 Question 2, Part 2, of Summa Theologica Terziapars, Trietis on the Saviour. This is the LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Summa Theologica Terziapars, Trietis on the Saviour by St. Thomas Aquinas, translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Question 2, of the mode of union of the word incarnate, in 12 articles. Part 2, articles 6 through 12. 6th article, whether the human nature was united to the word of God accidentally. Objection 1, it would seem that the human nature was united to the word of God accidentally. For the apostle says in Philippians 2.7 of the Son of God that he was in habit found as a man. But habit is accidentally associated with that to which it pertains, whether habit be taken for one of the ten categories or as a species of quality. Therefore, human nature is accidentally united to the Son of God. Objection 2, further. Whatever comes to a thing that is complete in being comes to it accidentally. For an accident is said to be what can come or go without the subject being corrupted. But human nature came to Christ in time, who had perfect being from eternity. Therefore it came to him accidentally. Objection 3, further. Whatever does not pertain to the nature or the essence of a thing is its accident. For whatever is is either a substance or an accident. But human nature does not pertain to the divine essence or nature of the Son of God, for the union did not take place in the nature as was said above in article 1. Hence the human nature must have accrued accidentally to the Son of God. Objection 4, further. An instrument accrues accidentally. But the human nature was the instrument of the Godhead in Christ, for Damascene says in On the True Faith 315 that the flesh of Christ is the instrument of the Godhead. Therefore it seems that the human nature was united to the Son of God accidentally. On the contrary, whatever is predicated accidentally predicates not substance but quantity or quality or some other mode of being. If therefore the human nature accrues accidentally when we say Christ is man. We do not predicate substance but quality or quantity or some other mode of being which is contrary to the decretal of Pope Alexander III who says Since Christ is perfect God and perfect man, what foolhardiness have some to dare to affirm that Christ as man is not a substance? I answer that in evidence of this question. We must know that two heresies have arisen with regard to the mystery of the union of the two natures in Christ. The first confused the natures as Otuques and Dioscorus who held that from the two natures one nature resulted so that they confessed Christ to be from two natures which were distinct before the union but not in two natures the distinction of nature coming to an end after the union. The second was the heresy of Nestorius and Theodore of Moxvestia who separated the persons for they held the person of the Son of God to be distinct from the person of the Son of Man and said these were mutually united first by indwelling in as much as the word of God dwelt in the man as in a temple. Secondly by unity of intention in as much as the will of the man was always in agreement with the will of the word of God. Thirdly by operation in as much as they said the man was the instrument of the word of God. Fourthly by greatness of honor in as much as all honor shown to the Son of God was equally shown to the Son of Man on account of his union with the Son of God. Fifthly by equivocation that is communication of names in as much as we say that this man is God and the Son of God. Now it is plain that these modes imply an accidental union but some more recent masters thinking to avoid these heresies through ignorance fell into them for some conceded one person in Christ but maintained two hypothesis or supposita saying that a man composed of body and soul was from the beginning of his conception assumed by the word of God and this is the first opinion set down by the master in his sentences 3d6 but others desirous of keeping the unity of person held that the soul of Christ was not united to the body but that these two were mutually separate and were united to the word accidentally so that the number of persons might not be increased and this is the third opinion which the master sets down in his sentences 3d6 but both of these opinions fall into the heresy of Nestorius the first indeed because to maintain it to hypothesis or supposita in Christ is the same as to maintain two persons as we're shown above in article three and if stress is laid on the word person we must have in mind that even Nestorius spoke of unity of person on account of the unity of dignity and honor hence the fifth council Constantinople 2 in collection 8 canon 5 directs an anathema against such a one as holds one person in dignity honor and andoration as Theodore and Nestorius foolishly wrote but the other opinion falls into the error of Nestorius by maintaining an accidental union for there is no difference in saying that the word of God is united to the man Christ by indwelling as in his temple as Nestorius said or by putting on man as a garment which is the third opinion rather it says something worse than Nestorius to wit that the soul and body are not united now the catholic faith holding the mean between the aforesaid positions does not affirm that the union of God and man took place in the essence or nature nor yet in something accidental but midway in a subsistence or hypothesis hence in the fifth council Constantinople 2 in collection 8 canon 5 we read since the unity may be understood in many ways those who follow the impiety of Apollonaris and Eutuchus professing the destruction of what came together that is destroying both natures confess a union by mingling but the followers of Theodore and Nestorius maintaining division introduce a union of purpose but the holy church of God rejecting the impiety of both these treasons confesses a union of the word of God with flesh by composition which is in subsistence therefore it is plain that the second of the three opinions mentioned by the master in his sentences 3d6 which holds one hypothesis of God and man is not to be called an opinion but an article of catholic faith so likewise the first opinion which holds two hypotheses and the third which holds an accidental union are not to be styled opinions but heresies condemned by the church in councils reply to objection one as damasin says in on the true faith 326 examples need not be holy and at all points similar for what is wholly similar is the same and not an example and especially in divine things for it is impossible to find a wholly similar example in the theology that is in the godhead of persons and in the dispensation that is the mystery of the incarnation hence the human nature in christ is likened to a habit that is a garment not indeed in regard to accidental union but in as much as the word is seen by the human nature as a man by his garment and also in as much as the garment is changed for it is shaped according to the figure of him who puts it on and yet he is not changed from his form on account of the garment so likewise the human nature assumed by the word of god is ennobled but the word of god is not changed as agustin says in his 83 questions 73 reply to objection 2 whatever accrues after the completion of the being comes accidentally unless it be taken into communion with the complete being just as in the resurrection the body comes to the soul which pre-exists yet not accidentally because it is assumed unto the same being so that the body has vital being through the soul but it is not so with whiteness for the being of whiteness is other than the being of man to which whiteness comes but the word of god from all eternity had complete being in hypothesis or person while in time the human nature accrued to it not as if it were assumed unto one being in as much as this is of the nature even as the body is assumed to the being of the soul but to one being in as much as this is of the hypothesis or person hence the human nature is not accidentally united to the son of god reply to objection 3 accident is divided against substance now substance as is plain from metaphysics 525 is taken in two ways first for essence or nature secondly for suppositum or hypothesis hence the union having taken place in the hypothesis is enough to show that it is not an accidental union although the union did not take place in the nature reply to objection 4 not everything that is assumed as an instrument pertains to the hypotheses of the one who assumes as is plain in the case of a saw or a sword yet nothing prevents what is assumed into the unity of the hypotheses from being as an instrument even as the body of man or his members hence Nestorius held that the human nature was assumed by the word merely as an instrument and not into the unity of the hypothesis and therefore he did not concede that the man was really the son of god but his instrument hence Cyril says in his letter to the Egyptian monks the scripture does not affirm that this Emmanuel that is christ was assumed for the office of an instrument but as god truly humanized that is made man but damasin held that the human nature in christ is an instrument belonging to the unity of the hypothesis seventh article whether the union of the divine nature and the human is anything created objection one it would seem that the union of the divine and human natures is not anything created for there can be nothing created in god because whatever is in god is god but the union is in god for god himself is united to human nature therefore it seems that the union is not anything created objection to further the end holds first place in everything but the end of the union is the divine of hostesses or person in which the union is terminated therefore it seems that this union are chiefly to be judged with reference to the dignity of the divine apostasies which is not anything created therefore the union is nothing created objection three further that which is the cause of a thing being such is still more so according to the posterior analytics one but man is said to be the creator on account of the union therefore much more is the union itself nothing created but the creator on the contrary whatever has a beginning in time is created now this union was not from eternity but began in time therefore the union is something created i answer that the union of which we are speaking is a relation which we consider between the divine and the human nature in as much as they come together in one person of the son of god now as was said above in the parse prima question 13 article seven every relation which we consider between god and the creature is really in the creature by whose change the relation is brought into being whereas it is not really in god but only in our way of thinking since it does not arise from any change in god and hence we must say that the union of which we are speaking is not really in god except only in our way of thinking but in the human nature which is a creature it is really therefore we must say it is something created reply to objection one this union is not really in god but only in our way of thinking for god is said to be united to a creature in as much as the creature is really united to god without any change in him reply to objection two the specific nature of a relation as of motion depends on the subject and since this union has its being nowhere save in a created nature as was said above it follows that it has a created being reply to objection three a man is called creator and is god because of the union in as much as it is terminated in the divine apostasis yet it does not follow that the union itself is the creator or god because that a thing is said to be created regards its being rather than its relation eighth article whether union is the same as assumption objection one you would seem that union is the same as assumption for relations as motions are specified by their termini now the term of assumption and union is one and the same notably the divine apostasis therefore it seems that the union and assumption are not different objection to further in the mystery of the incarnation the same thing seems to be what unites and what assumes and what is united and what is assumed but union and assumption seem to follow the action and passion of the thing uniting and the united of the thing assuming and the assumed therefore union seems to be the same as assumption objection three further damasin says in on the true faith 311 union is one thing incarnation is another for union demands mere copulation and leaves unsaid the end of the copulation but incarnation and humanation determine the end of the copulation but likewise assumption does not determine the end of copulation therefore it seems that union is the same as assumption on the contrary the divine nature is said to be united not assumed I answer that as was stated above in article 7 union implies a certain relation of the divine nature and the human according as they come together in one person now all relations which began in time are brought about by some change and change consists in action and passion hence the first and principal difference between assumption and union must be said to be that union implies the relation whereas assumption implies the action whereby someone is said to assume or the passion whereby something is said to be assumed now from this difference another second difference arises for the assumption implies becoming whereas union implies having become and therefore the thing uniting is said to be united but the thing assuming is not said to be assumed for the human nature is taken to be in the terminus of the assumption unto the divine apostasis when man is spoken of and hence we can truly say that the son of god who assumes human nature unto himself is man but human nature considered in itself that is in the abstract is viewed as assumed and we do not say that the son of god is human nature from this same follows a third difference which is that a relation especially one of equipments is no more to one extreme than to the other whereas action and passion bear themselves differently to the agent and the patient and to different termini and hence assumption determines the term whence and the term wither for assumption means a taking to oneself from another but union determines none of these things hence it may be said indifferently that the human nature is united with the divine or conversely but the divine nature is not said to be assumed by the human but conversely because the human nature is joined to the divine personality so that the divine person subsists in human nature reply to objection one union and assumption have not the same relation to the term but a different relation as was said above reply to objection two what unites and what assumes are not the same for whatsoever person assumes unites and not conversely for the person of the father united the human nature to the son but not to himself and hence he is said to unite and not to assume so likewise the united and the assumed are not identical for the divine nature is said to be united but not assumed reply to objection three assumption determines with whom the union is made on the part of the one assuming in as much as assumption means taking unto oneself odd say summary whereas incarnation and human nation determined with whom the union is made on the part of the thing assumed which is flesh or human nature and thus assumption differs logically both from union and from incarnation or human nation ninth article whether the union of the two natures in christ is the greatest of all unions objection one you would seem that the union of the two natures in christ is not the greatest of all unions for what is united falls short of the unity of what is one since what is united is by participation but one is by essence now in created things there are some that imply simply one as is shown especially in unity itself which is the principle of number therefore the union of which we are speaking does not imply the greatest of all unions objection to further the greater the distance between things united the less the union now the things united by this union are most distant namely the divine and human natures for they are infinitely apart therefore their union is the least of all objection three further from union the results one but from the union of soul and body in us there arises what is one in person and nature whereas from the union of the divine and human nature the results what is one in person only therefore the union of soul and body is greater than that of the divine and human natures and hence the union of which we speak does not imply the greatest unity on the contrary augustin says in on the trinity 110 that man is in the son of god more than the son is in the father but the son is in the father by unity of essence and man is in the son by the union of the incarnation therefore the union of the incarnation is greater than the unity of the divine essence which nevertheless is the greatest union and thus the union of the incarnation implies the greatest unity i answer that union implies the joining of several into some one thing therefore the union of the incarnation may be taken in two ways first in regard to the things united secondly in regard to that in which they are united and in this regard this union has a preeminence over other unions for the unity of the divine person in which the two natures are united is the greatest but it has no preeminence in regard to the things united reply to objection one the unity of the divine person is greater than numerical unity which is the principle of number for the unity of a divine person is an uncreated and self-subsisting unity not received into another by participation also it is complete in itself having in itself whatever pertains to the nature of unity and therefore it is not compatible with the nature of a part as in numerical unity which is a part of number and which is shared in by the things numbered and hence in this respect the union of the incarnation is higher than numerical unity by reason of the unity of the divine person and not by reason of the human nature which is not the unity of the divine person but is united to it reply to objection two this reason regards the things united and not the person in whom the union takes place reply to objection three the unity of the divine person is greater than the unity of person and nature in us and hence the union of the incarnation is greater than the union of soul and body in us and because what is urged in the argument on the contrary rests upon what is untrue namely that the union of the incarnation is greater than the union of the divine persons in essence we must say to the authority of augustin that the human nature is not more in the son of god than the son of god in the father but much less but the man in some respects is more in the son than the son in the father namely in as much as the same suppositum is signified when i say man meaning christ and when i say son of god whereas it is not the same suppositum of father and son tenth article whether the union of the incarnation took place by grace objection one it would seem that the union of the incarnation did not take place by grace for grace is an accident as was shown above in the paris primus agunde question 110 article 2 but the union of the human nature to the divine did not take place accidentally as was shown above in article six therefore it seems that the union of the incarnation did not take place by grace objection to further the subject of grace is in the soul but it is written in collosians to nine in christ dwelleth all the fullness of the godhead corporeally therefore it seems that this union did not take place by grace objection three further every saint is united to god by grace if therefore the union of the incarnation was by grace it would seem that christ is said to be god no more than other holy men on the contrary auguston says and on the predestination of the saints 15 by the same grace every man is made a christian from the beginning of his faith as this man from his beginning was made christ but this man became christ by union with the divine nature therefore this union was by grace i answer that as was said above in the paris primus agunde question 110 article 1 grace is taken in two ways first as the will of god gratuitously bestowing something secondly as the free gift of god now human nature stands in need of the gratuitous will of god in order to be lifted up to god since this is above its natural capability moreover human nature is lifted up to god in two ways first by operation as the saints know and love god secondly by personal being and this mode belongs exclusively to christ in whom human nature is assumed so as to be in the person of the son of god but it is plain that for the perfection of operation the power needs to be perfected by a habit whereas that a nature has being in its own suppositum does not take place by means of a habit and hence we must say that if grace be understood as the will of god gratuitously doing something or reputing anything as well pleasing or acceptable to him the union of the incarnation took place by grace even as the union of the saints with god by knowledge and love but if grace be taken as the free gift of god then the fact that the human nature is united to the divine person may be called a grace in as much as it took place without being preceded by any merits but not as though there were an habitual grace by means of which the union took place reply to objection one the grace which is an accident is a certain likeness of the divinity participated by man but by the incarnation human nature is not said to have participated a likeness of the divine nature but is said to be united to the divine nature itself in the person of the sun now the thing itself is greater than a participated likeness of it reply to objection two habitual grace is only in the soul but the grace that is the free gift of god of being united to the divine person belongs to the whole human nature which is composed of soul and body and hence it is said that the fullness of the godhead dwelt corporeally in christ because the divine nature is united not merely to the soul but to the body also although it may also be said that it dwelt in christ corporeally that is not as in a shadow as it dwelt in the sacraments of the old law of which it is said in the same place in collosions two seventeen that they are the shadow of things to come but the body is christ in as much as the body is opposed to the shadow and some say that the godhead is said to have dwelt in christ corporeally that is in three ways just as a body has three dimensions first by essence presence and power as in other creatures secondly by sanctifying grace as in the saints thirdly by personal union which is proper to christ hence the reply to the third objection is manifest notably because the union of the incarnation did not take place by habitual grace alone but in the subsistence or person 11th article whether any merits preceded the union of the incarnation objection one you would seem that the union of the incarnation followed upon certain merits because upon psalm 32 verse 22 let thy mercy oh lord be upon us etc gloss says here the prophets desire for the incarnation and its merited fulfillment are hinted at therefore the incarnation falls under merit objection to further whoever merits anything merits that without which it cannot be but the ancient fathers merited eternal life to which they were able to attain only by the incarnation for Gregory says in his commentary on Job 13 those who came into this world before christ's coming whatsoever eminency of righteousness they may have had could not on being divested of the body at once be admitted into the bosom of the heavenly country seeing that he had not as yet come by his own descending should place the souls of the righteous in their everlasting seat therefore he would seem that they merited the incarnation objection three further of the blessed virgin it is sung that she merited to bear the lord of all according to the office of the blessed virgin Mary in the dominican rite at the benedictus and this took place through the incarnation therefore the incarnation falls under merit on the contrary augustin says in on the predestination of the saints 15 whoever can find merits preceding the singular generation of our head may also find merits preceding the repeated regeneration of us his members but no merits preceded our regeneration according to Titus 3 5 not by the works of justice which we have done but according to his mercy he saved us by the laver of regeneration therefore no merits preceded the generation of christ i answer that with regard to christ himself it is clear from the above in article 10 that no merits of his could have preceded the union for we do not hold that he was first of all a mere man and that afterwards by the merits of a good life it was granted him to become the son of god as fortinas held but we hold that from the beginning of his conception this man was truly the son of god seeing that he had no other hypothesis but that of the son of god according to luke 135 the holy which shall be born of these shall be called the son of god and hence every operation of this man followed the union therefore no operation of his could have been meritorious of the union neither could the needs of any other man whatsoever have merited this union condinely first because the meritorious works of man are properly ordained to beatitude which is the reward of virtue and consists in the full enjoyment of god whereas the union of the incarnation in as much as it is in the personal being transcends the union of the beatified mind with god which is by the act of the soul in fruition and therefore it cannot fall under merit secondly because grace cannot fall under merit for the principle of merit does not fall under merit and therefore neither does grace for it is the principle of merit hence still less does the incarnation fall under merit since it is the principle of grace according to john 117 grace and truth came by jesus christ thirdly because the incarnation is for the reformation of the entire human nature and therefore it does not fall under the merit of any individual man since the goodness of a mere man cannot be the cause of the good of the entire nature yet the holy fathers merited the incarnation congressly by desiring and beseeching for it was becoming that god should hearken to those who obeyed him and thereby the reply to the first objection is manifest reply to objection to it is false that under merit falls everything without which there can be no reward for there is something prerequired not merely for reward but also for merit as the divine goodness and grace and the very nature of man and again the mystery of the incarnation is the principle of merit because of his fullness we have all received according to john 116 reply to objection three the blessed virgin is said to have merited to bear the lord of all not that she merited his incarnation but because by the grace bestowed upon her she merited that great of purity and holiness which fitted her to be the mother of god 12th article whether the grace of union was natural to the man christ objection one you would seem that the grace of union was not natural to the man christ for the union of the incarnation did not take place in the nature but in the person as was said above in article two now a thing is denominated from its terminus therefore this grace ought rather to be called personal than natural objection to further grace is divided against nature even as gratuitous things which are from god are distinguished from natural things which are from an intrinsic principle but if things are divided in opposition to one another one is not denominated by the other therefore the grace of christ was not natural to him objection three further natural is that which is according to nature but the grace of union is not natural to christ in regard to the divine nature otherwise it would belong to the other persons nor is it natural to him according to the human nature otherwise it would belong to all men since they are of the same nature as he therefore you would seem that the grace of union is no wise natural to christ on the contrary augustin says in his and curidian 40 in the assumption of human nature grace itself became somewhat natural to that man so as to leave no room for sin in him i answer that according to the philosopher in metaphysics 55 nature designates in one way nativity in another the essence of a thing hence natural may be taken in two ways first for what is only from the essential principles of a thing as it is natural to fire to mount secondly we call natural to man what he has had from his birth according to a fusions to three we were by nature children of wrath and in wisdom 1210 they were a wicked generation and their malice natural therefore the grace of christ whether of union or habitual cannot be called natural as if caused by the principles of the human nature of christ although it may be called natural as if coming into the human nature of christ by the causality of his divine nature but these two kinds of grace are said to be natural in christ in as much as he had them from his nativity since from the beginning of his conception the human nature was united to the divine person and his soul was filled with the gift of grace reply to objection one although the union did not take place in the nature yet it was caused by the power of the divine nature which is truly the nature of christ and it moreover belonged to christ from the beginning of his nativity reply to objection two the union is not said to be grace and natural in the same respect for it is called grace in as much as it is not from merit and it is said to be natural in as much as by the power of the divine nature it was in the humanity of christ from his nativity reply to objection three the grace of union is not natural to christ according to his human nature as if it were caused by the principles of the human nature and hence it need not belong to all men nevertheless it is natural to him in regard to the human nature on account of the property of his birth seeing that he was conceived by the holy ghost so that he might be the natural son of god and of man but it is natural to him in regard to the divine nature in as much as the divine nature is the act of principle of this grace and this belongs to the whole trinity to it to be the act of principle of this grace end of question two read by michael shane craig lambert lc question three of summa theologica tertia pars triates on the savior this is a libra vox recording all libra vox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit libra vox.org summa theologica tertia pars triates on the savior by saint thomas equinas translated by the fathers of the english dominican province question three of the mode of union on the part of the person assuming in eight articles we must now consider the union on the part of the person assuming and under this head there are eight points of inquiry first whether to assume is befitting to a divine person second whether it is befitting to the divine nature third whether the nature abstracted from the personality can assume fourth whether one person can assume without another fifth whether each person can assume sixth whether several persons can assume one individual nature seventh whether one person can assume two individual natures eighth whether it was more fitting for the person of the son of god to assume human nature than for another divine person first article whether it is befitting for a divine person to assume objection one it would seem that it is not befitting to a divine person to assume a created nature for a divine person signifies something most perfect now no addition can be made to what is perfect therefore since to assume is to take to oneself and consequently what is assumed is added to the one who assumes it does not seem to be befitting to a divine person to assume a created nature objection to further that to which anything is assumed is communicated in some degree to what is assumed to it just as dignity is communicated to whosoever is assumed to a dignity but it is of the nature of a person to be incommunicable as was said above in the parse prima question 29 article one therefore it is not befitting to a divine person to assume that is to take to himself objection three further person is constituted by nature but it is repugnant that the thing constituted should assume the constituent since the effect does not act on its cause hence it is not befitting to a person to assume a nature on the contrary augustin says this god that is the only begotten one took the form that is the nature of a servant to his own person but the only begotten god is a person therefore it is befitting to a person to take that is to assume a nature i answer that in the word assumption are implied two things notably the principle and the term of the act for to assume is to take something to oneself now of this assumption a person is both the principle and the term the principle because it properly belongs to a person to act and this assuming a flesh took place by the divine action likewise a person is the term of this assumption because as was said above in question two two articles one and two the union took place in the person and not in the nature hence it is plain that to assume a nature is most properly befitting to a person reply to objection one since the divine person is infinite no addition can be made to it hence Cyril says we do not conceive the mode of conjunction to be according to addition just as in the union of man with God nothing is added to God by the grace of adoption but what is divine is united to man hence not God but man is perfected reply to objection two a divine person is said to be incommunicable in as much as it cannot be predicated of several supposita but nothing prevents several things being predicated of the person hence it is not contrary to the nature of person to be communicated so as to subsist in several natures for even in a created person several natures may concur accidentally as in the person of one man we find quantity and quality but this is proper to a divine person on account of its infinity that there should be a concourse of natures in it not accidentally but in subsistence reply to objection three as was said above in question two article one the human nature constitutes a divine person not simply but for as much as the person is denominated from such a nature for human nature does not make the son of man to be simply since he was from eternity but only to be man it is by the divine nature that a divine person is constituted simply hence the divine person is not said to assume the divine nature but to assume the human nature second article whether it is befitting to the divine nature to assume objection one it would seem that it is not befitting to the divine nature to assume because as was said above in article one to assume is to take to oneself but the divine nature did not take to itself human nature for the union did not take place in the nature as was said above in question two articles one and three hence it is not befitting to the divine nature to assume human nature objection to further the divine nature is common to the three persons if therefore it is befitting to the divine nature to assume it is consequently befitting to the three persons and thus the father assumed human nature even as the son which is erroneous objection three further to assume is to act but to act befits a person not a nature which is rather taken to be the principle by which the asian acts therefore to assume is not befitting to the nature on the contrary augustin says that nature which remains eternally begotten of the father that is which is received from the father by eternal generation took our nature free of sin from his mother i answer that as was said above in article one in the word assumption two things are signified to wit the principle and the term of the action now to be the principle of the assumption belongs to the divine nature in itself because the assumption took place by its power but to be the term of the assumption does not belong to the divine nature in itself but by reason of the person in whom it is considered to be hence a person is primarily and more properly said to assume but it may be said secondarily that the nature assumed a nature to its person and after the same manner the nature is also said to be incarnate not that it is changed to flesh but that it assumed the nature of flesh hence damasin says in on the true faith three six following the blessed Athanasius and Cyril we say that the nature of god is incarnate reply to objection one oneself is reciprocal and points to the same suppositum but the divine nature is not a distinct suppositum from the person of the word hence in as much as the divine nature took human nature to the person of the word it is said to take it to itself but although the father takes human nature to the person of the word he did not thereby take it to himself for the suppositum of the father and the son is not one and hence it cannot be properly said that the father assumes human nature reply to objection two what is befitting to the divine nature in itself is befitting to the three persons as goodness wisdom and the like but to assume belongs to it by reason of the person of the word as was said above and hence it is befitting to that person alone reply to objection three as in god what is and whereby it is are the same so likewise in him what acts and whereby it acts are the same since everything acts in as much as it is in being hence the divine nature is both that whereby god acts and the very god who acts third article whether the nature abstracted from the personality can assume objection one it would seem that if we abstract the personality by our mind the nature cannot assume for it was said above an article one that it belongs to the nature to assume by reason of the person but what belongs to one by reason of another cannot belong to it if the other is removed as a body which is visible by reason of color without color cannot be seen hence if the personality be mentally abstracted the nature cannot assume objection to further assumption implies the term of union as was said above an article one but the union cannot take place in the nature but only in the person therefore if the personality be abstracted the divine nature cannot assume objection three further it has been said above in the parse prima question 40 article three that in the godhead if the personality is abstracted nothing remains but the one who assumes is something therefore if the personality is abstracted the divine nature cannot assume on the contrary in the godhead personality signifies a personal property and this is threefold notably paternity affiliation and procession as it was said above in the parse prima question 30 article two now if we mentally abstract these there still remains the omnipotence of god by which the incarnation was wrought as the angel says in luke 137 no word shall be impossible with god therefore it seems that if the personality be removed the divine nature can still assume I answer that the intellect stands in two ways towards god first to know god as he is and in this manner it is impossible for the intellect to circumscribe something in god and leave the rest for all that is in god is one except the distinction of persons and as regards these if one is removed the other is taken away since they are distinguished by relations only which must be together at the same time secondly the intellect stands towards god not indeed as knowing god as he is but in its own way that is understanding manifoldly and separately what in god is one and in this way our intellect can understand the divine goodness and wisdom and the like which are called essential attributes without understanding paternity or affiliation which are called personalities and hence if we abstract personality by our intellect we may still understand the nature assuming reply to objection one because in god what is and whereby it is our one if any one of these things which are attributed to god in the abstract is considered in itself abstracted from all else it will still be something subsisting and consequently a person since it is an intellectual nature hence just as we now say three persons on account of holding three personal properties so likewise if we mentally exclude the personal properties there will still remain in our thought the divine nature as subsisting and as a person and in this way it may be understood to assume human nature by reason of its subsistence or personality reply to objection two even if the personal properties of the three persons are abstracted by our mind nevertheless there will remain in our thoughts the one personality of god as the Jews consider and the assumption can be terminated in it as we now say it is terminated in the person of the word reply to objection three if we mentally abstract the personality it is said that nothing remains by way of resolution that is as if the subject of the relation and the relation itself were distinct because all we can think of in god is considered as a subsisting suppositum however some of the things predicated of god can be understood without others not by way of resolution but by the way mentioned above fourth article whether one person without another can assume a created nature objection one you would seem that one person cannot assume a created nature without another assuming it for the works of the trinity are inseparable as augustin says in anchor idiom 38 but as the three persons have one essence so likewise they have one operation now to assume is an operation therefore it cannot belong to one without belonging to another objection to further as we say the person of the sun became incarnate so also did the nature for the whole divine nature became incarnate in one of its hypotheses as damasin says in on the true faith three six but the nature is common to the three persons therefore the assumption is objection three further as the human nature in christ is assumed by god so likewise are men assumed by him through grace according to romans 14 3 god has taken him to him but this assumption pertains to all the persons therefore the first also on the contrary Dionysius says in on the divine names too that the mystery of the incarnation pertains to discrete theology that is according to which something distinct is said of the divine persons I answer that as was said above in article one assumption implies two things notably the act of assuming and the term of assumption now the act of assumption proceeds from the divine power which is common to the three persons but the term of the assumption is a person as stated above in article two hence what has to do with action in the assumption is common to the three persons but what pertains to the nature of term belongs to one person in such a manner as not to belong to another for the three persons caused the human nature to be united to the one person of the sun reply to objection one this reason regards the operation and the conclusion would follow if it implied this operation only without the term which is a person reply to objection two the nature is said to be incarnate and to assume by reason of the person in whom the union is terminated as stated above in articles one and two and not as it is common to the three persons now the whole divine nature is said to be incarnate not that it is incarnate in all the persons but in as much as nothing is wanting to the perfection of the divine nature of the person incarnate as Damascene explains there reply to objection three the assumption which takes place by the grace of adoption is terminated in a certain participation of the divine nature by an assimilation to its goodness according to 2nd Peter 1 4 that you may be made partakers of the divine nature and hence this assumption is common to the three persons in regard to the principle and the term but the assumption which is by the grace of union is common on the part of the principle but not on the part of the term as was said above fifth article whether each of the divine persons could have assumed human nature objection one you would seem that no other divine person could have assumed human nature except the person of the sun for by this assumption it has been brought about that god is the son of man but it was not becoming that either the father or the holy ghost should be said to be a son for this would tend to the confusion of the divine persons therefore the father and the holy ghost could not have assumed flesh objection to further by the divine incarnation men have come into possession of the adoption of sons according to romans 8 15 for you have not received the spirit of bondage again in fear but the spirit of adoption of sons but sonship by adoption is a participated likeness of natural sonship which does not belong to the father nor the holy ghost and said as said in romans 8 29 for whom he foreknew he also predestined to be made conformable to the image of his son therefore it seems that no other person except the person of the sun could have become incarnate objection three further the son is said to be sent and to be begotten by the temporal nativity in as much as he became incarnate but it does not belong to the father to be sent for he is in national as was said above in the paris prima question 32 article 3 as well as in question 43 article 4 therefore at least the person of the father cannot become incarnate on the contrary whatever the son can do so can the father and the holy ghost otherwise the power of the three persons would not be one but the son was able to become incarnate therefore the father and the holy ghost were able to become incarnate I answer that as was said above in articles 12 and 4 assumption implies two things notably the act of the one assuming and the term of the assumption now the principle of the act is the divine power and the term is a person but the divine power is indifferently and commonly in all the persons moreover the nature of personality is common to all the persons although the personal properties are different now whenever a power regards several things indifferently it can terminate its action in any of them indifferently as is plain in rational powers which regard opposites and can do either of them therefore the divine power could have united human nature to the person of the father or of the holy ghost as it united it to the person of the son and hence we must say that the father or the holy ghost could have assumed flesh even as the son reply to objection one the temporal sonship whereby christ is said to be the son of man does not constitute his person as does the eternal sonship but is something following upon the temporal nativity hence if the name of son were transferred to the father or the holy ghost in this manner there would be no confusion of the divine persons reply to objection two adoptive sonship is a certain participation of natural sonship but it takes place in us by appropriation by the father who is the principle of natural sonship and by the gift of the holy ghost who is the love of the father and son according to galatians four six god hath sent the spirit of his son into your heart's crying abba father and therefore even as by the incarnation of the son we receive adoptive sonship in the likeness of his natural sonship so likewise had the father become incarnate we should have received adoptive sonship from him as from the principle of the natural sonship and from the holy ghost as from the common bond of father and son reply to objection three it belongs to the father to be in national as to eternal birth and the temporal birth would not destroy this but the son of god is said to be sent in regard to the incarnation in as much as he is from another without which the incarnation would not suffice for the nature of mission sixth article whether several divine persons can assume one and the same individual nature objection one it would seem that two divine persons cannot assume one and the same individual nature for this being granted there would either be several men or one but not several for just as one divine nature in several persons does not make several gods so one human nature in several persons does not make several men nor would there be only one man for one man is this man which signifies one person and hence the distinction of three divine persons would be destroyed which cannot be allowed therefore neither two nor three persons can take one human nature objection to further the assumption is terminated in the unity of person as has been said above in article two but the father son and holy ghost are not one person therefore the three persons cannot assume one human nature objection three further damasin says in on the true faith three three and four and agustin in on the trinity one eleven three thirteen that from the incarnation of god the son it follows that whatever is said of the son of god is said of the son of man and conversely hence if three persons were to assume one human nature it would follow that whatever is said of each of the three persons would be said of the man and conversely what is said of the man could be said of each of the three persons therefore what is proper to the father notably to beget the son would be said of the man and consequently would be said of the son of god and this could not be therefore it is impossible that the three persons should assume one human nature on the contrary the incarnate person subsists in two natures but the three persons can subsist in one divine nature therefore they can also subsist in one human nature in such a way that the human nature be assumed by the three persons i answer that as was said above in question two article five first reply by the union of the soul and body in christ neither a new person is made nor a new hypothesis but one human nature is assumed to the divine person or hypothesis which indeed does not take place by the power of the human nature but by the power of the divine person now such is the characteristic of the divine persons that one does not exclude another from communicating in the same nature but only in the same person hence since in the mystery of the incarnation the whole reason of the deed is the power of the doer as agustin says in his letter 137 to volusianus we must judge of it in regard to the quality of the divine person assuming and not according to the quality of the human nature assumed therefore it is not impossible that two or three divine persons should assume one human nature but it would be impossible for them to assume one human hypothesis or person thus anselm says in the book on the conception of the virgin that several persons cannot assume one and the same man to unity of person reply to objection one in the hypothesis that three persons assume one human nature it would be true to say that the three persons were one man because of the one human nature for just as it is now true to say that three persons are one god on account of the one divine nature so it would be true to say that they are one man on account of the one human nature nor would one imply unity of person but unity in human nature for it could not be argued that because the three persons were one man they were one simply for nothing hinders are saying that men who are many simply are in some respect one for example one people and as agustin says in on the trinity six three the spirit of god and the spirit of man are by nature different but by inheritance one spirit results according to first Corinthians six seventeen he who is joined to the lord is one spirit reply to objection two in this supposition the human nature would be assumed to the unity not indeed of one person but to the unity of each person so that even as the divine nature has a natural unity with each person so also the human nature would have a unity with each person by assumption reply to objection three in the mystery of the incarnation there results a communication of the properties belonging to the nature because whatever belongs to the nature can be predicated of the person subsisting in that nature no matter to which of the natures it may apply hence in this hypothesis of the person of the father may be predicated what belongs to the human nature and what belongs to the divine and likewise of the person of the son and of the holy ghost but what belongs to the person of the father by reason of his own person could not be attributed to the person of the son or holy ghost on account of the distinction of persons which would still remain therefore it might be said that as the father was unbegotten so the man was unbegotten in as much as man stood for the person of the father but if one were to go on to say the man is unbegotten the son is man therefore the son is unbegotten it would be the fallacy of figure of speech or of accident even as we now say god is unbegotten because the father is unbegotten yet we cannot conclude that the son is unbegotten although he is god seventh article whether one divine person can assume two human natures objection one it would seem that one divine person cannot assume two human natures for the nature assumed in the mystery of the incarnation has no other suppositum than the suppositum of the divine person as is plain from what has been stated above in question two articles three and six therefore if we suppose one person to assume two human natures there would be one suppositum of two natures of the same species which would seem to imply a contradiction for the nature of one species is only multiplied by distinct supposita objection to further in this hypothesis it could not be said that the divine person incarnate was one man seeing that he would not have one human nature neither could it be said that there were several for several men have distinct supposita whereas in this case there would be only one suppositum therefore the aforesaid hypothesis is impossible objection three further in the mystery of the incarnation the whole divine nature is united to the whole nature assumed that is to every part of it for christ is perfect god and perfect man complete god and complete man as damasin says in on the true faith three seven but two human natures cannot be wholly united together in as much as the soul of one would be united to the body of the other and again two bodies would be together which would give rise to confusion of natures therefore it is not possible for one divine person to assume two human natures on the contrary whatever the father can do that also can the son do but after the incarnation the father can still assume a human nature distinct from that which the son has assumed for in nothing is the power of the father or the son lessened by the incarnation of the son therefore it seems that after the incarnation the son can assume another human nature distinct from the one he has assumed i answer that what has power for one thing and no more has a power limited to one now the power of a divine person is infinite nor can it be limited by any created thing hence it may not be said that a divine person so assumed one human nature as to be unable to assume another for it would seem to follow from this that the personality of the divine nature was so comprehended by one human nature as to be unable to assume another to its personality and this is impossible for the uncreated cannot be comprehended by any creature and so it is plain that whether we consider the divine person in regard to his power which is the principle of the union or in regard to his personality which is the term of the union it has to be said that the divine person over and beyond the human nature which he has assumed can assume another distinct human nature reply to objection one a created nature is completed in its essentials by its form which is multiplied according to the division of matter and hence if the composition of matter and form constitutes a new suppositum the consequence is that the nature is multiplied by the multiplication of suppositor but in the mystery of the incarnation the union of form and matter that is of soul and body does not constitute a new suppositum as was said above in article six hence there can be a numerical multitude on the part of the nature on account of the division of matter without distinction of suppositor reply to objection two it might seem possible to reply that in such a hypothesis you would follow that there were two men by reason of the two natures just as on the contrary the three persons would be called one man on account of the one nature assumed as was said above in article six first reply but this does not seem to be true because we must use words according to the purpose of their signification which is in relation to our surroundings consequently in order to judge of a word's signification or co-signification we must consider the things which are around us in which a word derived from some form is never used in the plural unless there are several suppositor for a man who has on two garments is not said to be two persons clothed but one clothed with two garments and whoever has two qualities is designated in the singular as such by reason of the two qualities now the assumed nature is as it were a garment although this similitude does not fit at all points as has been said above in question two article six first reply and hence if the divine person were to assume two human natures he would be called on account of the unity of suppositum one man having two human natures now many men are said to be one people in as much as they have some one thing in common and not on account of the unity of suppositum so likewise if two divine persons were to assume one singular human nature they would be said to be one man as stated in article six first reply not from the unity of suppositum but because they have some one thing in common reply to objection three the divine and human natures do not bear the same relation to the one divine person but the divine nature is related first of all there too in as much as it is one with it from eternity and afterwards the human nature is related to the divine person in as much as it is assumed by the divine person in time not indeed that the nature is the person but that the person of God subsists in human nature for the son of God is his godhead but it is not his manhood and hence in order that the human nature may be assumed by the divine person the divine nature must be united by a personal union with the whole nature assumed that is in all its parts now in the two natures assumed there would be a uniform relation to the divine persons nor would one assume the other hence who would not be necessary for one of them to be altogether united to the other that is all the parts of one with all the parts of the other eighth article whether it was more fitting that the person of the son rather than any other divine person should assume human nature objection one you would seem that it was not more fitting that the son of god should become incarnate than the father or the holy ghost for by the mystery of the incarnation men are led to the true knowledge of god according to john 1837 for this was i born and for this came i into the world to give testimony to the truth but by the person of the son of god becoming incarnate many have been kept back from the true knowledge of god since they referred to the very person of the son what was said of the son and his human nature as areas who held an inequality of persons according to what is said in john 1428 the father is greater than i now this error would not have arisen if the person of the father had become incarnate for no one would have taken the father to be less than the son hence it seems fitting that the person of the father rather than the person of the son should have become incarnate objection to further the effect of the incarnation would seem to be as it were a second creation of human nature according to gallation 615 for in christ jesus neither circumcision availeth anything nor uncircumcision but a new creature but the power of creation is appropriated to the father therefore it would have been more becoming to the father than to the son to become incarnate objection three further the incarnation is ordained to the remission of sins according to matthew 121 thou shalt call his name jesus for he shall save his people from their sins now the remission of sins is attributed to the holy ghost according to john 20 verses 22 and 23 receive ye the holy ghost whose sins you shall forgive they are forgiven them therefore it became the person of the holy ghost rather than the person of the son to become incarnate on the contrary damasin says in on the true faith 3 1 in the mystery of the incarnation the wisdom and power of god are made known the wisdom for he found a most suitable discharge for a most heavy debt the power for he made the conquered conquer but power and wisdom are appropriated to the son according to first chrithians 124 christ the power of god and the wisdom of god therefore it was fitting that the person of the son should become incarnate i answer that it was most fitting that the person of the son should become incarnate first on the part of the union for such as are similar are fittingly united now the person of the son who is the word of god has a certain common agreement with all creatures because the word of the craftsmen that is his concept is an exemplar likeness of whatever is made by him hence the word of god who is his eternal concept is the exemplar likeness of all creatures and therefore as creatures are established in their proper species though moveably by the participation of this likeness so by the non-participated and personal union of the word with a creature it was fitting that the creature should be restored in order to its eternal and unchangeable perfection for the craftsmen by the intelligible form of his art whereby he fashioned his handiwork restores it when it has fallen into ruin moreover he has a particular agreement with human nature since the word is a concept of the eternal wisdom from whom all man's wisdom is derived and hence man is perfected in wisdom which is his proper perfection as he is rational by participating the word of god as the disciple is instructed by receiving the word of his master hence it is said in ecclesiastic as one five the word of god on high is the fountain of wisdom and hence for the consummate perfection of man it was fitting that the very word of god should be personally united to human nature secondly the reason of this fitness may be taken from the end of the union which is the fulfilling of predestination that is of such as are preordained to the heavenly inheritance which is bestowed only on sons according to romans 8 17 if sons heirs also hence it was fitting that by him who is the natural son men should share this likeness of sonship by adoption as the apostle says in the same chapter in romans 8 29 for whom he foreknew he also predestined to be made conformable to the image of his son thirdly the reason for this fitness may be taken from the sin of our first parent for which the incarnation supplied the remedy for the first man sinned by seeking knowledge as is plain from the words of the serpent promising to man the knowledge of good and evil hence it was fitting that by the word of true knowledge man might be led back to god having wandered from god through an inordinate thirst for knowledge reply to objection one there is nothing which human malice cannot abuse since it even abuses god's goodness according to romans 2 4 or despises to thou the riches of his goodness hence even if the person of the father had become incarnate men would have been capable of finding an occasion of error as though the son were not able to restore human nature reply to objection two the first creation of things was made by the power of god the father through the word hence the second creation ought to have been brought about through the word by the power of god the father in order that the restoration should correspond to creation according to 2nd Corinthians 519 for god indeed was in christ reconciling the world to himself reply to objection three to be the gift of the father and the son is proper to the holy ghost but the remission of sins is caused by the holy ghost as by the gift of god and hence it was more fitting to man's justification that the son should become incarnate whose gift the holy ghost is end of question three read by michael shane craig lambert lc