 File 38 of a Treatise of Human Nature by David Hume, Volume 2. We now proceed to examine two questions, that is, concerning the manner in which the rules of justice are established by the artifice of men, and concerning the reasons which determine us to attribute to the observance or neglect of these rules a moral beauty and deformity. These questions will appear afterwards to be distinct. We shall begin with the former. Of all the animals with which this globe is peopled, there is none towards whom nature seems at first sight to have exercised more cruelty than towards men in the numberless wants and necessities with which she has loaded him and in the slender means which she affords to the relieving these necessities. In other creatures these two particulars generally compensate each other. If we consider the lion as a voracious and carnivorous animal, we shall easily discover him to be very necessitous. But if we turn our eye to his make and temper, his agility, his courage, his arms, and his force, we shall find that his advantages hold proportion with his wants. The sheep and ox are deprived of all these advantages, but their appetites are moderate and their food is of easy purchase. In men alone this unnatural conjunction of infirmity and of necessity may be observed in its greatest perfection. Not only the food which is required for his sustenance flies his search and approach, or at least requires his labor to be produced, but he must be possessed of clothes and lodging to defend him against the injuries of the weather. Though to consider him only in himself he is provided neither with arms nor force nor other natural abilities which are in any degree answerable to so many necessities. It is by society alone he is able to supply his defects and raise himself up to an equality with his fellow creatures, and even acquire a superiority above them. By society all his infirmities are compensated, and though in that situation his wants multiply every moment upon him, yet his abilities are still more augmented and leave him in every respect more satisfied and happy than it is possible for him in his savage and solitary condition ever to become. When every individual person labors apart and only for himself, his force is too small to execute any considerable work. His labor being employed in supplying all his different necessities, he never attains a perfection in any particular art, and as his force and success are not at all times equal, the least failure in either of these particulars must be attended with inevitable ruin and misery. Society provides a remedy for these three inconveniences. By the conjunction of forces our power is augmented. By the partition of employments our ability increases. And by mutual succor we are less exposed to fortune and accidents. It is by this additional force, ability and security, that society becomes advantageous. But in order to form society it is requisite not only that it be advantageous, but also that men be sensible of these advantages, and it is impossible in their wild uncultivated state that by study and reflection alone they should ever be able to attain this knowledge. Most fortunately, therefore, there is conjoined to those necessities whose remedies are remote and obscure, another necessity which having a present and more obvious remedy may justly be regarded as the first and original principle of human society. This necessity is no other than that natural appetite betwixt the sexes which unites them together and preserves their union till a new tie takes place in their concern for their common offspring. This new concern becomes also a principle of union betwixt the parents and offspring and forms a more numerous society where the parents governed by the advantage of their superior strength and wisdom and at the same time are restrained in the exercise of their authority by that natural affection which they bear their children. In a little time, custom and habit operating on the tender minds of the children makes them sensible of the advantages which they may reap from society as well as fashions them by degrees for it by rubbing off those rough corners and untoward affections which prevent their coalition. For it must be confessed that however the circumstances of human nature may render and union necessary, and however those passions of lust and natural affection may seem to render it unavoidable, yet there are other particulars in our natural temper and in our outward circumstances which are very incomodious and are even contrary to the requisite conjunction. Being the former we may justly esteem our selfishness to be the most considerable. I am sensible that generally speaking the representations of this quality have been carried much too far, and that the descriptions which certain philosophers delight so much to form of mankind in this particular are as wide of nature as any accounts of monsters which we meet within fables and romances. So far from thinking that men have no affection for anything beyond themselves, I am of opinion that though it be rare to meet with one who loves any single person better than himself, yet it is as rare to meet with one in whom all the kind affections taken together do not overbalance all the selfish. Most common experience. Do you not see that though the whole expense of the family be generally under the direction of the master of it, yet there are few that do not bestow the largest part of their fortunes on the pleasures of their wives and the education of their children, reserving the smallest portion for their own proper use and entertainment. This is what we may observe concerning such as have those endearing ties and may presume that the case would be the same with others were they placed in a like situation. But though this generosity must be acknowledged to the honor of human nature, we may at the same time remark that so noble an affection instead of fitting men for large societies is almost as contrary to them as the most narrow selfishness. For while each person loves himself better than any other single person and in his love to others bears the greatest affection to his relations and acquaintance, this must necessarily produce an opposition of passions and a consequent opposition of actions which cannot but be dangerous to the new established union. It is, however, worthwhile to remark that this contrarity of passions would be attended with but small danger did it not concur with a peculiarity in our outward circumstances which affords it an opportunity of exerting itself. There are three different species of goods which we are possessed of, the internal satisfaction of our minds, the external advantages of our body, and the enjoyment of such possessions as we have acquired by our industry and good fortune. We are perfectly secure in the enjoyment of the first. The second may be ravished from us but can be of no advantage to him who deprives us of them. The last only are both exposed to the violence of others and may be transferred without suffering any loss or alteration, while at the same time there is not a sufficient quantity of them to supply everyone's desires and necessities. As the improvement, therefore, of these goods is the chief advantage of society so the instability of their possession along with their scarcity is the chief impediment. In vain should we expect to find in uncultivated nature a remedy to this inconvenience or hope for any in-artificial principle of the human mind which might control those partial affections and make us overcome the temptations arising from our circumstances. The idea of justice can never serve to this purpose or be taken for a natural principle capable of inspiring men with an equitable conduct towards each other. That virtue, as it is now understood, would never have been dreamed of among rude and savage men. For the notion of injury or injustice implies an immorality or vice committed against some other person. And as every immorality is derived from some defect or unsoundness of the passions, and as this defect must be judged of in a great measure from the ordinary course of nature in the constitution of the mind, it will be easy to know whether we be guilty of any immorality with regard to others by considering the natural and usual force of those several affections which are directed towards them. Now it appears that in the original frame of our mind our strongest attention is confined to ourselves. Our next is extended to our relations and acquaintance, and it is only the weakest which reaches to strangers and indifferent persons. This partiality, then, and unequal affection must not only have an influence on our behavior and conduct in society, but even on our ideas of vice and virtue, so as to make us regard any remarkable transgression of such a degree of partiality, either by too great an enlargement or contraction of the affections, as vicious and immoral. Thus we may observe in our common judgments concerning actions where we blame a person who either centers all his affections in his family or is so regardless of them as in any opposition of interest to give the preference to a stranger or mere chance acquaintance. From all which it follows that our natural uncultivated ideas of morality instead of providing a remedy for the partiality of our affections do rather conform themselves to that partiality and give it an additional force and influence. The remedy, then, is not derived from nature, but from artifice, or more properly speaking, nature provides a remedy in the judgment and understanding for what is irregular and incommodious in the affections. For when men from their early education in society have become sensible of the infinite advantages that result from it and have, besides, acquired a new affection to company and conversation, and when they have observed that the principal disturbance in society arises from those goods which we call external and from their looseness and easy transition from one person to another, they must seek for a remedy by putting these goods, as far as possible, on the same footing with the fixed and constant advantages of the mind and body. This can be done after no other manner than by a convention entered into by all the members of the society to bestow stability on the possession of those external goods and leave everyone in the peaceable enjoyment of what he may acquire by his fortune and industry. By this means everyone knows what he may safely possess, and the passions are restrained in their partial and contradictory motions, nor is such a restraint contrary to these interests, for if so it could never be entered into nor maintained, but it is only contrary to their heedless and impetuous movement. Instead of departing from our own interest or from that of our nearest friends by abstaining from the possessions of others, we cannot better consult both these interests than by such a convention. As it is by that means we maintain society, which is so necessary to their well-being and subsistence as well as to our own. This convention is not of the nature of a promise, for even promises themselves, as we shall see afterwards, arise from human conventions. It is only a general sense of common interest which sense all the members of the society express to one another and which induces them to regulate their conduct by certain rules. I observe that it will be for my interest to leave another in the possession of his goods provided he will act in the same manner with regard to me. He is sensible of a like interest in the regulation of his conduct. When this common sense of interest is mutually expressed and is known to both, it produces a suitable resolution and behavior. And this may properly enough be called a convention or agreement betwixt us, though without the interposition of a promise, since the actions of each of us have a reference to those of the other and are performed upon the supposition that something is to be performed on the other part. Two men who pull the oars of a boat do it by an agreement or convention, though they have never given promises to each other. Nor is the rule concerning the stability of possession the less derived from human conventions that it arises gradually and acquires force by a slow progression and by our repeated experience of the inconveniences of transgressing it. On the contrary, this experience assures us still more that the sense of interest has become common to all our fellows and gives us a confidence of the future regularity of their conduct. And it is only on the expectation of this that our moderation and abstinence are founded. In like manner are languages gradually established by human conventions without any promise. Unlike manner, do gold and silver become the common measures of exchange and are esteemed sufficient payment for what is of a hundred times their value. After this convention concerning abstinence from the possessions of others is entered into and everyone has acquired a stability in his possessions, there immediately arise the ideas of justice and injustice as also those of property, right, and obligation. The latter are altogether unintelligible without first understanding the former. Our property is nothing but those goods whose constant possession is established by the laws of society, that is, by the laws of justice. Those therefore who make use of the words property or right or obligation before they have explained the origin of justice or even make use of them in that explication are guilty of a very gross fallacy and can never reason upon any solid foundation. A man's property is some object related to him. This relation is not natural but moral and founded on justice. It is very preposterous, therefore, to imagine that we can have any idea of property without fully comprehending the nature of justice and shooing its origin in the artifice and contrivance of men. The origin of justice explains that of property. The same artifice gives rise to both. As our first and most natural sentiment of morals is founded on the nature of our passions and gives the preference to ourselves and friends above strangers, it is impossible there can be naturally any such thing as a fixed right or property while the opposite passions of men impel them in contrary directions and are not restrained by any convention or agreement. No one can doubt that the convention for the distinction of property and for the stability of possession is of all circumstances the most necessary to the establishment of human society, and that after the agreement for the fixing and observing of this rule there remains little or nothing to be done towards settling a perfect harmony and concord. All the other passions, besides this of interest, are either easily restrained or are not of such pernicious consequence when indulged. Vanity is rather to be esteemed a social passion and a bond of union among men. Pity and love are to be considered in the same light, and as to envy and revenge, though pernicious they operate only by intervals and are directed against particular persons whom we consider as our superiors or enemies. This avidity alone of acquiring goods and possessions for ourselves and our nearest friends is insatiable, perpetual, universal, and directly destructive of society. There scarce is any one who is not actuated by it, and there is no one who has not reason to fear from it when it acts without any restraint and gives way to its first and most natural movements. So that upon the whole we are to esteem the difficulties in the establishment of society to be greater or less according to those we encounter in regulating and restraining this passion. It is certain that no affection of the human mind has both a sufficient force and a proper direction to counterbalance the love of gain and render men fit members of society by making them abstain from the possessions of others. Benevolence to strangers is too weak for this purpose, and as to the other passions they rather inflame this avidity when we observe that the larger our possessions are, the more ability we have of gratifying all our appetites. There is no passion, therefore, capable of controlling the interested affection but the very affection itself by an alteration of its direction. Now this alteration must necessarily take place upon the least reflection, since it is evident that the passion is much better satisfied by its restraint and by its liberty, and that in preserving society we make much greater advances in the acquiring possessions than in the solitary and forlorn condition which must follow upon violence and an universal license. The question, therefore, concerning the wickedness or goodness of human nature, enters not in the least into that other question concerning the origin of society, nor is there anything to be considered but the degrees of men's sagacity or folly. For whether the passion of self-interest be esteemed vicious or virtuous it is all a case, since itself alone restrains it. So that if it be virtuous men become social by their virtue. If vicious their vice has the same effect. Now as it is by establishing the rule for the stability of possession that this passion restrains itself, if that rule be very abstruse and of difficult invention society must be esteemed in a manner accidental and the effect of many ages. But if it be found that nothing can be more simple and obvious than that rule, that every parent in order to preserve peace among his children must establish it, and that these first rudiments of justice must every day be improved as the society enlarges, if all this appear evident as it certainly must, we may conclude that it is utterly impossible for men to remain any considerable time in that savage condition which precedes society, but that his very first state and situation may justly be esteemed social. This however hinders not but that philosophers may, if they please, extend their reasoning to the supposed state of nature provided they allow it to be a mere philosophical fiction which never had and never could have any reality. Human nature being composed of two principal parts which are requisite in all its actions, the affections and understanding, it is certain that the blind motions of the former without the direction of the latter incapacitate men for society, and it may be allowed us to consider separately the effects that result from the separate operations of these two component parts of the mind. The same liberty may be permitted to moral which is allowed to natural philosophers, and it is very usual with the latter to consider any motion as compounded and consisting of two parts separate from each other, though at the same time they acknowledge it to be in itself uncompounded and inseparable. This state of nature, therefore, is to be regarded as a mere fiction, not unlike that of the Golden Age which poets have invented, only with this difference that the former is described as full of war, violence and injustice, whereas the latter is painted out to us as the most charming and most peaceable condition that can possibly be imagined. The seasons in that first age of nature were so temperate, if we may believe the poets, that there was no necessity for men to provide themselves with clothes and houses as a security against the violence of heat and cold. The rivers flowed with wine and milk, the oaks yielded honey, and nature spontaneously produced her greatest delicacies. Nor were these the chief advantages of that happy age. The storms and tempests were not alone removed from nature, but those more furious tempests were unknown to human breasts which now cause such uproar and engender such confusion. Feverous ambition, cruelty, selfishness were never heard of. Cordial affection, compassion, sympathy were the only movements with which the human mind was yet acquainted. Even the distinction of mine and thine was banished from that happy race of mortals and carried with them the very notions of property and obligation, justice and injustice. This no doubt is to be regarded as an idle fiction, but yet deserves our attention because nothing can more evidently shoo the origin of those virtues which are the subjects of our present inquiry. I have already observed that justice takes its rise from human conventions, and that these are intended as a remedy to some inconveniences which proceed from the concurrence of certain qualities of the human mind with the situation of external objects. The qualities of the mind are selfishness and limited generosity, and the situation of external objects is their easy change joined to their scarcity in comparison of the wants and desires of men. But however philosophers may have been bewildered in those speculations, poets have been guided more infallibly by a certain taste or common instinct which in most kinds of reasoning goes farther than any of that art and philosophy with which we have been yet acquainted. They easily perceived if every man had a tender regard for another or if nature supplied abundantly all our wants and desires that the jealousy of interest which justice supposes could no longer have place, nor would there be any occasion for those distinctions and limits of property and possession which at present are in use among mankind. Increase to a sufficient degree the benevolence of men or the bounty of nature and you render justice useless by supplying its place with much nobler virtues and more valuable blessings. The selfishness of men is animated by the few possessions we have in proportion to our wants, and it is to restrain this selfishness that men have been obliged to separate themselves from the community and to distinguish betwixt their own goods and those of others. For need we have recourse to the fictions of poets to learn this, but beside the reason of the thing may discover the same truth by common experience and observation. It is easy to remark that a cordial affection renders all things common among friends and that married people in particular mutually lose their property and are unequated with the mine and thine which are so necessary and yet cause such disturbance in human society. The same effect arises from any alteration in the circumstances of mankind as when there is such a plenty of anything as satisfies all the desires of men, in which case the distinction of property is entirely lost and everything remains in common. Thus we may observe with regard to air and water, though the most valuable of all external objects, and may easily conclude that if men were supplied with everything in the same abundance, or if everyone had the same affection and tender regard for everyone as for himself, justice and injustice would be equally unknown among mankind. Here, then, is a proposition which I think may be regarded as certain, that it is only from the selfishness and confined generosity of men along with the scanty provision nature has made for his wants that justice derives its origin. If we look backward we shall find that this proposition bestows an additional force on some of those observations which we have already made on this subject. First, we may conclude from it that a regard to public interest or a strong, extensive benevolence is not our first and original motive for the observation of the rules of justice, since it is allowed that if men were endowed with such a benevolence, these rules would never have been dreamt of. Secondly, we may conclude from the same principle that the sense of justice is not founded on reason, or on the discovery of certain connections and relations of ideas which are eternal, immutable, and universally obligatory. For since it is confessed that such an alteration as that above mentioned in the temper and circumstances of mankind would entirely alter our duties and obligations, it is necessary upon the common system that the sense of virtue is derived from reason to shoo the change which this must produce in the relations and ideas. But it is evident that the only cause why the extensive generosity of men and the perfect abundance of everything would destroy the very idea of justice is because they render it useless, and that on the other hand his confined benevolence and his necessitous condition give rise to that virtue only by making it requisite to the public interest and to that of every individual. It was therefore a concern for our own and the public interest which made us establish the laws of justice, and nothing can be more certain than that it is not any relation of ideas which gives us this concern, but our impressions and sentiments without which everything in nature is perfectly indifferent to us and can never in the least affect us. The sense of justice, therefore, is not founded on our ideas, but on our impressions. Thirdly, we may further confirm the foregoing proposition that those impressions which give rise to this sense of justice are not natural to the mind of men, but arise from artifice and human conventions. For since any considerable alteration of temper and circumstances destroys equally justice and injustice, and since such an alteration has an effect only by changing our own and the public interest, it follows that the first establishment of the rules of justice depends on these different interests. But if men pursued the public interest naturally and with a hearty affection, they would never have dreamed of restraining each other by these rules, and if they pursued their own interest, without any precaution, they would run headlong into every kind of injustice and violence. These rules, therefore, are artificial and seek their end in an oblique and indirect manner, nor is the interest which gives rise to them of a kind that could be pursued by the natural and inartificial passions of men. To make this more evident, consider that though the rules of justice are established merely by interest, their connection with interest is somewhat singular and is different from what may be observed on other occasions. A single act of justice is frequently contrary to public interest, and were it to stand alone without being followed by other acts may in itself be very prejudicial to society. When a man of merit, of beneficent disposition, restores a great fortune to a miser or a seditious bigot, he has acted justly and laudably. But the public is a real sufferer, nor is every single act of justice considered apart more conducive to private interest than to public, and it is easily conceived how a man may impoverish himself by a signal instance of integrity and have reason to wish that with regard to that single act the laws of justice were for a moment suspended in the universe. But however single acts of injustice may be contrary, either to public or private interest, it is certain that the whole plan or scheme is highly conducive or indeed absolutely requisite both to the support of society and the well-being of every individual. It is impossible to separate the good from the ill. Property must be stable and must be fixed by general rules, though in one instance the public be a sufferer, this momentary ill is amply compensated by the steady prosecution of the rule and by the peace and order which it establishes in society. And even every individual person must find himself a gainer on balancing the account. Since without justice society must immediately dissolve, and everyone must fall into that savage and solitary condition which is infinitely worse than the worst situation that can possibly be supposed in society. When therefore men have had experience enough to observe that whatever may be the consequence of any single act of justice performed by a single person, yet the whole system of actions concurred in by the whole society is infinitely advantageous to the whole and to every part. It is not long before justice and property take place. Every member of society is sensible of this interest. Everyone expresses this sense to his fellows, along with the resolution he has taken of squaring his actions by it on condition that others will do the same. No more is requisite to induce any one of them to perform an act of justice who has the first opportunity. This becomes an example to others. And thus justice establishes itself by a kind of convention or agreement. That is, by a sense of interest supposed to be common to all and where every single act is performed in expectation that others are to perform the like. Without such a convention no one would ever have dreamed that there was such a virtue as justice, or have been induced to conform his actions to it. Taking any single act, my justice may be pernicious in every respect, and it is only upon the supposition that others are to imitate my example that I can be induced to embrace that virtue, since nothing but this combination can render justice advantageous, or afford me any motives to conform myself to its rules. We come now to the second question we proposed, that is, why we annex the idea of virtue to justice and a vice to injustice. This question will not detain us long after the principles which we have already established. All we can say of it at present will be dispatched in a few words, and for farther satisfaction the reader must wait till we come to the third part of this book. The natural obligation to justice, that is, interest, has been fully explained, but as to the moral obligation, or the sentiment of right and wrong, it will first be requisite to examine the natural virtues before we can give a full and satisfactory account of it. After men have found by experience that their selfishness and confined generosity acting at their liberty totally incapacitate them for society, and at the same time have observed that society is necessary to the satisfaction of those very passions, they are naturally induced to lay themselves under the restraint of such rules as may render their commerce more safe and comodious. To the imposition, then, and observance of these rules, both in general and in every particular instance, they are at first induced only by a regard to interest, and this motive on the first formation of society is sufficiently strong and forcible. But when society has become numerous and has increased to a tribe or nation, this interest is more remote, nor do men so readily perceive that disorder and confusion follow upon every breach of these rules as in a more narrow and contracted society. But though in our own actions we may frequently lose sight of that interest which we have in maintaining order and may follow a lesser and more present interest, we never fail to observe the prejudice we receive, either immediately or immediately from the injustice of others as not being in that case either blinded by passion or bypassed by any contrary temptation. Nay, when the injustice is so distant from us as no way to affect our interest, it still displeases us, because we consider it as prejudicial to human society and pernicious to every one that approaches the person guilty of it. We partake of their uneasiness by sympathy, and as everything which gives uneasiness in human actions upon the general survey is called vice and whatever produces satisfaction in the same manner is denominated virtue, this is the reason why the sense of moral good and evil follows upon justice and injustice. And though this sense in the present case be derived only from contemplating the actions of others, yet we fail not to extend it even to our own actions. The general rule reaches beyond those instances from which it arose, while at the same time we naturally sympathize with others in the sentiments they entertain of us. Thus self-interest is the original motive to the establishment of justice, but a sympathy with public interest is the source of the moral approbation which attends that virtue. Though this progress of the sentiments be natural and even necessary, it is certain that it is here forwarded by the artifice of politicians who in order to govern men more easily and preserve peace in human society have endeavored to produce an esteem for justice and an abhorrence of injustice. This, no doubt, must have its effect, but nothing can be more evident than that the matter has been carried too far by certain writers on morals who seem to have employed their utmost efforts to extirpate all sense of virtue from among mankind. Any artifice of politicians may assist nature in the producing of those sentiments which she suggests to us, and may even on some occasions produce alone an approbation or esteem for any particular action. But it is impossible it should be the sole cause of the distinction we make betwixt vice and virtue. For if nature did not aid us in this particular, it would be in vain for politicians to talk of honorable or dishonorable, praiseworthy or blameable. These words would be perfectly unintelligible and would no more have any idea annexed to them than if they were of a tongue perfectly unknown to us. The utmost politicians can perform is to extend the natural sentiments beyond their original bounds, but still nature must furnish the materials and give us some notion of moral distinctions. As public praise and blame increase our esteem for justice, so private education and instruction contribute to the same effect. For as parents easily observe that a man is the more useful, both to himself and others, the greater degree of probity and honor he is endowed with, and that those principles have greater force when custom and education assist interest and reflection, for these reasons they are induced to inculcate on their children from their earliest infancy the principles of probity and teach them to regard the observance of those rules by which society is maintained as worthy and honorable and their violation as base and infamous. By this means the sentiments of honor may take root in their tender minds and acquire such firmness and solidity that they may fall little short of those principles which are the most essential to our natures and the most deeply eradicated in our internal constitution. What farther contributes to increase their solidity is the interest of our reputation after the opinion that a merit or demerit attends justice or injustice is what's firmly established among mankind. There is nothing which touches us more nearly than our reputation, and nothing on which our reputation more depends than our conduct with relation to the property of others. For this reason everyone who has any regard to his character or who intends to live on good terms with mankind must fix an inviolable law to himself never by any temptation to be induced to violate those principles which are essential to a man of probity and honor. I shall make only one observation before I leave this subject, that is, that though I assert that in the state of nature or that imaginary state which preceded society there be neither justice nor injustice, yet I assert not that it was allowable in such a state to violate the property of others. I only maintain that there was no such thing as property, and consequently could be no such thing as justice or injustice. I shall have occasion to make a similar reflection with regard to promises when I come to treat of them, and I hope this reflection when duly weighed will suffice to remove all odium from the foregoing opinions with regard to justice and injustice. OF THE RULES WHICH DETERMINED PROPERTY Though the establishment of the rule concerning the stability of possession be not only useful, but even absolutely necessary to human society, it can never serve to any purpose while it remains in such general terms. Some method must be shown by which we may distinguish what particular goods are to be assigned to each particular person while the rest of mankind are excluded from their possession and enjoyment. Our next business then must be to discover the reasons which modify this general rule and fit it to the common use and practice of the world. It is obvious that those reasons are not derived from any utility or advantage which either the particular person or the public may reap from his enjoyment of any particular goods beyond what would result from the possession of them by any other person. To our better no doubt that everyone were possessed of what is most suitable to him and proper for his use. But besides that this relation of fitness may be common to several at once, it is liable to so many controversies and men are so partial and passionate in judging of these controversies that such a loose and uncertain rule would be absolutely incompatible with the peace of human society. The convention concerning the stability of possession is entered into in order to cut off all occasions of discord and contention. And this end would never be attained where we allowed to apply this rule differently in every particular case according to every particular utility which might be discovered in such an application. Justice in her decisions never regards the fitness or unfitness of objects to particular persons but conducts herself by more extensive views. Whether a man be generous or a miser he is equally well received by her and obtains with the same facility a decision in his favor even for what is entirely useless to him. It follows therefore that the general rule that possession must be stable is not applied by particular judgments but by other general rules which must extend to the whole society and be inflexible either by spite or favor. To illustrate this I propose the following instance. I first consider men in their savage and solitary condition and suppose that being sensible of the misery of that state and foreseeing the advantages that would result from society they seek each other's company and make an offer of mutual protection and assistance. I also suppose that they are endowed with such sagacity as immediately to perceive that the chief impediment to this project of society and partnership lies in the avidity and selfishness of their natural temper to remedy which they enter into a convention for the stability of possession and for mutual restraint and forbearance. I am sensible that this method of proceeding is not altogether natural. But besides that I hear only suppose those reflections to be formed at once which in fact arise insensibly and by degrees, besides this I say it is very possible that several persons being by different accidents separated from the societies to which they formerly belonged may be obliged to form a new society among themselves in which case they are entirely in the situation above mentioned. It is evident then that their first difficulty in this situation after the general convention for the establishment of society and for the constancy of possession is how to separate their possessions and assign to each his particular portion which he must for the future inulterably enjoy. This difficulty will not detain them long but it must immediately occur to them as the most natural expedient that everyone continue to enjoy what he is at present master of and that property or constant possession be conjoined to the immediate possession. Such is the effect of custom that it not only reconciles us to anything we have long enjoyed but even gives us an affection for it and makes us prefer it to other objects which may be more valuable but are less known to us. What has long lain under our eye and has often been employed to our advantage that we are always the most unwilling to part with but can easily live without possessions which we never have enjoyed and are not accustomed to. It is evident therefore that men would easily acquiesce in this expedient that everyone continue to enjoy what he is at present possessed of and this is the reason why they would so naturally agree in preferring it. Footnote 15. No questions in philosophy are more difficult than when a number of causes present themselves for the same phenomenon to determine which is the principal and predominant. There seldom is any very precise argument to fix our choice and men must be contented to be guided by a kind of taste or fancy arising from analogy and a comparison of similar instances. Thus in the present case there are no doubt motives of public interest for most of the rules which determine property. But still I suspect that these rules are principally fixed by the imagination or the more frivolous properties of our thought and conception. I shall continue to explain these causes, leaving it to the reader's choice, whether he will prefer those derived from public utility or those derived from the imagination. We shall begin with the right of the present possessor. It is a quality which I have already observed in human nature that when two objects appear in a close relation to each other, the mind is apt to ascribe to them any additional relation in order to complete the union, and this inclination is so strong as often to make us run into errors, such as that of the conjunction of thought and matter, if we find that they can serve to that purpose. Many of our impressions are incapable of place or local position, and yet those very impressions we suppose to have a local conjunction with the impressions of sight and touch, merely because they are conjoined by causation and are already united in the imagination. Since therefore we can feign a new relation and even an absurd one in order to complete any union, it will easily be imagined that if there be any relations which depend on the mind, it will readily conjoin them to any preceding relation and unite by a new bond such objects as have already in union in the fancy. Thus for instance we never fail in our arrangement of bodies to place those which are resembling in contiguity to each other, or at least in correspondent points of view, because we feel a satisfaction in joining the relation of contiguity to that of resemblance, or the resemblance of situation to that of qualities. And this is easily accounted for from the known properties of human nature. When the mind is determined to join certain objects, but undetermined in its choice of the particular objects, it naturally turns its eye to such as are related together. They are already united in the mind. They present themselves at the same time to the conception. And instead of requiring any new reason for their conjunction, it would require a very powerful reason to make us overlook this natural affinity. This we shall have occasion to explain more fully afterwards when we come to treat of beauty. In the meantime we may content ourselves with observing that the same love of order and uniformity which arranges the books in a library and the chairs in a parlor contribute to the formation of society and to the well-being of mankind by modifying the general rule concerning the stability of possession. And as property forms a relation betwixt a person and an object, it is natural to found it on some preceding relation. And as property is nothing but a constant possession secured by the laws of society, it is natural to add it to the present possession which is a relation that resembles it. For this also has its influence. If it be natural to conjoin all sorts of relations, it is more so to conjoin such relations as are resembling and are related together. End of footnote 15. But we may observe that though the rule of the assignment of property to the present possessor be natural and by that means useful, yet its utility extends not beyond the first formation of society, nor would anything be more pernicious than the constant observance of it by which restitution would be excluded and every injustice would be authorized and rewarded. We must therefore seek for some other circumstance that may give rise to property after society is once established, and of this kind I find four most considerable, that is occupation, prescription, accession, and succession. We shall briefly examine each of these beginning with occupation. The possession of all external goods is changeable and uncertain, which is one of the most considerable impediments to the establishment of society, and is the reason why by universal agreement, express or tacit, men restrain themselves by what we now call the rules of justice and equity. The misery of the condition which precedes this restraint is the cause why we submit to that remedy as quickly as possible, and this affords us an easy reason why we annex the idea of property to the first possession or to occupation. Men are unwilling to leave property in suspense, even for the shortest time, or open the least door to violence and disorder, to which we may add that the first possession always engages the attention most, and did we neglect it, there would be no color of reason for assigning property to any succeeding possession. Footnote 16. Some philosophers account for the right of occupation by saying that everyone has a property in his own labor, and when he joins that labor to anything, it gives him the property of the whole. But, one, there are several kinds of occupation where we cannot be said to join our labor to the object we acquire, as when we possess a meadow by grazing our cattle upon it. Two, this accounts for the matter by means of accession, which is taking a needless circuit. Three, we cannot be said to join our labor in anything but in a figurative sense. Properly speaking, we only make an alteration on it by our labor. This forms a relation betwixt us and the object, and hence arises the property, according to the preceding principles. End of Footnote 16. There remains nothing but to determine exactly what is meant by possession, and this is not so easy as may at first sight be imagined. We are said to be in possession of anything not only when we immediately touch it, but also when we are so situated with respect to it as to have it in our power to use it, and may move, alter, or destroy it according to our present pleasure or advantage. This relation, then, is a species of cause and effect, and as property is nothing but a stable possession derived from the rules of justice or the conventions of men, it is to be considered as the same species of relation. But here we may observe that as the power of using any object becomes more or less certain according as the interruptions we may meet with are more or less probable, and as this probability may increase by insensible degrees, it is, in many cases, impossible to determine when possession begins or ends. Or is there any certain standard by which we can decide such controversies? A wild boar that falls into our snares is deemed to be in our possession if it be impossible for him to escape. But what do we mean by impossible? How do we separate this impossibility from an improbability? And how distinguish that exactly from a probability? Do we track the precise limits of the one and the other and shoe the standard by which we may decide all disputes that may arise and, as we find by experience, frequently do arise upon this subject? FOOT NOTE 17 If we seek a solution of these difficulties in reason and public interest, we never shall find satisfaction. And if we look for it in the imagination, it is evident that the qualities which operate upon that faculty run so insensibly and gradually into each other that it is impossible to give them any precise bounds or termination. The difficulties on this head must increase when we consider that our judgment alters very sensibly according to the subject and that the same power and proximity will be deemed possession in one case which is not esteemed such in another. A person who has hunted a hare to the last degree of weariness would look upon it as an injustice for another to rush in before him and seize his prey. But the same person advancing to pluck an apple that hangs within his reach has no reason to complain if another, more alert, passes him and takes possession. What is the reason of this difference but that immobility not being natural to the hare but the effect of industry forms in that case a strong relation with the hunter which is wanting in the other? Here then it appears that a certain and invaluable power of enjoyment without touch or some other sensible relation often produces not property and I further observe that a sensible relation without any present power is sometimes sufficient to give a title to any object. The sight of a thing is seldom a considerable relation and is only regarded as such when the object is hidden or very obscure in which case we find that the view alone conveys a property according to that maxim that even a whole continent belongs to the nation which first discovered it. It is however remarkable that both in the case of discovery and that of possession the first discoverer and possessor must join to the relation an intention of rendering himself proprietor otherwise the relation will not have its effect and that because the connection in our fancy betwixt the property and the relation is not so great but that it requires to be helped by such an intention. From all these circumstances it is easy to see how perplexed many questions may become concerning the acquisition of property by occupation and the least effort of thought may present us with instances which are not susceptible of any reasonable decision. If we prefer examples which are real to such as are feigned we may consider the following one which is to be met with in almost every writer that has treated of the laws of nature. Two Grecian colonies leaving their native country in search of new seats were informed that a city near them was deserted by its inhabitants. To know the truth of this report they dispatched at once two messengers one from each colony who finding on their approach that their information was true began a race together with an intention to take possession of the city each of them for his countrymen. One of these messengers finding that he was not an equal match for the other launched his spear at the gates of the city and was so fortunate as to fix it there before the arrival of his companion. This produced a dispute betwixt the two colonies which of them was the proprietor of the empty city and this dispute still subsists among philosophers. For my part I find the dispute impossible to be decided and that because the whole question hangs upon the fancy which in this case is not possessed of any precise or determinant standard upon which it can give sentence. To make this evident let us consider that if these two persons had been simply members of the colonies and not messengers or deputies their actions would not have been of any consequence since in that case their relation to the colonies would have been but feeble and imperfect. Add to this that nothing determined them to run to the gates rather than the walls or any other part of the city but that the gates being the most obvious and remarkable part satisfy the fancy best in taking them for the whole as we find by the poets who frequently draw their images and metaphors from them. Besides we may consider that the touch or contact of the one messenger is not properly possession no more than the piercing of the gates with a spear but only forms a relation and there is a relation in the other case equally obvious though not perhaps of equal force. Which of these relations then conveys a right and property or whether any of them be sufficient for that effect I leave to the decision of such as are wiser than myself. End of footnote seventeen. But such disputes may not only arise concerning the real existence of property and possession but also concerning their extent and these disputes are often susceptible of no decision or can be decided by no other faculty than the imagination. A person who lands on the shore of a small island that is desert and uncultivated is deemed its possessor from the very first moment and acquires the property of the whole because the object is there bounded and circumscribed in the fancy and at the same time is proportioned to the new possessor. The same person landing on a desert island as large as Great Britain extends his property no farther than his immediate possession though a numerous colony are esteemed the proprietors of the whole from the instant of their debarkament. But it often happens that the title of first possession becomes obscure through time and that it is impossible to determine many controversies which may arise concerning it. In that case long possession or prescription naturally takes place and gives a person a sufficient property in anything he enjoys. The nature of human society admits not of any great accuracy nor can we always remount to the first origin of things in order to determine their present condition. Any considerable space of time sets objects at such a distance that they seem in a manner to lose their reality and have as little influence on the mind as if they never had been in being. A man's title that is clear and certain at present will seem obscure and doubtful fifty years hence even though the facts on which it is founded should be proved with the greatest evidence and certainty. The same facts have not the same influence after so long an interval of time and this may be received as a convincing argument for our preceding doctrine with regard to property and justice. Possession during a long tract of time conveys a title to any object but as it is certain that however everything be produced in time there is nothing real that is produced by time. It follows that property being produced by time is not anything real in the objects but is the offspring of the sentiments on which alone time is found to have any influence. Footnote 18. Present possession is plainly a relation betwixt a person and an object but is not sufficient to counterbalance the relation of first possession unless the former be long and uninterrupted in which case the relation is increased on the side of the present possession by the extent of time and diminished on that of first possession by the distance. This change in the relation produces a consequent change in the property. End of footnote 18. We acquire the property of objects by accession when they are connected in an intimate manner with objects that are already our property and at the same time are inferior to them. Thus the fruits of our garden, the offspring of our cattle, and the work of our slaves are all of them esteemed our property even before possession. Where objects are connected together in the imagination they are apt to be put on the same footing and are commonly supposed to be endowed with the same qualities. We readily pass from one to the other and make no difference in our judgments concerning them especially if the latter be inferior to the former. Footnote 19. This source of property can never be explained but from the imaginations and one may affirm that the causes here are unmixed. We shall proceed to explain them more particularly and illustrate them by examples from common life and experience. It has been observed above that the mind has a natural propensity to join relations especially resembling ones and finds a kind of fitness and uniformity in such an union. From this propensity are derived these laws of nature that upon the first formation of society property always follows the present possession and afterwards that it arises from first or from long possession. Now we may easily observe that relation is not confined merely to one degree but that from an object that is related to us we acquire a relation to every other object which is related to it and so on till the thought loses the chain by too long a progress. However the relation may weaken by each remove it is not immediately destroyed but frequently connects two objects by means of an intermediate one which is related to both and this principle is of such force as to give rise to the right of accession and causes us to acquire the property not only of such objects as we are immediately possessed of but also of such as are closely connected with them. Suppose a German, a Frenchman and a Spaniard to come into a room where there are placed upon the table three bottles of wine renish burgundy and port and suppose they should fall a quarreling about the division of them a person who was chosen for umpire would naturally to shoe his impartiality give every one the product of his own country and this from a principle which in some measure is the source of those laws of nature that describe property to occupation prescription and accession in all these cases and particularly that of accession there is first a natural union betwixt the idea of the person and that of the object and afterwards a new and moral union produced by that right or property which we ascribe to the person but here there occurs a difficulty which merits our attention and may afford us an opportunity of putting to trial that singular method of reasoning which has been employed on the present subject I have already observed that the imagination passes with greater facility from little to great than from great to little and that the transition of ideas is always easier and smoother in the former case then in the latter now as the right of accession arises from the easy transition of ideas by which related objects are connected together it should naturally be imagined that the right of accession must increase in strength in proportion as the transition of ideas is performed with a greater facility it may therefore be thought that when we have acquired the property of any small object we shall readily consider any great object related to it as an accession and as belonging to the proprietor of the small one hence the transition is in that case very easy from the small object to the great one and should connect them together in the closest manner but in fact the case is always found to be otherwise the empire of great britain seems to draw along with it the dominion of the orc niece the hebrides the isle of man and the isle of white but the authority over those lesser islands does not naturally imply any title to great britain in short a small object naturally follows a great one as its accession but a great one is never supposed to belong to the proprietor of a small one related to it merely on account of that property and relation yet in this latter case the transition of ideas is smoother from the proprietor to the small object which is his property and from the small object to the great one then in the former case from the proprietor to the great object and from the great one to the small it may therefore be thought that these phenomena are objections to the foregoing hypothesis that the ascribing of property to accession is nothing but an effect of the relations of ideas and of the smooth transition of the imagination it will be easy to solve this objection if we consider the agility and unsteadiness of the imagination with the different views in which it is continually placing its objects when we attribute to a person a property in two objects we do not always pass from the person to one object and from that to the other related to it the objects being here to be considered as the property of the person we are apt to join them together and place them in the same light suppose therefore a great and a small object to be related together if a person be strongly related to the great object he will likewise be strongly related to both the objects considered together because he is related to the most considerable part on the contrary if he be only related to the small object he will not be strongly related to both considered together since his relation lies only with the most trivial part which is not apt to strike us in any great degree when we consider the whole and this is the reason why small objects become accessions to great ones and not great to small it is the general opinion of philosophers and civilians that the sea is incapable of becoming the property of any nation and that because it is impossible to take possession of it or form any such distinct relation with it as may be the foundation of property where this reason ceases property immediately takes place thus the most strenuous advocates for the liberty of the seas universally allow that friths and bays naturally belong as an accession to the proprietors of the surrounding continent these have properly no more bond or union with the land than the pacific ocean would have but having an union in the fancy and being at the same time inferior they are of course regarded as an accession the property of rivers by the laws of most nations and by the natural turn of our thought is attributed to the proprietors of their banks accepting such vast rivers as the Rhine or the Danube which seem too large to the imagination to follow as an accession to the property of the neighboring fields yet even these rivers are considered as the property of that nation through whose dominions they run the idea of a nation being of a suitable bulk to correspond with them and bear them such a relation in the fancy the accessions which are made to lands bordering upon rivers follow the land say the civilians provided it be made by what they call alluvian that is insensibly and imperceptibly which are circumstances that mightily assist the imagination in the conjunction where there is any considerable portion torn at once from one bank and joined to another it becomes not his property whose land it falls on till it unite with the land and till the trees or plants have spread their roots into both before that the imagination does not sufficiently join them there are other cases which somewhat resemble this of accession but which at the bottom are considerably different and merit our attention of this kind is the conjunction of the properties of different persons after such a manner as not to admit of separation the question is to whom the united mass must belong where this conjunction is of such a nature as to admit of division but not of separation the decision is natural and easy the whole mass must be supposed to be common betwixt the proprietors of the several parts and afterwards must be divided according to the proportions of these parts but here i cannot forbear taking notice of a remarkable subtlety of the roman law in distinguishing betwixt confusion and commiction confusion is an union of two bodies such as different liquors where the parts become entirely undistinguishable commiction is the blending of two bodies such as two bushels of corn where the parts remain separate in an obvious and visible manner as in the latter case the imagination discovers not so entire and union as in the former but is able to trace and preserve a distinct idea of the property of each this is the reason why the civil law though it established an entire community in the case of confusion and after that a proportional division yet in the case of commiction supposes each of the proprietors to maintain a distinct right however necessity may at last force them to submit to the same division readers note the latin quotation from titius is not read here but rather the english translation in the case that your grain was mixed with that of titius if it was done voluntarily on the part of both of you it is common property in as much as the individual items that is the single grains which were the peculiar property of either of you were combined with your joint consent if however the mixture was accidental or if titius mixed it without your consent it does not appear that it is common property in as much as the several components retain their original identity rather in circumstances of this sort the grain does not become common property any more than a herd of cattle is regarded as common property if titius beasts should have become mixed up with yours however if all of the aforesaid corn is kept by either of you this gives rise to a suit to determine the ownership of property in respect to the amount of corn belonging to each it is in the discretion of the judge to determine which is the corn belonging to either party end of translation where the properties of two persons are united after such a manner as neither to admit a division nor separation as when one builds a house on another's ground in that case the whole must belong to one of the proprietors and here i assert that it naturally is conceived to belong to the proprietor of the most considerable part for however the compound object may have a relation to two different persons and carry our view at once to both of them yet as the most considerable part principally engages our attention and by the strict union draws the inferior along it for this reason the whole bears a relation to the proprietor of that part and is regarded as his property the only difficulty is what shall we be pleased to call the most considerable part and most attractive to the imagination this quality depends on several different circumstances which have little connection with each other one part of a compound object may become more considerable than another either because it is more constant and durable because it is of greater value because it is more obvious and remarkable because it is of greater extent or because its existence is more separate and independent it will be easy to conceive that as these circumstances may be conjoined and opposed in all the different ways and according to all the different degrees which can be imagined there will result many cases where the reasons on both sides are so equally balanced that it is impossible for us to give any satisfactory decision here then is the proper business of municipal laws to fix what the principles of human nature have left undetermined the superfaces yields to the soil says the civil law the writing to the paper the canvas to the picture these decisions do not well agree together and are a proof of the contrarity of those principles from which they are derived but of all the questions of this kind the most curious is that which for so many ages divided the disciples of proculus and sabinus suppose a person should make a cup from the metal of another or a ship from his wood and suppose the proprietor of the metal or wood should demand his goods the question is whether he acquires a title to the cup or ship sabinus maintained the affirmative and asserted that the substance or matter is the foundation of all the qualities that it is incorruptible and immortal and therefore superior to the form which is casual and dependent on the other hand proculus observed that the form is the most obvious and remarkable part and that from it bodies are denominated of this or that particular species to which he might have added that the matter or substance is in most bodies so fluctuating and uncertain that it is utterly impossible to trace it in all its changes for my part I know not from what principles such a controversy can be certainly determined I shall therefore content myself with observing that the decision of Trebonian seems to me pretty ingenious that the cup belongs to the proprietor of the metal because it can be brought back to its first form but the ship belongs to the author of its form for a contrary reason but however ingenious this reason may seem it plainly depends upon the fancy which by the possibility of such a reduction finds a closer connection and relation betwixt a cup and the proprietor of its metal then betwixt a ship and the proprietor of its wood where the substance is more fixed and unalterable end of footnote 19 the right of succession is a very natural one from the presumed consent of the parent or near relation and from the general interest of mankind which requires that men's possessions should pass to those who are dearest to them in order to render them more industrious and frugal perhaps these causes are seconded by the influence of relation or the association of ideas by which we are naturally directed to consider the son after the parents to cease and describe to him a title to his father's possessions those goods must become the property of somebody but of whom is the question here it is evident the person's children naturally present themselves to the mind and being already connected to those possessions by means of their deceased parent we are apt to connect them still further by the relation of property of this there are many parallel instances footnote 20 in examining the different titles to authority and government we shall meet with many reasons to convince us that the right of succession depends in a great measure on the imagination meanwhile i shall rest contented with observing one example which belongs to the present subject suppose that a person die without children and that a dispute arises among his relations concerning his inheritance it is evident that if his riches be derived partly from his father partly from his mother the most natural way of determining such a dispute is to divide his possessions and assign each part to the family from whence it is derived now as the person is supposed to have been once the full and entire proprietor of those goods i ask what is it makes us find a certain equity and natural reason in this partition except it be the imagination his affection to these families does not depend upon his possessions for which reason his consent can never be presumed precisely for such a partition and as to the public interest it seems not to be in the least concerned on the one side or the other end of footnote 20 end of file 39 file 40 of a treatise of human nature by david hume volume two this liber vox recording is in the public domain recording by george yeager book three of morals part two of justice and injustice section four of the transference of property by consent however useful or even necessary the stability of possession may be to human society it is attended with very considerable inconveniences the relation of fitness or suitableness ought never to enter into consideration in distributing the properties of mankind but we must govern ourselves by rules which are more general in their application and more free from doubt and uncertainty of this kind is present possession upon the first establishment of society and afterwards occupation prescription accession and succession as these depend very much on chance they must frequently prove contradictory both to men's wants and desires and persons and possessions must often be very ill adjusted this is a grand inconvenience which calls for a remedy to apply one directly and allow every man to seize by violence what he judges to be fit for him would destroy society and therefore the rules of justice seek some medium betwixt a rigid stability and this changeable and uncertain adjustment but there is no medium better than that obvious one that possession and property should always be stable except when the proprietor consents to bestow them on some other person this rule can have no ill consequence in occasioning wars and dissensions since the proprietors consent who alone is concerned is taken along in the alienation and it may serve to many good purposes in adjusting property to persons different parts of the earth produce different commodities and not only so but different men both are by nature fitted for different employments and attain to greater perfection in any one when they can find themselves to it alone all this requires a mutual exchange and commerce for which reason the translation of property by consent is founded on a law of nature as well as its stability without such a consent so far is determined by a plain utility and interest but perhaps it is from more trivial reasons that delivery or a sensible transference of the object is commonly required by civil laws and also by the laws of nature according to most authors as a requisite circumstance in the translation of property the property of an object when taken for something real without any reference to morality or the sentiments of the mind is a quality perfectly insensible and even inconceivable nor can we form any distinct notion either of its stability or translation this imperfection of our ideas is less sensibly felt with regard to its stability as it engages less our attention and is easily passed over by the mind without any scrupulous examination but as the translation of property from one person to another is a more remarkable event the defect of our ideas becomes more sensible on that occasion and obliges us to turn ourselves on every side in search of some remedy now as nothing more enlivens any idea than a present impression and a relation betwixt that impression and the idea it is natural for us to seek some false light from this quarter in order to aid the imagination in conceiving the transference of property we take the sensible object and actually transfer its possession to the person on whom we would bestow the property the supposed resemblance of the actions and the presence of this sensible delivery deceive the mind and make it fancy that it conceives the mysterious transition of the property and that this explication of the matter is just appears hence that men have invented a symbolical delivery to satisfy the fancy where the real one is impracticable thus the giving the keys of a granary is understood to be the delivery of the corn contained in it the giving of stone and earth represents the delivery of a manner this is a kind of superstitious practice in civil laws and in the laws of nature resembling the roman Catholic superstitions in religion as the roman catholics represent the inconceivable mysteries of the christian religion and render them more present to the mind by a taper or habit or grimace which is supposed to resemble them so lawyers and moralists have run into like inventions for the same reason and have endeavored by those means to satisfy themselves concerning the transference of property by consent and of file 40