 This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are on the public domain. To find out more information and to learn how you can volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. This recording by Christian Paco at communistrevolution.org. Democracy in America by Alex de Tocqueville translated by Henry Reeve Chapter 11 Liberty of the Press in the United States Chapter Summary Difficulty of restraining the liberty of the press particular reasons which some nations have to cherish this liberty. The liberty of the press a necessary consequence of the sovereignty of the people as it is understood in America. Violent language of the periodical press in the United States. Propensities of the periodical press illustrated by the United States. Opinion of the Americans upon the repression of the abuse of the liberty of the press by judicial prosecutions. Reasons for which the press is less powerful in America than in France. The influence of the liberty of the press does not affect political opinions alone, but it extends to all the opinions of men, and it modifies customs as well as laws. In another part of this work, I shall attempt to determinate the degree of influence which the liberty of the press has exercised upon civil society in the United States, and to point out the direction which it has given to the ideas as well as the tone which it has imparted to the character and the feelings of the Anglo-Americans. But at present I purpose simply to examine the effects produced by the liberty of the press in the political world. I confess that I do not entertain that firm and complete attachment to the liberty of the press which things that are supremely good in their very nature are want to excite in the mind. And I approve of it more from a recollection of the evils it prevents than from a consideration of the advantages it ensures. If anyone could point out an intermediate and yet a tenable position between the complete independence and the entire objection of the public expression of opinion, I should perhaps be inclined to adopt it. But the difficulty is to discover this position. If it is your intention to correct the abuses of unlicensed printing and to restore the use of orderly language, you may in the first instance try the offender by a jury. But if the jury acquits him, the opinion which was that of a single individual becomes the opinion of the country at large. Too much and too little has therefore hitherto been done. If you proceed, you must bring the delinquent before a court of permanent judges. But even here the cause must be heard before it can be decided. And the very principles which no book would have ventured to avow are blazoned forth in the pleadings. And what was obscurely hinted at in a single composition is then repeated in a multitude of other publications. The language in which a thought is embodied is the mere carcass of the thought and not the idea itself. Tribunals may condemn the form, but the sense and spirit of the work is too subtle for their authority. Too much has still been done to recede. Too little to attain your end. You must therefore proceed. If you establish a censorship of the press, the tongue of the public speaker will still make itself heard. And you have only increased the mischief. The powers of thought do not rely, like the powers of physical strength, upon the number of their mechanical agents. Nor can a host of authors be reckoned like the troops which compose an army. On the contrary, the authority of a principle is often increased by the smallness of the number of men by whom it is expressed. The words of a strong-minded man, which penetrate amidst the passions of a listening assembly, have more power than the vociferations of a thousand orators. And if it be allowed to speak freely in any public place, the consequence is the same as if free speaking was allowed in every village. The liberty of discourse must therefore be destroyed as well as the liberty of the press. This is the necessary term of your efforts. But if your object was to repress the abuses of liberty, they have brought you to the feet of a despot. You have been led from the extreme of independence to the extreme of subjection without meeting with a single, tenable position for shelter or repose. There are certain nations which have peculiar reasons for cherishing the liberty of the press, independently of the general motives which I have just pointed out. For in certain countries which profess to enjoy the privileges of freedom, every individual agent of the government may violate the laws with impunity, since those whom he oppresses cannot prosecute him before the courts of justice. In this case, the liberty of the press is not merely a guarantee, but it is the only guarantee of their liberty and their security which the citizens possess. If the rulers of these nations propose to abolish the independence of the press, the people would be justified in saying, give us the right of prosecuting your offenses before the ordinary tribunals, and perhaps we may then wave our right of appeal to the tribunal of public opinion. But in the countries in which the doctrine of the sovereignty of the people ostensibly prevails, the censorship of the press is not only dangerous, but it is absurd. When the right of every citizen to cooperate in the government of society is acknowledged, every citizen must be presumed to possess the power of discriminating between the different opinions of his contemporaries, and of appreciating the different facts from which inferences may be drawn. The sovereignty of the people and the liberty of the press may therefore be looked upon as correlative institutions, just as the censorship of the press and universal suffrage are two things which are irreconcilably opposed, and which cannot long be retained among the institutions of the same people. Not a single individual of the 12 millions who inhabit the territory of the United States has as yet dared to propose any restrictions to the liberty of the press. The first newspaper over which I cast my eyes upon my arrival in America contained the following article. In all this affair, the language of Jackson has been that of a heartless despot, solely occupied with the preservation of his own authority. Ambition is his crime, and it will be his punishment too. Intrigue is his native element, and intrigue will confound his tricks, and will deprive him of his power. He governs by means of corruption, and his immoral practices will redound to his shame and confusion. His conduct in the political arena has been that of a shameless and lawless gamester. He succeeded at the time, but the hour of retribution approaches, and he will be obliged to disgorge his winnings, to throw aside his false dice, and to end his days in some retirement, where he may curse his madness at his leisure. For repentance is a virtue with which his heart is likely to remain forever unacquainted. It is not uncommonly imagined in France that the virulence of the press originates in the uncertain social condition, in the political excitement, and the general sense of consequent evil which prevail in that country. And it is therefore supposed that as soon as society has resumed a certain degree of composure, the press will abandon its present vehemence. I am inclined to think that the above causes explain the reason of the extraordinary ascendancy it has acquired over the nation, but that they do not exercise much influence upon the tone of its language. The periodical press appears to me to be actuated by passions and propensities independent of the circumstances in which it is placed, and the present position of America corroborates this opinion. America is perhaps, at this moment, the country of the world which contains the fewest germs of revolution. But the press is not less destructive in its principles than in France, and it displays the same violence without the same reasons for indignation. In America, as in France, it constitutes a singular power, so strangely composed of mingled good and evil, that it is at the same time indispensable to the existence of freedom, and nearly incompatible with the maintenance of public order. Its power is certainly much greater in France than in the United States, though nothing is more rare in the latter country than to hear of a prosecution having been instituted against it. The reason of this is perfectly simple. The Americans, having once admitted the doctrine of the sovereignty of the people, apply it with perfect consistency. It was never their intention to found a permanent state of things with elements which undergo daily modifications. And there is consequently nothing criminal in an attack upon the existing laws, provided it be not attended with a violent infraction of them. They are, moreover, of opinion that courts of justice are unable to check the abuses of the press, and that as the subtlety of human language perpetually eludes the severity of judicial analysis, offenses of this nature are apt to escape the hand which attempts to apprehend them. They hold that to act with efficacy upon the press, it would be necessary to find a tribunal, not only devoted to the existing order of things, but capable of surmounting the influence of public opinion. A tribunal which should conduct its proceedings without publicity, which should pronounce its decrees without assigning its motives, and punish the intentions even more than the language of an author. Whosoever should have the power of creating and maintaining a tribunal of this kind would waste his time in prosecuting the liberty of the press, for he would be the supreme master of the whole community, and he would be as free to rid himself of the authors as of their writings. In this question, therefore, there is no medium between servitude and extreme license. In order to enjoy the inestimable benefits which the liberty of the press ensures, it is necessary to submit to the inevitable evils which it engenders. To expect to acquire the former, and to escape the latter, is to cherish one of those illusions which commonly misled nations in their times of sickness. When, tired with faction, and exhausted by effort, they attempt to combine hostile opinions and contrary principles upon the same soil. The small influence of the American journals is attributable to several reasons, amongst which are the following. The liberty of writing, like all other liberty, is most formidable when it is a novelty. For a people which has never been accustomed to cooperate in the conduct of state affairs, places implicit confidence in the first tribune who arouses its attention. The Anglo-Americans have enjoyed this liberty ever since the foundation of the settlements. Moreover, the press cannot create human passions by its own power, however skillfully it may kindle them where they exist. In America, politics are discussed with animation and a varied activity, but they rarely touch those deep passions which are excited whenever the positive interest of a part of the community is impaired. But in the United States, the interests of the community are in a most prosperous condition. A single glance upon a French and an American newspaper is sufficient to show the difference which exists between the two nations on this head. In France, the space allotted to commercial advertisements is very limited, and the intelligence is not considerable, but the most essential part of the journal is that which contains the discussion of the politics of the day. In America, three-quarters of the enormous sheet which is set before the reader are filled with advertisements, and the remainder is frequently occupied by political intelligence or trivial anecdotes. It is only from time to time that one finds a corner devoted to passionate discussions like those with which the journalists of France are wont to indulge their readers. It has been demonstrated by observation and discovered by the innate sagacity of the pettiest as well as the greatest of despots that the influence of a power is increased in proportion as its direction is rendered more central. In France, the press combines a two-fold centralization. Almost all its power is centered in the same spot and vested in the same hands, for its organs are far from numerous. The influence of a public press thus constituted upon a skeptical nation must be unbounded. It is an enemy with which a government may sign an occasional truce, but which it is difficult to resist for any length of time. Neither of these kinds of centralization exists in America. The United States have no metropolis. The intelligence as well as the power of the country are dispersed abroad, and instead of radiating from a point, they cross each other in every direction. The Americans have established no central control over the expression of opinion any more than over the conduct of business. These are circumstances which do not depend on human foresight, but it is owing to the laws of the Union that there are no licenses to be granted to printers, no securities demanded from editors as in France, and no stamp duty as in France and formerly in England. The consequence of this is that nothing is easier than to set up a newspaper and a small number of readers suffices to defray the expenses of the editor. The number of periodical and occasional publications which appears in the United States actually surpasses belief. The most enlightened Americans attribute the subordinate influence of the press to this excessive dissemination, and it is adopted as an axiom of political science in that country that the only way to neutralize the effect of public journals is to multiply them indefinitely. I cannot conceive that a truth which is so self-evident should not already have been more generally admitted in Europe. It is comprehensible that the persons who hope to bring about revolutions by means of the press should be desirous of confining its action to a few powerful organs. But it is perfectly incredible that the partisans of the existing state of things and the natural supporters of the law should attempt to diminish the influence of the press by concentrating its authority. The governments of Europe seem to treat the press with the courtesy of the Knights of Old. They are anxious to furnish it with the same central power which they have found to be so trusty a weapon in order to enhance the glory of their resistance to its attacks. In America there is scarcely a hamlet which has not its own newspaper. It may readily be imagined that neither discipline nor unity of design can be communicated to so multifarious a host, and each one is consequently led to fight under his own standard. All the political journals of the United States are indeed arrayed on the side of the administration or against it, but they attack and defend in a thousand different ways. They cannot succeed in forming those great currents of opinion which overwhelm the most solid obstacles. This division of the influence of the press produces a variety of other consequences which are scarcely less remarkable. The facility with which journals can be established induces a multitude of individuals to take apart in them. But as the extent of competition precludes the possibility of considerable profit, the most distinguished classes of society are rarely led to engage in these undertakings. But such is the number of the public prints that, even if they were a source of wealth, writers of ability could not be found to direct them all. The journalists of the United States are usually placed in a very humble position with a scanty education and a vulgar turn of mind. The will of the majority is the most general of laws, and it establishes certain habits which form the characteristics of each peculiar class of society. Thus it dictates the etiquette practiced at courts and the etiquette of the bar. The characteristics of the French journalist consist in a violent, but frequently an eloquent and lofty manner of discussing the politics of the day. And the exceptions to this habitual practice are only occasional. The characteristics of the American journalist consist in an open and coarse appeal to the passions of the populace. And he habitually abandons the principles of political science to assail the characters of individuals, to track them into private life, and to disclose all their weaknesses and errors. Nothing can be more deplorable than this abuse of the powers of thought. I shall have occasion to point out hereafter the influence of the newspapers upon the taste and the morality of the American people. But my present subject exclusively concerns the political world. It cannot be denied that the effects of this extreme license of the press tend indirectly to the maintenance of public order. The individuals who are already in the possession of a high station in the esteem of their fellow citizens are afraid to write in the newspapers. And they are thus deprived of the most powerful instrument which they can use to excite the passions of the multitude to their own advantage. Note, they only write in the papers when they choose to address the people in their own name, as for instance when they are called upon to repel columnius imputations and to correct a misstatement of facts. The personal opinions of the editors have no kind of weight in the eyes of the public. The only use of a journal is that it imparts the knowledge of certain facts. And it is only by altering or distorting those facts that a journalist can contribute to the support of his own views. But although the press is limited to these resources, its influence in America is immense. It is the power which impels the circulation of political life through all the districts of that vast territory. Its eye is constantly open to detect the secret springs of political designs and to summon the leaders of all parties to the bar of public opinion. It rallies the interests of the community round certain principles and it draws up the creed which factions adopt. For it affords a means of intercourse between parties which hear and which address each other without ever having been in immediate contact. When a great number of the organs of the press adopt the same line of conduct, their influence becomes irresistible. And public opinion, when it is perpetually assailed from the same side, eventually yields to the attack. In the United States, each separate journal exercises but little authority. But the power of the periodical press is only second to that of the people. The opinions established in the United States under the Empire of the Liberty of the Press are frequently more firmly rooted than those which are formed elsewhere under the sanction of a censor. In the United States, the democracy perpetually raises fresh individuals to the conduct of public affairs. And the measures of the administration are consequently seldom regulated by the strict rules of consistency or of order. But the general principles of the government are more stable and the opinions most prevalent in society are generally more durable than in many other countries. When once the Americans have taken up an idea, whether it be well or ill founded, nothing is more difficult than to eradicate it from their minds. The same tenacity of opinion has been observed in England, where for the last century greater freedom of conscience and more invincible prejudices have existed than in all the other countries of Europe. I attribute this consequence to a cause which may at first sight appear to have a very opposite tendency, namely to the liberty of the press. The nations amongst which this liberty exists are as apt to cling to their opinions from pride as from conviction. They cherish them because they hold them to be just and because they exercise their own free will in choosing them. And they maintain them not only because they are true, but because they are their own. Several other reasons conduce to the same end. It was remarked by a man of genius that ignorance lies at the two ends of knowledge. Perhaps it would have been more correct to have said that absolute convictions are to be met with at the two extremities and that doubt lies in the middle. For the human intellect may be considered in three distinct states, which frequently succeed one another. A man believes implicitly because he adopts a proposition without inquiry. He doubts as soon as he is assailed by the objections which his inquiries may have aroused. But he frequently succeeds in satisfying these doubts and then he begins to believe afresh. He no longer lays hold on a truth in its most shadowy and uncertain form. But he sees it clearly before him and he advances onwards by the light it gives him. Note, it may, however, be doubted whether this rational and self-guiding conviction arouses as much fervor or enthusiastic devotedness in men as their first dogmatical belief. And note, when the liberty of the press acts upon men who are in the first of these three states, it does not immediately disturb their habit of believing implicitly without investigation, but it constantly modifies the objects of their intuitive convictions. The human mind continues to discern but one point upon the whole intellectual horizon. And that point is in continual motion. Such are the symptoms of sudden revolutions and of the misfortunes which are sure to befall those generations which abruptly adopt the unconditional freedom of the press. The circle of novel ideas is, however, soon terminated. The touch of experience is upon them and the doubt and mistrust which their uncertainty produces becomes universal. We may rest assured that the majority of mankind will either believe they know not where for or will not know what to believe. Few are the beings who can ever hope to attain to the state of rational and independent conviction which true knowledge can beget in defiance of the attacks of doubt. It has been remarked that in times of great religious fervor men sometimes change their religious opinions. Whereas in times of general skepticism everyone clings to his own persuasion. The same thing takes place in politics under the liberty of the press. In countries where all the theories of social science have been contested in their turn the citizens who have adopted one of them stick to it. Not so much because they are assured of its excellence as because they are not convinced of the superiority of any other. In the present age men are not very ready to die in defense of their opinions but they are rarely inclined to change them. And there are fewer martyrs as well as fewer apostates. Another still more valid reason may yet be adduced. When no abstract opinions are looked upon as certain men cling to the mere propensities and external interests of their position which are naturally more tangible and more permanent than any opinions in the world. But it is not a question of easy solution whether aristocracy or democracy is most fit to govern a country. But it is certain that democracy annoys one part of the community and that aristocracy oppresses another part. When the question is reduced to the simple expression of the struggle between poverty and wealth the tendency of each side of the dispute becomes perfectly evident without further controversy. End of Chapter 11 This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org Democracy in America Volume 1 by Alexis de Tocqueville translated by Henry Reeve Chapter 7 Political Associations in the United States In no country in the world has the principle of association been more successfully used or more unsparingly applied to a multitude of different objects than in America. Besides the permanent associations which are established by law under the names of townships cities and counties a vast number of others are formed and maintained by the agency of private individuals. The citizen of the United States has taught from his earliest infancy to rely upon his own exertions in order to resist the evils and the difficulties of life. He looks upon social authority with an eye of mistrust and anxiety and he only claims its assistance when he is quite unable to shift without it. This habit may even be traced in the schools of the rising generation where the children in their games are want to submit to rules which they have themselves established and to punish misdemeanors which they have themselves defined. The same spirit pervades every act of social life. If a stoppage occurs in a thoroughfare and the circulation of the public is hindered the neighbors immediately constitute a deliberative body and this extemporaneous assembly gives rise to an executive power which remedies the inconvenience before anybody has thought of recurring to an authority superior to that of the persons immediately concerned. If the public pressures are concerned an association is formed to provide for the splendor and the regularity of the entertainment. Societies are formed to resist enemies which are exclusively of a moral nature and to diminish the vices of intemperance. In the United States associations are established to promote public order, commerce, industry, morality and religion for there is no end which the human will seconded by the collective exertions of individuals despairs of attaining. I shall hereafter have occasion to show the effects of association upon the course of society and I must confine myself for the present to the political world. When once the right of association is recognized the citizens may employ it in several different ways. An association consists simply in the public ascent which a number of individuals give to certain doctrines and in the engagement which they contract to promote the spread of these doctrines by their exertions. The right of association with these views is very analogous to the liberty of unlicensed writing but societies thus formed to possess more authority than the press. When an opinion is represented by a society it necessarily assumes a more exact and explicit form. It numbers its partisans and comprises their welfare in its cause. They, on the other hand, become acquainted with each other and their zeal is increased by their number. An association unites the efforts of minds which have a tendency to diverge in one single channel and urges them vigorously towards one single end which it points out. The second degree in the right of association is the power of meeting. When an association is allowed to establish centers of action at certain important points in the country its activity is increased and its influence extended. Men have the opportunity of seeing each other means of execution are more readily combined and opinions are maintained with a degree of warmth and energy which written language cannot approach. Lastly, in the exercise of the right of political association there is a right of association there is a third degree. The partisans of an opinion may unite in electoral bodies and choose delegates to represent them in a central assembly. This is, properly speaking, the application of the representative system to a party. Thus, in the first instance, a society is formed between individuals professing the same opinion and the tie which keeps it together is of a purely intellectual nature. In the second case, small assemblies are formed which only represent a fraction of the party. Lastly, in the third case, they constitute a separate nation in the midst of the nation a government within the government. Their delegates, like the real delegates of the majority represent the entire collective force of their party and they enjoy a certain degree of that national dignity and great influence which belongs to the chosen representatives of the people. It is true that they have not the right of making the laws but they have the power of attacking those which are in being and of drawing up beforehand those which they may afterwards cause to be adopted. If in a people which is imperfectly accustomed to the exercise of freedom or which is exposed to violent political passions a deliberating minority which confines itself to the contemplation of future laws be placed in juxtaposition to the legislative majority I cannot but believe that public tranquility incurs very great risks in the nation. There is doubtless a very wide difference between proving that one law is in itself better than another and proving that the former ought to be substituted for the latter. But the imagination of the populace is very apt to overlook this difference which is so apparent to the minds of thinking men. It sometimes happens that a nation is divided into two nearly equal parties each of which affects to represent the majority. If in immediate contiguity to the directing power another power be established which exercises almost as much moral authority as the former it is not to be believed that it will long be content to speak without acting or that it will always be restrained by the abstract consideration of the nature of associations which are meant to direct but not to enforce opinions to suggest but not to make the laws. The more we consider the independence of the press in its principal consequences the more are we convinced that it is the chief and so to speak the constitutive element of freedom in the modern world. A nation which is determined to remain free is therefore right in demanding the unrestrained exercise of this independence. But the unrestrained liberty of political association cannot be entirely assimilated to the liberty of the press. The one is at the same time less necessary and more dangerous than the other. A nation may confine it within certain limits without forfeiting any part of its self-control and it may sometimes be obliged to do so in order to maintain its own authority. In America the liberty of association for political purposes is unbounded. An example will show in the clearest light to what an extent this privilege is tolerated. The question of the tariff or a free trade produced a great manifestation of party feeling in America. The tariff was not only a subject of debate as a matter of opinion but it exercised a favorable or prejudicial influence upon several very powerful interests of the states. The North attributed a great portion of its prosperity and the South all its sufferings to this system. In so much that for a long time the tariff was the sole source of the political animosities which agitated the Union. In 1831 when the dispute was raging with the utmost virulence a private citizen of Massachusetts proposed to all the enemies of the tariff by means of the public prince to send delegates to Philadelphia in order to consult together upon the means which were most fitted to promote freedom of trade. This proposal circulated in a few days from Maine to New Orleans by the power of the printing press. The opponents of the tariff adopted it with enthusiasm meetings were formed on all sides and delegates were named. The majority of these individuals were well known and some of them had earned a considerable degree of celebrity. South Carolina alone which afterwards took up arms in the same cause sent 63 delegates. On October 1st 1831 this assembly which according to the American custom had taken the name of a convention met at Philadelphia it consisted of more than 200 members. Its debates were public and they at once assumed a legislative character. The extent of the powers of Congress the theories of free trade and the different clauses of the tariff were discussed in turn. At the end of ten days deliberation the convention broke up after having published an address to the American people in which it declared that Congress had not the right of making a tariff and that the existing tariff was unconstitutional. Two, that the prohibition of free trade was prejudicial to the interests of all nations and to that of the American people in particular. It must be acknowledged that the unrestrained liberty of political association has not hitherto produced in the United States those fatal consequences which might perhaps be expected from it elsewhere. The right of association was imported from England and it has always existed in America so that the exercise of this privilege is now amalgamated with the manners and customs of the people. At the present time liberty of association is become a necessary guarantee against the tyranny of the majority. In the United States as soon as a party has become preponderant all public authority passes under its control its private supporters occupy all the places and have all the force of the administration at their disposal. As the most distinguished partisans on the other side of the question are unable to surmount the obstacles which exclude them from power they require some means of establishing themselves upon their own basis and of opposing the moral authority of the minority to the physical power which dominers over it. Thus a dangerous expedient is used to obviate a still more formidable danger. The omnipotence of the majority appears to me to present such extreme perils to the American republics that a dangerous measure which is used to repress it seems to be more advantageous than prejudicial. And here I am about to advance a proposition which may remind the reader of what I said before in speaking of municipal freedom. There are no countries in which associations are more needed to prevent the despotism of faction or the arbitrary power of a prince than those which are democratically constituted. In aristocratic nations the body of the nobles and the more opulent part of the community are in themselves natural associations which act as checks upon the abuses of power. In countries in which these associations do not exist if private individuals are unable to create an artificial and a temporary substitute for them I can imagine no permanent protection against the most galling tyranny and a great people may be oppressed by a small faction or by a single individual with impunity. The meeting of a great political convention for there are conventions of all kinds which may frequently become a necessary measure is always a serious occurrence even in America and one which is never looked forward to by the judicious friends of the country without alarm. This was very perceptible in the convention of 1831 at which the exertions of all the most distinguished members of the assembly tended to moderate its language and to restrain the subjects which it treated within certain limits. It is probable in fact that the convention of 1831 exercised a very great influence upon the minds of the malcontents and prepared them for the open revolt against the commercial laws of the Union which took place in 1832. It cannot be denied that the unrestrained liberty of association for political purposes is the privilege which a people is longest in learning how to exercise. If it does not throw the nation into anarchy it perpetually augments the chances of that calamity. On one point however this perilous liberty offers a security against dangers of another kind. In countries where associations are free secret societies are unknown. In America there are numerous factions but no conspiracies. Different ways in which the right of association is understood in Europe and in the United States different use which is made of it The most natural privilege of man next to the right of acting for himself is that of combining his exertions with those of his fellow creatures and of acting in common with them. I am therefore led to conclude that the right of association is almost as inalienable as the right of personal liberty. No legislator can attack it without impairing the very foundations of society. Nevertheless if the liberty of association is a fruitful source of advantages and prosperity to some nations it may be perverted or carried to excess by others and the element of life may be changed into an element of destruction. A comparison of the different methods which associations pursue in those countries in which they are managed with discretion as well as in those where liberty degenerates into license may perhaps be thought useful both to governments and to parties. The greater part of Europeans is to work upon an association as a weapon which is to be hastily fashioned and immediately tried in the conflict. A society is formed for discussion but the idea of impending action prevails in the minds of those who constitute it. It is in fact an army and the time given to parley serves to reckon up the strength and to animate the courage of the host after which they direct their march against the enemy. Resources which lie within the bounds to impose it as means but never as the only means of success such however is not the manner in which the right of association is understood in the United States. In America the citizens who form the minority associate in order in the first place to show their numerical strength and so to diminish the moral authority of the majority and in the second place to stimulate competition and to discover those arguments of the majority for they always entertain hopes of drawing over their opponents to their own side and of afterwards disposing of the supreme power in their name. Political associations in the United States are therefore peaceable in their intentions and strictly legal in the means which they employ and they assert with perfect truth that they only aim at success by lawful expedience. The difference which exists between the Americans is that there are numerous parties so diametrically opposed to the majority that they can never hope to acquire its support and at the same time they think they are sufficiently strong in themselves to struggle and defend their cause. When a party of this kind forms an association its object is not to conquer but to fight. In America the individuals who hold opinions very much opposed to those of the majority hope to win it over to their own principles in the end. The exercise of the right of association becomes dangerous in proportion to the impossibility which excludes great parties from acquiring the majority. In a country like the United States in which the differences of opinion are mere differences of hue the right of association may remain unrestrained without evil consequences. The inexperience of many of the European nations of association as a right of attacking the government the first notion which presents itself to a party as well as to an individual when it has acquired a consciousness of its own strength is that of violence the notion of persuasion arises at a later period and is only derived from experience the English who are divided into parties which differ most essentially from each other rarely abuse the right of association so intense that there is no undertaking so mad or so injurious to the welfare of the state that a man does not consider himself honored in defending it at the risk of his life but perhaps the most powerful of the causes which tend to mitigate the excesses of political association in the United States is universal suffrage in countries in which universal suffrage exists the majority is never doubtful because neither party nor society the associations which are formed are aware as well as the nation at large that they do not represent the majority this is indeed a condition inseparable from their existence for if they did represent the preponderating power they would change the law instead of soliciting its reform the consequence of this is that the moral influence of the government which they attack the associations which do not affect to represent the majority or which do not believe that they represented this conviction or this pretension tends to augment their force amazingly and contributes no less to legalize their measures violence may seem to be excusable in defense of the cause of oppressed right thus it is in the vast labyrinth of human laws that extreme liberty sometimes corrects the abuses of license and that extreme democracy as well as the dangers of democratic government in europe associations consider themselves in some degree as the legislative and executive councils of the people which is unable to speak for itself in america where they only represent a minority of the population they argue and they petition the means which the associations of europe employ are in accordance with the end which they propose to obtain as the principal aim of those bodies is to act and not to debate which naturally led to adopt a form of organization which differs from the ordinary customs of civil bodies and which assumes the habits and the maxims of military life they centralize the direction of their resources as much as possible and they entrust the powers of the whole party to a very small number of leaders the members of these associations respond to a watchword like soldiers on duty they profess the doctrine of free will and the tyrannical control which these societies exercise is often far more unsupportable than the authority possessed over society by the government which they attack their moral force is much diminished by these excesses and they lose the powerful interest which is always excited by a struggle between oppressors and the oppressed the man who in given cases consents to obey his fellows to rank as a free citizen the Americans have also established certain forms of government which are applied to their associations but these are invariably borrowed from the forms of the civil administration the independence of each individual is formally recognized the tendency of the members of the association points as it does in the body of the community towards the same end but they are not obliged to follow the same track no one abdures the exercise and that will for the benefit of a common undertaking End of Section 19 This is a LibriVox recording All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org Recording by Leon Meyer Democracy in America Volume 1 by Alexis de Tocqueville Translated by Henry Reeve Chapter 13 Chapter 1 Government of the Democracy in America I am well aware of the difficulties which attend this part of my subject but although every expression which I am about to make use of may clash upon some one point with the feelings of the different parties which divide my country I shall speak my opinion with the most perfect openness In Europe we are at a loss how to judge the true character because in Europe two conflicting principles exist and we do not know what to attribute to the principles themselves and what to refer to the passions which they bring into collision Such however is not the case in America There the people reigns without any obstacle and it has no perils to dread and no injuries to avenge In America democracy is swayed by its own free propincities its course is natural and its activity is unrestrained and the United States consequently afford the most favorable opportunity of studying its real character and to know people can this inquiry be more vitally interesting than to the French nation which is blindly driven onwards by a daily and irresistible impulse towards a state of things which may prove either despotic or republican but which will assuredly be democratic Universal Suffrage I have already observed that universal suffrage has been adopted in all the states of the Union it consequently occurs amongst different populations which occupy very different positions in the scale of society I have had opportunities of observing its effects in different localities and amongst races of men who are nearly strangers to each other by their language, their religion and their manner of life in Louisiana as well as in New England and Georgia and in Canada I have remarked that universal suffrage affects America either all the good or all the evil consequences which are assigned to it in Europe and that its effects differ very widely from those which are usually attributed to it choice of the people and instinctive preferences of the American democracy in the United States the most able men are rarely placed at the head of affairs reason of this peculiarity the envy which prevails in the lower orders of France for what reason the most distinguished men in America frequently seclude themselves from public affairs many people in Europe are apt to believe without saying it or to say without believing it that one of the great advantages of universal suffrage is that it entrusts the direction of public affairs to men who are worthy of the public confidence they admit that the people is unable to govern for itself but they aver that it is and that it instinctively designates those persons who are animated by the same good wishes and who are the most fit to wield the supreme authority I confess that the observations I made in America by no means coincide with these opinions on my arrival in the United States I was surprised to find so much distinguished talent among the subjects and so little among the heads of the government it is a well authenticated fact that the present day the most able men in the United States are very rarely placed at the head of affairs and it must be acknowledged that such has been the result in proportion as democracy has outstepped all its former limits the race of American statesmen has evidently dwindled most remarkably in the course of the last 50 years several causes may be assigned to this phenomenon it is impossible notwithstanding the most strenuous exertions of the intelligence of the people above a certain level whatever may be the facilities of acquiring information whatever may be the profusion of easy methods and of cheap science the human mind can never be instructed and educated without devoting a considerable space of time to those objects the greater or the lesser possibility of subsisting without labor is therefore the necessary boundary of intellectual improvement this boundary is more remote in some countries and more restricted in others but it must exist somewhere in order to procure the means of physical subsistence that is to say as long as it retains its popular character it is therefore quite as difficult to imagine a state in which all the citizens should be very well informed as a state in which they should all be wealthy these two difficulties may be looked upon as correlative it may very readily be admitted that the mass of the citizens are sincerely disposed to promote the welfare of their country nay more it may even be allowed that the lower classes are less apt to be swayed by considerations of personal interest than the higher orders but it is always more or less impossible for them to discern the best means of attaining the end which they desire with sincerity long and patient observation joined to a multitude of different notions is required to form a just estimate of the character of a single individual and can it be supposed that the vulgar had the power of succeeding in an inquiry which misleads the penetration of genius itself the people has neither the time nor the means which are essential to the prosecution of an investigation of this kind its conclusions are hastily formed from a superficial inspection of the more prominent features of a question which is linked in a sense to the clamor of a mount a bank who knows the secret of stimulating its tastes while its truest friends frequently fail in their exertions moreover the democracy is not only deficient in that soundness of judgment which is necessary to select men really deserving of its confidence but it has neither the desire nor the inclination to find them out it cannot be denied to promote the feeling of envy in the human heart not so much because they afford to everyone the means of rising to the level of any of his fellow citizens as because those means perpetually disappoint the persons who employ them democratic institutions awaken and foster a passion for equality which they can never entirely satisfy this complete equality eludes the grasp of the people at the very moment is, as Pascal says, with eternal flight the people is excited in the pursuit of an advantage which is more precious because it is not sufficiently remote to be unknown or sufficiently near to be enjoyed the lower orders are agitated by the chance of success they are irritated by its uncertainty and they pass from the enthusiasm of pursuit to the exhaustion of ill success and lastly whatever transcends their own limits appears to be an obstacle to their desires and there is no kind of superiority however legitimate it may be which is not irksome in their sight it has been supposed that the secret instinct which leads the lower orders to remove their superiors as much as possible from the direction of public affairs is peculiar to France this however is an error it is not inherent in any particular nation but in democratic institutions in general and although it may have been heightened by peculiar political circumstances it owes its origin to a higher cause in the United States the people is not disposed to hate the superior classes of society but it is not very favorably inclined towards them and it carefully excludes them from the exercise of authority and does not entertain any dread of distinguished talents but it is rarely captivated by them and it awards its approbation very sparingly to such as have risen without the popular support whilst the natural propensities of democracy induce the people to reject the most distinguished citizens as its rulers these individuals are no less apt to retire from a political career in which it is almost impossible to retain themselves this opinion has been very candidly set forth by Chancellor Kent who says in speaking with great eulogiums of that part of the constitution which empowers the executive to nominate the judges quote it is indeed probable that the men who are best fitted to discharge the duties of this high office would have too much reserve in their manners and too much austerity in their principles for them to be returned to be at an election where universal suffrage is adopted unquote such were the opinions which were printed without contradiction in America in the year 1830 I hold it to be sufficiently demonstrated that universal suffrage is by no means a guarantee of the wisdom of the popular choice and that whatever its advantages may be this is not one of them causes which may partly correct these tendencies of the democracy and the military effects produced on peoples as well as on individuals by great dangers why so many distinguished men stood at the head of affairs in America 50 years ago influence which the intelligence and manners of the people exercise upon its choice example of New England states of the south west influence of certain laws upon the choice of the people election by an elected body its effects upon the composition of the Senate when a state is threatened by serious dangers the people frequently succeeds in selecting the citizens who are the most able to save it it has been observed that man rarely retains his customary level in presence of very critical circumstances he rises above or he sinks below his usual condition and the same thing occurs in nations at large the people sometimes quench the energy of the people instead of stimulating it they excite without directing its passions and instead of clearing they confuse its powers of perception the Jews deluge the smoking ruins of their temple with the carnage of the remnant of their host but it is more common both in the case of nations and in that of individuals to find extraordinary virtues the characters are then thrown into relief as edifices which are concealed by the gloom of night are illuminated by the glare of a conflagration at those dangerous times genius no longer abstains from presenting itself in the arena and the people alarmed by the perils of its situation buries its envious passions in a short oblivion great names may then be drawn from the balloting box I have already observed at the present day are very inferior to those who stood at the head of affairs 50 years ago this is as much a consequence of the circumstances as of the laws of the country when America was struggling in the high cause of independence to throw off the yoke of another country and when it was about to usher a new nation into the world the spirits of its inhabitants were roused to the height which their great efforts required and the excitement the most distinguished men were ready to forestall the ones of the community and the people clung to them for support and placed them at its head but events of this magnitude are rare and it is from an inspection of the ordinary course of affairs that our judgment must be formed if passing occurrences sometimes act as checks upon the passions of democracy the intelligence and the manners of the community are more powerful and far more permanent this is extremely perceptible in the United States in New England the education and the liberties of the communities were engendered by the moral and religious principles of their founders where society has acquired a sufficient degree of stability to enable it to hold certain maxims and to retain fixed habits the lower orders are accustomed although they said at naught all those privileges which wealth and birth have introduced among mankind the democracy in New England consequently makes a more judicious choice than it does elsewhere but as we descend towards the south to those states in which the constitution of society is more modern and less strong where instruction is less general and where the principles of morality, of religion are less happily combined we perceive that the talents and the virtues of those who are in authority become more and more rare lastly when we arrive at the new southwestern states in which the constitution of society dates but from yesterday and presents an agglomeration of adventurers and speculators we are amazed at the persons who are invested with public authority and we are led to ask by what force to the people who direct it the state can be protected and society be made to flourish there are certain laws of a democratic nature which contribute nevertheless to correct in some measure the dangerous tendencies of democracy on entering the house of representatives of Washington one is struck by the vulgar demeanor of that great assembly the eye frequently does not discover a man of celebrity the members are almost all obscure individuals whose names present no associations to the mind they are mostly village lawyers men in trade or even persons belonging to the lower classes of society in a country in which education is very general it is said that the representatives of the people do not always know how to write correctly at a few yards distance from this spot is the door to the large proportion of the celebrated men of America scarcely an individual is to be perceived in it who does not recall the idea of an active and illustrious career the senate is composed of eloquent advocates distinguished generals wise magistrates and statesmen of note whose language would at all times do honor to the most remarkable parliamentary debates of Europe what then is the cause to be found in one assembly rather than in the other why is the former body remarkable for its vulgarity and its poverty of talent whilst the latter seems to enjoy a monopoly of intelligence and of sound judgment both of these assemblies emanate from the people both of them are chosen by universal suffrage and no voice has hitherto been heard to a certain America that the senate is hostile and from what cause then does so startling a difference arise the only reason which appears to me adequately to account for it is that the house of representatives is elected by the populace directly and that the senate is elected by elected bodies the whole body of the citizens names the legislature of each state and the federal constitution converts these legislatures into so many electoral bodies which return the members of the senate are elected by an indirect application of universal suffrage for the legislatures which name them are not aristocratic or privileged bodies which exercise the electoral franchise in their own right but they are chosen by the totality of the citizens they are generally elected every year and new members may constantly be chosen who will employ their electoral rights in conformity with the wishes of the public but this transmission in an assembly of chosen men operates an important change in it by refining its discretion and improving the forms which it adopts men who are chosen in this manner accurately represent the majority of the nation which governs them but they represent the elevated thoughts which are current in the community the propensities which prompt its nobler actions rather than the petty passions which disturb or the vices which disgrace it the time may be already anticipated at which the American republics will be obliged to introduce the plan of election by an elected body more frequently into their system of representation or they will incur no small risk of perishing miserably amongst the shoals of democracy and here I have no scruple in confessing that I look upon this peculiar system of election as the only means of bringing the exercise of political power to the level of all classes of the people those thinkers who regard this institution as the exclusive weapon of a party and those who fear on the other hand to make use of it seem to me to fall into as great an error in the one case as in the other influence which the American democracy has exercised on the laws relating to elections when elections are rare they expose the state to a violent crisis when they are frequent in the category of feverish excitement the Americans prefer the second of these two evils mutability of the laws opinions of Hamilton and Jefferson on this subject when elections recur at long intervals the state is exposed to violent agitation every time they take place parties exert themselves to the utmost in order to gain a prize which is so rarely within their reach and as the evil is almost irremediable for the candidates who fail the consequences of their disappointed ambition may prove most disastrous if on the other hand the legal struggle can be repeated within a short space of time the defeated parties take patience when elections occur frequently their recurrence keeps society in a perpetual state of feverish excitement and in parts a continual instability to public affairs thus on the one hand the state is exposed to the perils of revolution on the other to perpetual mutability the former system threatens the very existence of the government the latter is an obstacle to all steady and consistent policy the Americans have preferred the second of these evils to the first but they were led to this conclusion by their instincts much more than by their reason for a taste for variety is one of the characteristic passions of democracy an extraordinary mutability has by this means been introduced into their legislation many of the Americans consider the instability of their laws as a necessary consequence of a system whose general results are beneficial but no one in the United States affects to deny the fact of this instability or to contend that it is not a great evil Hamilton after having demonstrated the utility of a power which might prevent or which might at least impede the promulgation of bad laws adds quote it might perhaps be said that the power of preventing bad laws includes that of preventing good ones and may be used to the one purpose as well as to the other but this objection will have little weight with those who can properly estimate the mischiefs of that inconstancy and mutability in the laws which form the greatest character and genius of our governments unquote federalist number 73 and again in number 62 of the same work he observes quote the facility and excess of lawmaking seem to be the diseases to which our governments are most liable the mischievous effects of the mutability in the public councils arising from a rapid succession of new members would fill a volume every new election in the states is found to change one half of the representatives from this change of men must proceed a change of opinions and of measures which forfeits the respect and confidence of other nations poisons the blessings of liberty itself and diminishes the attachment and reverence of the people toward a political system which betrays so many marks of infirmity unquote Jefferson himself the greatest democrat whom the democracy of America has yet produced pointed out the same evils the instability of our laws said he in a letter to Madison is really a very serious inconvenience I think that we ought to have obviated it by deciding that a whole year should always be allowed to elapse between the bringing in of a bill and the final passing of it it should afterward be discussed and put to the vote without the possibility of making any alteration in it and if the circumstances of the case required a more speedy decision the question should not be decided by a simple majority but by a majority of at least two thirds of both houses public officers under the control of the democracy in America simple exterior of the American public officers no official costume all public officers are remunerated political consequences of this system no public career exists in America result of this public officers in the United States are commingled with a crowd of citizens they have neither palaces nor guards nor ceremonial costumes this simple exterior of the persons and authority is connected not only with the peculiarities of the American character but with the fundamental principles of that society in the estimation of the democracy the government is not a benefit but a necessary evil a certain degree of power must be granted to the public officers for they would be of no use without it but the ostensible semblance of authority is by no means indispensable to the conduct of affairs and it is needlessly offensive to the susceptibility of the public the public officers themselves are well aware that they only enjoy the superiority over their fellow citizens which they derive from their authority of putting themselves on a level with the whole community by their manners a public officer in the United States is uniformly civil accessible to all the world attentive to all requests and obliging in his replies I was pleased by these characteristics of a democratic government and I was struck by the manly independence of the citizens who respect the office more than the officer and who are less attached to the emblems of authority and who bears them I am inclined to believe that the influence which costumes really exercise in an age like that in which we live has been a good deal exaggerated I never perceived that a public officer in America was the less respected whilst he was in the discharge of his duties because his own merit was set off by no adventitious signs on the other hand it is very doubtful whether a peculiar dress to the respect which public characters ought to have for their own position at least when they are not otherwise inclined to respect it when a magistrate and in France such instances are not rare indulges his trivial wit at the expense of the prisoner or derides the predicament in which a culprit is placed it would be well to deprive him of his robes of office to see whether he would recall some portion of the natural dignity of mankind a democracy may however allow a certain show of magisterial pomp and clothe its officers in silks and gold without seriously compromising its principles privileges of this kind are transitory they belong to the place and are distinct from the individual but if public officers are not uniformly remunerated by the state the public charges must be entrusted by the citizens and independence who constitute the basis of an aristocracy and if the people still retains its right of election that election can only be made from a certain class of citizens when a democratic republic renders offices which had formerly been remunerated gratuitous it may safely be believed that the state is advancing to monarchical institutions and when a monarchy begins to be paid it is a sure sign that it is approaching toward a despotic or a republican form of government the substitution of paid for unpaid functionaries is of itself in my opinion sufficient to constitute a serious revolution I look upon the entire absence of gratuitous functionaries in America as one of the most prominent signs of the absolute dominion which democracy exercises of whatsoever nature they may be are paid so that everyone has not merely the right but also the means of performing them although in democratic states all the citizens are qualified to occupy stations in the government all are not tempted to try for them the number and the capacities of the candidates are more apt to restrict the choice of electors than the connections of the candidate ship in nations in which the principle of election extends to every place in the state no political career can properly speaking be said to exist men are promoted as if by chance to the rank which they enjoy and they are by no means sure of retaining it the consequence is that in tranquil times public functions offer but few lures to ambition in the United States the persons who engage in the perplexities of political life are individuals of very moderate pretensions the pursuit of wealth generally diverts men of great talents and of great passions from the pursuit of power and it very frequently happens that a man does not undertake to direct the fortune of the state until he has discovered his incompetence to conduct his own affairs the vast number of very ordinary men who occupy public stations is quite as attributable to these causes as a bad choice of the democracy in the United States I am not sure that the people would return the men of superior abilities who might solicit its support but it is certain that men of this description do not come forward arbitrary power of magistrates under the rule of the American democracy for what reason the arbitrary power of magistrates is greater in absolute monarchies and in democratic republics than it is in limited monarchies the arbitrary power of the magistrates in New England in two different kinds of government the magistrates exercise a considerable degree of arbitrary power namely under the absolute government of a single individual and under that of a democracy this identical result proceeds from causes which are nearly analogous in despotic states the fortune of no citizen is secure and public officers are more safe than private individuals the sovereign who has under his control the lives, the property and sometimes the honor of the men whom he employs does not scruple to allow them a great latitude of action because he is convinced that they will not use it to his prejudice in despotic states the sovereign is so attached to the exercise of his power that he dislikes the constraint even of his own regulations to do it as line of conduct provided he be certain that their actions will never counteract his desires in democracies as the majority has every year the right of depriving the officers whom it is appointed of their power it has no reason to fear any abuse of their authority as the people is always able to signify its wishes to those who conduct the government it prefers leaving them to make their own exertions once feather their activity and the popular authority it may even be observed on attentive consideration that under the rule of a democracy the arbitrary power of the magistrate must be still greater than in despotic states in the latter the sovereign has the power of punishing all the faults with which he becomes acquainted but it would be vain for him to hope to become acquainted with all those which are committed by the supreme but it is universally present the American functionaries are in point of fact much more independent in the sphere of action which the law traces out for them than any public officer in Europe very frequently the object which they are to accomplish is simply pointed out to them and the choice of the means is left to their own discretion in New England for instance the select men of each township draw up the list of persons who are to serve on the jury the only rule which is laid down to guide them in their choice is that they are to select citizens possessing the elective franchise and enjoying a fair reputation in France the lives and liberties of the subjects would be thought to be in danger if a public officer of any kind was entrusted with so formidable a right in New England the same magistrates are empowered by the names of habitual drunkards in public houses and to prohibit the inhabitants of a town from supplying them with liquor a sensorial power of this excessive kind would be revolting to the population of the most absolute monarchies here however it is submitted to without difficulty nowhere has so much been left by the law to the arbitrary determination of the magistrate as in democratic republics because this arbitrary power would lead to many alarming consequences it may even be asserted that the freedom of the magistrate increases as the elective franchise is extended and as the duration of the time of office is shortened hence arises the great difficulty which attends the conversion of a democratic republic into a monarchy the magistrate ceases to be elective but he retains the rights and the habits of an elected officer which lead directly to despotism it is only in limited monarchies that the law which prescribes the sphere in which public officers are to act super intends all their measures the cause of this may be easily detected in limited monarchies the power is divided between the king and the people both of whom are interested in the stability of the magistrate the king does not venture to place the public officers under the control of the people on the other hand the people fears less the magistrate should serve to oppress the liberties of the country if they were entirely dependent upon the crown they cannot therefore be said to depend on either one or the other the same cause which induces the king and the people to render public officers independent suggests the necessity of such securities as may prevent their independence from encroaching upon the authority of the former and the liberties of the latter they consequently agree as to the necessity of restricting the functionary to a line of conduct laid down beforehand and they are interested in confining him by certain regulations which he cannot evade end of chapter 13 part 1 this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org Recording by Leon Meyer Democracy in America Volume 1 by Alexis de Tocqueville translated by Henry Reeve Chapter 13 Part 2 Government of the Democracy in America Instability of the Administration in the United States In America the public acts of a community and the occurrences of a family newspapers the only historical remains instability of the administration prejudicial to the art of government the authority which public men possess in America is so brief and they are so soon commingled with the ever changing population of the country that the acts of a community frequently leave fewer traces than the occurrences of a private family the public administration is so to speak oral and traditionary that it is not permitted to writing and that little is wafted away forever like the leaves of the civil by the smallest breeze the only historical remains in the United States are the newspapers but if a number be wanting the chain of time is broken and the present is severed from the past I am convinced that in 50 years it will be more difficult to collect authentic documents concerning the social condition of the Americans at the present day than it is to find remains that the states were ever invaded by barbarians it would be necessary to have recourse of the history of other nations in order to learn anything of the people which now inhabits them the instability of the administration has penetrated into the habits of the people it even appears to suit the general taste and no one cares for what occurred before his time no methodical system is pursued no archives are formed and no documents are brought together when it would be very easy to do so where they exist there are several papers several original public documents which are given to me in answer to some of my inquiries in America society seems to live from hand to mouth like an army in the field nevertheless the art of administration may undoubtedly be ranked as a science and no sciences can be improved if the discoveries and observations of successive generations are not connected together in the order in which they occur one man in the short space of his life remarks a fact that the art of administration the latter reduces the truth to a fixed proposition and mankind gathers the fruit of individual experience upon its way and gradually forms the sciences but the persons who conduct the administration in America can seldom afford any instruction to each other and when they assume the direction of society they simply possess those attainments which are most widely disseminated in the community and no experience peculiar to themselves democracy carried to its furthest limits is therefore prejudicial and for this reason it is better adapted to a people already versed in the conduct of an administration than to a nation which is uninitiated in public affairs this remark indeed is not exclusively applicable to the science of administration although a democratic government is founded upon a very simple and natural principle it always presupposes the existence of a high degree of culture and enlightenment in society at the first glance it may be imagined to belong to the earliest ages of the world that it could only come last in the succession of human history charges levied by the state under the rule of the American democracy in all communities citizens divisible into three classes habits of each of these classes in the direction of public finances why public expenditure must tend to increase when the people governs what renders the extravagance of a democracy less to be feared in America public expenditure under a democracy before we can affirm whether a democratic form of government is economical or not we must establish a suitable standard of comparison the question would be one of easy solution if we were to attempt to draw a parallel between a democratic republic and an absolute monarchy the public expenditure would be found to be more considerable under the former than under the latter such as the case with all free states compared to those which are not so it is certain that despotism ruins individuals by preventing them from producing wealth much more than by depriving them of the wealth which they have produced it dries up the source of riches willst it usually respects acquired property freedom on the contrary engenders far more benefits than it destroys in the nations which are favored by free institutions invariably fine that their resources increase even more rapidly than their taxes my present object is to compare free nations to each other and to point out the influence of democracy upon the finances of a state communities as well as organic bodies are subject to certain fixed rules in their formation which they cannot evade they are composed of certain elements which are common to them at all times and under all circumstances the people may always be mentally divided into three distinct classes the first of these classes consists of the wealthy the second of those who are in easy circumstances and the third is composed of those who have little or no property and who subsist more especially by the work which they perform for the two superior orders the proportion of the individuals who are included in these three divisions may vary according to the condition of society but the divisions themselves can never be obliterated it is evident that each of these three classes will exercise an influence peculiar to its own propensities upon the administration of the finances of the state after the three exclusively possesses the legislative power it is probable that it will not be sparing of the public funds because the taxes which are levied on a large fortune only tend to diminish the sum of superfluous enjoyment and are in point of fact but little felt if the second class has the power of making the laws it will certainly not be lavish of taxes because nothing is so onerous as a large in post which is levied upon a small income the government of the middle classes is very economical though perhaps not the most enlightened and certainly not the most generous of free governments but now let us suppose that the legislative authority is vested in the lowest orders there are two striking reasons which show that the tendency the expenditure will be to increase not to diminish as the great majority of those who create the laws are possessed of no property upon which taxes can be imposed but those who are possessed of some little property readily find means of regulating the taxes so that they are burdensome to the wealthy and profitable to the poor although the rich are unable to take the same advantage when they are in possession of the government in countries in which the poor should be exclusively invested with the power of making the laws no great economy of public expenditure ought to be expected that expenditure will always be considerable either because the taxes do not weigh upon those who levy them or not to weigh upon those classes in other words the government of the democracy is the only one under which the power which lays on taxes escapes the payment of them it may be objected but the argument has no real weight that the true interest of the people is indissolubly connected with that of the wealthier portion of the community since it cannot but suffer by the severe measures to which it resorts but is not the true interest of kings to render their subjects happy with nobles to admit recruits into their order and suitable grounds if remote advantages had power to prevail over the passions and exigencies of the moment no such thing as a tyrannical sovereign or an exclusive aristocracy could ever exist again it may be objected that the poor are never invested with the sole power of making the laws but I reply that wherever universal suffrage has been established the majority of the community should be proved that the poor always constitute the majority it may be added with perfect truth that in the countries in which they possess the elective franchise they possess the sole power of making laws but it is certain that in all the nations of the world the greater number has always consisted of those persons who hold no property or of those whose property is insufficient to exempt them from the necessity of working in order to procure an easy subsistence and to fact invest the poor with a government of society the disastrous influence which popular authority may sometimes exercise upon the finances of a state was very clearly seen in some of the democratic republics of antiquity in which the public treasure was exhausted in order to relieve indigent citizens or to supply the games and theatrical amusements of the populace it is true that the representative system was then very imperfectly known that at the present time the influence of popular passion is less felt in the conduct of public affairs but it may be believed that the delegate will in the end conform to the principles of his constituents and favor their propensities as much as their interests the extravagance of democracy is however less to be dreaded in proportion as the people acquires a share of property because on the one hand the contributions of the rich are then less needed especially on taxes which do not affect the interests of the lower classes on this account universal suffrage would be less dangerous in France than in England because in the latter country the property on which taxes may be levied is vested in fewer hands America where the great majority of the citizens possess some fortune is in a still more favorable position than France there are still further causes when the aristocracy governs the individuals who conduct the affairs of state are exempted by their own station in society from every kind of privation they are contented with their position power and renown are the objects for which they strive and as they are placed far above the obscure throng of citizens they do not always distinctly perceive how the well-being of the mass of the people ought to redown to their own honor they are not indeed callous to the sufferings of the poor but they cannot feel those miseries that they were themselves partakers of them provided that the people appear to submit to its lot the rulers are satisfied and they demand nothing further from the government an aristocracy is more intent upon the means of maintaining its influence than upon the means of improving its condition when on the contrary the people is invested with the supreme authority the perpetual sense of their own miseries impels the rulers of society to seek for perpetual ameliorations a thousand different objects are subjected to improvement the most trivial details are sought out as susceptible of amendment and those changes which are accompanied with considerable expense are more especially advocated since the object is to render the condition of the poor more tolerable who cannot pay for themselves moreover all democratic communities are agitated by an ill-defined excitement and by a kind of feverish impatience that engender a multitude of innovations almost all of which are attended with expense in monarchies and aristocracies the natural taste which the rulers have for power and for renown is stimulated by the promptings of ambition and they are frequently incited by these temptations to a very costly undertakings in democracies where the rulers labor under privations they can only be courted by such means as improve their well-being and these improvements when a people begins to reflect upon its situation it discovers a multitude of wants to which it had not been before subject and to satisfy these exigencies recourse must be had to the coffers of the state hence it arises that the public charges increase in proportion as civilization spreads and that imposts are augmented as knowledge pervades the community the last cause which frequently renders a democratic government dear than any other is that a democracy does not always succeed in moderating its expenditure because it does not understand the art of being economical as the designs which it entertains are frequently changed and the agents of those designs are still more frequently removed its undertakings are often ill-conducted or left unfinished in the former case the state spends some out of all proportion to the end which it proposes to accomplish in the second the expense itself is unprofitable the American democracy as regards the salaries of public officers in the democracies those who establish high salaries have no chance of profiting by them tendency of the American democracy to increase the salaries of subordinate officers and to lower those of the more important functionaries reason of this comparative statement of the salaries of public officers in the United States and in France there is a powerful reason for these salaries to economize upon the salaries of public officers as the number of citizens who dispense the remuneration is extremely large in democratic countries so the number of persons who can help to be benefited by the receipt of it is comparatively small in aristocratic countries on the contrary the individuals who fix high salaries have almost always a vague hope of profiting by them these appointments may be looked upon as a capital which they create it must however be allowed that a democratic state is most parsimonious towards its principal agents in America the secondary officers are much better paid and the dignitaries of the administration much worse than they are elsewhere these opposite effects result from the same cause the people fixes the salaries of the public officers in both cases and the scale of remuneration is determined by the consideration of its own wants should be placed in the same easy circumstances as the public itself but when the question turns upon the salaries of the great officers of state this rule fails and chance alone can guide the popular decision the poor have no adequate conception of the ones which the higher classes of society may feel the sum which is scanty to the rich appears enormous to the poor man whose wants do not extend beyond the necessaries of life and in his estimation a state with his twelve or fifteen hundred dollars a year is a very fortunate and enviable being if you undertake to convince him that the representative of a great people ought to be able to maintain some show of splendor in the eyes of foreign nations he will perhaps assent to your meaning but when he reflects on his own humble dwelling and on the hard earned produce of his worrisome toil he remembers all that he could do with the salary which you say is insufficient and he has startled the common wealth besides the secondary public officer is almost on a level with the people whilst the others are raised above it the former may therefore excite his interest but the latter begins to arouse his envy this is very clearly seen in the United States where the salaries seem to decrease as the authority of those who receive them augments under the rule of an aristocracy it frequently happens on the contrary that whilst the high officers are receiving magnificent salaries the inferior ones have not more than enough to procure the necessaries of life the reason of this fact is easily discoverable from causes very analogous to those which I have just alluded if a democracy is unable to conceive the pleasures of the rich or to witness them without envy an aristocracy is slow to understand or to speak more correctly is unacquainted with the privations of the poor the poor man is not the fellow of the rich one but he is a being of another species an aristocracy is therefore apt to care but little for the fate of its subordinate agents and their salaries are only raised when they refuse to perform their service for too scanty or immuneration it is the parsimonious conduct of democracy towards its principal officers which is countenance to supposition of far more economical propensities than any which it really possesses it is true that it scarcely allows the means of honorable subsistence of individuals who conduct its affairs but enormous sums are lavish to meet the exigencies or to facilitate the enjoyments of the people the money raised by taxation may be better employed but it is not saved in general democracy gives largely to the community and very sparingly to those who govern it the reverse is the case in aristocratic countries where the money of the state is expended to the profit of the persons who are at the head of affairs difficulty of distinguishing the causes which contribute to the economy of the American government we are liable to frequent errors and the research of those facts which exercise a serious influence upon the fate of mankind since nothing is more difficult than to appreciate their real value one people is naturally inconsistent and enthusiastic another is sober and calculating and these characteristics originate in their physical constitution or in remote causes with which we are unacquainted these are nations which are fond of parade and the bustle of festivity and which do not regret the costly gayities of an hour others on the contrary are attached to more retiring pleasures and seem almost ashamed of appearing to be pleased in some countries the highest value is set upon the beauty of public edifices in others the productions of art are treated with indifference and everything which is unproductive and some renown in others money is the ruling passion independently of the laws all these causes concur to exercise a very powerful influence upon the conduct of the finances of the state if the Americans never spend the money of the people in galas it is not only because the imposition of taxes is under the control of the people but because the people takes no delight in public rejoicings if they repudiate all ornament from their architecture and their homely advantages it is not only because they live under democratic institutions but because they are a commercial nation the habits of private life are continued in public and we ought carefully to distinguish that economy which depends upon their institutions from that which is the natural result of their manners and customs whether the expenditure of the United States can be compared to that of France two points to be established in order to estimate the extent of the wealth and the rate of taxation the wealth and the charges of France not accurately known why the wealth and charges of the Union cannot be accurately known researchers of the author with a view to discover the amount of taxation in Pennsylvania general symptoms which may serve to indicate the amount of the public charges in a given nation result of this investigation for the Union many attempts have recently been made to compare the public expenditure of that country with the expenditure of the United States all these attempts have however been unattended by success and a few words will suffice to show that they could not have had a satisfactory result in order to estimate the amount of the public charges of a people two preliminaries are indispensable it is necessary in the first place to know the wealth of that people and in the second to learn what portion of that wealth and the amount of taxation without showing the resources which are destined to meet the demand is to undertake a feudal labor for it is not the expenditure but the relation of the expenditure to the revenue which it is desirable to know the same rate of taxation which may be easily supported by a wealthy contributor will reduce a poor one to extreme misery the wealth of nations is composed of several distinct elements of which population is the first to be the third the first of these three elements may be discovered without difficulty among civilized nations it is easy to obtain an accurate sense of the inhabitants but the two others cannot be determined with so much facility it is difficult to take an exact amount of all the lands in a country which are under cultivation with their natural or their acquired value and it is still more impossible to estimate the entire personal property which is at the disposal of a nation or a city and number of shapes under which it may occur and indeed we find that the most ancient civilized nations of Europe including even those in which the administration is most central have not succeeded as yet in determining the exact condition of their wealth in America the attempt has never been made for how would such an investigation be possible in a country where society has not yet settled into habits of regularity and tranquility whose exertions it can command and direct to one soul end and where statistics are not studied because no one is able to collect the necessary documents or to find time to peruse them thus the primary elements of the calculations which have been made in France cannot be obtained in the Union the relative wealth of the two countries is unknown the property of the former is not accurately determined and no means exist of computing for the sake of discussion to abandon this necessary term of the comparison and I can find myself to a computation of the actual amount of taxation without investigating the relation which subsists between the taxation and the revenue but the reader will perceive that my task has not been facilitated by the limits which I here lay down for my researches it cannot be doubted that the central administration of France assisted by all the public in direct and indirect taxis levied upon its citizens but this investigation which no private individual can undertake has not hitherto been completed by the French government or at least its results have not been made public we are acquainted with some total of the charges of the state we know the amount of the departmental expenditure but the expenses of the communal divisions have not been computed and the amount of the public expenses and to America we shall perceive that the difficulties are multiplied and enhanced the union publishes an exact return of the amount of its expenditure the budgets of the four and twenty states furnish similar returns of their revenues but the expenses incident to the affairs of the counties and the townships are unknown the authority of the federal government cannot oblige the provincial governments to throw any light upon this point and even if these governments were inclined to afford their simultaneous cooperation it may be doubted whether they possess the means of procuring a satisfactory answer independently of the natural difficulties of the task the political organization of the country would act as a hindrance to the success of their efforts the county and town magistrates are not appointed by the authorities of the state and they are not subjected to their control it is therefore very allowable to suppose that if the state were desirous of obtaining the returns which we require they would be appointed by the neglected those subordinate officers whom it would be obliged to employ it is in point of fact useless to inquire what the Americans might do to forward this inquiry since it is certain that they have hitherto done nothing at all there does not exist a single individual at the present day in America or in Europe who can inform us what each citizen of the union annually contributes to the public charges of the nation hence we must conclude then it is to estimate the relative wealth of France and America I will even add that it would be dangerous to attempt this comparison for when statistics are not based upon computations which are strictly accurate they mislead instead of guiding a right the mind is easily imposed upon by the false affectation of exactness which prevails even in the misstatements of science and it adopts of confidence errors which are dressed in the forms of mathematical truth or our numerical investigation with the hope of meeting with data of another kind in the absence of positive documents we may form an opinion as to the proportion which the taxation of a people bears to its real prosperity by observing whether its external appearance is flourishing whether after having discharged the cause of the state the poor man retains the means of subsistence and the rich the means of enjoyment and whether both classes are contented with their position of substantial exertions so that industry is never in want of capital nor capital unemployed by industry the observer who draws his inferences from these signs will undoubtedly be led to the conclusion that the American of the United States contributes a much smaller portion of his income to the state than the citizen of France nor indeed can the result be otherwise a portion of the French debt is the consequence of two successive invasions and the union has no similar calamity to fear a nation placed upon the continent of Europe is obliged to maintain a large standing army the isolated position in the union enables it to have only 6,000 soldiers the French have a fleet of 300 sale the Americans have 52 vessels how then can the inhabitants of the union be called upon to contribute as largely as the inhabitants of France no parallel can be drawn between the finances of two countries so differently situated it is by examining what actually takes place in the union and not by comparing the union with France that we may discover whether the American government is really economical on casting my eyes over the different republics which form the confederation I perceive that their governments lack perseverance in their undertakings and that they exercise no steady control over the men whom they employ whence I naturally infer that they must often spend the money of the people to no purpose or to consume more of it great efforts are made in accordance with the democratic origin of society to satisfy the exigencies of the lower orders to open the career of power to their endeavors and to diffuse knowledge and comfort amongst them the poor are maintained immense sums are annually devoted to public instruction all services what so ever are immunerated and the most subordinate agents are liberally paid if this kind of government appears to me to be useful and rational it is nevertheless constrained to admit that it is expensive wherever the poor direct public affairs and dispose of the national resources it appears certain that as they profit by the expenditure of the state they are apt to augment that expenditure I conclude therefore without having resource to inaccurate computations and without hazarding a comparison which might prove incorrect that the democratic government to the Americans is not a cheap government as is sometimes asserted and I have no hesitation in predicting that if the people of the United States is ever involved in serious difficulties it's taxation will speedily be increased to the rate of that which prevails in the greater part of the aristocracies and the monarchies of Europe End of Chapter 13 Part 13