 This is Shankaran who is going to take us through the nuances of Section 5 and Section 14 of the limitation act and as Vikas has put it, all of us know what is Section 5 in detail but regarding Section 14, many of us are unaware. Section 5 deals with the contamination of delay which is nothing but the extension of the prescribed period in certain cases. And Section 14 deals with the exclusion of time of proceeding which is born of ID in a court without jurisdiction and it consists of two limbs also. And the Supreme Court, I think it was in Kumara Dasanaya's judgment, where it was held that Section 14, regarding the first lip of Section 14, that is applicable only in the suits in your definition of the suit which is containing Section 2 of the limitation act. But the principle thereof that could be applied for the purpose of contamination of delay in filing even a revision application in terms of Section 5. And the main objective that the limitation act itself, it serves as, is to primarily provide a bar upon the time limit within which the agreed party, he can institute a suit or an application or an appeal in the court under the legislation. Upon limitation is not enacted. Then it would have led to some an unconditional or a never ending litigation procedure as no party would be concerned to refer a timely litigation and the party, he would find his cause of action not being executed for a long, long time. And now today we have two sections, which prime of us here on a primary blush would appear more or less similar. But Section 5 and Section 14, they are not mutually exclusive. And the principles of Section 14, my limited knowledge may be used to constitute a sufficient cause under Section 5. Now over to you, this is Shankaran. Thank you, Mr. Prem. Thank you, Mr. Vikas. So only one facet, while we will be talking about Section 5 and 14, I am sorry that while we were discussing about the webinar, we didn't take things forward. Like the arbitration act, etc. where you cannot get the condonation if some people today could be taken up or we will take it on some other session where there is no provision to condone the delay. But we will deal with separate. Okay, that's fine. Deal with separate. Yeah, yeah, because I felt that is also an important fact. Normally people feel that this delay can be condoned by moving in application. Over to you, sir. Yes. Now dear friends, today we have to deal with Section 5 and 14. Section 5, all of us know that there is a provision for extension of time, which is popularly known as condonation of delay. The exact word used in the section is extension of the prescribed period. I told you the period of limitation and prescribed period are different. Section 2 J of the limitation defines the period of limitation as the period provided in the schedule and the prescribed period, the period of limitation computed in accordance with the provision of the act. Now, this is extension of the prescribed period. Extention of prescribed period in certain cases. Let us see what section 5 says. And in the earlier session, also I said that the limitation act applies to. So it's appeals and applications. Other. What is it? Section 5 does not include a suit. Let us see the wording of section 5. Any appeal or any application. Other than an application under any of the provisions of order 21 of the quotas with procedure. May be admitted after the prescribed period. If the appellant or the applicant satisfies the quote that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application with such period. Explanation is also there. The fact that appellant or applicant was misled by an order practice or judgment of the high court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be a sufficient cause. So delay can be condoned on sufficient cause. In what cases it will apply? It will apply only to appeals and applications other than an application under order 21 of the quotas with procedure. Order 21 we know that it relates to execution. So far as suits and execution petitions are concerned. Section 5 is out of place. Section 5 cannot be applied to suits and execution petitions. Now if a suit is to be filed today. The person who comes to the court with all papers ready. He has to file the suit today. While coming to the court he met with an accident. He was in the hospital for one week. He is discharged from the hospital. Immediately rushes to the court. And files a suit. There is a delay of one week. Question is whether the delay can be controlled. The answer is no. There is no question of extension of the period for filing a suit. There are other provisions in the limitation act. Where a fresh period is available. Extension is available. Explosion is available. All those things are available. But for condoning the delay in filing a suit. There is no provision. It may appear to be harsh. But it is a fact that the court lacks power to condone delay. Section 15 14. So operates in a different field. But as Prem pointed out. They are not mutually exclusive. And we will come to section 14 later. Now in the matter of condonation of delay. In filing an appeal. The court can condone delay provided there are sufficient reasons. It is not the extent of delay that is really that really matters. It is the reason. Of causing the delay whether there is sufficient cause for. The delay preferring the appeal or application. Whether the court is satisfied. With your explanation. If there is sufficient grout. Even if the delay is for months together. Or years together. In appropriate cases the court has power to control the. Court must be satisfied. Satisfies the court. The order passed by the court must record that satisfaction. I am satisfied that there are sufficient grouts as stated by the petitioner. It is not the extent of delay. Even if there is a delay of one month in filing the appeal. It is likely to be dismissed. But even if the delay is one year is likely to be controlled. Provided. It depends on the reasons. Sufficient cause. Sufficient you are otherwise of the cause. Now. The courts were taking. A strict view. In the matter of condonation of delay. Up till 1987. When I started practice. To get an appeal admitted. To delay condonation for 30 years 30 days or 20 days. Was very difficult. Even if it is 15 days delay. The courts insisted on. Explaining each day's delay. Each day's delay. That was the practice. But. A complete change occurred. By a decision of the Supreme Court. That is. In 19 a year 1987 Supreme Court. 1353. 1353. Where the court said. Seven tests were laid out. Which was not either to being. The court said. To follow. Or to. By the courts while the matter of condoning. Let us see what the principles are. I will read out. One. Ordinarily. A litigant does not stand to benefit. By lodging. An appeal late. This is a paragraph three or four of the judge. To. The court said. In a murderous matter be thrown out. At the very threshold. Three. If the delay is condoned. The highest that can happen. Is that the case would be decided on the merits. Four. The principle that every day's delay should be condoned. A pragmatic. And not a pedantic approach should be made by the court. That was the test. Have you explained every day's delay. Or the argument of the respondent will be. Every day's delay is not explained. Some. Delay is explained by this state. 15 or 16 that date. The delay of that date is not explained. So even a. Non-explanation of the single day's delay. May sometimes be. A fatal to. The maintenance of the application. The principle that. Every day's delay should be condoned. A pragmatic. And not a pedantic approach should be made by the court. Five. When substantial justice and technical. Conservations are pitted against. Each other. The course of substantial justice. Deserves to be preferred. For. The other side cannot claim to have vested right. In injustice. Being done. Because of a non-deliberate. Delay. Next six. There is no presumption that. Delay is occasion. Deliberately. Or on account of. Culpable negligence. Or on account of. A litigant does not stand to benefit. By resorting to delay. In fact. He runs a serious risk. It must be grass seven. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected. Not on account of its power to legalize. Injustice. On technical grounds. But because it is capable of removing injustice. And is expected to be. This decision. Made a complete. A complete change. To the scenario of the next. And in various decisions of Supreme Court. This 87 Supreme Court was followed. 87 Supreme Court was followed. Applied. And there is no other decision which. Departs from it. Of course there are decisions which say that. The reasons must be stated. It must be proved and all those things. But at the same time the principles which are set out. In 1987 Supreme Court. Were being. Are being followed. In another in other decisions of Supreme Court. Till now. Now we'll also see some of the decisions. Five or six. Five or six. Five or six. All the decisions. Five or six decisions. Very important decisions. Nothing more than that. I am citing only Supreme Court judgments because. Advocates from various states are there. Please note another decision. 2010. Five. 2010. Five. I did not mention the citation. The. The. The. The name of the case is collector land acquisition. And then the knock. Collector land acquisition. And then the knock. Versus. Osamuth. Kati G. And other. Now next decision is. 2010. Five. Five. Nine. Oriental Aromachemical Industries Limited versus Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation and another. This 87 was followed, principles are set out. Next. 2019, 10 SCC, 408, 408. Three judges, State of Manipura and others. Versus Quoting, K-O-T-I-N-G, LAMCAM, L-A-M-K-A-N-G. Another decision of the Supreme Court, AIR, 2018, 2018 Supreme Court, 807, 807. Bengal Chemists and Drugists Association. Versus Kalyan Chaudhary. There the Supreme Court dealt with certain other principles. Where a period of limitation is fixed, peremptory or mandatory language. And deal with that question. The Supreme Court answered in that case, peremptory or mandatory language. Providing for a statutory period of limitation, including a grace period. Which may be provided on showing of sufficient cause. Words such as not exceeding or but not thereafter. The Supreme Court held that they are equivalent in clearly indicating that the limitation period extended no further. There are certain statutes, for example, NIA Act section could be applied. Certain period is fixed and an extension up to a particular limit is fixed. Going by the decisions of Supreme Court when such peremptory fixing, then there is no question of any extension. Depending upon the nature of the statute, the purpose for which it is made. And the nature of the proceedings, all these interpretations arise. And next, and this context I may say. That in orderly 21 CPC written statement. By the 1999 amendment, a period of 30 days was fixed. In 2002 amendment, the proviso was added that can be extended up to 90 days. The Supreme Court in Salem advocate association case. Held that even after the expiry of 90 days. The period can be extended because the Supreme Court interpreted the scope and amity of rule 10 of order 8 along with order 8 rule 1. And said that a harmonious construction is required. And it was held that even though the words used are that up to 90 days. But the consequences are not mentioned on the other hand rule 10 provides for the court's power. And therefore, in those in the circumstances, even after 90 days, the court can accept a written statement. Next decision is a year 1988 Supreme Court. A year 1988 Supreme Court. 897. Bassa Walingappa versus special land land acquisition officer. The expression sufficient cause in section five. Must receive a liberal construction. So as to advance substantial justice. And generally delays and preferring appeals are required to be condoned. In the interest of justice. Where no gross negligence. Or deliberate inaction. Or lack of bonafides. Is imputable to the party seeking for condolences of feeling. What is sufficient cause is explained. Unrealistic interpretations must be excluded from conservation. And the matter of functioning of government. The Supreme Court decision emphasizes. Government decisions are proverbially slow and compared. As they are by considerable degree of procedural retake in the process of their making. It would perhaps be unfair and unrealistic. To put government and private parties on the same footing. In all respects in such matters. Implicit in the very nature of governmental functioning. There is procedural delay. Incidental to the decision making process. Law is the same to all. To a private party or to the government. But in the matter of exercising the discretion. It is pointed out by the Supreme Court. That a private party may decide to file an appeal he may implement it within time. Or even if there is delay some a few days delay. But in so far as the governmental action is concerned. It requires from traveling from one desk to another. Decisions to be taken at various points. By the various departments. And red typism is the hallmark. And all those things are realistic. Are to be realistically considered by the court. He's bought the Supreme Court 6. That is the decision in Basawalikapa. A year 1988 Supreme Court 897. Next is A year 1996 Supreme Court. 1623. State of Haryana versus. Chandramani and others. Chandramani and others. In view of the fact that the government is an impersonal machinery. And the inherited bureaucratic methodology. Decisions are taken at slow pace. Certain amount of latitude is not impermissible in such cases. If the appeals brought by the state are lost for such a default. It is the public interest that suffers. The expression sufficient cost should be considered with pragmatism. In justice oriented approach. Rather than the technical detection of sufficient cost for explaining every day. This is what the Supreme Court said. Chandramani's case. Next is. ILR. It is a Kerala decision. Of course it was rendered by me. It is not because I have rendered it. I am citing there are several Kerala decisions. More than that of Supreme Court. Various decisions which are very relevant on the point. But since those Kerala decisions corresponding AER citation is not available. I am not citing those decisions. ILR 2007 one Kerala. It is reported in Kerala lot times. 2007 one KLT. 673. Why I cited this. Is. Delay in filing an appeal. There occurs delay in various metrics. In the matter of setting aside a wait match. Which occurs under order 22 of the court of sue procedure. There also. Under article 120 and 121 of the limitation. The period of limitation for impleding is provided as 90 days. Article 121. To set aside the wait man. It is 60 days. So after 90 days the suit will await. Or appeal will await. Whatever it is. 120. 121. Setting aside a wait man. Another 60 days from 90 days. Court can set aside the wait. And that is that takes us to 150 days. After 150 days. What will happen. If the plaintiff dies. Or let us take it the defendant. Defendant dies. Or the respondent in an appeal dies. The opponent has to take steps to. The legal representatives of the defendant. Or the respondent as the case may be. Or the defendant as the case may be. Or the defendant as the case may be. Or the defendant as the case may be. Or the defendant as the case may be. That has to be done in 90 days. On expiry of 90 days. The suit or appeal will await. But it can be. A wait man can be set aside. If an application is made with another 60 days. If. 90 plus 60. 150 days expires. Application for impleding and other applications. Are filed. On the 200th day. What will happen. What will happen. There is delay. Delay of how much. Is it 200 days. Or. 50 days. Or. 110 days. Is the question. Delay will be 50 days. The principles are explained in that decision. Name of the case is. Shankaran and others. Versus. There. It is also held. That in the matter of condonation of delay in filing an appeal. Is quite different from. The matter of condoning delay. In filing the application to set aside the way. Because in the latter case. There is already an appeal pending. The parties before court. And. In the other case. Filing an appeal pending. The parties before court. And in the other case. Filing an appeal. He has not approached the. So the delay in filing an appeal. And the delay in making the application. For employees and setting aside. But. There is slight difference. In this later later case. That is the matter of condoning the delay. Setting aside the wait. The court will be more liberal. Than the other. It is also held. Next case. And the number six. The name of the case. Yao. Tian. Twenty love by a CC 15 someone. One Hi Summer name of the case Monday. Ben. They Great Shah. Manipadae Raj Shah. Versus newspaper. Barbara. Bran mumbai. Down by the municipal corporation. Below 7 years and 108 These. and the ground made out is that misplacement of necessary papers. The question was whether the delay can be condoned. Supreme Court held that no premium can be given for a total lethargy or utter negligence on the part of officers of the state and or its agencies and instrumentalities. Applications filed them for condonation of delay cannot be allowed as a matter of course by accepting the plea that dismissal of the matter on the ground of bar of reputation will cause injury to public interest. In the other decision cited by me, the Supreme Court said that public interest will suffer. It is true but though it is public interest matter relates to public interest, this lethargy, total lethargy or utter negligence that is not a ground to condone the long delay. Next decision is 2016 Supreme Court 3006 name of the case state of Jammu and Kashmir versus R.K. Zalpuri Zalpuri said a LPURI and others that is an application for condonation of delay. Repetition was filed challenging an order of dismissal from service filed after a delay of five years. The employee was dismissed from service in the year 1999 but he chose to avail the remedy. He did not, he chose not to avail the departmental remedy. He woke up from his lumber to knock at the doors of the High Court after a lapse of five years. The staleness of the claim remains stale and it could not have been allowed to rise like a phoenix by the root court. For repetition generally we will say that the period of 90 days is a reasonable period and all those but there is strictly there is no repetition for condonation of delay etc. Court is exercising its jurisdiction but that is not a ground to condone or disregard this much lapse on the part of the litigant. Next decision is 2002 3 SCC 195 Ramnath Sao SAO alias Ramnath Sao and others versus Govardhan Sao and others. That is sufficient cause setting aside abitement, condonation of delay, liberal interpretation should be made than the case of condonation of delay in filing an appeal etc. That principle has been set out paragraph 2 13 and 40. Next is 19 96 2 SCC 568 568 96 2 SCC 568 813 568 568 and so on. Setting aside abitement that theory 96 2 SCC 568 state of MP versus SS Aqalkar AKOLKAR. Now I when you read the commentaries on section 5 of the limitation you will see thousands of decisions, thousands and thousands of decisions. I have cited only very few, very few because the principle just to mention the principles and also the different situations may arise and all those things. Now let us go to section 40. 14 is to some extent difficult, particularly the last portion of it. 14, the exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in court without jurisdiction. Subsection 3 is to a little bit difficult. One and two not so difficult. Let us read the particular portion because the words are important. Words are important. One, in computing the period of limitation for an issue, the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence, another civil proceeding. It does not say suit. So for the purpose of computing the period of limitation for an issue, the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence, another civil proceeding. Whether in a court of the first instance or of appeal or revision against the defendant shall be excluded where the proceeding relates to the same matter in issue, where the proceeding relates to the same matter in issue and is prosecuted good faith in a court which from defective jurisdiction or other cause of a life nature is unable to entertain it. What is the meaning of this? There is a civil proceeding before a court. That court could not entertain it because of defective jurisdiction or other cause of a life nature. Thereafter, a regular suit is filed before the court. It is naturally sometimes beyond time. What will happen to the time spent by the party in prosecuting the case in another court? Whether it can be excluded? If it is a suit, there is no question of condonation of delay or extension of period under section 5. Section 5 cannot be applied at all. But the period during which he was prosecuting with due diligence, another civil proceeding. If that period can be excluded, is excluded, then if the suit is within time, the court can exclude that period during which this litigant was prosecuting with due diligence, another proceeding in respect of the same subject matter, same matter in issue in a court which because of defective jurisdiction or other cause of a life nature could not entertain. What is defective jurisdiction or other cause of a life nature? Supreme Court has said that defective jurisdiction or other cause of a life nature should be run just in generous with defective jurisdiction. There is some defect court could not entertain. Therefore, the shooter fails because of lack of jurisdiction or defect of jurisdiction or jurisdictional aspect. And he institutes a suit in the regular court which has jurisdiction. But if it is beyond time and the period during which he was prosecuting the defective proceedings before a wrong court, then the suit is within time, it is not a question of condoning the delay, the exclusion of the period during which he was prosecuting with due diligence, another civil proceeding in respect of the same matter in issue in a court which because of defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a life nature could not entertain that. That is subsection 1. Let us see subsection 2. In computing the period of limitation for any application, subsection 1 is for a suit and subsection 2 relates to application. The time during which the applicant has been prosecuting with due diligence, another civil proceeding, same wording as in subsection 1. Whether in a court of the first instance or of appeal or revision, same thing as in subsection 1. Against the same party, for the same relief shall be excluded. Subsection 1, it is not the same relief relates to the same matter in issue. That is the difference. Same matter in issue. The suit as well as the formal proceedings in a wrong court was in respect to the same matter in issue. Whereas in the case of an application, not a suit, that is subsection 2 relates to computation of the period of limitation or an application. The time during which the applicant has been prosecuting with due faith, with due diligence, another civil proceeding in a wrong court for the same relief, that period shall be excluded where such proceeding is prosecuted good faith in a court, which because of defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a life nature not entertained. There also the reason is defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a life nature. There also it is proceeding. And instead of suit, it is an application. Subsection 1 relates to suits and to apply section 14, it must be in respect to the same matter in issue, the suit as well as the proceed. Whereas in the case of an application for exclusion of that period, it is more stringent. The former proceeding must be for the same relief as in the case of an application filed before the regular court subsequently. This is the difference. One is same relief, the other is same matter in issue. Rest is the same. Then you have to read along with this explanation. For the purpose of this section, we will come to three later. For the purpose of this section, in excluding the time during which the former civil proceeding, former civil proceeding was pending, the day on which that proceeding was instituted and the day on which it ended shall both be counted. Be a plaintiff for an applicant resisting an appeal shall be deemed to be prosecuting a proceeding. What is the meaning of this? A plaintiff for an applicant resisting an appeal shall be deemed to be prosecuting a proceeding. That is a person prosecuting a proceeding in a wrong court because of defective jurisdiction or other cause of a life nature the court could not entertain. And it was a bona fide one. It was being prosecuted with due diligence. That period will be excluded in the case of a suit under subsection one and in the case of an application under subsection two. Now, what is this a plaintiff for an applicant resisting an appeal shall be deemed to be prosecuting a proceeding? What is the meaning of this? I will give an example to clarify it. See, A file says who gets to be. B says the court has no jurisdiction. The court in which the proceeding is initiated has no jurisdiction. So, talk to proceeding whatever it is has no jurisdiction. That court says that it has jurisdiction. There is no defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a life nature. And the matter is going to be decided. Whether at that stage or after the decision is rendered, this question of jurisdiction is challenged in appeal or revision as the case may be or in original petition or article 222. Whatever it is, whether at the initial stage itself it is challenged or after the disposal of the proceeding it is challenged. But this question is under challenge. So, the trial court said that there is no defect of jurisdiction and the contingent of the respondent is out of place. It is not, it is without any substance. That means the plaintiff succeeded in respect of that point. Before the appellate court, it does not agree with the trial. It says that there is defect of jurisdiction. And it is held that the suit, the proceedings suit or proceeding before that court is not maintained. What happens? That suit fails, suit fails because of the decision of the appellate court. What will happen during the time in which he was prosecuting the suit? During the time in which he was prosecuting, he was defending the appeal or revision. That is what he said, plaintiff or an applicant resisting an appeal shall be deemed to be prosecuting an appeal. So, the plaintiff or applicant in the case where it was held that the trial court held that it has jurisdiction. But the appellate court says otherwise he was prosecuting the suit and he was prosecuting the appeal. So, the time during which shall be deemed to be prosecuting the appeal, the time during which he was resisting an appeal shall be deemed to be prosecuting. It need not be prosecuting the word, prosecuting need not refer to his being a plaintiff or petitioner, applicant. Even as a respondent, he may prosecute because without prosecuting, he cannot substantiate his condition that the suit is maintained until there is no defect of jurisdiction. He succeeded in the trial court with respect to the jurisdictional aspect, but he did not succeed before the appeal. The period during which he was prosecuting as a respondent, the appeal, he was defending the appeal, that period also will be counted as a period during which he was prosecuting with the due diligence. The time during which he was prosecuting the original proceeding in the trial court plus the period during which he was resisting the appeal that both will be excluded for the purpose of subsection one or subsection two as the case may be. Now, we go to three. To understand subsection three, we have to have CPC also with us, order 23, order 23 CPC. Now, let us read subsection three first. Notwithstanding anything contained in rule two of order 23 of the court of suit procedure, the provisions of subsection one shall apply, subsection one of section 14 shall apply in relation to a fresh suit instituted on permission granted by the court under rule one of that order. That order means order 23. Where such permission is granted on the ground that the first suit must fail by reason of a defected jurisdiction of the court or other cause of a life nature. On a simple reading of subsection three, see it is very difficult to understand. So, we have to see what is order 23, rule one, three. Order 23, rule one provides for abandonment of suit and withdrawal of suit. Abandonment the plaintiff can have at any time. Withdrawal also he can do in two ways. One without the permission of the court and two with the permission. If no permission is granted by the court, no permission is applied for, no permission is granted. He cannot file another suit in respect of the same subject matter. Whereas if permission is granted, he can file another suit. Withdrawal of suit can be for reasons mentioned in subsection three of sub rule three of rule one, which says that where the court is satisfied that a suit must fail by reason of some formal defect or that there are sufficient. I am reading order 23, rule one, subsection three. The court may permit and if permission is granted with the liberty to institute a fresh suit in respect of the same subject matter or part of the court and where and it is provided where in sub rule four that if a plaintiff abandons the suit or withdraws from the suit without permission, he shall be precluded from instituting a fresh suit in respect of such subject matter or part of the claim. This is the disqualification which a person suffers on account of withdrawal of suit without permission of the court. So with the permission of the court, it is withdrawn and another suit is instituted immediately. That is not permission was granted by the court is no guarantee for the period of application. That is what is provided in rule two of order let us read rule two. In any fresh suit instituted on permission granted under the last preceding rule, the plaintiff shall be bound by law of limitation in the same manner as if the first suit has not been instituted. So I will summarize it. A suit is fine. We draw one of that suit becomes necessary for any of the reasons mentioned in sub rule three of rule one because of some formal defect it may fail or there are sufficient grounds. Sometimes a plaint may be amended 10 times. It looks so clumsy. Reliefs are changed, court fee changed, valuation changed and so many stitching and therefore the plaintiff may say all right I may be permitted to withdraw from this we draw this suit and I shall find a fresh suit. If it is within the period of limitation, no harm permission is granted. If it is if it is beyond limitation that the court granted permission is no ground to institute a suit related fresh suit will be bought by limitation means gone withdrawal from the suit and institution of a fresh suit is not a continuation of the earlier suit that is well settled and therefore when you withdraw the suit be very careful to see that a suit filed thereafter with the permission of the court would be within time because rule two of order 23 says that if a suit is withdrawn it is subject to the limitation permission. The plaintiff shall be bound by the law of limitation the same manner how it is computed as if the first suit has not been instituted the court will look into the second suit is it within time it is not within time no matter whether permission was granted there was a no matter whether an earlier suit was there all these are out of question court will not look it as if the first suit is not there limitation will be computed for the purpose of the second suit a fresh suit instituted on permission of the court this is the rule now let us read sub rule three now let us read some rule again not understanding anything contained in rule two of order 23 order 23 rule two says that limitation is not saved the provisions of subsection one shall apply provisions of subsection one of section 14 which provides for exclusion of the period shall apply in relation to a fresh suit instituted on permission granted by the court and a rule one of order 23 of that order means order 23 where such permission is granted on the ground of on the ground that the first suit must fail by reason of a defect in the jurisdiction of the court or other cause of a life nature withdrawal can be on many grounds but if that ground relates to defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a life nature as is mentioned in sub rule one or sub rule two as a subsection one or subsection two then notwithstanding anything that they did order 23 rule two the period of limitation that the the period of limitation will be computed after excluding the period during which the first proceeding was pending and that was withdrawn with permission and with leave to institute a fresh suit and that was on the ground of defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a life nature so from the various grounds which are available under order 23 rule one three this ground is carved out and it is made part of section 14 so to that extent this is an exception to rule two of order 23 so notwithstanding anything that they did order 23 rule two is the general rule that if you institute a suit we draw it with permission institute a fresh fresh suit the period of limitation will be computed as if you are not instituted the earlier suit at all the court will look into what is the date of institution now that withdrawal can be on various grounds but if that withdrawal was on the ground of defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a life nature then notwithstanding that rule two of order 23 says that the period of limitation will not be saved it will be saved if it relates to a matter world because of defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a life nature the plaintiff could not continue that suit or application as the case and it was permitted to be withdrawn on that ground at specific in this is what is subsection three so so this is an exception to rule two of order now let us see some of the decisions also within the time permitted now it is 20 over therefore we will go fast section 14 decisions so that a few of the decisions I will mention which will help you yes now 2015 7 a cc 58 2015 7 a cc 58 mp steel corporation versus commission of central accents justice rowington the remand rendered that statement that is a case where it was held I cited it earlier where it was held that the limitation act applies to courts and not to tribunals and costly judicial authorities that is that point is weight rated all the relevant decisions on that point have been considered by the Supreme Court and this was also held section 14 even though the provisions of section 14 applies to only two courts proper that is courts has understood in the strict sense being part of the judicial branch of the state but principles underlying section 14 which advance cause of justice apply to appeals file before possible judicial tribunal such as that under the customs 128 of the customs is not a complete court customs act is not a so in mp steel it is held that limitation act applies to courts section 14 provides for exclusion in certain cases though it is not a court the principle of exclusion will apply to statutory tribunals as well it is not section 14 assets the principle will apply that is what is that 2018 7 a cc 169 consolidated engineering enterprises consolidated engineering enterprises and another versus principal secretary irrigation department and there you may see paragraph 11 12 and 14 paragraph 11 12 and 14 while conserving the approach so section 14 of the limitation proper approach will have to be adopted and the provisions will have to be interpreted so as to advance the cause of justice rather than abort the proceedings it will be well to bear in mind that an element of mistake is inherent in the invocation of section 14 in fact the section is intended to provide relief against the bar of limitation in cases of mistake and remedy or selection of a wrong form on reading section 14 of the act it becomes clear that the legislature has enacted the set section to extend certain period cover the principle further down the principle is clearly applicable not only to case in which the litigant brings his application in the court but that is a court having no jurisdiction to entertain it but also where he brings a suit or application in the wrong court in consequence of bona fide mistake of law or defect of procedure having regard to the intention of the legislature this court is of the firm opinion that equity underlying section 14 should be applied to its fullest extent and time taken diligently prosecuting the remedy in a wrong court should be excluded now 2009 one ICC 2009 one ICC seven eight six seven eight six name of the case message shakti tubes limited versus state of Bihar and others their repetition was fine and a suit was later fine appellate court declined to exclude the time spent pursuing the repetition the question was whether the time spent in proceeding with the repetition which was defective because of jurisdiction aspect that can be that can be excluded discussion in paragraph 22 23 24 25 26 and provisions of 14 of the limitation act have been held to be applicable even in proceeding arising under section 34 of the arbitration that was a another case decided by the Supreme Court which is referred to it is well settled that another decision was referred to all questions of limitation by the court and courts cannot travel beyond the terms of the words used yes this next is a year 1997 kerala a kerala decision i am compelled to mention 361 by justice Boris Huron poor it had as a judge of the Supreme Court name of the case raja retina nike raja retina nike in a i k k a versus permission of group a it is not reported is in klt also it is reported 1997 one klt 777 say an application under say order 21 rule 90 was fine it was dismissed later in application under section 47 was fine cpc whether that period can be excluded whether that application is maintainable all these questions were considered even after dismissal of an application under rule 90 of order 21 an application under section 47 can be very detailed discussion facts in paragraph 2 then discussion in paragraph 5 12 13 either for 12 either for overall the conduction on behalf of the decree holder that the judgment are having earlier applied for setting aside the sale under order 21 rule 90 is stopped from finding an application under section 47 in the city then paragraph 30 the application under section 47 of the code was admittedly made out of time in view of my conclusion that section 14 of the limitation act is not available to the judge minister to exclude the time spent by him in prosecuting the application is not entitled to exclusion why it was held because it was not for the same relief the application under order 21 rule 90 and the application under section 47 is not for the same relief because section 14 2 of the limitation act provides that it must be for the same relief the formal proceeding and the later application or suit should be for the same procedure next is 19 97 9 SCC 1997 9 SCC 701 Sundar Das and others versus Gajaran Rao and others next is a year 99 not a year 1985 Supreme Court 39 39 suffer Khan and others versus Board of Revenue from defective jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature what is the meaning of it the expression cause of a like nature will have to be read a just term generous with the expression defective jurisdiction the expression other cause of a like nature must be so interpreted as to convey something analogous to the preceding words from defective jurisdiction the party seeking the benefit of section 14 failed in the earlier proceeding on merits and not on defective jurisdiction then section 14 cannot be applied next is a year 1985 Supreme Court 1669 Vijay Kumar Rampal and others Vijay Kumar Rampal and others versus Divan Devi 14 of the limitation act see the discussion next is 2002 volume 6 SCC 336 336 Dina through a loss versus Bharat Singh Bharat Singh time taken for proceeding with a suit without including necessary party cannot be excluded under 14 tree and is a clear case of latches because party pursuing such suit cannot be said to be acting in good faith the expression as used in means exercise of with the due care and attention with the due care and attention because it is defined good faith does not include proceeding taken without due care and attention is section 2 is defined next 2000 volume 5 SCC 355 corresponding AER citation AER 2000 Supreme Court 2023 Sarathi Sarathi versus State Bank of India what is the meaning of this expression court in section 40 not only civil court not mean civil court but also includes any authority or tribunal having the power of it need not be civil court section 14 says about court and inside of these case it was held in paragraph 15 applying the above principles in the instant case we are the opinion that the deputy commissioner of labor appeals which was an authority constituted under 41 two of the Tamil Nadu shops and establishments act to hear and decide appeal was a court within the meaning of section 14 of the limitation act and the proceedings pending before him were civil next 2010 15 SCC 259 259 new gram in milk cooperative society limited new gram in milk cooperative society limited versus general manager deli milk scheme government of India 259 there it is clear that the appellant was under a bona fide wrong impression that it could exclude the award directly being under the impression that the matter was governed by the new law arbitration act therefore the period spent in pursuing the execution proceeding has to be excluded further delay one and a half months in filing the application for making the award rule of the court so under the unamended under the old arbitration act the arbitral orbital award had to be made the rule of the court by making an application for the district court now under the present act the award is it can be executed as if it is a decree so he filed an execution petition it was found that it was defective because the old act will apply so he had to make an application before the district court to make the award a rule of the an order that award directly cannot be executed the period during which the execution petition was pending can be excluded discussion in paragraph six seven and eight then a year 2009 supreme court one three double three one three double three kumara das and naya versus ir ic sohan and others this is the decision which frame pointed out see paragraph 13 14 and 15 the provisions of section five and 14 of the limitation act alike should thus be applied in a broad-based manner when subsection two of section 14 of the limitation act per se is not applicable the same would not mean that the principle second there too would not be applied otherwise the provisions of section five of the limitation act would apply there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the same would be applicable to case of in this nature paragraph 14 there cannot be further there cannot be further there cannot further more be any doubt whatsoever that having regard to the definition of suit as defined in section two l of the limitation act a revision application will not answer the same description but although the provisions of section 14 of the limitation act per se are not applicable in our opinion the principles thereof would be applicable for the purpose of condonation of delay filing an appeal or a revision applicable under section five then a discussion paragraph 15 towards the last of that when the provisions are meant to apply and in fact found to be applicable to the facts and circumstances case in our opinion there is no reason as to why the court will refuse to apply the same only because a wrong portion has been mentioned in the case of this nature subsection two of section 14 per se may not be applicable but as indicated here and above the principle thereof would be applicable for the purpose of condonation of delay terms of section five that is how it applies it is not mutually exclusive there is a kerala decision on that point 1991 1991 KT 218 1991 KT 218 Samuel Joseph versus Ramachandran Chellayan section five and 14 are not mutually exclusive even in a case where section 14 apply section five is not excluded section five is not excluded these are some of the decisions which i intended to mention now i think i have completed with the time with mr vigas back to vigas yes sir as usual logging in was a punctuality taking the session was more punctual this this is by Paradeesh sir what is to what extent is section 14 applicable to proceedings under the insolvency in bankruptcy court in sir that i i i am not i am not sure i am not sure i am sorry i cannot give an answer because i have not studied the scope of that act go kultas vasu and now probably because of the other decision which i cited though it is not a quote that is the decision by justice rv reveter which i mentioned cited supreme court decision even though per se it may not apply the principles may apply two decisions i cited today on that point therefore please see whether it can be applied to your piece yes whether Prem k has got any answer on that question i will ask is an authority on decisions yeah i will ask i'm just giving him a call so meanwhile go kultas has written a query i just examined that i will ask Prem to come yes Prem has not taken the call meanwhile a decree holder files an execution petition after a passage of 17 years the execution is dismissed for want of prosecution now year has passed since the dismissal as decree is valid for 12 years what is the remedy can delay be condone for restoration of execution petition or a fresh execution is required now the execution petition was fired yeah no that was dismissed for non-prosecution execution petition was dismissed for non-prosecution but the execution petition took 17 years meanwhile now he says that since the valid the fresh execution could have been filed within 12 years now whether he has to file an application for seeking restoration by filing an application for condo no original execution petition was filed within 12 years yes yes that was filed within 12 years that was dismissed for default yes now if you file it is beyond 12 years is it not now rule 105 and 106 of product 21 will answer it 105 and 106 if you read if the execution petition is posted for hearing and if a party fails to appear it shall be dismissed for default and within 30 days he can make the application there there are some decisions including a decision which is rented by ordinary posting of the case execution petition and it is dismissed for default and application for restoration that 105 and 106 will not apply if it is posted for hearing then only that 30 days period will apply otherwise section 151 can be applied but here the execution petition was filed within time but it was dismissed for default how many days after dismissal for default one year one year if it is posted for hearing it cannot be x a it cannot be condoned because there is no power to condone delay 30 days is the period under rule 105 and 106 right together i will just exactly say the word order 21 rule 105 and 106 105 the code before which an application for any foregoing rules is pending may fix a date for hearing 106 setting aside then 105 to where on the day fixed or other date to which the hearing is adjourned the applicant does not appear when the case is called for hearing the code may make an order that the application be dismissed then that can be restored under rule 106 but a period of limitation is provided 30 days sub rule 3 of rule 106 an application under sub rule 1 shall be made within 30 days the question is whether that delay can be condoned because it is an execution petition section 5 use auto clicks section 5 cannot be applied therefore there are a few decisions including a decision rendered by that if the execution petition is posted for taking steps or for formal posting not for hearing and it happens to be dismissed and an application for restoration is filed beyond 30 days that rule will not apply because to apply rule 106 it must have been posted for hearing otherwise in such circumstances section 151 can be applied is the decision but here one year is over if an execution petition is filed now it is beyond 12 years you have to make an application for restoration and if the execution petition was posted for hearing he is out these days are the provisions of limitation act applicable to repetitions provisions of the limitation act assets are not applicable to repetitions but the principles may apply in several cases limitation act also some of the applying section 14 itself one of the decisions which I mentioned the period spent during prosecuting in a in the high court a red proceeding can be excluded likewise a suit was being prosecuted though for repetition there is no fixed period of limitation the high court can take into account that he was prosecuting in good faith a suit and therefore it is pending for one or two years there was a delay in finding the repetition delay as such is not a question of days or months together but he came late that can be taken into account therefore though the limitation act assets cannot apply to red proceeding but the principles may apply as we have a full bench also of Punjab Reena High Court Teja Singh versus UT 81 81 PLR page one which says broad principles would apply like the red petition cannot be dismissed on the ground of delay it can be dismissed on the ground of delay and latches yes yes this is by Chinmay I have a question suit filed for bear injunction suit valued at rupees hundred after three years written statement as filed setting up a rival title plain demanded to add relief or declaration of title the valuation for the suit increases the suit instead of being transferred to the appropriate court having jurisdiction is turned under section 7 rule 10 immediately the play link is taken to return and refile as to whether a section 14 can be used in such a case yes now why the court did error it was amended because of the written statement was filed later and it happened that the suit is to be amended for declaration of title where the valuation exceeded the pecuniary limits of jurisdiction of that court the court was not justified in rejecting or returning the play quote to quote should have allowed that application and then return the play and it can be filed in proper court therefore 14 need not be yes in such case 14 can be applied 14 can be applied yes that one hour 15 minutes are over so we will wind up and tomorrow friends we will have a session on what is trial and when does it start in the various types of criminal trial that is by Justice V. Ram Kumar do stay connected with us tomorrow at 4 p.m. and as usual sir you took us to the entire journey of law to understand the section 5 and section 14 including their subclassifications as such and we are all and grateful to you for sharing your knowledge and it's always a pleasure hearing you and as we have already said that you can like share and subscribe to the channel of Justice Katie Sankaran where you will get the entire sessions of civil procedure court as well as the implementation act and similarly on this platform beyond law CLC we have taken sessions on different aspects you can also share like and subscribe and comment on the channel of beyond law CLC for all the sessions so far we have conducted they are more than 350 thank you everyone stay safe stay blessed and keep on wearing your mask do vaccination and maintain social distancing thank you namaskar