deepen them and strengthen the ones we need. And one of those relationships is reaching out beyond the state. So just to resume, I won't go through the interests and the elements of the strategy, but the things that are distinctive are the domestic focus, are the focus on international order, so we want to strengthen ourselves at home and we want to make sure we've got a rules-based set of institutions and practices to act within abroad. And then to the tremendous emphasis on reaching beyond the state to forge public-private partnerships and a way of engaging the world that is far more like a CEO would think in terms of being at the center of supply networks and customer networks in the way I think many of the most forward-leaning CEOs are thinking than a classic geopolitical view. And with that, I will stop. Thank you. Thank you. I didn't realize I talked that much.