 Hello and welcome to this virtual event to mark the launch of the 2022 Low Institute Pacific Aid Map. My name is Roland Rader and I am the lead economist here at the Low Institute and the host for today's session. Before we begin, let me start by acknowledging the traditional owners of the land in which we meet and pay my respects to our elders, both past and present. The Pacific Aid Map is a flagship research project for the Low Institute, led by my fantastic colleague, Alex Dianth, who is a research fellow at the Low Institute and the lead researcher for the Pacific Aid Map. For today's session, Alex will be presenting very shortly on his key findings for the 2022 edition of the map. We will then have a panel discussion where Alex will be joined by two other expert guests whom I will introduce later on. The theme for our discussion today is managing regional crisis, competition and recovery. In particular, the 2022 edition of the map represents the first comprehensive picture of how aid and other development finance flows to the Pacific have been have responded and been reshaped by the COVID-19 pandemic. And I can say that the results are both fascinating and important for anyone interested in aid and development in the Pacific region. So without further delay, let me turn things over to Alex Dianth, who will present the key findings from the 2022 Low Institute Pacific Aid Map. Yes, thanks Roland. Well, yes, so this is, as Roland mentioned, this is the fifth edition of the Low Institute Pacific Aid Map. And for those who are watching at home and who are not familiar with the aid map, this is the most comprehensive database on aid and development flows to the Pacific ever assembled. And so in this year's edition, we're covering aid flows from 2008 to today. And we're actually covering, you know, more than 57,000 different projects and activities that have been implemented by a range of donors. We have 67 different donors repatriated in the aid map. And so we're looking at traditional donors like Australia and New Zealand. We're also looking at multilateral development organization like the ADB, the Asian Development Bank, the World Bank. But we're also looking at what we call non-traditional donors. So those could be China, Taiwan and so forth. And this year we're particularly excited about this year at this edition of the map because for the first time, as Roland mentioned, we really can analyze how, you know, the international community and development partners have supported the Pacific when the region was facing the dire consequences of COVID-19. But also in this year's edition, we see how the pandemic has actually required development partners to reconfigurate their aid in order to support the region. So let's jump straight into it. The first thing to notice in this year's edition of the map is that 2020 is the largest year on record when it comes to development financing in the Pacific. So development financing is aid, so grants, loans and other financial assistance. And with more than $4 billion disbursed in the Pacific in 2020, aid and development financing has increased by 47% from its 2019 level. And it has actually more than doubled since 2008, which is the time where we started the Pacific Aid Map exercise. And so, you know, this is a massive jump, but it is also justified. The Pacific was hit hard by the pandemic. As you can remember, early in the crisis, the Pacific Nations used their isolation at their advantage to shelf themselves from the pandemic. But because this nation is really heavily reliant on external sources of income, like trade and tourism, this came at a tremendous economic, some Pacific nations faced an economic contraction of two digit numbers, economic contraction. And actually the region as a whole has experienced, contracted by 6% according to the AMS. And so as a result, and what you can see in this graph is that the international community reacted by providing a lot of support to the region. What's interesting to actually see in this edition of the map is the large increase, that this largest increase was primarily driven by the massive increase in loans to the Pacific. So in 2008, loans represented around 18% of financing flows to the Pacific. In 2020, they represent almost half of the financing to the region. And so it looks like the pandemic has actually increased this trend that we've seen over the past decade. So when we look at where does the money go, well, it wouldn't come to this. It's not a surprise to see that actually most of the financing flows were going to Melanesan countries. And this is, you know, in some ways justified. I mean Papua New Guinea and Fiji together represents 84% of the region's GDP and around 85% of the population. But what I found surprising when I started to collect all the information is to see like how important the financing flows directed to the compact state. You know, Micronesia and so the federal state of Micronesia and the Marshall Islands were those flows were important. They didn't really translate the fact that the United States has been very active when border closure happens to use basically the United States. You use the compact agreement trust funds to basically transfer enormous sums of money to allow these countries to, you know, keep on with their liquidity. But actually one of the most interesting findings is also that we realized that most of the financing was targeted to most of the increase in financing was targeted to countries that received that way highly dependent on on tourism. So, you know, you could see that Fiji and Palo, for instance, have almost triple the aid, the aid, sorry, to those countries to Fiji and Palo was almost tripled in 2020. But it was also like another, you know, countries that relied heavily on on tourism, but then we entered the crisis in a very, in a very healthy, you know, economic situation. The government has generated over the years, many budget surpluses mostly generated by the sale of their golden passports, notably. There are three countries that actually experience a decrease in the aid in 2020. So those were the Cook Islands, Solomon Islands and Nauru. So what's interesting is that the Cook Islands actually graduated from ODA in 2019. And so it meant that you couldn't receive as much aid in 2020. So that was like bad timing for them. Then you had the Solomon Islands and Nauru. Both of them received large trenches of large financing trenches of projects in 2019, which has created this kind of slump in from 2019 to 2020. But this doesn't mean that actually they haven't received any COVID support on the contrary, they did receive quite a lot. But the amount that they received in 2019 was much more important. So overall, what we see is that, you know, there was actually a dramatic increase in development assistance to the Pacific in the times of COVID-19. And what we've realized is actually that, you know, when we analyze the data from the Pacific, it might be that most of the development increase in 2020 was actually coming from what we called what we have identified as COVID-19, direct COVID-19 related projects. In fact, actually, non-COVID-19 related projects have decreased from 2019 to 2020. And this is an interesting fact, this is an interesting fact, because, you know, during COVID-19, during the pandemic, development partners faced project implementation limitation caused by as a border closure or health restriction measures. And so there was, you know, in the fact of in the, you know, when when those development partners faced this crisis, they had to, you know, they had to reprioritize funding. And so some existing projects, some existing project became lower priorities. And so as a result, you know, like most development partners actually in the in the Pacific, in the Pacific, as I have experienced a reduction in the aid delivery in in 2020. So the good thing in this, in this year's Pacific aid map is that actually we have preliminary preliminary data for 2021. And so what it shows, what this preliminary data shows is that actually, you know, most development partners shifted the aid in response to COVID-19, but with variable speed. So the agent development bank, for instance, almost tripled its financing, its financing budget in the Pacific in 2020, in comparison to 2019 levels. And as a result, and actually this is the first time this happens in the Pacific aid map history is that Australia, the ADB, the agent development has become the first development partners to the Pacific in terms of USD, USD disbursed to the Pacific, and Australia for the first time is second when like in previous years Australia was like the main development partners of the Pacific. Australia and the World Bank, well, they have the way they were slower to respond in 2020, but when they reacted and when they responded, they have actually responded very forcefully. So what you see is that, you know, in 2020, the Australia provided this 144 Australian dollars loans to Papua New Guinea. In 2021, it provided another another loan this time of 650 million dollars of direct direct budget support to PNG again. And this actually has become the largest transaction ever recorded in the Pacific aid map. So this, you know, this, this loan, this, this increase is very significant and actually the loan has become the largest loan, sorry, financing to the Pacific has become like this very important means to finance the economic recovery in the Pacific. What you can also see in this graph is that actually, you know, I mentioned before that many of the development partners have experienced a reduction in the aid delivery in 2020. The peak in 2020 that you see from the 48 other development partners is actually mostly driven by additional loans provided by either Japan or more grand financing provided by the United States to their compact to the compact of free association states in the North Pacific. And then what's interesting is to see that actually China, Chinese aid has reduced over the years. And that was surprising to us because, you know, China has has become like the second, the second largest development partners of the Pacific over the years, and seeing that China was unreactive to us was surprising. So let's talk more about China. You know, China's aggregate financing to the Pacific has continued to decline since it's peaked, since it peaked in, in 2016, and, and in fact actually in 2020 in 2020 China had reached China's development program to the Pacific had reached $187 million, which is the slowest level recorded so far in the Pacific aid map since 2008. And actually of those of those 187 million only 5% were directly allocated to COVID-19 related support. And so you know for us like we did expect actually China to do way more than this in the Pacific at the time at the time of the pandemic. And so preliminary findings actually show that this trends is has been, you know, going on has continued actually in 2021. So why, why did this happen? Well, look, I mean, there is actually, there's a supply and demand issue. So on the supply and the supply side, what's important to mention is that, you know, China is actually facing an economic slowdown. My colleague Roland Roger brought an economic paper on this. And this means that actually this economic slowdown means that actually there is less budgets allocated to development. And so this is why like globally you see for instance like a decrease of Belt and Road Initiative project, Belt and Road Initiative projects. And this is something that you could also see in the in the Pacific. So this is on the demand on the supply on the supply side on the demand side, there are three components that can explain the reduction in Chinese aid project in the Pacific. The first one is that, you know, the, the, the, the financing that China provides in the Pacific is usually directed towards infrastructure project, but also finance through Exim Bank loans. And it's actually pretty expensive when you compare the terms of those loan like expensive when you're comparing them to, to other development partners. And so, you know, like in the time of, of reduced government revenues of after two years of pandemic, the, the, the budgets in the Pacific have actually reduced fiscal space have reduced and so Pacific nation can't really afford those type, those type of projects. And there's also the fact that, you know, like Pacific nations have actually woken up to the quality, the quality of Chinese aid projects and the quality of Chinese loans. I mean, you know, you've heard over the years that China was implementing, you know, what's building road to know as building whites what building elephants, not white elephants. What elephants, what elephants in the Pacific. And also, like, you know, in the Pacific days, like the story of the Tonga, the Chinese debts held by Tonga that actually raises a lamb bells and so basically there is a smaller and smaller appetite for, for Chinese aid project in the Pacific. And the third aspect in the supply side of why China is Chinese aid projects are going down in the Pacific is mostly due to the fact that you know it becomes harder and harder to build infrastructure project in the Pacific and the competition is becoming stronger like in 2008. China had to compete with the ADB and Japan for building new infrastructure project in 2020 2021 now like there are many other development partners involved Australia is actually is actually involved in infrastructure financing we'll talk about this in a minute. But yeah, so it does become way more difficult for for China to to you know, implement projects in the Pacific. But this by no means means that China is actually off the region and that China is living the region on the contrary. When you know what we've seen is that China had remained a key diplomat key diplomatic tool for Beijing in the Pacific actually new development financing has become more closely targeted to to specific countries that have been care bus and the Solomon Islands. The two most recent new Pacific Island countries diplomatic allies of China. And in both of those countries actually China is not only taking, you know, taking on the project so taking on like the sons that Taiwan was financing in the Pacific but actually they are like doing more for you since you see like in the Solomon Islands. They're not only you know they're they're continuing to contribute to a local development initiative but like they are contributing to even more projects in in in the Pacific in in those in those nations. So, another interesting finding in this year's edition of the Pacific aid map is the need is that you know the need for immediate crisis response in the Pacific so actually an increase a dramatic increase in direct budget support to the Pacific. Over the years many successful Australian and foreign government have actually tried to steer clear from direct budget support. And this is for a few reasons like the first one is a fiduciary risk you know like I mean it's like there was a risk that the public resources were not used in for the intended purposes or you know them. They were they were worried that the finances wouldn't be properly accounted for. And there was also like a question of the risk of development effectiveness you know like with respect to absorption capacity the quality of the project and so forth. But you know in the time of border of border closure and travel restriction direct budget support has become the fastest mechanism to support the economies of the Pacific. Actually almost 40% of development finances provided to the Pacific in 2020 was in the forms of direct budget support. And the first thing is actually 90% of those direct budget support were provided under the form of loans, and most of those were actually directed towards Fiji and Papua New Guinea. So you know, the day is clearly like a significant increase in budget support and it's likely that it will continue for some time given the week economic outlook. But also the week, you know, outlook of the recovery and the budget repairs in the region. And I guess this actually raises the question of that sustainability in the Pacific. The situation in the Pacific has worsened during during the pandemic Pacific nation draw on you know on domestic reserves and limited government revenues. They basically keep the economies afloat, but this has dramatically dramatically reduced the available fiscal space. And so as a result, as you can see in the left graph. Most countries so an increase in their growth public debt relative to GDP. Some countries, you know, have actually managed to reduce the debt to GDP. This is the case of, for instance, narrow that's half its public debt by implementing its debt action plan to repay its past obligation. But for other countries and most importantly for Fiji, for instance, the crisis has hit really hard. The country and so as a result, it experienced a dramatic increase in its debt level, moving from 47% in 2019 to 87% in 2021. And this is why you know, as you can see on the graph on the left, the overall IMF debt risk rating in the Pacific has really, really shifted towards towards the red of the past few years. Similarly, seven out of 12 Pacific Island countries are classified at high risk of the distress to moderates, while only three are considered as being in a sustainable situation. So this issue of course is the issue of course is that the Pacific, you know, we'll continue to to real to to need liquidity. And so loan financing seems to be well anchored in the Pacific so far to be one of the mechanism that that will secure this this liquidity. And so this leads me to actually my last slides, which shows that, you know, Australia is supposed to become an increasingly prominent lender to the Pacific at a time when debt sustainability in the region is already because. According to the BBD, the Pacific region is estimated to, to need around 3.1 billion US dollars per year in investment in infrastructure investment by 2030. And that's interesting because to according to the Pacific heat map so far in average infrastructure commitments to the Pacific from the whole international community oscillates around one billion US dollars per year. And on its side, you know, Australia's commitments to infrastructure projects represent around 10% of its eight program has represented around 10% of its eight program over the past 10 years. And so this is this represent around 100 million dollars per year of commitments. But you know in 20 in 2018 the government, you know, the Austrian government announced the Pacific step up and one of the element of this specific step up was a creation of the Australian infrastructure financing facility for the Pacific, the eighth. And so the F was implemented in 2019. And with the goal of you know like providing a mix of grants and loans to the Pacific to support sustainable infrastructure in the Pacific. And according to you know like our, our calculation the FFP has so far committed around 600 million dollars in infrastructure project in the Pacific. And this implies actually a 60% 60% increase of infrastructure spending in the region and more is actually to be expected, you know the, the, the loaning, the landing headroom of the FFP now is around what 3 billion US dollars 3 billion Australian Australian dollars. So you know like, it is clear that if you know if Australia and other development partners want to do more like especially I mean Australia with the Australian infrastructure financing facility for the Pacific well considerable considerable care will be required in implementing new loans to avoid contributing to future debt problem in the Pacific. But anyway, so this is the end of my presentation. Here I put the link of the Pacific a map for you to have a look. If there are three things, three key things I want you to go home with after this presentation, those are like the following the first one is that you know the COVID-19 pandemic has cemented the role of traditional development partners to the Pacific, especially military development banks that have been very agile and very quick in responding to the to the current crisis, but this doesn't mean by no means that China is actually leaving the region. And also, you know, like the COVID-19 pandemic has also to both charge the use of direct budget support to the Pacific. Now, like the dead situation has also worsened in the region and so any development that will that wants to that will want to use constitutional lending in the Pacific will have to do this with care, not to aggravate the situation. Okay, well, thank you Alex for that that excellent presentation and lots of lots of fascinating insights which hopefully we will get to as part of this panel discussion but there's a lot of, there's a lot of material for I think people out there and very the public and analysts to really chew through. So you know that is of course the beauty of the aid map is that you know you and we can take away our key findings but actually there's an entire resource out there for people out in the world to draw upon. So now we move to the panel discussion component of today's event, and I'm pleased to introduce two very excellent additional guests to join us. The first is Henry Cocker who is a sustainable development advisor at the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, and Henry has a wealth of experience working across the region in various senior policy roles and he is joining us virtually today from Suva. So, welcome, Henry. And second is my other excellent colleague Dr Meg Keen who has recently joined the low Institute as the new director of our civic islands program and was previously the inaugural director of the Australia Pacific Security College at the Australian National University. So welcome to you Meg. Well, so Henry, we might start with you first just to offer a bit of a perspective from the region. So, you know we've seen from Alex how aid and development finance and development partners have really sought to step up during the COVID-19 pandemic and all the shocks that we've seen since that time. Someone operating out of the region. I mean, how do you see the role that aid and development partners have played through what has obviously been a very difficult time for the Pacific. You know, have there been particular things that you think have worked very well. Things maybe have not worked so well. What's your perspective. I'm not rolling. Thank you so much for having me here. And thank you so much to the to Alex and his presentation before that. But it's very interesting and still learning a lot. I wanted to touch on that question by saying that by starting off by saying that here in the Pacific way, we have ongoing crisis. It's not only the climate change or COVID-19 but we have disasters that hit us every year. So we are always in the state of of crisis in the Pacific. So in terms of touching again on the question. We are referring to the COVID-19 crisis. By the end of the Pacific, it's still unfolding. We had the virus, we had the vaccination, we had the border lockdowns, we had the social hardships, and Alex in his presentation touched on the debt and economic issues that are now at our doorsteps now. These are these are part and parcel of the ways that we are now experiencing here in the Pacific. This is on top of the climate change and ongoing disasters and natural disasters that we have on an annual basis. The strengths that I see with the aid and development partners, it is good. Some of the strengths that I see is the greater focus, greater attention in terms of the issues and vulnerabilities we are grappling with here in the Pacific. We see strengthened relationships with partners and relationships with new partners. These are all part and parcel of things that we are enjoying and fully appreciating in terms of going forward. At the same time, by Alex touched on his presentation on this, we see that with the new attention, renewed attention in the Pacific, there is now greater use of our budget process, through budget supports that translates to a greater understanding of our weaknesses and our vulnerabilities within our systems, our institutions, and how we can work together to further improve our capacity and strengthen our institutions and processes. So that's a key strength I see already just based on the discussion we got so far. The weaknesses, I guess, there's always going to be pros and cons and there's always going to be a working progress in a number of issues. The weaknesses I see is that there's still room for better coordination, better communication, and for better collaboration to help us through the issues and crisis that we endure on a daily basis. Thank you, Henry. A lot of important points that you raised there. Of course, issues like donor coordination are becoming more difficult at a certain level as well. On the one hand, many partners are trying to coordinate, particularly the traditional development partners. On the other hand, China has now become a large development partner, although that is there's a bit of flux there as Alex has highlighted. So I want to turn to you, Meg, just around, as you know, and many know that aid and development finance in the Pacific has been heavily affected by geopolitics affecting the region as well. We saw from Alex's presentation, China's shrinking overall aggregate financing to the region, but that was also becoming more targeted in certain countries. And then we see the traditional development partners trying to respond to all this. How do you see this picture in terms of how is it affecting development assistance to the region? What does it all mean? Well, it's a dynamic process. And I think that's also when we look at these trends. I mean, you can have dips, but they can be reversed very quickly. And we've seen that with the response to COVID. So we have a dynamic situation. I think there's also a difference between China's engagement and some of the traditional donors. It doesn't see itself as a donor. It sees itself as a South South development partner. So it has a different mode of engagement. And in the face of COVID, it was less flexible, less able to respond. I think what we're also seeing with that dip is its reflection of return and risk for China. It is investing. It's a lender. It had to suspend some of the repayments on its aid. So the return was less. And so it needed to adjust accordingly. So I think we have to keep in mind that we have different modes of investment in the region, different modes of engagement. And they're going to respond different to a crisis. Alex highlighted that mentioned the surge we're seeing is in response to COVID. And yet we didn't see China responding to COVID. So I think that's important. It is more competition, and that gives more choice to the Pacific. So I think it is also important that this is not just a donor story. This is a story about Pacific Island country agency and choice and making rational choices in the face of the options in one of them. So recently in PNG, and it mentioned the fact that it hadn't taken loans for China for the last three years, there were simply more concessional loans and grants available, and it made that choice to go that route. We also saw when the new Prime Minister of Samoa took office, she looked at the potential for debt distress. She looked at the budget and made a decision that at this time, the loan that was on offer by China for the port upgrade was not a sensible thing to pursue. Perhaps in the future, not now. So we're seeing competition, we're seeing different assessments of risk and return, different modes of operation, but very importantly, the Pacific Island countries making choices about what will serve their development interests best, and they have more choices because there's competition. Very important points, Meg. We also still at the same time see the Incubus and in Solomon Islands that actually, as Alex showed in those charts, China's presence is ramping up and it's actually quite significant. I wonder, Alex, can you tell us what's underneath that exactly? What is China doing in Incubus and Solomon Islands, and how has that played out in terms of Taiwan as a traditional partner and now China is coming in? Yeah, I think this is a good point. I think when the diplomatic switch happened in 2019, a lot of people were wondering how much did it cost China to actually convince these countries to make this switch. And I guess what China was trying to do was to look at what Taiwan had done over the past few years, over the previous years in Cuba and in Solomon Islands and try to basically replace them in some ways. And so what you see in the Solomon Islands is that actually China is contributing very much like what Taiwan used to do in the past. It's contributing to what you call the constituency development fund, basically by providing direct funding to the government, and then the government can use the funds for their own constituency for development projects. And it's interesting actually because I remember that I read somewhere that China was criticizing Taiwan for doing this because they said that it would faster corruption in the souls, the Solomon Islands, and it seems that they're using the same mechanism. In terms of amounts, I think if I remember well, Taiwan was contributing to around 8 to 9 million dollars per year, China contributes to around 11 million. So, I mean, so far in the Solomon Islands as well, I think what China does, and that's actually very interesting in that they're contributing to helping the country prepare for what for the 2023 Pacific Games. So, you know, they engage in those big infrastructure projects. And I think this is why, you know, like the amount of Chinese aid in Solomon Islands is actually growing quite a lot. In Kiribati, it's a different story. What we found so far is that Kiribati has had, you know, had received support from Taiwan for agriculture projects for some renewable energy projects. And so far we haven't actually seen China doing this. What we've seen is that China is helping for some, you know, some recovery grants, but they're very, very tiny, and those recovery grants are linked to the pandemic. But also most interestingly that there seem to be financing one of the two plans that would help, you know, Kiribati in developing its tourism industry. And, you know, I've heard in the past that, you know, the government, the government of Kiribati had asked Taiwan to finance these plans. But the Taiwanese aid program couldn't actually, you know, finance this kind of projects because it wasn't like actually a development project. It was more like, you know, giving money for transport for like a new plane. And yeah, the way the Taiwanese aid program was structured didn't allow this apparently the way that China's aid program is structured can help for this. Yeah, but I mean that's very interesting in terms of the specifics. I mean, Australia is still doing a lot more at the end of the day. I don't have the numbers at hand in my mind, but Australia is doing a lot more, for example, to the extent that this is partly a competition for influence. You know, that's the way things have gone to some extent, unfortunately, but Australia is still doing more at the end of the day. Yeah, well, different things. Exactly. So that's the, that's actually a very interesting point is that Australia has remained the main development partners in the Solomon Islands. But the thing is that we don't spend, we don't use our money for flashy projects like this. We know for like big, big stadium or big roads or whatever we did the way the Australian aid program is structured in in the Solomon Islands is mostly to focus on governance project on health project. So we're trying to make the government the administration and the government of the system should more. And it's a resilience. We have, I think Australia has a program called employment and economic reforms, which is really to, yeah, to strengthen the administration over there. And in Curebus, it's very much focused on health. And yes, again, you know, like Australia used to be was or is the main development partners. So what's interesting is also to see like how quickly China is picking up, you know, like when we're comparing numbers. Yes, Australia sits at the top and it's actually the same story when you look at the Pacific global, the Pacific as a region as a whole. You know, Australia is contributes every year to around 40 to 44% of the total development assistance to the Pacific, except in 2020, when the ADB actually as I showed in my presentation triple and became the first development partners, but in any of any of the years, you know, Australia is by far the first development partners by by providing so around 40% of the eight China of the years as stabilized at around 8% in 2020 decreased a little bit by five to 5% and so I think this is the same story that you see here in in in Curebus and the Solomon Islands, you know, Australia is really far beyond all the other development partners. And if it continues like the way it has continue on the reason that it has taken since 2019, then you know like it will quickly catch up. Henry, I know it's always a difficult issue but I want to bring you in on just the geopolitics of aid and development finance and assistance in the Pacific. What's the view in your own sort of view and the view from the region, in terms of how is this affecting development assistance, because it's clearly complicating things in a significant way there's there's more money flowing in in some in some senses but there's also different tensions perhaps with development effectiveness as well. Thank you so much, Roland that question. If you correct geopolitics is a bit sensitive for me, given that I'm a regional civil servant, and our members are sovereign nations with their own foreign policies, and some of our members are donors and some of our members are receivers of these assistance. Perhaps, I can probably say that from a development lens, I can see that the benefits of geopolitics at the moment is that it's highlighting as I touched on earlier. It's highlighting our ongoing issues and vulnerabilities. I see that the geopolitics is this opportunity or an opportunity to discuss them to coordinate collaborate and propose that new solutions. So just overall what I, what I would say and I just basically just listening to Alex touching and make touching on the assistance Australia's provider in terms of development assistance, also the Chinese assistance is probably say that, at the end of the day, we're all earthlings. I, and from a specific perspective, I don't think we're dead keen to be taking away from other other other colleagues and brothers in other regions in the global world. The courage then is to say that we have said SDG 17.2, which is the global target for 0.7% of ODA to GNI. What I'll say is this to encourage the geopolitics that all these discussions would lead to an overall increase in meeting this SDG 17.2 target. Thank you, Henry. I mean, I think it is important as you raise to try and focus on, you know, there are a lot of various pressures going on, but how can they be used in a constructive manner to forward sustainable development, particularly in the Pacific region, because what we're focusing on. I mean, one of the new initiatives is, is, is coming from, you know, traditional partners, and called the partners of the blue Pacific initiative, which is trying to you know really bring greater coordination and cohesion from traditional partners in backing the Pacific's own agenda. So this is, I think a response to some of the changing international dynamics around what's happening the Pacific as well I'd like to get all of your your thoughts on that but maybe I just start with you make in terms of what do you make of this this new initiative. It's problematic to be to be honest. At one level, it is positive because it's responding to the 2050 strategy for the blue Pacific saying, which has been said repeatedly by the Pacific we need more coordination we need more collaboration, the increase competition is straining small systems with limited resources. In that sense, it's a positive response. The problem is, it's a catchy title but what's behind it and trying to understand what's behind it. So we know it, the five partners that have signed up to this begin with but there's others about to join but we don't know the criteria for membership, and I think we need to know that and the Pacific needs to know that there is a commitment for coordination and collaboration but we have little detail at the moment on how that's going to happen. What is the coordinating mechanism, how does that relate to the Pacific Island forum, and for instance after each leaders forum, except for the last one because of different circumstances but there is a donor dialogue that occurs. So what's in addition to is this something that may ultimately replace it it's just unclear. We have and I'm sure Henry can talk more about it but a review of the regional architecture and it's not clear if the traditional donors are signaling a different collaboration, or it's just an initiative that is going to sit outside of it. So I think, in theory, it's a great idea to coordinate and collaborate in practice, this particular initiative needs more detail it needs more connection to the already pre existing regional institutions. And yeah just a greater and more clear narrative about what's this purpose how's it going to operate, and who's involved, who's not involved, and why that is the case. Alex, do you want to comment on. Yeah, I mean I would just say that I'm very much aligned with what makes commented on which is like I think it's a very good opportunity for everyone partners to increase their coordination because yeah at the end of the day like what you see in the pacific eight map is that you have like 67 different development partners involved in the Pacific. But at the end of the day the reason we build the pacific eight map is that because we've heard that it was difficult to know who was doing what in the region and to what extent. So, I think yes like this this initiative is a good one other than this is another similar initiative would actually contribute to maybe increase aid effectiveness in the pacific so better coordination transparency and so forth. But I completely agree with you it was still at it seemed that we're still at an early stage. There are many things to be defined in this partner of the pacific so yeah I'm impatient to see what it's going to lead to. Very good. What about Henry can I ask you what it what it what is your thoughts and perspectives on the partners of the blue Pacific initiative. Well, thank you Roland and I fully agree with both what Alex and make have touched on. It's still early stages there's a lot of issues and a lot of questions to be answered. Yes, make that will be part and parcel of the regional architecture work which is, we are now working on or betting on. So it's as a, as I said it's still early stages and I guess what we all, all hope for is that there will be communication collaboration and coordination for better development effectiveness. Now we actually have some questions, some video questions that we've collected from people in the region which we'd like to play, and then I'll get our panel members to answer those questions so if we could play the first question please. In an increasingly challenging world, we find ourselves adapting to changes, external forces and global crisis, and we asked the eight question. How can things be done differently. One classic example is the COVID-19 pandemic. When the world closed its borders, we couldn't fly in our mission experts and technical consultants to the ground in the Pacific. And while that posed a challenge for the region, I saw that as an opportunity, it was an opportunity for our people to step up. An opportunity for them to strengthen their leadership, their skills, and their ownership of the development programs that they should be managing and running. So the question I'd like to ask is how do we strengthen this aspect of aid in strengthening local capacities on the ground in the Pacific. Okay, so the question is about how can development partners, you know, improve upon what's happened during the COVID-19 pandemic in terms of because of the border restrictions. You know, they haven't been able to fly in all the international advisers that had to rely more on local capacity, local experts, consultants, officials, and this is a good thing. So how can it be built upon going forward? Maybe I'd ask you Meg, if you want to answer that question. I think it's an excellent question and I have to sort of say that I did do a research project during the COVID period about how localization actually worked. And I have to say not only our own research but that of the Red Cross Pacific, that of the Humanitarian Advisory Group came to the same conclusion that the response was better. It was more streamlined, more targeted to priorities, more supportive of institutions, local institutions. So absolutely it's about how we lock that in and don't just sort of slide back to the way things are as soon as the borders open. And what was asked of us is to find ways not only just to co-design but to co-deliver. So the head of a civil society organization said that we don't just want to be service delivery people. We want to be involved in delivering and well, delivering, designing and evaluating. And I think as well, and this is happening in some countries in the Pacific is protocols that make sure when people intervene, they are meeting local needs. And as researchers, we can't get research permits so that's we put in an application and we demonstrate the value to the Pacific Island country where we want to work. And so there is this concept of accountability. It's just accountable to the money-giver. It's accountable to the people who receive. And I think finally some great initiatives were started because of the lock border, the Pacific Humanitarian Pathway, and indeed the BlackRock facility, which is a regional facility in Fiji for humanitarian response and reduction. And the idea is the first responder should be the region. And they should be working together and responding and setting the pathways for the delivery of assistance and recovery and reduction of the vulnerability of these countries. So we do have the foundations on which to build. And I think it's not only about the donors. It's also about the Pacific Island countries and the regional agencies locking that in, putting up protocols and holding the system so that it goes forward. It doesn't slide back to old ways. Thanks for that. Thank you for that, Meg. I might ask Henry if he wants to comment on that as well. But actually our next question touches on similar issues. So why don't we hear from our next video question and then we'll turn to Henry to build on some of these arguments. Through two decades of geopolitical shifts, natural disasters, elections and regime changes and technology driven transformations, two things remain relatively unchanged in the Pacific. High aid dependency and low aid effectiveness. With the recent influx of aid and attention from development partners to the region. My question is one of agenda setting and power sharing. Aid is a thriving industry in the Pacific comprising an ecosystem of actors and the role these actors get to play in setting the agenda and co-developing and co-leading aid programs has often depended on their proximity to the donor. Local partners have shown leadership in articulating and demonstrating the changes that they would like to see to this power dynamic. And it has been heartening to hear that development partners are indicating a willingness to listen to learn and to share power. My question is, will the array of resets and step ups to the Pacific include local voices in setting the agenda and sharing power and accountability through co-developing and co-leading aid programs. So another another question we have from the region again, looking at whether or not all the talk about resets and step ups can be targeted towards actually strengthening Pacific leadership of development and development assistance in the region. Henry, we asked you to offer your perspective on this question. Thank you so much, Roland and it's, it's interesting questions and I guess I'll probably try and illustrate it using the sustainable development goals. The SDGs are once approved by leaders at the UN platform is implemented through linkages to national plans to sector plans to budgets and activities. This provides the process of accountability throughout in terms of the different layers in terms of the activities that are required on the ground running to address the different issues and vulnerabilities or projects that's required by the member country. At the same time, it also recognizes that the different platforms provides the opportunity for different stakeholders to participate in the decision making process, and also to influence the projects and activities that are being implemented, all aligned to the overall SDG global agreement that we've been there was approved or everybody signed up to in the UN platform. So you've got an alignment of implementation which provides those platforms for accountability and for discussion and stakeholder participation, but you also have an opportunity to recognize the different champions at different levels, because with implementation of changes of tackling of different projects and different issues, you need not only good leadership at the top, but you also need leadership at the different platforms and different levels of action. And I guess the SDG implementation throughout our membership here in the Pacific is an indication of how this has been thought of and how we have been trying to address the issues that's been raised with the questions. At the global level, countries have a voluntary national reporting process to do back to the to the UN in July of the high level of political platform discussions. So those are the different levels of accountability and reporting back. And I think illustrates the level of work that's done behind the scenes to implement and to improve effectiveness and to promote leadership accountability and stakeholder discussion. Thank you. Thank you, Henry for elaborating on all of that. We'll go to the last video question that we have which it now brings in the issue of climate change. Climate change is a single most existential threat to Pacific peoples, our development, aspirations and the security of our future. Our question is, how has COVID-19 change or impacted the aid environment for addressing climate change in the Pacific. Okay, so the question there is about the relationship between aid and climate change and how has the COVID-19 crisis and all of these shocks. How has that affected that situation, the link between aid and climate change. Alex, I'll bring you in on this one. Well, I mean, it's true that during the whole, you know, COVID pandemic we've seen like a massive increase in funding in the Pacific through loans and but those loans were mostly directed to, as we explained before, you know, like they were mostly budget support loans that were there to help the Pacific Island countries face liquidity issues and also help them, you know, find a social protection projects. But, you know, like the Pacific is one of the most fragile region when it comes to climate change. You know, some nations are facing, when they're facing the natural disasters, they're basically facing like the suppression of many points of their own GDP. And so we did that adaptation should be central to financing the recovery in the Pacific. And I think so this is what we need to really focus on, you know, to make sure that this that we are like targeting like we are channeling our financing through like a green, green recovery in some ways. So that we make sure that you know, not only like the Pacific is recovering quickly but in a resilient way. And that's very, very important. I mean, I think the region is so vulnerable to natural disasters and as Henry pointed out earlier earlier in our conversation that that can never be forgotten, even when we're dealing with other shocks like COVID-19 or you know, the ramifications of Russia's invasion in the Ukraine. So, you know, super important point. We're nearing the end of our sort of time allocation for this discussion so I want to close out by sort of asking our panel to look forward in terms of where things are headed. We might start with you, Alex. I mean, you, through the aid map, you've analyzed the past trends. You can sort of now peer into the future. You know, where do you think things are going? What do you think are some of the key trends that are going to, you know, extend beyond, you know, 2020 into some of your preliminary results of 2021-22 but also actually beyond that. What do you see as some of the key trends? Well, I mean, look, I can't tell you what the future holds. But one thing that I think will continue will be the use of loan financial, you know, financial lending to the Pacific. We realize that actually, you know, direct budget support is a very good and efficient way to provide quick and direct financing to the Pacific. And you know, the economic recovery in the Pacific is not going as quickly as in other parts of the world. So the region will continue to need extensive financial support as we talked about, you know, green economic recovery would be great. There's a story of the vaccines as well, you know, like, I mean, we're still, you know, in the aid map, because the aid map closes in 2020, you won't see vaccines for this year. But actually in the data we've already collected, you know, we've already have preliminary data for 2021. And there you can see like the distribution of vaccine in the Pacific. That has been actually, if you think about it, like a pretty good story, like some Pacific nations were among the first to be vaccinated in the Pacific. Some others like Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands are still struggling to cover their whole population. But like the vaccine delivery by development partners to the Pacific has actually been quite successful. So we'll see this going in the future. And I think a bigger climate focus will be definitely something we'll see more donors pay attention to. Very important. Henry, your thoughts in terms of looking ahead. What do you think the key trends are and how do you think that how appropriate do you think that is and what would you like to see happen? Thank you, Roland for the question. I can only say that in here in the Pacific, our members, our leaders in those our development strategy the 2050 strategy for the blue Pacific continent. It's basically a people centered development approach. Putting in cultural values, looking at ourselves as a large ocean state and seeing ourselves working together with people collectively using the Pacific way. And I see our issues remain same in terms of climate change, COVID-19 ways that I talked to earlier, gender connectivity and technology growth and infrastructure. There was just some of the issues that we deal with on a daily basis. So Meg, we'll give you the last word in terms of future trends and what you'd like to see happen. I think the big lesson here is that aid can grow, aid can change, it can pivot, and it can be flexible. And there's always been the assumption that it's a bit like a tanker, it can't move easily. I think COVID tells us otherwise. I think the financing story and the potential debt distress says to me that in the end it's people who manage these systems. And if we don't invest in the people going forward, we've got a problem and we need human development as well as infrastructure. We need to think about the youth, which is growing rapidly and needs investment we need education we need skills. And for those analyzing this tool, I think there's a wealth of information there, but don't forget that development is more than aid. And so we do have to look at the other complimentary schemes in the private sector labor mobility and diplomacy and what's happening there. And that needs a big microscope, I think as well. Very excellent points to close on. Let me thank Alex in particular for his presentation and comments through the panel, as well as Meg and Henry for joining us for this excellent panel discussion. Lots of important points and lots of important data and information in the Pacific Aid map. So hopefully, you know, this is just the start of the conversation around this latest edition of the Pacific Aid map. So thank you to our audience for joining us for this discussion of the 2022 Lowy Institute Pacific Aid map. If you haven't already please check out the map online at our website or simply Google Pacific Aid map and it should turn up. We're also publishing a number of articles on our digital magazine the interpreter featuring a range of voices from the Pacific Aid and Development Community to provide their own perspectives on the findings in the Pacific Aid map so please check out those as well. Thanks also to our events and digital team for their support in this event. And finally to our order and audience. Thanks again for joining us and we look forward to you joining us next time. Thank you.