 Section 13. 1. Background and evidentiary principles of report on the investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Report on the investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election by Robert Mueller. Section 13. 1. Background legal and evidentiary principles. A. Legal framework of obstruction of justice. The May 17, 2017 appointment order and the special counsel regulations provide this office with jurisdiction to investigate, quote, federal crimes committed in the course of and with intent to interfere with the special counsel's investigation, such as perjury, obstruction of justice, destruction of evidence, and intimidation of witnesses, end quote. 28 CFR section 600.4A. Because of that description of our jurisdiction, we sought evidence for our obstruction of justice investigation with the elements of obstruction offenses in mind. Our evidentiary analysis is similarly focused on the elements of such offenses, although we do not draw conclusions on the ultimate questions that govern a prosecutorial decision under the principles of federal prosecution. See Justice Manual, Section 9-27.000 at Sec. 2018. Here we summarize the law interpreting the elements of potentially relevant obstruction statutes in an ordinary case. This discussion does not address the unique constitutional issues that arise in an inquiry into official acts by the president. Those issues are discussed in a later section of this report addressing constitutional defenses that the president's counsel have raised. See Volume 2, Section 3.B, Infra. Three basic elements are common to most of the relevant obstruction statutes. One, an obstructive act. Two, a nexus between the obstructive act and an official proceeding. And three, a corrupt intent. See, e.g., 18 USC, sections 1503, 1505, 1512, C2. We describe those elements as they have been interpreted by the courts. We then discuss a more specific statute aimed at witness tampering. See 18 USC, Section 1512B. And describe the requirements for attempted offenses and endeavors to obstruct justice. See 18 USC, Sections 1503, 1512, C2. Obstructive act. Obstruction of justice law, quote, reaches all corrupt conduct capable of producing an effect that prevents justice from being duly administered regardless of the means employed, end quote. United States v. Silverman, 745 F. Second, 1386, 1393, 11th Circuit, 1984, interpreting 18 USC, Section 1503. An effort to influence a proceeding can qualify as an endeavor to obstruct justice even if the effort was subtle or circuitous and, however cleverly or with whatever cloaking of purpose, it was made. United States v. Rowe, 529 F. Second, 629, 632, 4th Circuit, 1975. See also, United States v. Quattrone, 441 F. Third, 153, 173, 2nd Circuit, 2006. The verbs obstruct or impede are broad and can refer to anything that blocks makes difficult or hinders. Maranello v. United States, 138 F. 1101, 1106, 2018. An improper motive can render an actor's conduct criminal even when the conduct would otherwise be lawful and within the actor's authority. See United States v. Quetto, 151 F. Third, 620, 631, 7th Circuit, 1998, affirming obstruction conviction of a criminal defense attorney for litigation-related conduct. United States v. Cintolo, 818 F. Second, 980, 992, 1st Circuit, 1987. Quote, any act by any party, whether lawful or unlawful on its face, may abridge Section 1503 if performed with a corrupt motive. Nexis to a pending or contemplated official proceeding. Abstruction of justice law generally requires a nexus or connection to an official proceeding. In Section 1503, the nexus must be to pending judicial or grand jury proceedings. United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 599, 1995. In Section 1505, the nexus can include a connection to a pending federal agency proceeding or a congressional inquiry or investigation. Under both statutes, the government must demonstrate a relationship in time, causation or logic between the obstructive act and the proceeding or inquiry to be obstructed. Id at 599. See also Arthur Anderson LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 707-708, 2005. Section 512c prohibits obstructive efforts aimed at official proceedings including judicial or grand jury proceedings. 18 U.S.C. Section 1515a1a. Quote, for purposes of Section 1512, an official proceeding need not be pending or about to be instituted at the time of the offense. 18 U.S.C. Section 1512f1. Although a proceeding need not already be in progress to trigger liability under Section 1512c, a nexus to a contemplated proceeding must still be shown. 19 U.S. v. Young. 916f3 368 386 4th Circuit, 2019. 19 U.S. v. Patrick. 781f3 438 445 8th Circuit, 2015. 19 U.S. v. Phillips. 583f3 1261 1264 10th Circuit, 2009. United States v. Reich. 479f3 179 186 2nd Circuit, 2007. The nexus requirement narrows the scope of obstruction statutes to ensure that individuals have fair warning of what the law prescribes. Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 600. The nexus showing has subjective and objective components. As an objective matter, a defendant must act, quote, in a manner that is likely to obstruct justice, end quote, such that the statute, quote, excludes defendants who have an evil purpose, but use means that would only unnaturally and improbably be successful, end quote. Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 601 602, emphasis added, quote, the endeavor must have the natural and probable effect of interfering with the due administration of justice, end quote, id at 599. As a subjective matter, the actor must have, quote, contemplated a particular foreseeable proceeding, end quote, Patrick 781 f3rd at 445 to 446. A defendant need not directly impede the proceeding. Rather, a nexus exists if, quote, discretionary actions of a third person would be required to obstruct the judicial proceeding if it was foreseeable to the defendant that the third party would act on the defendant's communication in such a way as to obstruct the judicial proceeding, end quote. United States v. Martinez, 864 f3rd, 223, 228, 2nd Circuit, 2017. Corruptly. The word corruptly provides the intent element for obstruction of justice and means acting knowingly and dishonestly or with an improper motive. United States v. Richardson, 676 f3rd, 491, 508, 5th Circuit, 2012. United States v. Gordon, 710 f3rd, 1124, 1151, 10th Circuit, 2013. To act corruptly means to, quote, act with an improper purpose and to engage in conduct knowingly and dishonestly with the specific intent to subvert, impede, or obstruct, end quote, the relevant proceeding. C-18 USC, section 1515b, quote, as used in section 1505, the term corruptly means acting with an improper purpose, personally, or by influencing another, end quote. See also Arthur Anderson, 544 U.S. at 705-706, interpreting corruptly to mean wrongful, immoral, depraved, or evil, and holding that acting knowingly, corruptly in 18 USC, section 1512b, requires consciousness of wrongdoing. The requisite showing is made when a person acted with an intent to obtain improper, advantage for himself or someone else, inconsistent with official duty and the rights of others. Valentine's Law Dictionary, 276, 3rd Edition, 1969. See United States v. Pasha, 797, f3rd, 1122, 1132, DC Circuit, 2015, Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 616, Scalia J concurring in part and dissenting in part, characterizing this definition as the long-standing and well-accepted meaning of corruptly. Witness tampering. A more specific provision in section 1512 prohibits tampering with a witness. See 18 USC, section 1512b, 1 and 3, making it a crime to knowingly use intimidation or corruptly persuade another person or engage in misleading conduct towards another person. To establish corrupt persuasion, it is sufficient that the defendant asked a potential witness to lie to an individual. To establish corrupt persuasion, it is sufficient that the defendant asked a potential witness to lie to investigators in contemplation of a likely federal investigation into his conduct. United States v. Edland, 887, f3rd, 166, 174, 4th Circuit, 2018. United States v. Sparks, 791, f3rd, 1188, 1191, 1192, 10th Circuit, 2015. United States v. Bern, 435, f3rd, 16, 23 to 26, 1st Circuit, 2006. United States v. Lachey, 417, f3rd, 715, 718 to 719, 7th Circuit, 2005. United States v. Burns, 298, f3rd, 523, 539 to 540, 6th Circuit, 2002. United States v. Pennington, 168, f3rd, 1060, 1066, 8th Circuit, 1999. The persuasion need not be coercive, intimidating or explicit. It is sufficient to urge, induce, ask, argue, give reasons. Sparks, 791, f3rd, 1192, or coach or remind witnesses by planting misleading facts. Edland, 887, f3rd, 174. Corrupt persuasion is shown, quote, where a defendant tells a potential witness a false story as if the story were true, intending that the witness believed the story and testified to it, end quote. United States v. Rodelitz, 786, f2nd, 77, 82, 2nd Circuit, 1986. See, United States v. Gabriel, 125, f3rd, 89, 102, 2nd Circuit, 1997. It also covers urging a witness to recall a fact that the witness did not know, even if the fact was actually true. See, Leche, 417, f3rd, at 719. Corrupt persuasion can also be shown in certain circumstances when a person, with an improper motive, urges a witness not to cooperate with law enforcement. See, United States v. Schatz, 145, f3rd, 1289, 1301, 11th Circuit, 1998, telling Secretary, quote, not to say anything to the FBI and she would not be bothered. When the charge is acting with the intent to hinder, delay, or prevent the communication of information to law enforcement under Section 1512b3, the nexus to a preceding inquiry articulated in Aguilar that an individual have, quote, knowledge that his actions are likely to affect the judicial proceeding, and quote, 515 US at 599, does not apply because the obstructive act is aimed at the communication of information to investigators not at impeding an official proceeding. Acting knowingly, corruptly, requires proof that the individual was conscious of wrongdoing. Arthur Anderson, 544 US at 705 to 706, declining to explore, quote, the outer limits of this element, unquote, but indicating that an instruction was in firm where it permitted conviction, even if the defendant, quote, honestly and sincerely believed that the conduct was lawful. It is an affirmative defense that, quote, the conduct consisted solely of lawful conduct and that the defendant's sole intention was to encourage, induce, or cause the other person to testify truthfully. 18 USC, Section 1512e. Attempts and endeavors. Section 1512c2 covers both substantive obstruction offenses and attempts to obstruct justice. Under general principles of attempt law, a person is guilty of an attempt when he has the intent to commit a substantive offense and takes an overt act that constitutes a substantial step toward that goal. See, United States versus Rizende Pons, 549 US 102, 106 to 107, 2007, quote, the act must be substantial in that it was strongly corroborative of the defendant's criminal purpose, unquote. United States versus Pratt, 351 F3rd, 131, 135, Fourth Circuit, 2003. While mere abstract talk does not suffice, any concrete and specific acts that corroborate the defendant's intent can constitute a substantial step. United States versus Irving, 665 F3rd, 1184, 1198 to 1205, 10th Circuit, 2011. Thus, quote, soliciting an innocent agent to engage in conduct constituting an element of the crime, unquote, may qualify as a substantial step. Model Penal Code, Section 5.01 to G. See, United States versus Lucas, 499 F3rd, 769, 781, 8th Circuit, 2007. The omnibus clause of 18 USC, Section 1503 prohibits an endeavor to obstruct justice, which sweeps more broadly than Section 1512's attempt provision. See, United States versus Samson, 898 F3rd, 287, 302, Second Circuit, 2018. United States versus Leisure, 844 F2nd, 1347, 1366 to 1367, 8th Circuit, 1988. Collecting Cases, quote, it is well established that an obstruction of justice offense is complete when one corruptly endeavors to obstruct or impede the due administration of justice. The prosecution need not prove that the due administration of justice was actually obstructed or impeded. United States versus Davis, 854 F3rd, 1276, 1292, 11th Circuit, 2017. B. Investigative and Evidentiary Considerations. After the appointment of the special counsel, this office obtained evidence about the following events relating to potential issues of obstruction of justice involving the president. A. The President's January 27, 2017 dinner with former FBI Director James Comey, in which the president reportedly asked for Comey's loyalty one day after the White House had been briefed by the Department of Justice on contacts between former National Security Advisor Michael Flynn and the Russian Ambassador. B. The President's February 14, 2017 meeting with Comey, in which the president reportedly asked Comey not to pursue an investigation of Flynn. C. The President's private requests to Comey to make public the fact that the president was not the subject of an FBI investigation and to lift what the president regarded as a cloud. D. The President's outreach to the Director of National Intelligence and the Directors of the National Security Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency about the FBI's Russia investigation. E. The President's stated rationales for terminating Comey on May 9, 2017, including statements that could be reasonably understood as acknowledging that the FBI's Russia investigation was a factor in Comey's termination and F. D. The President's reported involvement in issuing a false statement about the June 9, 2016 Trump Tower meeting between Russians and senior Trump campaign officials that said the meeting was about adoption and admitted that the Russians had offered to provide the Trump campaign with derogatory information about Hillary Clinton. Taking into account that information and our analysis of applicable statutory and constitutional principles discussed below in Volume 2, Section 3, infra, we determined that there was a sufficient factual and legal basis to further investigate potential obstruction of justice issues involving the president. Many of the core issues in an obstruction of justice investigation turn on an individual's actions and intent. We therefore requested that the White House provide us with documentary evidence in its possession on the relevant events. We also sought and obtained the White House's concurrence in our conducting interviews of White House personnel who had relevant information. And we interviewed other witnesses who had pertinent knowledge, obtained documents on a voluntary basis when possible, and used legal process where appropriate. These investigative steps allowed us to gather a substantial amount of evidence. We also sought a voluntary interview with the president. After more than a year of discussion, the president declined to be interviewed. Redaction, grand jury. During the course of our discussions, the president did agree to answer written questions on certain Russia-related topics, and he provided us with answers. He did not similarly agree to provide written answers to questions on obstruction topics or questions on events during the transition. Ultimately, while we believed that we had the authority and legal justification to issue a grand jury subpoena to obtain the president's testimony, we chose not to do so. We made this decision in view of the substantial delay that such an investigative step would likely produce at a late stage in our investigation. We also assessed that, based on the significant body of evidence we had already obtained of the president's actions and his public and private statements describing or explaining those actions, we had sufficient evidence to understand relevant events and to make certain assessments without the president's testimony. The office's decision-making process on this issue is described in more detail in Appendix C, in a note that precedes the president's written responses. In assessing the evidence we obtained, we relied on common principles that apply in any investigation. The issue of criminal intent is often inferred from circumstantial evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Croteau, 819, F3rd, 1293, 1305, 11th Circuit, 2016. Guilty knowledge can rarely be established by direct evidence. Therefore, mens rea elements, such as knowledge or intent, may be proved by circumstantial evidence. United States v. Robinson, 702, F3rd, 2236, 2nd Circuit, 2012. The government's case rested on circumstantial evidence, but the mens rea elements of knowledge and intent can often be proved through circumstantial evidence and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. The principle that intent can be inferred from circumstantial evidence is a necessity in criminal cases, given the right of a subject to assert his privilege against compelled self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment and therefore declined to testify. Accordingly, determinations on intent are frequently reached without the opportunity to interview an investigatory subject. Abstruction of justice cases are consistent with this rule. See, e.g., Edland, 887, F3rd, 174, 176, relying on, quote, significant circumstantial evidence that the defendant was conscious of her wrongdoing, unquote, in an obstruction case, quote, because evidence of intent will almost always be circumstantial, a defendant may be found culpable where the reasonable and foreseeable consequences of her acts are the obstruction of justice. Quattrone, 441, F3rd, 173, 174. Circumstantial evidence that illuminates intent may include a pattern of potentially obstructive acts, federal rules of evidence, 404b, quote, evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act may be admissible to prove motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, planning, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident, unquote. See, e.g., United States v. Frank Hauser, 80, F3rd, 641, 648 to 650, 1st Circuit, 1996, United States v. Arnold, 773, F2nd, 823, 832 to 834, 7th Circuit, 1985, Centolo, 818, F2nd, at 1,000. Credibility judgments may also be made based on objective facts and circumstantial evidence. Standard jury instructions highlight a variety of factors that are often relevant in assessing credibility. These include whether a witness had a reason not to tell the truth, whether the witness had a good memory, whether the witness had the opportunity to observe the events about which he testified, whether the witness's testimony was corroborated by other witnesses, and whether anything the witness said or wrote previously contradicts his testimony. See, e.g., 1st Circuit pattern jury instructions, section 1.06, 2018, 5th Circuit pattern jury instructions, criminal cases, section 1.08, 2012. 7th Circuit pattern jury instructions, section 3.01, 2012. In addition to those general factors, we took into account more specific factors in assessing the credibility of conflicting accounts of the facts. For example, contemporaneous written notes can provide strong corroborating evidence. See, United States v. Nobles, 422, US 225, 232, 1975, the fact that a, quote, statement appeared in the contemporaneously recorded report would tend to strongly corroborate the investigator's version of the interview, end quote. Similarly, a witness's recitation of his account before he had any motive to fabricate also supports the witness's credibility. See, Tom v. United States, 513, US 150, 158, 1995, quote, a consistent statement that predates the motive is a square rebuttal of the charge that the testimony was contrived as a consequence of that motive, end quote. Finally, a witness's false description of an encounter can imply consciousness of wrongdoing. See, Al-Adal v. Obama, 613, F3, 1102, 1107, DC Circuit, 2010, noting the, quote, well-settled principle that false, exculpatory statements are evidence, often strong evidence, of guilt. We applied those settled legal principles in evaluating the factual results of our investigation. End of section 13, recording by Amy Conger, San Francisco, California. Section 14A of report on the investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org, recording by Lynn Jarrow. Report on the investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election by Robert Mueller. Volume 2, Factual results of the obstruction investigation. This section of the report details the evidence we obtained. We first provide an overview of how Russia became an issue in the 2016 presidential campaign, and how candidate Trump responded. We then turn to the key events that we investigated. The President's conduct concerning the FBI investigation of Michael Flynn, the President's reaction to public confirmation of the FBI's Russia investigation, events leading up to and surrounding determination of FBI Director Comey, efforts to terminate the special counsel, efforts to courtail the scope of the special counsel's investigation, efforts to prevent disclosure of information about the June 9, 2016 Trump Tower meeting between Russians and senior campaign officials, efforts to have the Attorney General unrecuse and conduct towards McGahn, Cohen, and other witnesses. We summarize the evidence we found and then analyze it by reference to the three statutory obstruction of justice elements, obstructive act, nexus to a proceeding, and intent. We focus on elements be caused by regulation. The special counsel has jurisdiction to investigate federal crimes committed in the course of and with intent to interfere with the special counsel's investigation, such as perjury, obstruction of justice, destruction of evidence, and intimidation of witnesses, Title XXVIII Code of Federal Regulations 600.4A. Consistent with our jurisdiction to investigate federal obstruction crimes, we gathered evidence that is relevant to the elements of those crimes and analyzed them within an elements framework, while refraining from reaching ultimate conclusions about whether crimes were committed for the reasons explained above. This section does not address legal and constitutional defenses raised by counsel for the President. Those defenses are analyzed in Volume II, Section III. Section A. The campaign's response to reports about Russian support for Trump. During the 2016 campaign, the media raised questions about a possible connection between the Trump campaign and Russia. The questions intensified after WikiLeaks released politically damaging Democratic Party emails that were reported to have been hacked by Russia. Trump responded to questions about possible connections to Russia by denying any business involvement in Russia, even though the Trump organization had pursued a business project in Russia as late as June 2016. Trump also expressed skepticism that Russia had hacked the emails at the same time as he and other campaign advisors privately sought information, redacted, harmed ongoing matter, about any further planned WikiLeaks releases. After the election, when questions persisted about possible links between Russia and the Trump campaign, the President-elect continued to deny any connections to Russia and privately expressed concerns that reports of Russian election interference might lead the public to question the legitimacy of his election. 1. Press reports allege links between the Trump campaign and Russia. On June 16, 2015, Donald J. Trump declared his intent to seek nomination as the Republican candidate for President by early 2016. He distinguished himself among Republican candidates by speaking of closer ties with Russia, saying he would get along well with Russian President Vladimir Putin, questioning whether the NATO alliance was obsolete and praising Putin as a strong leader. The press reported that Russian political analysts and commentators perceived Trump as favorable to Russia. Beginning in February 2016 and continuing through the summer, the media reported that several Trump campaign advisors appeared to have ties to Russia. For example, the press reported that campaign advisor Michael Flynn was seated next to Vladimir Putin at an RT gala in Moscow in December 2015 and that Flynn had appeared regularly on RT as an analyst. The press also reported that foreign policy advisor Carter Page had ties to a Russian state-run gas company and that campaign chairman Paul Manafort had done work for the Russian-backed former Ukrainian president, Viktor Yanukovych. In addition, the press raised questions during the Republican National Convention about the Trump campaign's involvement in changing the Republican platform stance on giving weapons to Ukraine to fight Russian and rebel forces. 2. The Trump campaign reacts to WikiLeaks release of hacked emails. On June 14, 2016, a cybersecurity firm that had conducted in-house analysis for the Democratic National Committee DNC posted an announcement that Russian government hackers had infiltrated the DNC's computer and obtained access to documents. On July 22, 2016, the day before the Democratic National Convention, WikiLeaks posted thousands of hacked DNC documents revealing sensitive internal deliberations. Soon thereafter, Hillary Clinton's campaign manager publicly contended that Russia had hacked the DNC emails and arranged their release in order to help candidate Trump. On July 26, 2016, The New York Times reported that U.S. intelligence agencies had told the White House they now have high confidence that the Russian government was behind the theft of emails and documents from the Democratic National Committee. Within the Trump campaign, aides reacted with enthusiasm to reports of the hacks, redacted, harm to ongoing matter, discussed with campaign officials that WikiLeaks would release the hacked material. Some witnesses said that Trump himself discussed the possibility of upcoming releases, redacted, harm to ongoing matter. Michael Cohen, then Executive Vice President of the Trump Organization and Special Counsel to Trump, recalled hearing redacted, harm to ongoing matter. Cohen recalled that Trump responded, oh, good, alright, and redacted, harm to ongoing matter. Manafort said that shortly after WikiLeaks' July 22, 2016 release of hacked documents, he spoke to Trump, redacted, harm to ongoing matter. Manafort recalled that Trump responded that Manafort should, redacted, harm to ongoing matter, keep Trump updated. Deputy Campaign Manager Rick Gates said that Manafort was getting pressure about redacted, harm to ongoing matter, information, and that Manafort instructed Gates, redacted, harm to ongoing matter, status updates on upcoming releases. Around the same time, Gates was with Trump on a trip to an airport, redacted, harm to ongoing matter, and shortly after the call ended, Trump told Gates that more releases of damaging information would be coming. Redacted, harm to ongoing matter, were discussed within the campaign, and in the summer of 2016, the campaign was planning a communication strategy based on the possible release of Clinton emails by WikiLeaks. Three, the Trump campaign reacts to allegations that Russia was seeking to aid candidate Trump. In the days that followed WikiLeaks' July 22, 2016 release of hacked DNC emails, the Trump campaign publicly rejected suggestions that Russia was seeking to aid candidate Trump. On July 26, 2016, Trump tweeted that it was crazy to suggest that Russia was dealing with Trump, and that for the record he had zero investments in Russia. In a press conference the next day, July 27, 2016, Trump characterized this whole thing with Russia as a total deflection and stated that it was far-fetched and ridiculous. Trump said that the assertion that Russia had hacked the emails was unproven, but stated that it would give him no pause if Russia had Clinton's emails. Trump added, Russia, if you're listening, I hope you're able to find the 30,000 emails that are missing. I think you will probably be rewarded mightily by our press. Trump also said that there's nothing that I can think of that I'd rather do than have Russia friendly as opposed to the way they are right now. And in response to a question about whether he would recognize Crimea as Russian territory and consider lifting sanctions, Trump replied, we'll be looking at that, yeah, we'll be looking. During the press conference, Trump repeated, I have nothing to do with Russia five times. He stated that the closest he came to Russia was that Russians may have purchased a home or condos from him. He said that after he held the Miss Universe pageant in Moscow in 2013, he had been interested in working with Russian companies that wanted to put a lot of money into developments in Russia, but it never worked out. He explained, frankly, I didn't want to do it for a couple of different reasons, but we had a major developer that wanted to develop property in Moscow and other places, but we decided not to do it. The Trump Organization, however, had been pursuing a building project in Moscow, the Trump Tower Moscow Project, from approximately September 2015 through June 2016. And the candidate was regularly updated on developments, including possible trips by Michael Cohen to Moscow to promote the deal and by Trump himself to finalize it. Cohen recalled speaking with Trump after the press conference about Trump's denial of any business dealings in Russia, which Cohen regarded as untrue. Trump told Cohen that Trump Tower Moscow was not a deal yet and said, why mention it if it is not a deal? According to Cohen, at around this time in response to Trump's disavowal of connections to Russia. Campaign advisors had developed a party line that Trump had no business with Russia and no connections to Russia. In addition to denying any connections with Russia, the Trump campaign reacted to reports of Russian election interference in aid of the campaign by seeking to distance itself from Russian contacts. For example, in August 2016, Foreign Policy Advisor JD Gordon declined an invitation to Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak's residence because the timing was not optimal in view of media reports about Russian interference. On August 19, 2016, Manafort was asked to resign amid media coverage scrutinizing his ties to a pro-Russian political party in Ukraine and links to Russian business. And when the media published stories about Page's connection to Russia in September 2016, Trump campaign officials terminated Page's association with the campaign and told the press that he had played no role in the campaign. On October 7, 2016, WikiLeaks released the first set of emails stolen by a Russian intelligence agency from Clinton campaign chairman John Podesta. The same day, the federal government announced that the Russian government directed the recent compromises of emails from U.S. persons and institutions, including from U.S. political organizations. The government statement directly linked Russian hacking to the releases on WikiLeaks with the goal of interfering with the presidential election and concluded that only Russia's senior most officials could have authorized these activities based on their scope and sensitivity. On October 11, 2016, Podesta stated publicly that the FBI was investigating Russia's hacking and said that candidate Trump might have known in advance that the hacked emails were going to be released. Vice presidential candidate Mike Pence was asked whether the Trump campaign was in cahoots with WikiLeaks in releasing damaging Clinton-related information and responded, nothing could be further from the truth. 4. After the election, Trump continues to deny any contacts or connections with Russia or that Russia aided his election. On November 8, 2016, Trump was elected president. Two days later, Russian officials told the press that the Russian government had maintained contacts with Trump's immediate entourage during the campaign. In response, Hope Hicks, who had been the Trump campaign spokesperson, said, we are not aware of any campaign representatives that were in touch with any foreign entities before yesterday when Mr. Trump spoke with many world leaders. Hicks gave an additional statement denying any contacts between the campaign and Russia. It never happened there was no communication between the campaign and any foreign entity during the campaign. On December 10, 2016, the press reported that US intelligence agencies had concluded that Russia interfered in last month's presidential election to boost Donald Trump's bid for the White House. Reacting to the story the next day, President-elect Trump stated, I think it's ridiculous. I think it's just an other excuse. He continued that no one really knew who was responsible for the hacking, suggesting that the intelligence community had no idea if it's Russia or China or somebody, it could be somebody sitting in a bed someplace. The president-elect also said the Democrats were putting out the story of Russian interference because they suffered one of the greatest defeats in the history of politics. On December 18, 2016, Podesta told the press that the election was distorted by the Russian intervention and questioned whether Trump campaign officials had been in touch with the Russians. The same day, incoming chief of staff, Ryan Priebus, appeared on Fox News Sunday and declined to say whether the president-elect accepted the intelligence community's determination that Russia intervened in the election. When asked about any contact or coordination between the campaign and Russia, Priebus said, even this question is insane. Of course we didn't interface with the Russians. Priebus added that this whole thing is a spin job and said the real question is why the Democrats are doing everything they can to delegitimize the outcome of the election. On December 29, 2016, the Obama administration announced that in response to Russian cyber operations aimed at the US election, it was imposing sanctions and other measures on several Russian individuals and entities. When first asked about the sanctions, President-elect Trump said, I think we ought to get on with our lives. He then put out a statement that said, it's time for our country to move on to bigger and better things. But indicated that he would meet with intelligence community leaders the following week for a briefing on Russian interference. The briefing occurred on January 6, 2017, following the briefing. The intelligence community released the public version of its assessment, which concluded with high confidence that Russia had intervened in the election, few a variety of means with the goal of harming Clinton's electability. The assessment further concluded with high confidence that Putin and the Russian government had developed a clear preference for Trump. Several days later, Buzzfeed published unverified allegations compiled by former British intelligence officer Christopher Steele during the campaign about candidate Trump's Russia connections under the headline, these reports alleged Trump has deep ties to Russia. In a press conference the next day, the president-elect called the release an absolute disgrace and said, I have no dealings with Russia. I have no deals that could happen in Russia because we've stayed away. So I have no deals. I have no loans and I have no dealings. We could make deals in Russia very easily if we wanted to. I just don't want to because I think that would be a conflict. Several advisors recalled that the president-elect viewed stories about his Russian connections, the Russia investigations, and the intelligence community assessment of Russian interference as a threat to the legitimacy of his electoral victory. Hicks, for example, said that the president-elect viewed the intelligence community assessment as his achilles heel because, even if Russia had no impact on the election, people would think Russia helped him win, taking away from what he had accomplished. Sean Spicer, the first White House communications director, recalled that the president thought the Russia story was developed to undermine the legitimacy of his election. Gates said the president viewed the Russia investigation as an attack on the legitimacy of his win. And previous recalled that when the intelligence assessment came out, the president-elect was concerned people would question the legitimacy of his win. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Report on the investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election by Robert Mueller. Volume 2 Factual Results of the Abstraction Investigation Section B, The President's Conduct Concerning the Investigation of Michael Flynn Overview During the presidential transition, incoming National Security Advisor Michael Flynn had two phone calls with a Russian ambassador to the United States about the Russian response to U.S. sanctions imposed because of Russia's election interference. After the press reported on Flynn's contacts with the Russian ambassador, Flynn lied to incoming administration officials by saying he had not discussed sanctions on the calls. The officials publicly repeated those lies in press interviews. The FBI, which previously was investigating Flynn for other matters, interviewed him about the calls in the first week after the inauguration, and Flynn told similar lies to the FBI. On January 26, 2017, Department of Justice DOJ officials notified the White House that Flynn and the Russian ambassador had discussed sanctions. And that Flynn had been interviewed by the FBI. The next night, the President had a private dinner with FBI Director James Comey, in which he asked for Comey's loyalty. On February 13, 2017, the President asked Flynn to resign. The following day, the President had a one-on-one conversation with Comey, in which he said, I hope you can see your way clear to letting this go, to letting Flynn go. Evidence 1. Incoming National Security Advisor Flynn discusses sanctions on Russia with Russian ambassador Sergey Kislyak. Shortly after the election, President-elect Trump announced he would appoint Michael Flynn as his National Security Advisor. For the next two months, Flynn played an active role on the presidential transition team, PTT, coordinating policy positions and communicating with foreign government officials, including Russian ambassador to the United States, Sergey Kislyak. On December 29, 2016, as noted in Volume 2, Section 2A.4, the Obama administration announced that it was imposing sanctions on other measures on several Russian individuals and entities. That day, multiple members of the PTT exchanged emails about the sanctions and the impact they would have on the incoming administration, and Flynn informed members of the PTT that he would be speaking to the Russian ambassador later in the day. Flynn, who was in the Dominican Republic at the time, and Katie McFarland, who was slated to become the Deputy National Security Advisor, and was at the Mar-a-Lago Resort in Florida with the President-elect and other senior staff, talked by phone about what, if anything, Flynn should communicate to Kislyak about the sanctions. McFarland had spoken with incoming administration officials about the sanctions and Russia's possible responses and thought she had mentioned in those conversations that Flynn was scheduled to speak with Kislyak. Based on those conversations, McFarland informed Flynn that incoming administration officials at Mar-a-Lago did not want Russia to escalate the situation. At 4.43 p.m. that afternoon, McFarland sent an email to several officials about the sanctions and informed the group that General Flynn is talking to Russian ambassador this evening. Approximately one hour later, McFarland met with the President-elect and senior officials and briefed them on the sanctions and Russia's possible responses. Incoming Chief of Staff Reince Priebus recalled that McFarland may have mentioned at the meeting that the sanctions situation could be cooled down and not escalated. McFarland recalled that at the end of the meeting someone may have mentioned to the President-elect that Flynn was speaking to the Russian ambassador that evening. McFarland did not recall any response by the President-elect. Priebus recalled that the President-elect viewed the sanctions as an attempt by the Obama administration to embarrass him by delegitimizing his election. Immediately after discussing the sanctions with McFarland, on December 29, 2016, Flynn called Kislyak and requested that Russia respond to the sanctions only in a reciprocal manner without escalating the situation. After the call, Flynn briefed McFarland on its substance. Flynn told McFarland that the Russian response to the sanctions was not going to be escalatory because Russia wanted a good relationship with the Trump administration. On December 30, 2016, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that Russia would not take retaliatory measures in response to the sanctions at that time and would instead plan further steps to restore Russian-U.S. relations based on the policies of the Trump administration. Following that announcement, the President-elect tweeted, Great move on delay by V. Putin. I always knew he was very smart. On December 31, 2016, Kislyak called Flynn and told him that Flynn's request had been received at the highest levels and Russia had chosen not to retaliate in response to the request. Later that day, Flynn told McFarland about this follow-up conversation with Kislyak and Russia's decision not to escalate the sanctions situation based on Flynn's request. McFarland recalled that Flynn thought his phone call had made a difference. Flynn spoke with other incoming administration officials that day, but does not recall whether they discussed the sanctions. Flynn recalled discussing the sanctions issue with incoming administration official Stephen Bannon the next day. Flynn said that Bannon appeared to know about Flynn's conversations with Kislyak, and he and Bannon agreed that they had stopped the train on Russia's response to the sanctions. On January 3, 2017, Flynn saw the President-elect in person and thought they discussed the Russian reaction to the sanctions, but Flynn did not have a specific recollection of telling the President-elect about the substance of his calls with Kislyak. Members of the intelligence community were surprised by Russia's decision not to retaliate in response to the sanctions. When analyzing Russia's response, they became aware of Flynn's discussion of sanctions with Kislyak. Previously, the FBI had opened an investigation of Flynn based on his relationship with the Russian government. Flynn's contacts with Kislyak became a key component of that investigation. 2. President-elect Trump is briefed on the intelligence community's assessment of Russian interference in the election, and Congress opens election interference investigations. On January 6, 2017, as noted in Volume 2, Section 2A.4, intelligence officials briefed President-elect Trump and the incoming administration on the intelligence community's assessment that Russia had interfered in the 2016 presidential election. When the briefing concluded, Comey spoke with the President-elect privately to brief him on unverified, personally sensitive allegations compiled by Steele. According to a memorandum Comey drafted immediately after their private discussion, the President-elect began the meeting by telling Comey he had conducted himself honorably over the prior year and had a great reputation. The President-elect stated that he thought highly of Comey, looked forward to working with him, and hoped that he planned to stay on as FBI director. Comey responded that he intended to continue serving in that role. Comey then briefed the President-elect on the sensitive material in the Steele reporting. Comey recalled that the President-elect seemed defensive, so Comey decided to assure him that the FBI was not investigating him personally. Comey recalled he did not want the President-elect to think of the conversation as a J. Edgar Hoover move. On January 10, 2017, the media reported that Comey had briefed the President-elect on the Steele reporting, and BuzzFeed News published information compiled by Steele online stating that the information included specific unverified and potentially unverifiable allegations of contact between Trump aides and Russian operatives. The next day, the President-elect expressed concern to intelligence community leaders about the fact that the information had leaked and asked whether they could make public statements refuting the allegations in the Steele reports. In the following weeks, three congressional committees opened investigations to examine Russia's interference in the election and whether the Trump campaign had colluded with Russia. On January 13, 2017, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, SSCI, announced that it would conduct a bipartisan inquiry into Russian interference in the election including any links between Russia and individuals associated with political campaigns. On January 25, 2017, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, HIPSEY, announced that it had been conducting an investigation into Russian election interference and possible coordination with the political campaigns. And on February 2, 2017, the Senate Judiciary Committee announced that it too would investigate Russian efforts to intervene in the election. 3. Flynn makes false statements about his communications with Kislyak to incoming administration officials, the media and the FBI. On January 12, 2017, a Washington Post columnist reported that Flynn and Kislyak communicated on the day the Obama administration announced the Russia sanctions. The column questioned whether Flynn had said something to undercut the U.S. sanctions and whether Flynn's communications had violated the letter or spirit of the Logan Act. President-elect Trump called Priebus after the story was published and expressed anger about it. Priebus recalled that the President-elect asked, what the hell is this all about? Priebus called Flynn and told him the President-elect was angry about the reporting on Flynn's conversations with Kislyak. Flynn recalled that he felt a lot of pressure because Priebus had spoken to the boss and said Flynn needed to kill the story. Flynn directed McFarland to call the Washington Post columnist and inform him that no discussion of sanctions had occurred. McFarland recalled that Flynn said words to the effect of, I want to kill the story. McFarland made the call as Flynn had requested, although she knew she was providing false information. And the Washington Post updated the column to reflect that a Trump official had denied that Flynn and Kislyak discussed sanctions. When Priebus and other incoming administration officials questioned Flynn internally about the Washington Post column, Flynn maintained that he had not discussed sanctions with Kislyak. Flynn repeated that claim to Vice President-elect Michael Pence and to incoming Press Secretary Sean Spicer. In subsequent media interviews in mid-January, Pence, Priebus and Spicer denied that Flynn and Kislyak had discussed sanctions, basing those denials on their conversations with Flynn. The public statements of incoming administration officials denying that Flynn and Kislyak had discussed sanctions alarmed senior DOJ officials who were aware that the statements were not true. Those officials were concerned that Flynn had lied to his colleagues, who in turn had unwittingly misled the American public, creating a compromise situation for Flynn because the Department of Justice assessed that the Russian government could prove Flynn lied. The FBI investigative team also believed that Flynn's calls with Kislyak and subsequent denials about discussing sanctions raised potential Logan Act issues and were relevant to the FBI's broader Russia investigation. On January 20, 2017, President Trump was inaugurated and Flynn was sworn in as National Security Advisor. On January 23, 2017, Spicer delivered his first press briefing and stated that he had spoken with Flynn the night before, who confirmed that the calls with Kislyak were about topics unrelated to sanctions. Spicer's statements added to the Department of Justice concerns that Russia had leveraged over Flynn based on his lies and could use that derogatory information to compromise him. On January 24, 2017, Flynn agreed to be interviewed by agents from the FBI. During the interview which took place at the White House, Flynn falsely stated that he did not ask Kislyak to refrain from escalating the situation in response to the sanctions on Russia imposed by the Obama administration. Flynn also falsely stated that he did not remember a follow-up conversation in which Kislyak stated that Russia had chosen to moderate its response to those sanctions, as a result of Flynn's request. 4. DOJ officials notify the White House of their concerns about Flynn. On January 26, 2017, Acting Attorney General Sally Yates contacted White House Counsel Donald McGahn and informed him that she needed to discuss a sensitive matter with him in person. Later that day, Yates and Mary McCord, a senior national security official at the Department of Justice, met at the White House with McGahn and White House Counsel's office attorney James Burnham. Yates said that the public statements made by the Vice President denying that Flynn and Kislyak discussed sanctions were not true and put Flynn in a potentially compromised position because the Russians would know he had lied. Yates disclosed that Flynn had been interviewed by the FBI. She declined to answer a specific question about how Flynn had performed during that interview, but she indicated that Flynn's statements to the FBI were similar to the statements he had made to Pence and Spicer denying that he had discussed sanctions. McGahn came away from the meeting with the impression that the FBI had not pinned Flynn down in lies, but he asked John Eisenberg, who served as legal advisor to the National Security Council, to examine potential legal issues raised by Flynn's FBI interview and his contacts with Kislyak. That afternoon, McGahn notified the President that Yates had come to the White House to discuss concerns about Flynn. McGahn described what Yates had told him, and the President asked him to repeat it so he did. McGahn recalled that when he described the FBI interview of Flynn, he said that Flynn did not disclose having discussed sanctions with Kislyak, but that there may not have been a clear violation of United States Code Title 18 1001. The President asked about Section 1001, and McGahn explained the law to him, and also explained the Logan Act. The President instructed McGahn to work with Priebus and Bannon to look into the matter further, and directed that they not discuss it with any other officials. Priebus recalled that the President was angry with Flynn in light of what Yates had told the White House, and said, Not again! This guy! This stuff! That evening, the President dined with several senior advisors and asked the group what they thought about FBI Director Comey. According to Director of National Intelligence Dan Coates, who was at the dinner, no one openly advocated terminating Comey, but the consensus on him was not positive. Coates told the group that he thought Comey was a good director. Coates encouraged the President to meet Comey face-to-face and spend time with him before making a decision about whether to retain him. 5. McGahn has a follow-up meeting about Flynn with Yates. President Trump has dinner with FBI Director Comey. The next day, January 27, 2017, McGahn and Eisenberg discussed the results of Eisenberg's initial legal research into Flynn's conduct, and specifically whether Flynn may have violated the Espionage Act, the Logan Act, or United States Code Title 18, Section 1001. Based on his preliminary research, Eisenberg informed McGahn that there was a possibility that Flynn had violated U.S. Code Title 18, Section 1001, and the Logan Act. Eisenberg noted that the United States had never successfully prosecuted an individual under the Logan Act, and that Flynn could have possible defenses, and told McGahn that he believed it was unlikely that a prosecutor would pursue a Logan Act charge under the circumstances. That same morning, McGahn asked Yates to return to the White House to discuss Flynn again. In that second meeting, McGahn expressed doubt that the Department of Justice would bring a Logan Act prosecution against Flynn, but stated that the White House did not want to take action that would interfere with an ongoing FBI investigation of Flynn. Yates responded that the Department of Justice had notified the White House so that it could take action in response to the information provided. McGahn ended the meeting by asking Yates for access to the underlying information the Department of Justice possessed pertaining to Flynn's discussions with Kislyak. Also, on January 27th, the President called FBI Director Comey and invited him to dinner that evening. Previous recalled that before the dinner, he told the President something like, Don't talk about Russia whatever you do. And the President promised he would not talk about Russia at the dinner. McGahn had previously advised the President that he should not communicate directly with the Department of Justice to avoid the perception or reality of political interference in law enforcement. When Bannon learned about the President's planned dinner with Comey, he suggested that he or Previous also attend, but the President stated that he wanted to dine with Comey alone. Comey said that when he arrived for the dinner that evening, he was surprised and concerned to see that no one else had been invited. Comey provided an account of the dinner in a contemporaneous memo, an interview with this office and congressional testimony. According to Comey's account of the dinner, the President repeatedly brought up Comey's future, asking whether he wanted to stay on as FBI Director. Because the President had previously said he wanted Comey to stay on as FBI Director, Comey interpreted the President's comments as an effort to create a patronage relationship by having Comey ask for his job. The President also brought up the steel reporting that Comey had raised in the January 6, 2017 briefing and stated that he was thinking about ordering the FBI to investigate the allegations to prove they were false. Comey responded that the President should think carefully about issuing such an order, because it could create a narrative that the FBI was investigating him personally, which was incorrect. Later in the dinner, the President brought up Flynn and said, the guy has serious judgment issues. Comey did not comment on Flynn and the President did not acknowledge any FBI interest in or contact with Flynn. According to Comey's account, at one point during the dinner the President stated, I need loyalty, I expect loyalty. Comey did not respond and the conversation moved on to other topics, but the President returned to the subject of Comey's job at the end of the dinner and repeated, I need loyalty. Comey responded, you will always get honesty from me. The President said, that's what I want, honest loyalty. Comey said, you will get that from me. After Comey's account of the dinner became public, the President and his advisors disputed that he had asked for Comey's loyalty. The President also indicated that he had not invited Comey to dinner, telling a reporter that he thought Comey had asked for the dinner because he wanted to stay on. But substantial evidence corroborates Comey's account of the dinner invitation and the request for loyalty. The President's daily diary confirms that the President extended a dinner invitation to Comey on January 27th with respect to the substance of the dinner conversation. Comey documented the President's request for loyalty in a memorandum he began drafting the night of the dinner. Senior FBI officials recalled that Comey told them about the loyalty request shortly after the dinner occurred and Comey described the request. While under oath in congressional proceedings and in a subsequent interview with investigators subject to penalties for lying under United States Code Title 18, Section 1001, Comey's memory of the details of the dinner, including that the President requested loyalty, has remained consistent throughout. On February 2nd, 2017, Eisenberg reviewed the underlying information relating to Flynn's calls with Kislyak. Eisenberg recalled that he prepared a memorandum about criminal statutes that could apply to Flynn's conduct. But he did not believe the White House had enough information to make a definitive recommendation to the President. Eisenberg and McGahn discussed that Eisenberg's review of the underlying information confirmed his preliminary conclusion that Flynn was unlikely to be prosecuted for violating the Logan Act. Because White House officials were uncertain what Flynn had told the FBI, however, they could not assess his exposure to prosecution. For violating United States Code Title 18, Section 1001. The week of February 6th, Flynn had a one-on-one conversation with the President in the Oval Office about the negative media coverage of his contacts with Kislyak. Flynn recalled that the President was upset and asked him for information on the conversations. Flynn listed the specific dates on which he remembered speaking with Kislyak, but the President corrected one of the dates he listed. The President asked Flynn what he and Kislyak discussed, and Flynn responded that he might have talked about sanctions. On February 9th, 2017, the Washington Post reported that Flynn discussed sanctions with Kislyak the month before the President took office. After the publication of that story, Vice President Pence learned of the Department of Justice's notification to the White House about the content of Flynn's calls. He and other advisors then sought access to and reviewed the underlying information about Flynn's contacts with Kislyak. FBI Deputy Director Andrew McCabe, who provided the White House officials access to the information and was present when they reviewed it, recalled the officials asking him whether Flynn's conduct violated the Logan Act. McCabe responded that he did not know, but the FBI was investigating the matter because it was a possibility. Based on the evidence of Flynn's contacts with Kislyak, McGann and Priebus concluded that Flynn could not have forgotten the details of the discussions of sanctions and had instead been lying about what he discussed with Kislyak. Flynn had also told White House officials that the FBI had told him that the FBI was closing out its investigation of him, but Eisenberg did not believe him. After reviewing the materials and speaking with Flynn, McGann and Priebus concluded that Flynn should be terminated and recommended that course of action to the President. That weekend Flynn accompanied the President to Mar-a-Lago. Flynn recalled that on February 12, 2017, on the return flight to D.C. on Air Force One, the President asked him whether he had lied to the Vice President. Flynn responded that he may have forgotten details of his calls, but he did not think he lied. The President responded, OK, that's fine, I got it. On February 13, 2017, Priebus told Flynn he had to resign. Flynn said he wanted to say goodbye to the President, so Priebus brought him to the Oval Office. Priebus recalled that the President hugged Flynn, shook his hand and said, We'll give you a good recommendation, you're a good guy, we'll take care of you. Talking points on the resignation prepared by the White House Counsel's Office and distributed to the White House Communications Team stated that McGann had advised the President that Flynn was unlikely to be prosecuted and the President had determined that the issue with Flynn was one of trust. Spicer told the Press the next day that Flynn was forced to resign. Not based on a legal issue, but based on a trust issue where a level of trust between the President and General Flynn had eroded to the point where the President felt he had to make a change. 7. The President Discusses Flynn with FBI Director Comey On February 14, 2017, the day after Flynn's resignation, the President had lunch at the White House with New Jersey Governor Chris Christie. According to Christie, at one point during the lunch the President said, Now that we've fired Flynn, the Russia thing is over. Christie laughed and responded, no way. He said, this Russia thing is far from over and we'll be here on Valentine's Day 2018 talking about this. The President said, What do you mean? Flynn met with the Russians. That was the problem. I fired Flynn. It's over. Christie recalled responding that based on his experience, both as a prosecutor and as someone who had been investigated, firing Flynn would not end the investigation. Christie said there was no way to make an investigation shorter, but a lot of ways to make it longer. The President asked Christie what he meant and Christie told the President not to talk about the investigation. Even if he was frustrated at times, Christie also told the President that he would never be able to get rid of Flynn like gum on the bottom of your shoe. Towards the end of the lunch, the President brought up Comey and asked if Christie was still friendly with him. Christie said he was. The President told Christie to call Comey and tell him that the President really likes him. Tell him he's part of the team. At the end of the lunch, the President repeated his request that Christie reach out to Comey. Christie had no intention of complying with the President's request that he contact Comey. He thought the President's request was nonsensical, and Christie did not want to put Comey in the position of having to receive such a phone call. Christie thought it would have been uncomfortable to pass on that message. At 4 p.m. that afternoon, the President met with Comey, Sessions, and other officials for a Homeland Security briefing. At the end of the briefing, the President dismissed the other attendees and stated that he wanted to speak to Comey alone. Sessions and Senior Advisor to the President Jared Kushner remained in the Oval Office as other participants left. But the President excused them, repeating that he wanted to speak only with Comey. At some point, after others had left the Oval Office, Priebus opened the door, but the President sent him away. According to Comey's account of the meeting, once they were alone, the President began the conversation by saying, I want to talk about Mike Flynn. The President stated that Flynn had not done anything wrong in speaking with the Russians, but had to be terminated because he had misled the Vice President. The conversation turned to the topic of leaks of classified information, but the President returned to Flynn saying, He is a good guy and has been through a lot. The President stated, I hope you can see your way clear to letting this go, to letting Flynn go. He is a good guy. I hope you can let this go. Comey agreed that Flynn is a good guy, but did not commit to ending the investigation of Flynn. Comey testified under oath that he took the President's statement as a direction because of the President's position and the circumstances of the one-on-one meeting. Shortly after meeting with the President, Comey began drafting a memorandum documenting their conversation. Comey also met with his senior leadership team to discuss the President's request, and they agreed not to inform FBI officials working on the Flynn case of the President's statements, so the officials would not be influenced by the request. Comey also asked for a meeting with Sessions and requested that Sessions not leave Comey alone with the President again. 8. The media raises questions about the President's delay in terminating Flynn. After Flynn was forced to resign, the press raised questions about why the President waited more than two weeks after the DOJ notification to remove Flynn, and whether the President had known about Flynn's contacts with Kislyak before the DOJ notification. The press also continued to raise questions about connections between Russia and the President's campaign. On February 15, 2017, the President told reporters, General Flynn is a wonderful man, I think he's been treated very, very unfairly by the media. On February 16, 2017, the President held a press conference and said that he removed Flynn because Flynn didn't tell the Vice President of the United States the facts, and then he didn't remember, and that just wasn't acceptable to me. The President said he did not direct Flynn to discuss sanctions with Kislyak, but it certainly would have been okay with me if he did. I would have directed him to do it if I thought he wasn't doing it. I didn't direct him, but I would have directed him because that's his job. Enlisting the reasons for terminating Flynn, the President did not say that Flynn had lied to him. The President also denied having any connection to Russia, stating, I have nothing to do with Russia. I told you, I have no deals there. I have no anything. The President also said he had nothing to do with WikiLeaks' publication of information, hacked from the Clinton campaign. 9. The President attempts to have Katie McFarland create a witness statement denying that he directed Flynn's discussions with Kislyak. On February 22, 2017, Priebus and Bannon told McFarland that the President wanted her to resign as Deputy National Security Advisor, but they suggested to her that the administration could make her ambassador to Singapore. The next day, the President asked Priebus to have McFarland draft an internal email that would confirm that the President did not direct Flynn to call the Russian ambassador about sanctions. Priebus said he told the President he would only direct McFarland to write such a letter if she were comfortable with it. Priebus called McFarland into his office to convey the President's request that she memorialize in writing that the President did not direct Flynn to talk to Kislyak. McFarland told Priebus she did not know whether the President had directed Flynn to talk to Kislyak about sanctions, and she declined to say yes or no to the request. Priebus understood that McFarland was not comfortable with the President's request, and he recommended that she talk to attorneys in the White House Council's office. McFarland then reached out to Eisenberg. McFarland told him that she had been fired from her job as Deputy National Security Advisor and offered the ambassadorship in Singapore, but that the President and Priebus wanted a letter from her denying that the President directed Flynn to discuss sanctions with Kislyak. Eisenberg advised McFarland not to write the requested letter. As documented by McFarland in a contemporaneous memorandum for the record that she wrote because she was concerned by the President's request, Eisenberg thought the requested email and letter would be a bad idea from my side because the email would be awkward. Why would I be emailing Priebus to make a statement for the record? But it would also be a bad idea for the President because it looked as if my ambassadorial appointment was in some way a quid pro quo. Later that evening, Priebus stopped by McFarland's office and told her not to write the email and to forget he ever mentioned it. Around the same time, the President asked Priebus to reach out to Flynn and let him know that the President still cared about him. Priebus called Flynn and said that he was checking in and that Flynn was an American hero. Priebus thought the President did not want Flynn saying bad things about him. On March 31, 2017, following news that Flynn had offered to testify before the FBI and congressional investigators in exchange for immunity, the President tweeted, Mike Flynn should ask for immunity in that this is a witch hunt excuse for big election loss by media and Dems of historic proportion. In late March or early April, the President asked McFarland to pass a message to Flynn telling him the President felt bad for him and that he should stay strong. Analysis. In analyzing the President's conduct related to the Flynn investigation, the following evidence is relevant to the elements of obstruction of justice. A. Obstructive Act. According to Comey's account of his February 14, 2017 meeting in the Oval Office, the President told him, I hope you can see your way clear to letting this go. To letting Flynn go. I hope you can let this go. In analyzing whether these statements constitute an obstructive act, a threshold question is whether Comey's account of the interaction is accurate. And if so, whether the President's statement had the tendency to impede the administration of justice by shutting down an inquiry that could result in a grand jury investigation and a criminal charge. After Comey's account of the President's request to let Flynn go became public, the President publicly disputed several aspects of the story. The President told the New York Times that he did not shoo other people out of the room when he talked to Comey and that he did not remember having a one-on-one conversation with Comey. The President also publicly denied that he had asked Comey to let Flynn go or otherwise communicated that Comey should drop the investigation of Flynn. In private, the President denied aspects of Comey's account to White House advisors, but acknowledged to previous that he brought Flynn up in the meeting with Comey and stated that Flynn was a good guy. Despite those denials, substantial evidence corroborates Comey's account. First, Comey wrote a detailed memorandum of his encounter with the President on the same day it occurred. Comey also told senior FBI officials about the meeting with the President that day and their recollections of what Comey told them at the time are consistent with Comey's account. Second, Comey provided testimony about the President's request that he let Flynn go under oath in congressional proceedings and in interviews with federal investigators subject to penalties for lying under United States Code Title 18, Section 1001. Comey's recollections of the encounter have remained consistent over time. Third, the objective corroborated circumstances of how the one-on-one meeting came to occur support Comey's description of the event. Comey recalled that the President cleared the room to speak with Comey alone after a homeland security briefing in the Oval Office, that Kushner and Sessions lingered and had to be shoot out by the President, and that Previs briefly opened the door during the meeting, prompting the President to wave him away. While the President has publicly denied those details, other administration officials who were present have confirmed Comey's account of how he ended up in a one-on-one meeting with the President. And the President acknowledged to Previs and McGahn that he in fact spoke to Comey about Flynn in their one-on-one meeting. Fourth, the President's decision to clear the room and in particular to exclude the Attorney General from the meeting signals that the President wanted to be alone with Comey, which is consistent with the delivery of a message of the type that Comey recalls rather than a more innocuous conversation that could have occurred in the presence of the Attorney General. Finally, Comey's reaction to the President's statements is consistent with the President having asked him to let Flynn go. Comey met with the FBI leadership team, which agreed to keep the President's statements closely held and not to inform the team working on the Flynn investigation so that they would not be influenced by the President's request. Comey also promptly met with the Attorney General to ask him not to be left alone with the President again, an account verified by Sessions, FBI Chief of Staff James Rybicki and Jody Hunt, who was then the Attorney General's Chief of Staff. A second question is whether the President's statements, which were not phrased as a direct order to Comey, could impede or interfere with the FBI's investigation of Flynn while the President said he hoped Comey could let Flynn go, rather than affirmatively directing him to do so. The circumstances of the conversation show that the President was asking Comey to close the FBI's investigation into Flynn. First, the President arranged the meeting with Comey so that they would be alone and purposely excluded the Attorney General, which suggests that the President meant to make a request to Comey that he did not want anyone else to hear. Second, because the President is the head of the executive branch, when he says that he hopes a subordinate will do something, it is reasonable to expect that the subordinate will do what the President wants. Indeed, the President repeated a version of let this go three times, and Comey testified that he understood the President's statements as a directive, which is corroborated by the way Comey reacted at the time. B. Nexus to a Proceeding To establish a Nexus to a Proceeding, it would be necessary to show that the President could reasonably foresee and actually contemplated that the investigation of Flynn was likely to lead to a grand jury investigation or prosecution. At the time of the President's one-on-one meeting with Comey, no grand jury subpoenas had been issued as part of the FBI's investigation into Flynn. But Flynn's lies to the FBI violated federal criminal law, redacted grand jury, and resulted in Flynn's prosecution for violating United States Code Title 18, Section 1001. By the time the President spoke to Comey about Flynn, DOJ officials had informed McGahn, who informed the President, that Flynn's statements to senior White House officials about his contacts with Kislyak were not true, and that Flynn had told the same version of events to the FBI. McGahn also informed the President that Flynn's conduct could violate United States Code Title 18, Section 1001. After the Vice President and senior White House officials reviewed the underlying information about Flynn's calls on February 10, 2017, they believed that Flynn could not have forgotten his conversations with Kislyak, and concluded that he had been lying. In addition, the President's instruction to the FBI Director to let Flynn go suggests his awareness that Flynn could face criminal exposure for his conduct, and was at risk of prosecution. As part of our investigation, we examined whether the President had a personal stake in the outcome of an investigation into Flynn. For example, whether the President was aware of Flynn's communications with Kislyak close in time to when they occurred. Such that, the President knew that Flynn had lied to senior White House officials, and that those lies had been passed on to the public. Some evidence suggests that the President knew about the existence and content of Flynn's calls when they occurred, but the evidence is inconclusive and could not be relied upon to establish the President's knowledge. In advance of Flynn's initial call with Kislyak, the President attended a meeting where the sanctions were discussed and an advisor may have mentioned that Flynn was scheduled to talk to Kislyak. Flynn told McFarland about the substance of his calls with Kislyak, and said they may have made a difference in Russia's response, and Flynn recalled talking to Bannon in early January 2017 about how they had successfully stopped the train on Russia's response to the sanctions. It would have been reasonable for Flynn to have wanted the President to know of his communications with Kislyak, because Kislyak told Flynn his request had been received at the highest levels in Russia and that Russia had chosen not to retaliate in response to the request, and the President was pleased by the Russian response, calling it a great move. And the President never said publicly or internally that Flynn had lied to him about the calls with Kislyak, but McFarland did not recall providing the President-elect with Flynn's readout of his calls with Kislyak, and Flynn does not have a specific recollection of telling the President-elect directly about the calls. Bannon also said he did not recall hearing about the calls from Flynn, and in February 2017 the President asked Flynn what was discussed on the calls and whether he had lied to the Vice President, suggesting that he did not already know. Our investigation accordingly did not produce evidence that established that the President knew about Flynn's discussions of sanctions before the Department of Justice notified the White House of those discussions in late January 2017. The evidence also does not establish that Flynn otherwise possessed information damaging to the President that would give the President a personal incentive to end the FBI's inquiry into Flynn's conduct. Evidence does establish that the President connected the Flynn investigation to the FBI's broader Russia investigation, and that he believed, as he told Christie, that terminating Flynn would end the whole Russia thing. Flynn's firing occurred at a time when the media and Congress were raising questions about Russia's interference in the election, and whether members of the President's campaign had colluded with Russia. Multiple witnesses recalled that the President viewed the Russia investigations as a challenge to the legitimacy of his election. The President paid careful attention to negative coverage of Flynn and reacted with annoyance and anger when the story broke disclosing that Flynn had discussed sanctions with Kislyak. Just hours before meeting one-on-one with Comey, the President told Christie that firing Flynn would put an end to the Russia inquiries, and after Christie pushed back, telling the President that firing Flynn would not end the Russia investigation, the President asked Christie to reach out to Comey and convey that the President liked him and that he was part of the team. That afternoon, the President cleared the room and asked Comey to let Flynn go. We also sought evidence relevant to assessing whether the President's direction to Comey was motivated by sympathy towards Flynn. In public statements, the President repeatedly described Flynn as a good person who had been harmed by the Russia investigation, and the President directed advisors to reach out to Flynn to tell him that the President cared about him and felt bad for him. At the same time, multiple senior advisors including Bannon, Priebus, and Hicks said that the President had become unhappy with Flynn well before Flynn was forced to resign and that the President was frequently irritated with Flynn. Priebus said he believed the President's initial reluctance to fire Flynn stemmed not from personal regard, but from concern about the negative press that would be generated by firing the National Security Advisor so early in the administration. And Priebus indicated that the President's post-firing expressions of support for Flynn were motivated by the President's desire to keep Flynn from saying negative things about him. The way in which the President communicated the request to Comey is also relevant to understanding the President's intent. When the President first learned about the FBI investigation to Flynn, he told McGahn, Bannon, and Priebus not to discuss the matter with anyone else in the White House. The next day, the President invited Comey for a one-on-one dinner against the advice of an aide who recommended that other White House officials also attend. At the dinner, the President asked Comey for loyalty and, at a different point in the conversation, mentioned that Flynn had judgment issues. When the President met with Comey the day after Flynn's termination, shortly after being told by Christie that firing Flynn would not end the Russia investigation, the President cleared the room, even excluding the Attorney General, so that he could again speak to Comey alone. The President's decision to meet one-on-one with Comey contravened the advice of the White House counsel that the President should not communicate directly with the Department of Justice to avoid any appearance of interfering in law enforcement activities. And the President later denied that he cleared the room and asked Comey to let Flynn go, a denial that would have been unnecessary if he believed his request was a proper exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Finally, the President's effort to have McFarland write an internal email denying that the President had directed Flynn to discuss sanctions with Kislyak highlights the President's concern about being associated with Flynn's conduct. The evidence does not establish that the President was trying to have McFarland lie. The President's request, however, was sufficiently irregular that McFarland, who did not know the full extent of Flynn's communications with the President, and thus could not make the representation the President wanted, felt the need to draft an internal memorandum documenting the President's request, and Eisenberg was concerned that the request would look like a quid pro quo in exchange for an ambassadorship.