 international relations capsuled for the Shankar Academy, Shankar Arya's Academy. Today, our topic is strain in India-Russia relations. There's a saying in diplomacy that there are no permanent friends or permanent enemies, only permanent interests. India-Russian relations were considered to be an exception to this rule, because we have had very consistent good relationship with Russia, in fact the Soviet Union before that, for nearly half a century. But at the moment, this relationship is under some strain. But given the history of the relationship and the strength of continuing mutuality of interests, dictated by history and geography, the two countries are likely to remain friendly, even as they diversify relationships that are increasingly tabled in the world. So I look at the present context in the relationship as a temporary phase, and things might settle down. The impact of the long history of Indo-Soviet cooperation during the Cold War is too significant to be erased or wished away. Vandinaru's fascination for socialism and planned development formed the basis of the strong political and economic relationship with the Soviet Union soon after India's independence. In the early 50s, the Soviet Union began giving development assistance to India, and in the 60s, they also started giving us military assistance. It was the Soviet Union which helped India build India's basic infrastructure, and many of the institutions built with Soviet support continued to be crucial in India's economic development. The virtual battle arrangement known as rupee ruble arrangement between the two countries promoted trade and investment between the two countries. The political support from the Soviet Union was also very strong, first on Kashmir, then on India's nuclear ambitions, and most importantly, at the time of the liberation of Bangladesh, and it led to a treaty which called into question India's non-aligned credentials. The Soviet vetoes on Kashmir, Goa and Bangladesh were historic, and India reciprocated by remaining neutral on Hungary, on Czechoslovakia, but we also supported the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. India was the only country outside the Soviet bloc which extended support to the Soviet Union on crucial occasions. India's position on Afghanistan, in a way condoning the Soviet invasion, affected India's relations with the United States and many non-aligned countries. I was in Moscow, I was posted in Moscow during the heyday of Indo-Soviet relations between 1974 and 1979. Although important events in India, like India's peaceful nuclear explosion in 1974, the national emergency in 1975 and the formation of the Janata government in 1977 jolted the Soviet Union. These are all unexpected. But the nature of the relationship was such that they did not affect the cooperation which took place between the two countries. When we tested in 1974, the Soviet Union joined the international protest against India's nuclear test and joined the nuclear suppliers group to counter India's development of nuclear technology. But bilaterally they expressed understanding of India's compulsions. The Soviet Union gave the strongest support to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi during the emergency by meeting some special economic needs at that time. Soviet Union was very surprised when Mrs. Indira Gandhi lost the elections in 1977. That was not expected by them. They felt a bit unsure of the new dispensation in India, but quickly adjusted themselves to the new situation because the new leadership in Delhi, like Prime Minister Morali Deshaille and Foreign Minister Adalviyari Vajpayee emphasized the continuity of Indo-Soviet relations. The so-called genuine non-alignment of Janata Party hinted at distancing India from the Soviet Union. But in effect, nothing changed. I went with Prime Minister Morali Deshaille to Moscow later after I had come back. When Prime Minister Morali Deshaille tried to disown the Indo-Soviet treaty because he thought that it was counter to the non-aligned policy of India. But he quickly understood the importance of a close relationship with the Soviet Union and realized that continuity in Indo-Soviet relations was crucial. The only negative thing that he did during that visit was to turn down an offer made by the Soviet Union to send an Indian astronaut to outer space. He thought it was a waste of time and not particularly useful. The collapse of the Soviet Union and Russia's initial efforts to seek sustenance from the United States led to a lost decade, as it is called, say from 1990 onwards. There was a lull in the relationship between India and Russia. But the essential space and technology transfer for India's defense industry continued with Russia and some of the republics which were hosting some of the military technology, military factories, etc. And after Russia began to return to the international stage under Vladimir Putin, India-Russia cooperation gained strength in trade, defense and nuclear technology. And Russia became India's biggest trading partner in the 90s. Russia joined the rest of the world in questioning India's nuclear test in 1998. But continued its nuclear cooperation in Kudankulam, which was established before our tests. And they even leased to India a nuclear attack submarine, which is still in service in India. The India-U.S. nuclear deal, which was signed in 2008, resulted in an improvement in India-U.S. relations. But the main beneficiary of the deal was Russia because nuclear trade with other countries got blocked because of the liability law enacted by the parliament of India. But Russia continued its cooperation with India on nuclear technology on the basis of what is known as the grandfather clause. It was a matter of concern to China and Russia when India became a major defense partner of the U.S. And Prime Minister Modi announced that a new symphony in India-U.S. relations was beginning. So the first signs of strain in Russia-India relations, which we now feel, started when Russian delegates who came to Amritsar to attend the Heart of Asia meeting stated that the main terrorist threat to the world was not from border terrorism, cross-border terrorism, but IS, al-Qaeda, etc. This was totally opposite the position that Russia had taken till then because terrorism against India, which was nicknamed as cross-border terrorism. Was a factor against which Russia was committed to a fight. But for them to say that the cross-border terrorism is not really the important factor, but IS and al-Qaeda sounded some alarm bells in India. There were also indications at this time that Russia was getting closer to China for the very same reason that India was getting close to the United States. And Russia often had what was called a Pakistan card. So whenever they were somewhat dissatisfied with India, they always tried to get a bit closer to Pakistan so that the situation can be brought back to normal. And at this time, Russia also tried to get India to join China's Belt and Road Initiative. Since India was the only country which had not joined it, they felt that they should persuade India. But of course, India had very strong reservations about it, not only because that was based on China establishing dominance over the world, but also because the project involving Pakistan was running through the Pakistan occupation. So these were ripples that one noticed. And therefore Prime Minister Modi went all the way to Sochi for an informal meeting with President Putin to see whether this imbalance which has come into the relationship can be reset. And we do not know what they discussed, but quite obviously, Mr. Modi must have convinced President Putin that India's good relationship with the United States will not come in the way of its relationship with Russia. Prime Minister Modi also made a visit to Vladivostok and got India involved in the development of that region. But still that did not reverse Russia's policy to be closer to China and Pakistan. In 2020, following the geopolitical changes that was set into motion because of COVID-19, Russia became even closer to China and began supplying arms to Pakistan and held joint exercises in the Indian Ocean. We have a tradition of having annual summits with the Soviet leadership and in 2020 for various reasons, the summit also did not take place. And Russia kept saying that Russia-China relations in 2020 was as the best possible lever. But the irony of it was that this was the time that China launched an attack on the line of control in Ladakh. Instead of supporting India, what Russia did was to make some mediation efforts, but did not support the Indian position. Very much like in 1962, when we expected the Soviet Union to support India against China, the Soviet Union said that one is a brother and the other is a friend and we would not be able to help either. So they were convinced that the reason for China-India problems on the border was probably the result of India becoming an instrument of the aggressive policies of the West on China. Of course, to crown it all, the activation of the Quad drove Russia into the Chinese camp, just as the aggression on the border drove India into the arms of the United States. Russia started describing Quad as the Asian NATO, as China did. Russia's relationship with China and Pakistan grew so rapidly that it became clear that it will neither oppose China's aggression or condemn Pakistani terrorism against India. So it was against this backdrop of certain uneasiness between India and Russia that Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov paid a visit to India and Pakistan. The United States used to have a policy of hyphenation of India and Pakistan, which meant that whatever they did with respect to India, they had to do with Pakistan. But this was abandoned by Clinton in 2000. But as though they were copying the hyphenation of the United States, Mr. Lavrov came to India for a shorter period, but went to travel directly from India to Pakistan and stayed there for a longer period. And quite a few programs of cooperation between Moscow and Islamabad were finalized. Foreign Minister Jay Shankar described India-Russia relations when Mr. Lavrov was in India in the traditional manner. He said, time-tested, energetic and forward-looking relations. But Mr. Lavrov described it differently and said, it's warm, comprehensive and productive. So you can see the two assessments. The Indian assessment of the Russian position was more positive and indicating continuity and interest to continue it. While Mr. Lavrov used words which described also this relationship was becoming conditional or complicated. Of course, India had already ordered us 400 missiles from Russia. And the United States had shown some concern about this because as a close defense partner of the United States, getting Russian equipment into the Arsenal Indian defense establishment might go against the spirit of the relationship between India and the US, which have signed four major foundational treaties which enable India and the United States to have interoperability in the services. And therefore some sophisticated equipment from Russia would create problems. So there was some indication by the Americans when General Austin was in India that there could be some problems with this 400. But we stood very firm on that. And the Russians were told by our foreign minister that we would certainly go ahead with the acquisition of his 400 missiles. That may have indicated that things are not bad with Russia. But at the same time, the whole visit, Mr. Lavrov's visit left the impression that all is not well between New Delhi and Moscow. And on top of it, Prime Minister Narendra Modi did not find it necessary to reschedule his election campaign to receive Lavrov. Normally, Russian foreign minister would get an audience with the Prime Minister. And from here he went to Islamabad and he was received at the highest level. And Lavrov even revealed in Islamabad that consultations were taking place between India and Pakistan to improve relations. India had tried to keep this as a secret and it never revealed that this was taking place. But it was Mr. Lavrov in Islamabad that let the cat out of the bag as it were. Russia has also other problems with the West as well as the United States, the US policy on Ukraine and Crimea. And the recent measures that President Biden has taken against Russian diplomats and others supposed to have been involved in American elections. And also the criticism over Alexei Navalny's failing health, the leader of the opposition, have embedded relations between Russia and the US. And Russia is looking for new alliances. Similarly, India is also seeking new alignments, defense supplies and support from the international community. This is the situation that emerges in India-Russia relations. There is no breakup. There is no change in the essential goodwill between the two countries. But there are sufficient indication that things are not moving in the right direction as far as India-Russia relations are concerned. I believe that this is a way of no return and it may be difficult for India and Russia to come back to normalcy. But my own opinion is that the whole world is in a state of flux, mainly because of the pandemic and also because of the geopolitical changes taking place. The United States appearing to be weakening and China appearing to be growing so fast that it may become the most dominant country in the world in a short period of time rather than a long period of time which was researched. So this is a situation where everyone is in a state of indecision. Everyone is keeping his options open to settle it one way or the other as the situation stabilizes. The present trend is that a new Cold War is developing between the United States and China and both Russia and India. And also many other countries in the world would like to watch the situation and see what they should do. Should India be non-aligned like during the first Cold War or should we be identifying ourselves with one of the countries? Our interest of course basically is to be an independent poll in the new multi-polar world. But the possibilities for that are dim at the moment because of the kind of flux in international relations. So my conclusion is that matters will settle down. More understanding will be created from between Russia and India. And the long cooperation, long history of Indo-Soviet relations will eventually determine the future of India-Russia relations. So while we take note of the unease in the relationship, I don't think it is yet time to think that India-Russia relationship are not retrievable. So the present unpleasantness may not last very long. And when a new global geopolitical arrangement settles in, maybe India and Russia will continue to be friends in a different configuration of the nations of the world. So we should await, continue with what our relationship with what we have with Moscow, which is cooperation in various areas. Keep a watch on the Russian movement towards China and Pakistan. But hope that things will settle down sooner than later. Thank you very much.