 I'm Martin Wolf from the Financial Times where the panel is called All Change What Next for Monetary Policy and we're going to take that headline title in a slightly more sensible direction. But we will be clear what we're going to do. Before I start let me introduce the panelist. So to my right is Laura Alfaro, Warren Alpert Professor at the Harvard Business School. To her right is Mark Carney who is now the United Nations Special Envoy for Climate Action and Finance but has been governor of both the Bank of England and the Bank of Canada which is I think unique as far as I know. I've been trying to find out whether anybody else has been the head of two completely different central banks. Presumably in the ECB there must have been some overlaps. To my left is Thomas Jordan who is chairman of the governing board of the Swiss National Bank which in terms of inflation performance is surely the best in the world for decades. To his left is Julio Velarde who is governor of the central bank of Peru and to his left is Catherine Garrett Cox, Chief Executive Officer of Asset Management of the Gulf International Bank. So a nice wide panel with a nice broad range of experiences and it's pretty obvious why we will be addressing this because we've just gone through a pretty big inflationary shock not to put it mildly wild widely expected and we are still in the process of getting it under control and that has raised obviously lots of questions about was this a monetary policy or other policy mistake or was it just a series of shocks and how does that interact and what lessons should we learn from what has happened. We're not I think going to predict what's going to happen to interest rates next because I have a strong suspicion that the only people who could tell us about that with any confidence here are not going to tell us. So one thing I've learned as a journalist is you don't ask a practising central bank governor when he or she is going to raise or lower rates. It's fruitful. So we'll focus mostly on that and then we will look at having looked at the lessons of this episode. We will then look at probably relatively brief briefly about whether beyond what this teaches us from the operation of monetary policy we will look at whether central banks should be given other mandates or have other objectives and there's particular focus and it's very appropriate in this context that Mark is here on the climate mandate and should there be an or if not a mandate how should it be taken into account. But there may be some other issues that we will want to address. So let's start then with the lessons from this episode which has been very interesting. I'm the most significant inflation episode I would say since the late 70s early 80s globally. And so and it was certainly not expected. But of course we had extraordinary shocks COVID post COVID recovery two wars. So what do we learn from this episode. Is it basically nothing could have been done to prevent it. It was just one of those things and they're doing a magnificent job of bringing it under control. Or actually whether some serious policy mistakes we should be thinking about. What do you think. Thomas Jordan. Well I think the regime the policy regimes or the policy frameworks are OK. They are good. It was probably more difficult to make the right analysis. So what was permanent what was transitory. I think there was a certain mistake at the beginning. Our monetary policy framework served us quite well. We could react relatively early and could maintain inflation at a very low level. Now looking forward. I believe what is really important is having a forward looking approach. Not looking at the actual inflation really having a forward looking approach. Low inflation is not really bad. It's much better than having high inflation. Think we have also to be humble about our capability to forecast. So we have to review these forecasts all the time. Take it into account also structural changes. And in my view what is very important to have a risk management approach. So I think it's much better to take decisions that are robust for a wider variety of different outcomes rather than to choose one particular policy that may be the best but only in one particular scenario. So I think risk management approach in the future is very important to focus on price stability and not to go into extreme optimism optimization for monetary policy. Can I just follow up with one question which many will ask and very interesting in your views is you said which is what I would expect you in particular the Swiss National Bank to say low inflation is not really too bad. Do you. One of the critiques people would make is that before the shock in the in the teens to a number of major central banks notably the Fed but also the Bank of England and the ECB work very very hard. And now the Japanese Bank of Japan is working even harder to get inflation up because they do think it's bad. And in the process they did enormous monetary expansion at least expansion of the monetary base. Do you think that was a mistake. Well I cannot really speak for the others. But in our case I think it was extremely helpful to have a more flexible approach that you can say everything that is below 2 percent but positive is an acceptable level. So we did not have to go in extreme monetary policy decisions. So sometimes it's extremely difficult to bring inflation from one point to two percent points and everything else is functioning very well. So I think we can maintain normal monetary policy even if inflation is for some time below 2 percent. But above zero. Of course. Yes. OK. Yeah. So and that of course was the problem for the Japan which we must be clear about. Julio if I may question. So what is your view of the lessons of this experience. And why it happened and what we should learn from it. Well first probably one lesson is that there was overconfidence that inflation has been conquered. The revolution of the 90s and the effects of the crisis made inflation very low. And even this worry that we were mentioning about the ECB Bank of England. That's it. I also believe there was a supply show but it has disappeared. There are also two expansionary fiscal policy. But also monetary policy was too expansionary. And the effects were not so visible at first. In a case we've started increasing the rate in from zero zero point eighty five. We increase in August two thousand thirty one as soon as inflation was exceeding our target. But even at the time when power was saying it doesn't matter when power was saying it was transitory. At the time we were not so sure that it was going to last a long time. Even the first two months of two thousand twenty two before the mission of Ukraine inflation was a little more than two percent annually. So it seemed that it was just an episode that you should just normalize the monetary rate. And then happy Ukraine with this so much liquid in the system. You couldn't fight this increasing prices so rapidly. We have increased the rate all the months after until January of two of two thousand eight to two. We have started reduction of interest rate in September five five reductions already. It's September this year. But I believe that is very high. You knew it was a supply choking measure. You cannot apply extra monetary breaks because of recession. So the only way was increasing your interest rate a month after month trying to step this. And now I believe that inflation is on its way back around the world. And probably we are going to get there. Some countries might reach in two thousand eighty five. In our case our course now is within the target. And we expect headland to be within the target in the next two months. So we are pretty well. But it is it is a process. And I believe it has to do something with Thomas. It was insinuating in part created the central banks that you are going to react inflation is going to be higher. It's not only the effect on the interest rate on on demand is that credibility that the central bank will continue pushing rates until inflation is controlled. So I believe that affects in part the reaction of the markets. So let me make sure I get the numbers right. You said you've had five reductions in interest rate start in September. Actually just to finish we were the first country in the world to start inflation already with negative inflation in 2001. The second was the up and with Coro in 2014. So we have the episodes of very low inflation. But we are not sure. Of course. And when did you first raise rates. September of last year. This is we have one limit is. So that last increase was this month. A little bit possible. When we reduce increases in me. No. You you've been. If I understand it you've lowered them five times in September. When before that did you first increase them. August two thousand twenty one. So we were ahead of you said you were ahead of the all the major Western banks by many months. I believe that the Americans are Europe were the first to hike. OK. That's very very health just so the audience understands this. So first let me clarify. I'm not a central banker. And I I want you are married to us. Yes. Thus I want to be humble because as they say in Latin America it's not the same to see her coming than to dance with her. No no no. He'll have a need to go out with her. Meaning it is very easy for me outside to be more critical. And let me take a perhaps a more academic view. I think we're going to go back and we want to see big shocks and we want to say yes government spending had to go up. We will disagree on the quantity not on the on that direction. I do think there was a little bit more than was needed especially in certain countries. Then we needed monetary policy. Some countries saw the concerns early because they saw the effects early but also they were more sensitive to the effects to your point in Latin America. We have a very clear inflation is a very regressive tax in Latin America. Our history of income inequality and poverty is also a history of very high inflation. And thus I think that is why many countries in Latin America at the early science acted because these are poor people than one who pay inflation exposed. It's interesting that we have seen very quick reduction in many countries. I don't think we're going to take it as the regime didn't work. I also right now if you try to explain the reduction in inflation on the usual suspects inflation expectations which have been anchored labor supply and disruptions in supply chain. We probably won't be able to explain it. That means there was some productivity change. And again it's possible that is AI. Although I don't think we see the effects just yet. It's possible it's some home work Zoom logistics. But I think exposed is going to look a lot like the 90s that we managed to bring it down very quickly because of some productivity that is hard to measure in the 90s. It was computers. Walmart logistics. Now it's going to be some mixture of Zoom AI logistics. But I think exposed. We're going to see it. It worked. There were some deviations. We cannot explain but on average the regime worked. And are you when you say that you're thinking that specifically in the Latin American context or more broadly. I think more broadly they people would say some acted first some act that later maybe they should have have acted early on. But I think in hindsight we're going to say the tools worked. OK. And I think you've stressed one very important point which actually surprised me a bit. Which is inflation expectations seem to be remain rather well anchored. I actually have to say that I find that very surprising because it's a huge price level shock. But but it does seem to me incredibly important and it is a very significant issue. So let me now turn to you Catherine. What is that. How does the private sector feel about this mess. Sorry. This transitory shock. Thank you very much. Yes. I'm always rather nervous of being on a part on a panel with Mark. And I'm very glad that you started off by suggesting we don't get into the topic of short term interest rates. Because I think my perspective is that we've got to dispense with the obsession of the short term. And the reality is that the short term framing around topics such as this is distinctly unhelpful for what we need to tackle in the world today. And as we all know monetary policy is also an imperfect tool. So the perspective that the private sector brings to this is mostly what we want to see is a resilient financial system. And there is no doubt that the short term obsession with some of these topics is that frankly complete odds with the long term investments that we have to make in areas of whether it's climate change the whole transition that we need to see in the energy space and more and more. And I think we'll probably come back to that in the second part of your panel. But I also think that one of the lessons that we've learned through this whole cycle Martin is that organizations need to be much better at stress testing. A yes in part that was a mandate from the central banks and that has been helpful. But as a long term investor one of the things that we're really looking at is have organizations embedded more robust scenario analysis stress testing into their corporate DNAs because ultimately they will then be much more successful in the long term. So I think as I said you know the private sector generally speaking likes to invest on a long term basis. And when you think about some of the challenges that we're tackling today whether it's health care whether it's the climate space you know everything that's going on in AI. One of the things that gives me great hope is that in a post pandemic environment we've learned to move faster. You know one of the conversations we sort of had had sort of previously is do we return to a pre a pre COVID environment. And personally I really hope we don't because if you think about the transformative things that we've got much better and faster at since collaboration generative AI really tackling some of the big issues in the world. I think you have to be full of hope. But I reiterate that we've got to focus on the long term. Do you think there's a little wrinkle on that. And I've been thinking about this. You talked about stress testing and stress testing yourself as a business not imposing. But we seem to be very and I'd be interested to be more about what's happening. All these shocks of the last few years and I live side the financial crisis itself. Would it seem to me have automatically forced business leaders to consider the risks and therefore to stress test themselves. Whether that makes them all long term. I'm not clear but it might make them much more aware of the environment in which they might be operating. Do you think that's true. I think it I think it is true. I mean obviously I represent a bank and asset management business so I would say categorically in our case. I mean we were doing much of this before the bank. You know the central banks mandated this. But you know ultimately it creates more resilience and you know it forces us to really understand what is happening in the macro context. And frankly it's not just climate change that's causing shocks in the system. We have geopolitics. We have conflicts everywhere. We have an uncertain political situation over the next two years. So I think if you don't come back to where you started. If you don't deploy effective risk management across your business you are missing a major trick. So Mark what is your assessment of the the transitory blip stroke colossal mistake. What do we take away from it. Above all in terms of what we must continue to do and what we need to change. OK. Well first it's a pleasure to be with all of you. Catherine especially. And I guess I'll put it in maybe the following framing which is that for a long period up until including post financial crisis really up until the COVID shock. Most central banks not all but most central banks certainly in the G7 were operating in a world of what's called divine coincidence at least in central bank parlance. In other words inflation was below target and the economy were their economies were operating below potential. So to the extent to which they thought about a dual mandate either formally in the U.S. or getting the economy back to potential as a means to have inflation at target both sides said one thing. Stimulate. And the question was calibrating that stimulus and making sure that it was in the right direction. OK. That is not the case when you have a supply shock. When you have a supply shock has been painfully demonstrated you have to make trade offs. And if you're an inflation target or you have to decide to extend you can as a central bank and there's limits to your power of course the horizon over which you try to bring inflation back to target that's the flexibility in inflation targeting. If it's a one off oil price shock for example you look through it but central banks were not faced with one off supply shocks were faced with like London buses a series of supply shocks that showed up at the same time and I very much reemphasize one of the points that Julio made which and the Ukraine shock on the energy side and the knock on effect of that on top of existing shocks are coming out of COVID are significant. Now we had this theoretical experience or more than theoretical experience at the Bank of England when we looked at Brexit and this is in the public record because our scenario analysis was pulled out from us by parliament. We view that it was a supply shock which it has proved to be and the consequence of that would be the economy would slow the exchange rate would go down inflation would go up and the Bank of England would have to tighten interest rates. That's exactly what happened at the time that that was released apart from my central banking colleagues in private nobody I wouldn't shouldn't say nobody very few people recognize that as a credible scenario. That's how long the world had gone. You reference the 70s without a major supply shock that had some endurance. Next point and I'll finish up which is. So how is inflation come down. It's come down and it hasn't come down. If I may the job is not complete. Nobody's suggesting that it's complete but progress has been made and it's come down for two broad reasons. One part of those supply shocks have unwound particularly with respect to obviously COVID induced issues with supply chains challenges in the goods market. Some recovery in labor markets as people have themselves gone back into the labor market. The energy price shock of course it can reemerge but flows through and then crucially the actions of the central banks in acting to tighten have moderated demand such that there's a greater prospect of demand and supply being in balance. So that's that's the overall aspect. And the last point I just make is that the lesson I would take from this is the strength of the regime. There's issues of execution and the degree of difficulty that my peers at former peers I guess have had to deal with. But the strength of the regime flexibility crucial importance point Catherine made of macro potential of having a resilient financial system so the financial system itself can deal with these shocks. And I think you have to give very high marks to the central banks and other authorities because the system made it through those shocks. But the last point is that we are in a world I would suggest where we're going to see additional supply shocks with some relatively high degree of certainty with some persistence. And just to finish on that which is you know effectively the world is being rewired. Our trade routes are being rewired through de-risking of supply chains. That is a form of a supply shock. It will have some persistence. Obviously energy systems are being rewired with addressing climate change. And so those are both for a period have some headwinds. Ultimately could bring greater resilience and moving in the other direction. And I think it's very early days. So I don't think it's showing up in supply today. But we have the rewiring of intelligence and the positive supply shock that will come. I suspect and others here in Davos are better placed to comment on this and affected. I suspect we don't start to see that until later in this decade. But then central banks will be grappling with headwinds and tailwinds if you will on supply. On top of their usual responsibilities of managing demand and a resilient financial system. Just ask one follow up question of the two central bank as others may intervene towards just before the crisis. A number of central banks and not I think the Bank of England but certainly the Fed and the ECB were giving indicating or explicitly shifting their regime in a way to be more backward looking. In other words to say that if we have failed to hit the target for a long time. That means we're not where we should be cumulatively. And in that situation we ought to wait longer to react. And we're committing ourselves to wait longer to react. And they sort of announces pretty well if my memory is twenty nineteen. I may have got that. It would. Let's say they're about. But just in the run into the timing wasn't. The timing was not. Let's put it. Do you think that way of looking at things was one of the reasons they didn't recognize that if you've got a significant supply shock. Well that sort of means you likely have excess demand. As you pointed out. And therefore you should start thinking about what that means for your monetary policy. I think it's fair to say with the full wisdom of hindsight. That the the feds. The fed felt its hands were tied. For a longer period of time because of that regime the flexible average inflation targeting regime. And that they had added to that regime. A series of other conditions. That that in terms of sequencing of the change in policy as well. And actually specific outcomes in the labor market above and beyond just the level of the nominal GDP. That meant that they they waited too long. And I think they would. What do you think about this. I mean in a way it seems to be one of the big episode. Lessons of this is you have to be consistently forward looking. Yeah. And. And. And that I think consistent very much with what you said at the beginning that one of the important conclusions. Well for me. Yes. I think forward looking is absolutely necessary. Although I believe I think the very difficulty was given these supply shocks and the war. The disentangling between what is permanent and what is transitory. And there the views were very different at the beginning. And that was maybe independent of whether it was forward looking or backward looking. But in general I said at the beginning I think it's very necessary to be forward looking. But Mark said it before that the uncertainty about what happens in the future is also very big. So we have always to review our forecast and then to adjust again. So the uncertainty is very big and we have to find a way to make robust decision within this very uncertain environment. Would you add anything on that. Yes. I believe it has to be forward looking. But I be sure the future is tainted. But we have seen the past that not exist shocks since the 70s. The low inflation for almost 30 years. Even what we saw before Lehman that confidence in many policymaking states that that cycle was conquered that it was not going to be a recession. So it is true you have to be forward looking but your forward looking vision is affected by what had been happening the recent years. Yeah. And I think I've been thinking about one final point. Then we go on. But then want to go particularly to that some of the some of these other issues. But the we we essentially decided that after the financial crisis that we needed to change our whole approach to financial regulation in a pretty big way. It was a big it was a big failure. What I'm hearing here is the view that yes it was an inflationary upsurge because of unexpected supply shocks. There were some parts of the way they were approaching the mandate their mandate before which probably be too backward looking. But the essence of the regime. The what turned out to continue to be relatively flexible labor markets. That's quite important. That's other policies that the inflation expectations rained quite remarkably well anchored despite a big shock. It looks as though we have a very good chance of getting out of it though we don't know how quickly that actually we can say that after this shock unlike the financial shock there isn't actually any real need to change the way central banks handle monetary policy. Is that your view. Again there's a lot of heterogeneity and a lot of regimes. I once was in a in a meeting where it's an important policymaker was saying oh the problems with deflation. And this was a speech that was given in Brazil. And everyone was like deflation. So again some of these views are very short memories. Some of these views of we really had a problem with getting inflation up and we're more of the North than many other countries. I think that probably helped them in thinking well we need to react. But in terms of the tools I think in hindsight we will say the regime worked again. I am a fan of inflation targeting because it does give you flexibility. You don't need to get the target today. You can get it in. And I think that worked. And so going to these grand visions of changing monetary policy I actually don't think we need them. I think getting inflation right is not easy. Getting whether it's a permanent transitory is a supply shock or demand shock is not easy. I think getting inflation to the right number is extremely important. Again I think some of the deviations is not everyone thinks how regressive it can be. I think many countries really you can see it in the politics. Exactly. I do am of the view the poor people pay it. So we shouldn't deviate from a 2 percent target. And thus I will maintain it. Like it's not easy to get the number right. Let's not complicate it and let's try to work towards getting the number right. So one final thing here I think and then I want to go into these other issues. But Thomas said we take those pretty important that you should be pretty relaxed between zero and two. Which means by implication that you might you might be at zero and and be relaxed about and of course it might suddenly be meant negative. Would you take the same view about and this is a really big controversy now as you know lots of people I've spent years fighting them say well when it went down to less in Britain actually than elsewhere. But when it went well below target for long periods the effort to push it up with all that makes you know just a huge mistake and a huge distortion and we're suffering from that in part if not in the inflation at least in excess debt and all the rest. So Thomas is right. This is what we should have done. Well first thing it's always good to look at the numbers and inflation averaged just under two percent in the U.K. so if I could speak for U.K. actually hit its target. Yes. Thank you. Thank you. We memorialize that. This is better inflation in some country. We are OK at inflation. We just got under control. The this but what's critical in it. Look. Yes. The flexibility should be used on both sides. First point particularly if you have situations where you have good disinflation in other words you have let's let's let's pretend we're in twenty twenty eight twenty twenty nine we're all invited back and we're here and we have this productivity dividend that's coming from A.I. and from the net zero transition which does give a productivity dividend as it as it flows through and then we have lower lower price inflation. There is a pretty good and we should be having a pretty robust debate at that point about taking some of that in lower inflation that supply benefit stretch it using the flexibility to take longer to come back and making sure that we have robust and and and regardless of whether we do that I I would say one of the lessons of the productivity boom in the early 2000s and the response to that is that might have been a better policy in the late in the U.S. late 90s in the run up to the sub what turned out to be the run up to the subprime crisis. But we can have a broader discussion of time for the and then the second point I just want to emphasize though is that it is it picks up on something Catherine and actually everyone has touched on is I think the regimes that will perform better in the next few years are the ones that were very robust during the pre COVID period on the health of their financial systems and thinking about their mortgage markets and thinking about indebtedness and and so those who put in place basically restrictions so that you couldn't take out a mortgage even though bank rate was one percent unless you could service it at five or six percent. Those types of macro potential measures which weren't hugely popular but now are incredibly relevant and that means the system of the financial system functions better. Last point if I may which is that this thing on stress testing. It's it's very hard to stress for the crisis that actually happens. You know plans are useless but planning is essential that Eisenhower line but planning for failure makes the financial institution more robust for what what does actually happen. And that's why there's huge value to this in good times for the bad. Let's just talk briefly about the mandate. I don't think we're going to get time to go to questions from the audience. I apologize but I think that was inevitable. So I'll stop with you Catherine if you were in charge chance to check her in the case you could change the man you could change the the mandate of the Bank of England without any different legislation or any of that messy stuff. So would you add in climate or some other considerations as a mandate or and if not how would you incorporate it in risk management in the bank in the bank and its financial sector management. What do you think. Well I don't envy their task for a for a start and we obviously have some some far more qualified people on the panel. But what I would say is that I'm full of hope that across the financial service sector and actually across the economy as a whole there is far greater awareness of sustainability factors in in planning for the future. And we obviously had a huge lead globally taken by the Bank of England you know under Mark's leadership and it's you know it wasn't just a good idea people are actually doing it. The other hat I wear in addition to my G.I.B. hat is I also chair CDP which is the carbon disclosure project through which organizations around the world disclose their their their climate related financial disclosures and the really important thing is is that the numbers are rising exponentially. So it isn't something that people are necessarily doing just because they're told to because it makes a difference in terms of how their investors perceive the value of that organization. So it then becomes a really you know self fulfilling circle. But I think you know the second point I would make and then sort of obviously make time for others is that I don't think it's just the mandate of central banks to tackle climate change. I think that's far too naive. I think it is the role of governments. I think it's the role of the private sector. And frankly it's also the role of consumers. I think if we're not aware if we're not having these conversations with our children again I think we're living in a cave and there are huge issues to tackle. If you simply look at some of the climate related disclosures that we see through TCFD financial institutions are holding around nine trillion dollars of fossil fuel assets on their balance sheets. We are going to have a big stranded asset problem and we will need to work through this. So if we don't do it together and come back to the earlier point I made around this sort of post sort of in the in the eye of the storm and the pandemic and post pandemic view of cooperation and collaboration. I just don't think we have I hope. But I am full of hope because I think we can do it. But the key point you're making here is this is a systems problem and it's not a bank of a central bank problem as such. It has to look at this but it's not the main actor. Sometimes every softening people seem to believe that somehow because it's got all this money and monetary power and you don't actually have to legislate in it just can fix it. I don't think it's helpful to understand that you can't. Do you have any views on changing of the mandate of the central bank. This is one of the other one that is much discussed and I know you have about 40 seconds for this is shall we raise the inflation target. No. OK. That's a great. But also let me add something. I think sometimes we forget we're here an elite. There are some people that do not know what they're going to eat tomorrow. And so for them the discussion with their kids. I honestly think it should be what am I going to feed you tomorrow. Am I going to send you to school. And sometimes we take that for granted. Maybe they're not the ones who should be thinking about these grand topics. And I just say it because again I do think we have a bias here and we forget that there are many people that is what am I going to feed my my kid tomorrow. And that is their their priority. And thus again inflation is very regressive. And so we want to get right. Climate affects prices and many central banks have already incorporated that the Brazilian Central Bank does consider what is going to be the effect of the new year La Niña on agriculture enterprise. So it's already there because it is affecting the final price. And I think that's the way to do it. And not directly beautifully pointed Julio. The mandates are perfect. So should we change them. At least I think that most of the emerging market countries in the state already have probably a rancid in a race one to three first with the fact that we have a volatility. So you have a particular poor country where the weight of food is high in the CPI. We have more volatility. But also probably all the U.S. will have benefits at the end in the transition. Probably we have pressure on prices as you insinuated out. So probably part of this might be somewhat higher than you're talking for some time. And it's good not to put a pressure to that. But I think that for a time will be two point three two point four two point five. And not be obsessed with the number. What people want is lower stable inflation. They don't know if they don't care if there's two point two or two point one or two. Mark what do you think about the mandate. Well I wouldn't change the target. So I agree with professor. I think it served well. First point. Secondly I think the principal role of central banks with respect to climate is with respect to the resilience of individual financial institutions and the system as a whole. And if I could put it this way normally what you're doing. This is a financial regulation. It's a financial regulatory money. And so there's many central banks that don't actually have a financial regulatory responsibility therefore it doesn't fall for them. But you know in general in financial stability is my last point which is you need to plan for failure. Right. So you think of you know there's a COVID shock. There's you know some bad thing happens a big financial institution fail. So I plan for failure. Think about how we keep the system functioning. So those who are at least well off are not hurt. It's it's it is unforgivable to have the problems of the financial system fall on the most vulnerable in society. With respect to climate one of the key things you're planning for in stress testing is success. Society decides in the UK and Canada many other places but in UK and Canada it's the law the land to get to net zero by 2050. So the question that's asked is well what if we actually do that. What if companies change their energy mix they get their emissions down. What's your exposure. Where's where your problems on your balance sheet where your assets on your balance sheet. How does that move. Have you thought it through. And that's and that's a critical aspect that just helps to support the smoothing of that transition whatever society actually implements. Last word for you. Well on the mandate I'm convinced that it's very important to maintain a very narrow mandate. We can only justify central bank independence by having a narrow mandate price stability supporting the economy and central bank independence is really a key success factor for for a monetary policy. It's also important to see that we do not really have effective and efficient instrument to tackle climate change. So our main contribution is really a stable economic environment and then parliament and government content their responsibility and take the appropriate measure. So I think a narrow mandate is really I think for everybody the best we can have and we can justify independence. Thank you very much. Well I 18 seconds to sum up and it actually seems fairly clear which in the brain is almost disappointing. People agree so much. But the but the basic conclusion here is the flexible inflation targeting framework which has become the norm has worked reasonably well in despite some really big shocks and we can obviously they're obviously they're all going to have to go back and look at whether they did the forecasting properly and all the rest of it and learn from it. But inflation expectations were well anchored. We haven't needed the huge apparently the huge increases in unemployment that for instance my friend Larry Summers thought would be necessary. That's an enormous policy achievement which I hadn't expected. There's a good chance that they we will get back on to target in the next year or two. It's going to be pretty difficult to exit from policy. We didn't go into that but that's clearly true. And the world is massively uncertain and we've just been reminded of that. To some degree the central bankers were not basically they couldn't have avoided this. And we should preserve them as well as basically the regime as firmly and as well as we can. But of course there are huge other economic and social problems and the central banks have to play a part in this and the most obvious way they play a part in this is making sure that the financial risks associated with them are fully internalized within the system. And otherwise I'm afraid the the the solutions will lie in the hands of politics and private business and us all. I think that's very much the sense and the hope that somehow we can hand it over to the central banks to fix easy delusion. And there are a few people who do actually seem to think that. And I think they've done a wonderful job and it's been a very enjoyable discussion. I'm sorry there wasn't time for Q&A but such as like with five panelists and 45 minutes it was never going to happen. Thank you very much.