 Good afternoon everyone, and thank you for joining us for what seems to be a packed out session on Iraq which is indicative not only of the importance of my hope country Iraq but also the importance of the speakers that have joined us here today so we thank you we look forward to your insights questions and comments as the session begins we've started 15 minutes late so well not late we've moved the session 15 minutes to allow for lunch and so we'll be wrapping up at quarter to four. My name is Mina Al Arabi I'm the assistant editor-in-chief of Sherkh al-Ausat and I thank you for joining us today session today is called Iraq's twin challenges on the one hand having to fight ISIS and these extremist militants that are a threat not only to Iraq Syria in the region but some would argue to the world. On the other hand the challenge of building an inclusive country inside of Iraq and making sure that it cares for all its citizens equally regardless of their gender their sect their ethnicity or any other issue that may actually cause them to be discriminated against. So we don't have prepared remarks we want this to be a free flowing conversation. I will introduce our speakers even though they have of course a long history of service in different fields in Iraq I will keep it brief. We have the speaker of parliament Mr. Salim Abdullah Juburi speaker of the Iraqi Parliament. We have with us here Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq Mr. Roj Nuri Shahwees. We have also Ambassador Ryan Crawley public service but was also ambassador to Iraq and held other posts and we have Mr. Basim Salim who is chairman of capital bank here in Jordan. So I would like to start by going to Mr. Juburi and asking him about the security situation in Iraq and how we got to a point where today we hear that the last checkpoint between Iraq and Syria has fallen to the militants known as ISIS and I want to also stress upon the point that some would argue that the Sunni majority provinces of Iraq have created an atmosphere that will allow these extremists to thrive. How would you respond to that? Thank you very much in this meeting and forum that is actually a great chance to talk but also to listen to other perspectives particularly that we're in an extraordinary situation we're going through in Iraq and probably things have become even worse after the fall of Ramadi in a myriad of inputs that really aggravated the situation but I do assume that we'll be speaking frankly because we need not pay lip service to the lives lost and to the millions displaced among Iraqis I say it honestly and frankly when Mosul fell to ISIS which brought the advent of ISIS in order to establish their so-called caliphate then the Sunni community then I mean felt that ISIS came as its saviour its saviour from what from injustice oppression marginalization and exclusion against the Sunni community in Iraq then soon after that the Sunni majority in Mosul they realized that ISIS is the enemy to all and they are propagating an ideology that cannot be accommodated be it by Sunnis or Shiites or any other social component in Iraq and that's why they tried hard and their best to face this dangerous challenge there are numerous obstacles that prevented them from doing so successfully including the physical material capabilities that I mean here weapons equipment training as well although we assume that numerous Iraqis were able to join the popular forces or the tribes but still under constitutional terms this is an informal grouping of citizens defending their own land but actually we can see it as part of their popular contribution to the security of the country and I say frankly the Sunni majority in Saladin and Armbar that are under ISIS control should receive hope and should give should get a sense of feeling that if ISIS is moved and defeated what follows next will be better than the current rule of ISIS because there's certain practices or I should say malpractices that really conveyed the wrong messages for the liberated provinces we need to tell them we want to build a democratic state that respects the human being that does not exclude anyone that everyone enjoys the well-being and common proper living our people in Armbar when they see ISIS and then they wonder what about our displaced people left the creed and the decree was liberated after that and still three months from the liberation they were not able to go back to their homes so people in Armbar will say are we willing to live the same situation so what I believe in is as follows one Sunni areas are definitely against ISIS Sunni and defeating ISIS will not be realized say after the positive contribution of the Sunnis in those communities and this is the responsibility of the government and international community finally say that we need to provide a clear cut model for a community and political reform that is associated with the reform security situation talking about fighting ISIS using weapons only this is a ramp lacking way of thinking we need to employ ideology reform and the role model that we can all the model that we can provide so that would be able to recruit people to ISIS but still it's almost a year now and muslims as under ISIS control all what you have said yes Iraqis and then Iraqis do believe what you said we need reforms the political potential to be employed against ISIS but after a full year of ISIS rule what has been achieved by the government and the parliament to fight such a phenomenon of course the government exerted some efforts in liberating certain areas that were under ISIS control and we need not forget at the same time that the there is a rehabilitation process for the Iraqi army particularly after the defeats suffered after the fall of Nino province in the north IE muslim and they still have rampant corruption that's a problem and in addition to that ISIS is a means that can be used to achieve certain considerations and ends and no one and no one can be rendered innocent from not being involved in using ISIS as a means but it's our destiny we Iraqis that ISIS was so used intentionally in Iraq and probably in Syria but in order to settle all political issues took place in Iraq and that's why we are paying for it as Iraqis the government has tried its best but still it has to do more now for the Iraqi parliament started to mobilize the people and try to support the military one problem that should be diagnosed properly is the lack of the command of the unity of command is absent like the liberation processes in Tikrit was successful simply because there was a single unified command their single voice and they were rendered victorious but now it's missing and therefore it's defeat after defeat being suffered in other areas and ISIS is gaining control and the expense of the Iraqi military not only what are you speaking in Arabic? Of course, the topic can be used as a point to start discussing anything, including ISIS, Iraq, security situation, and you name it. It is important when we consider the current situation in Iraq. It is necessary when we consider the situation in Iraq and the aftermath of the situation, which was quite contrary to our expectations. We have to recall the fact that Iraq is a multi-ethnicity, multi-religious, multi-faith country, but also where problems are rampant and long-lasting with a long history that are deeply rooted within the Iraqi society as part of the various components and structures at the security level, at the government level. When change came around, it was necessary to stop these problems and to solve these problems once and for all, and to opt for a new trend towards justice, equality, democracy, etc. Now, in the course of the political process in Iraq, and quite unfortunately and regrettably, I say frankly, we were not able to reach a political consensus. The various components of the political forces and powers representing the various aspects of the Iraqi people failed to arrive at a unified, consolidated political view or consensus. Although we were able to arrive at common pillars or foundations that were duly documented in the Iraqi constitution. But even the constitution now has become mere income paper, unfortunately, because we failed to enforce many of its articles. When political consensus is absent, political stability will become absent as a result, and with the absence of political stability, there will be no security stability, that's for sure. In addition to that, the Iraqi security forces and apparatuses, in my own point of view and I stand corrected and I do hope I'm wrong, but I say they were based on the wrong, erroneous foundation. They were not designed properly and we did not continue to construct them to reach maturity because they were designed mimicking the former Iraqi army, which was a defeated army who lost three wars in a row. In addition to the fact that the internal conflict in Iraq resulted in segregating the Iraqi army from the rest of the Iraqi society. However, I believe that the largest burden now in any military operation in the Iraqi army, it will be doomed to failure. They won't be able to do it. The other side of the story is that when the US forces pulled the troops from Iraq, the Iraqi army was not ready. And there were certain voices that raised, including military figures, including the Joint Chief of Staff of the Iraqi army. He said the Iraqi army still needs so and so years before it is fully ready to address the security troubles and problems and the challenges in Iraq. In addition to the pulling out of US troops, rendering the Iraqi army in a ramp situation incomplete, but the US forces pulled the troops completely, i.e. relatively speaking, the US forces no longer had any relationships or ties with the Iraqi army. And there was no possibility whatsoever to lend a helping hand to the Iraqi army or security forces directly, swiftly, rapidly or effectively when needed. So this side of the story as well led to the fact that security forces are weak in front of the terrorist attacks, be it in the form of ISIS or non-ISIS entities. So in such a situation, with the absence of political stability, with the lack of the proper trend towards national reconciliation, and with the absence of the force needed to face the forces in the field, all of this rendered a deteriorated situation. We are up against a huge danger in Iraq. We are facing it today, not tomorrow. Therefore we need an immediate direct action to come up with swift solutions. Long term solutions need time, need effort, need studies, but now we need in real time a solution because already danger is encroaching upon the gates of Baghdad. We need all to stand together, work commonly and overcome our internal problems to stand unified together vis-à-vis the danger that is threatening us. Well as you said, there is need to have swift solutions. What are the two most rapid swift solutions you suggest and that are applicable? First of all, the pre-judgments that are issued here and there about the Bishmarga or the popular coalition forces need to be stopped. And also the barrier that prevents from providing weapons to the Sunni population should also be removed and they need to be directly engaged and involved in the security operation in Iraq. As for the coalition, there are also prior judgments, ready-made judgments that are used. Iraq itself, when the United States decided to aid Iraq in counter-terrorism and suggested deploying the Apache helicopters, the Iraqi government refused. Why? Under the pretext that it needs land crews, land crews means that there is a problem with the Iraqi sovereignty. Such pre-determined judgments up front need to be removed. We need assistance, period. So the Deputy Prime Minister is saying we need action, quick action and help. Can we expect help from the U.S. to be more than the air power that's being used at the moment? It's a pleasure to be here with old friends, sad over the circumstances that Iraq and the region face. I think our role here is to try to sketch out a better way forward. And I just would make clear that, particularly in light of your pointed question, that I no longer represent or speak for the United States governments and I have to add that sessions such as this are now a lot more fun for me. And that's why we want direct answers. I think the Speaker and the Deputy Prime Minister have analyzed this situation very well. Even after the fall of Ramadi and Palmyra, Daesh is not an existential threat to Iraq. As I said last night, they weren't going to march on Irbil. They're not going to march on Baghdad. It's obviously more comfortable saying they were not going to march on Irbil if you're sitting in Texas rather than sitting in Irbil. But that is beyond their capabilities and they know it. The real threat to Iraq, it seems to me, is precisely what the Speaker and the Deputy Prime Minister have laid out. It is the problems within. The absence of meaningful political reconciliation, which is kind of the umbrella, and many things flow from that. None of them are good. So for the United States, yes, I think we should be doing more to assist the military effort. But what, in my view, we really should be doing more of is to assist the Iraqis in resolving some of these enormous problems created well before 2003 in the invasion. But certainly exacerbated in its aftermath. It is specious for anyone to say, well, it's an Iraqi problem. The Iraqis have to sort it out themselves. That isn't going to happen. And I blame no community for this. Anyone who knows anything about Iraq, past and present, can understand the reasons why meaningful reconciliation right now is really beyond the communities unassisted. That's where the United States, I think, should come in. And with it, others in the international community who have obviously a common concern. In my experience as ambassador from 2007 to 2009, what one party could not give directly to another, they could maybe put it in our pocket. And then we could play a role in working with other parties to see if we could help them fashion what ultimately had to be an Iraqi solution. But the role of the facilitator was key. It was then, it is now, and there is no facilitator because the withdrawal in 2011 of the United States forces frankly also lands a withdrawal of the United States politically. And sadly, very much of what we're seeing today, I would suggest, is a consequence of that withdrawal. It is never too late in global politics. I would like to think that the Camp David summit earlier this month would be the beginning of a U.S. re-engagement in the region and in Iraq. The Camp David talks led to the enunciation of what I now call the Obama doctrine, that the Gulf region is a vital national security interest to the United States. Iraq sits at the top of the Gulf. And national security does not mean sending in the divisions. It means taking seriously the problems of a country and a region and working politically at senior levels to try to help ameliorate those. I hope we're doing it in the future because we're certainly not doing it now. Of course we want to talk about solutions rather than just the problems. There is some in Iraq who would argue that so long as we have a political system that supports divisions amongst Iraqis to be represented either according to sector ethnicity, it's very hard to go beyond the ceiling of the troubles we've had in Iraq in the last 12 years or so. So can we step back from that and actually build an inclusive national identity and political system? Or is that too long to take at a time when we're facing threats so imminent as the extremists pose? Well, to steal a phrase from Al Qaeda, we have to deal with the near enemy, obviously. But ultimately to defeat that enemy, Daesh, we all have to get at the problem of the far enemy, which are the divisions within Iraq by sect and by ethnicity that have created an environment that Daesh can exploit. I've spent a long time in the region, as you know. Iraq today, for all of its problems and divisions, is not the Lebanon that emerged after the French mandate, where the sectarian differences are so deeply and inextricably ingrained. Iraq has a different history, a history of tolerance and of inclusivity that we sometimes lose sight of as we look back, say, to the advent of the Saddam years. That history can be Iraq's future, but it is going to take an outside element and right now there's only one, and that's the United States. We're speaking about the future and of hopefully some possibilities, and for that I guess we look to the private sector. And this is why I wanted to come to you, Mr. Asalim, is to ask you, at a time when Iraq is facing so much turmoil and most of the headlines would think that anyone who wants to invest in Iraq must be crazy. But at the same time, there are people who are investing in Iraq and actually see that there's so much opportunity in this country. So what's your take looking across the border into Iraq? Is it too big a risk at the moment to be involved in Iraq? Well, you know, we have invested as a Jordanian band in Iraq 2010, and at that time things were much better than what they are now. But even if you look at what's happening over the last two years, and the growth in oil production remained to increase, and the figures that were published by the Iraqi government last month, I mean, it was a record oil production compared to even the 50s and 60s and 70s before the Iraq-Iran War. If you look on all the macro figures, they're very positive. If you look at the real growth, last year was low, but I'm talking about the last 10 years. It has done extremely well and one of the highest in the area. GDP went up from $500 to $6,800. Iraq is a very rich country, and if you consider the oil production and the revenues generated the exports from $10 billion to $100 billion last year, I mean, despite the fact of all the prices decrease, Iraq will remain to have a considerable revenue for the real infrastructure of the country. We in the banking sector, despite again of what's happening between Kurdistan and down south and in the middle, we see people that import goods, whether a Kurdish company up north, they import to service and cater for all Iraq. They want to do their exports to Baghdad and down south. They do the importation through Meen on Qasar or up north depending on what is more feasible to them. So really one united Iraq, you still feel it in the business community. I think our problem is with the government, with the regulations, with the commitment of the government, I mean politically, forget about, our gentleman there has said a lot about ISIS and the political differences. But if you look about the economic decisions that are taken by the parliament, they're all the right decisions. But when it comes to implementation, they're not there. I think it is very sad to hear or listen or write in the newspaper that the government is not committed in renegotiating deals that they have done with the private sector, whether in the oil and gas or in different projects now, that we see a lot of cases from the private sector are at court. And I think this is very discouraging for the private sector. The market is there and people, we just launched a new product for car loans for people that want to buy a new car for $10,000, $15,000 as a bank. We are located, by the way, all over Iraq. We are in Basra, Qasar, Baghdad, Erbil, Islamania, we're all around the place. So people want to do banking. They are keen on having banks around. They would like to save their money in banks rather than home. But this needs the regulation that the government are saying or even passing laws by the parliament to be implemented. And I think the private sector needs commitment from the government that they mean what they say. And law and order is extremely important for the private sector. So the government isn't doing what all it can do to help develop the private sector. Again, we seem to be going from one crisis to another in Iraq and sometimes that leads to putting important decisions on the side, especially at a moment that we hear Iraq is almost run out of money despite the figures that we're hearing here. How can that be? And legally, the Iraq is moving with the market economically and the market economy has its own conditions and laws. These conditions and these rules are practical. And from one year to another, we try to develop these rules to develop a legal environment and an infrastructure that is appropriate and conducive to investments and to free business in Iraq. Let's not look at today. It's clear that there are difficulties today, but in general, if we look at the potential, the economic potential of Iraq, it has a lot of potential. If this potential is properly tapped into, Iraq can overcome all of its economic problems very quickly. However, the main problem is in the current administrations in Iraq, the Iraqi institutions, whether financial or industrial. In general, the Iraqi ministries and Iraqi institutions, there are still a lot of employees who are in control, but they are not convinced of the market economy and they are still working in accordance with the principles of central economy or the socialist economy of Saddam Hussein. In order to implement this change, this is one of the reasons, perhaps, that led to this delay in advancements in economic advancements in Iraq. This also hinges on consensus, political consensus and political stability. The lack of political consensus and political stability, then the administration will not be stable, and even if a decision is made, even if it's a proper decision, it will not be implemented and everything will only be ink on paper. This is, in fact, the situation in Iraq. If we compare the situation today with the same situation, with the same processes several years ago, we'll find that there's development. Procedures are much better. There are certain decisions that are implemented, maybe not completely, but definitely it's much better than before. And I personally believe that in terms of creating an environment that is conducive to investments and conducive to the private sector, I think this is possible, and this is where we're heading in Iraq. It is the official policy of the Iraqi government. Questions, but Ambassador, I think you want to add something there. I did, because I thought Mr. Salam made a very important point. There is actually a fair amount of American private investment in Iraq. There would be a lot more if some obstacles were overcome. Those obstacles for our investors, by and large, are not Daesh. They're not the Hashidishabi. They're not even the Peshmerga. It is the problem of government opacity, the absence of facilitating regulations for investment. There are areas in that domain. Levels of corruption. And levels of corruption. It's a long list. What our investors would like to see is an overhaul of the Iraqi stock market to bring it into the 21st century. If that were to happen, and I would think that's something that all sex and ethnicities should be able to agree on, because it's good for everybody, you would see a very substantial amount of international private capital come into the country even under the security conditions that prevail now. There are two main challenges in bringing investments and capital in Iraq. The first one is security related, and the other one is legislative to find the proper basis to protect the capital and also to find enough attractiveness for this capital to come to Iraq. But I will not get into the second issue, but I will focus on the first one, the security situation. The international solidarity to maintain a stable environment for investments in Iraq is still shy. It is not bold enough. It is no more than just words. The international community did not take a single step to help Iraq face its security problems. And when I talk about the Arab situation, with the exception of one or two countries, including Jordan, only these one or two countries talked about the possibility of equipping Iraq, assisting Iraq, giving weapons, everyone else is still waiting. And naturally, if the security situation is not conducive to effective investments or efficient investments, we cannot talk about proper or productive or effective investments because we did not resolve or solve the issues that stand in the way of investments. Let's open the floor to questions. If you could kindly identify yourself and indicate to me if you have a question. There we go. We have a question here. If we could please just get the mic. Mohammad Jaffer from Kuwait. My question has to do with the other issues, aside from Daesh, economic issues. Expatriation of money out of Iraq duties. There's a lot of disruption that's taking place that's been present there for more than 10 years now. And recently, we've noticed difficulties getting money out of Iraq through central bank. There's 8% duties that are being asked to be paid for goods coming into the country and for the money coming out of the country. Under normal circumstances, these problems are bearable. With ISIS taking the territory with the uncertainty, even people have been there for many years and who have made investments are starting to worry today. Is the government aware of these worries and what do they propose to do about them? A lot of people that don't imagine this, right? They don't imagine that I do represent the government. In the recent years, after the fall of Saddam Hussein, we tried within the government structures to give the Iraqi central bank kind of independence. And the main condition is to have an independent central bank to push the economic process forward. The Iraqi central bank worked very well from the beginning and it's still doing a good job to try to maintain the exchange rate of the Iraqi dinar and to fight inflation and to supervise the Iraqi banks and to help new banks to be established and to develop. One of the issues with the central bank, the issues that the government had with the central bank and other people as well is the sale of the US dollar in auctions. And there were accusations that these foreign currencies that are sold to banks are not used for import of necessary goods and not for the items that are declared in the manifest. So Iraq loses twice. The exchange rate is not in the interest of Iraq or exchanging these foreign currencies is not in the interest of Iraq and there's no duties or excise on the items that are being imported using this currency. So this is another loss to Iraq. So now duties and taxes are taken from the banks that previously used to be taken at the borders. So instead of charging taxes and duties at the border because the borders are not guaranteed they cannot properly monitor imports. So the central bank through selling foreign currencies if a business says we want so and so dollars in order to import so they sell them the foreign currency and they charge them the duties. These taxes and duties should not be paid by the bank nor by the clients of the bank. It should be paid by the merchant who is importing and who should have paid it at the borders. This is what is happening. This is what you mentioned and this is still not understood because the central bank did not explain it well. Some banks, not all banks, some banks are now charging 8% to the citizens who are buying dollars for example to pay hospital bills or to pay the university fees for their children abroad. Certain banks blame the central bank and they charge this percentage as if it is a blanket rate that covers any dealings with foreign currencies. What our gentleman was saying, I agree with him 100%. The idea is that you pay income, you pay import taxes on anything that you import to Iraq. So since you cannot do it on the borders you are doing it through banks. So they're imposing the 8% and our gentleman there was asking that if he wants to transfer out his profits he will not pay the 8%. But what is happening now? People that are importing goods to Iraq are not using banks anymore. They're going to money exchanges because they don't pay the 8%. So actually what they're trying to do is to make people pay the 8%, they're not coming to banks, they're not opening LCs, they're not doing any bank transfers and they're going to money exchanges to avoid the 8%. So really such regulations that the central bank is passing although they mean well they want to increase the revenue for the government but they're doing it the wrong way and they will end up losing the revenue without doing the proper transactions according to best practice anti-money laundering is taken in consideration, etc. So it's the right way of thinking to increase income but you should do that in a different manner. The system needs to be rectified. This is the right way of thinking to increase income but you should do that in a different manner. The system needs to be rectified. Any more questions? I was meeting with a commander from the Nino Liberation Army that asked for his training to liberate Mosul and the commander has said that ISIS is actually trying to bring services. He said, I hate to admit it but they're trying to bring services to Mosul and unless we do something fast it will be too late to pry them away from the civilians that remain there and that need those services. Because it wants to improve its image they do certain actions that seem to be in the interest of the people like building or removing the concrete on the streets and allowing people to move but they also do a lot of killing and people in Mosul I'm not living there but I hear that they say the following they say what we are living today inside Mosul given the fact that the number of people in Nineveh are more than 2 million people and there are women and children and some of them stayed out of fear and others stayed because they had no money to leave but some of them say the current situation for me is okay but they're all afraid of a decisive moment that will arrive and that is the war between ISIS and those who want to liberate Nineveh and those who will pay the price are the innocent civilians always because in wars this is what happens usually in wars when will Nineveh be liberated the liberation campaigns after Salahuddin had to face one of two choices either move to Nineveh or move to Anbar and the decision was to go to Anbar because there was American interest we cannot deny that and it was perhaps a bit easier to go to Anbar and if Anbar and Beiji and Salahuddin will be liberated then it will be easier to liberate Nineveh it will come eventually we don't know when we cannot set a time frame especially given the surprises that we see happening every day but we hope that within the next few months it will be liberated and once again we cannot liberate Nineveh without the assistance of the residents of Nineveh they need to stand up against ISIS allow me to ask how can the people of Nineveh rebel against ISIS when we see the Iraqi army running away from ISIS this is a real question I'm from Mosul and for the How did you respond? How did you kill the leader of Anbar? How did you How did you fight the people of Anbar? How did you fight the people of Anbar? How did you fight the people of Anbar? How did you fight the people of Anbar? How did you how did you fight the people of Anbar? How did you fight the people of Anb through ISIS? How did you fight the citizens of Anb? How did you fight the remains of you? how did you The people and the people are under the control of ISIS, but they are waiting for the final moment which they will be talking about to the Liberation Army. And they are there. And this is an unanswered issue. And there must be a moment of fear or fear that exists for those who face ISIS because they are human, just like the others are human. But we need opportunities and an opportunity and a vision for reform. And this is one of the possibilities. Yes, it is possible. I look at the issue from the Kurdish side. The reality of the city of Mosul, not anywhere in the world, where it is currently liberated from 12 criminal cases, without any administration. And this is how life is like. You are being controlled by a natural way of life, despite the problems of the refugees and the problems which have progressed through the lack of control and the lack of message. The message is not only about the revolution, it's also about our eyes. The city of Mosul is now liberated from three sides, from the western side and the north and the east side. and the support of the Peshmerga forces. The Peshmerga forces were able to stop the first attacks of Daesh by making sure of the help of the Al-Hulafa Al-Jawiya. And this help, was a thank-you, it had a good effect. And at that time, the effect that we needed. So, the Peshmerga is currently, as I said, three times the power of the Al-Muzal, but not by the power of the Peshmerga. And it is not good for the Peshmerga to be one of them to enter the Al-Muzal's religion and to work on the Al-Muzal's liberation or the fighting within the Al-Muzal. First of all, the Al-Muzal of the city has its own specialty, and the city is a large civil center. The Al-Muzal's liberation work requires education and education, and it requires the participation of all living beings, and this work will be successful. It requires the participation of other Iraqi living beings, and it requires the participation of the Al-Muzal's people, and it requires the participation of the most effective Al-Hulafa Al-Jawiya. So, we are able to move towards Al-Muzal and to be the less vulnerable citizens. Okay, oh, we have several questions. I'll start here, and then we'll work our way around. I'm going to group them in three only because of our time, so we'll start with the first question here and then gentlemen there and this lady here. Loh El-Khateeb from Iraq Energy Institute. For the past 90 years, since the foundation of the new state of Iraq, the first 80 years, Iraq tried its luck with a central regime, whether it's during monarchy, post-monarchy, and over that, Iraq experienced with at least 10 coup d'etats, uprising, et cetera, which is very much abnormal kind of like behavior for a state to experience any stability. Post-the-regime change of 2003, Iraq tried its luck with federalism, I would say 10 years after the referendum on the federal constitution. I'm sorry, I'm going to have to ask you for the question on because of time. The question is based, I mean, with regards to the shape of the state, there's a big question on what is Iraq? Is it central state? We still have the applications, the practices on centralism. Is it a federal state still just on paper while all factions and politicians still talking confederalism? So isn't about time for politicians and senior leadership to have a candid dialogue to discuss the twin challenges of Iraq, which is identity and geography? Thank you. Thank you so much. Okay, gentleman here. My question is to the ambassador. The United States, why did it leave Iraq in this dire situation? Why did it leave Iraq in such a situation? And his excellency, the ambassador, he was an ambassador in Iraq and he used to support the politicians who did this to the country. He's one of the people, all the ambassadors, all the U.S. ambassadors, they used to transmit to their administration a description of the situation. The main reason is that the deputy Qasem Sulaimani is dealing with Iran from Iraq. So is there a situation, intelligence situation, military situation, is it this bad in the United States? I think we're talking about an American failure, not an Iraqi failure because the Americans failed whereas others... So we'll start with these two ladies here. So is Iraq a central state, a federal state, a confederal state? We can say it's a hybrid system. When the constitution was written, it talked about a federal system. But since there is only one region or regional government, of course through the constitution, a government can become a region or a government can join a region. But this didn't happen. There were attempts. There are requests from Al-Anbar, from Al-Anbar, from Salah-e-Din. But the fact that it did not happen on the ground doesn't mean that we deny it because it is possible, according to the constitution. Now we are using a decentralized system. We have just promulgated a law that will transform eight ministries into the governors, which means that we will give more powers to the current governors, eight ministries. Eight very important ministries will be moved to the governorates. So we cannot talk about a transformation from a strong centralized system to a widely decentralized system without going through phases. We have not gone through those phases yet. So this is the system that is in place now. There is a committee to amend the constitution. It will look into this, into the positive and negative characteristics and hopefully come up with an acceptable solution. According to the constitution, we are a federal system. But now it is not a homogeneous or asymmetrical federal system because there is only one region, one federal region. There was supposed to be several federal regions, or at least a Kurdish region and an Arab region. If this is not possible, then we can't have, then it's possible to have several regions, one Kurdish and the other one could be Sunni, Shi'ite, et cetera. This is the right way to apply true decentralization and to avoid problems and to avoid friction between the different factions or parties. Each region will be completely responsible for its management and federal issues will be limited. And so the amount of problems will also be limited. But the more we try to apply federalism and decentralization properly, the more we can remove Iraq from its problems and remove on the way to solving deeply rooted problems in Iraq. Unfortunately, during the first period, the Sunnis rejected federalism. And the Shi'ites accepted federalism. But now we see the situation has been turned around. It is the Shi'ites who don't want federalism and the Sunnis who want it. If we want Iraq to remain unified, there needs to be equality between the different groups. We need to have justice in Iraq, justice for everyone. There has to be a decentralized system, a truly decentralized and federal system. Otherwise, the problems will increase. Well, one could phrase it that way, but we don't live there. So if Iraq fails, rather obviously, it's ultimately going to be an Iraqi failure from which we will all suffer and for which we will all pay. And that's why I was saying earlier, whatever anyone thinks of the original decision to invade Iraq in 2003, that's why we have PhD programs. So generations of young people can write PhD theses on should we or shouldn't we. It doesn't matter because we did. I have said for years, I've learned maybe two things in 40 years in the Middle East. The first is be careful what you get into. The law of unintended consequences and 40th order reactions. The second thing is be even more careful what you get out of. That the consequences of disengagement can be graver than those of engagement in the first place. And arguably, we didn't pay attention to either rule with respect to Iraq. But you can't rewind the movie. The invasion happened. The challenge now is how to bring Iraq to a better place. So we don't have a failure in Iraq and in the region that threatens all of us. And that, I would submit again, is through a return of US political engagement at a sustained and senior level. You do not end the war simply by withdrawing your forces from the battlefield. You simply give the space to other forces that you're probably not going to like very much, like General Soleimani and the militias and Daesh. There is still time and opportunity to help Iraq to a better course. But it is going to take a different American policy in my view. Our very final question before we wrap up. So yeah, no, you can go ahead. I think the mic is taking its time. One question. My question is to Sir Jaburi. We know that there have been a budget dispute between the KRG and the central government. I'd like to know what the reason for that is. And especially because the Kurdish forces, the Peshmerges, have been the major forces fighting on the ground. And as a result of the budget dispute, we have had to have local fundraisings to provide for them. And that is also a tragedy. So I'd like to know the reason for that. What's the reason for that? If I were to defer the question to His Excellency Deputy Prime Minister, he should be able to tell us and to see whether or not he really represents the government or KRG. Well, it's my nature. Building on my personal history, I always go for the truth. I can never agree more, the speaker says. Anyways, Mr. Saleem has already explained his legislative role because he was in charge of passing the budget law, which included striking an agreement or a deal between the KRG and the central government on fiscal matters and on all your revenues. Had it been enforced or implemented as should be, we would have been able to do away with one key problems among or inter-alia numerous huge problems we're suffering. Now, the agreement between the region, I.E. KRG, entails that we provide the Iraqi government through the Turkish ports with 550,000 barrels of oil a day and 250,000 barrels that are the products of oil fields in the KRG and 300,000 barrels of oil produced from Kirkuk to be pumped through the new pipeline that was paid for by the Kurdistan region in order to pump the oil to the Turkish seaports. In return, the Iraqi government, as it is already stipulated in the budget law, the central government should transfer the region's share. Mind the time, please, the moderator says. However, there is an additional point is that the federal government has to help the KRG to complete the infrastructure needed to transport the required quantities. And of course, the infrastructure was not ready by the beginning of the year in order to pump 200,000 barrels a day. After four months, the two sides were able together to make available the infrastructure in its complete format. And now, KRG can now export 600,000 barrels a day and to be paid to the revenues of which to be paid to the central government at the outset. KRG paid to the central government about one quarter of its share of the budget. So it sounded as if the federal government has bought KRG oil exports, if we might say so, because due to the limited capacity of the infrastructure available, the pipeline. But later on, when the KRG was able to follow through on its commitments, the federal government only paid 30% to 40% only of the KRG's share of the budget. So this has taken us steps backwards and created new tensions that were pointless. The two sides have to stick to the agreement as is to solve the problems. You have to forgive me, because they will kill us if we don't finish on time. We're already two minutes late. I want to thank you. I want to thank our speakers. There is so much to discuss on Iraq that we could be here for another two days. So I want to thank our speakers for their honesty and their very direct answers. Thank you.