 Hello John here and this morning I'm at Sandalands in Croydon, the location of a tragic disaster. I used to travel through here quite a lot as a child and because of this, this event has a personal place in my heart. It's strange seeing somewhere you know so well being the scene for disaster. Well anyway that's enough of me, John. Let's get over to John in It is November 2016 and tragedy has fallen on London. Seven have died in a derailment on the Croydon tram network. It marks the first fatalities on the tram in the UK since 1959. The network represented a modern and reliable former public transport for a previously neglected part of London. The Croydon tram system is relatively new, having only been running since the year 2000 but although apparently modern the accident would highlight the lack of safety systems and show that 16 years without a fatal disaster like this must have been a miracle. Welcome to Plainly Difficult, my name is John and today we're looking at the Croydon tram disaster. Background. Our story starts here in New Addington, which is around here on a map and a newly constructed post-war council estate. The town had been converted from farmland to a residential area before the Second World War. The original plan was for a new garden city out near the Surrey Hills. 4,400 houses, a parade of shops, two churches, cinema and a village green were originally envisioned but the major world war would interrupt the original plans. The war would halt development in the area and would herald the beginnings of its isolation from the rest of London. Post World War II, London's housing landscape had changed significantly. Many more needed homes and with much of Greater London being bombed damaged, quick high-density housing was needed and as such a tight-knit council estate was constructed. Well, the Garden Village Ideal Society was pushed to the wayside but the some 22,000 residents found themselves in one of the largest population centres in London without a rail link. This led in the 1960s to a proposal to convert the West Croydon to Wimbledon line from a British railway line to a tramway as well as converting parts of the Woodside and Addiscombe line. The plans wouldn't gain too much traction until the late 1980s when the many small branch lines around Croydon fell into decline. British rail was eager to offload these routes and converting portions of them into a light rail system offered a unique way for disposing of the unprofitable and sometimes unpopular sections of track. This repurposing of British rail infrastructure wasn't unique to Croydon however. A similar project was well underway in Manchester which upon its opening in 1992 made use of two heavy rail suburban lines and the Tyne and Wear Metro had reused heavy rail infrastructure in the 1980s. You see, the late 1980s was a bit of a revival for light rail. Manchester was one but the DLR in East London was a big proof of concept, well at least for the capital city, but instead of the all singing and dancing automatic train operated network with the DLR, Croydon would get a tramway. As such the Croydon Tramlink Act of 1994 resulted. This gave the London Regional Transport, the predecessor to transport for London, the power to build and run a tramlink network. The Croydon tram network would run Elmer's End to Croydon, Beckham Junction to Croydon and New Addington to Wimbledon via Croydon. Now because of the use of the old with the new core route through Croydon, the free south and eastern destinations had to feed through Sanderlands along what used to be the old Woodside and South Croydon Joint Railway alignment between Coom Road and Woodside. But you may see an issue here when I show you on a map. The old railway is along a straight line where Croydon is over here. So how do we get trams from here or here to Croydon? Well this is where Sanderlands becomes important. After the three tunnels heading north from the old Coom Road station the line would take a sharp turn to the left if coming from New Addington or sharp turn to the right if coming from Beckham or Elmer's End. But trams can handle sharp turns as they have a smaller loading gauge and have better suited wheel profile for turns. This is given in sacrifice of top speed. As such the network only had a maximum speed of 80 kilometres per hour or 50 miles an hour. The tram link network started operation in May 2000 and would turn out to be a vital method of transport in the area helping to turn New Addington from a forgotten council estate to commuting suburb of Croydon. Although in reality this was debatable. I mean it definitely improved New Addington's connections. I remember as a child sitting on the top of the number 64 bus patiently riding through Fieldway, Salesdon, South Croydon, East Croydon and eventually Electric House with my grandparents on an outing to Surrey Street Market. Now the tram network relies on a method of working called drive on site which is pretty self-explanatory. Drivers don't have signalling like on the railway. They should be able to stop short of any obstruction because trams aren't as heavy as trains they can stop within the available sighting distance. So long as the tram has been driven at the correct speed for the area they can stop short of any other tram. This is explained in the Tram Driver's Rulebook. A tram should be able to stop before a reasonably visible stationary obstruction ahead from the intended speed of operation using the service brake. To assist with this principle of operation the line is given a speed depending on its characteristics of the section of track. For example 80kmh in the straight section between Woodside and Coombe Road tunnels and 20kmh around a tight curve at Sanderlands. To tell the driver what speed to drive a speed board is provided. The tram must be doing that speed before it passes the sign. But the tramway did have signals for points, level crossings and conflicting moves. The point signals indicate how the points are set and the other two tell the driver when it's safe to proceed. The rolling stock upon opening of the network was the Bombardier CR400. These multiple units 31m long and 2.65m wide trams have 70 seats and a total passenger capacity of just over 200, both seated and standing. They are powered by 750v DC overhead power lines and have a top speed of 50mph or 80kmh. Now because trams exist in a bit of a strange middle ground between bus and train, they, at least on the Croydon tram network, were not considered to need any type of protection system, apart from the dead man's handle which puts on the emergency brake when there is no hand on it. Now this is problematic, especially at, say, the Sanderlands curve, which essentially could act like a slingshot. But for the most part, tram-borne safety systems didn't seem to be an issue. Well, until it was. The disaster. It is the morning of the 9th of November, 2016, and tram 2551 has just arrived at New Addington at 5.47am. The driver has 6 minutes to change ends and prepare the tram for its return journey towards Croydon. He has been on shift since 4.53am, having taken tram 2551 out of Thrapia Lane depot and driving it in service towards New Addington. All has been fine so far, although early in the morning the driver would later report that he has slept well in the night. At 5.53am, tram 2551 departed New Addington, slowly making its way along the single line bit of track towards King Henry's Drive. The tram for the next two stops down the hill towards Addington Village into change was running to time. Down to gravel hill stop and up gravel hill itself was all as normal, with the driver obeying the speed limits across the road crossing. The tram left Coombe Lane tram stop a minute late but was easily recovered at Lloyd Park. From here, tram 2551 would have to navigate a tight curve into the long straight through the three tunnels. Again, the tram obeyed the speed restriction through the turn. The journey through the three tunnels was one of the fastest sections of track on the route. The driver, upon reaching the 80km per hour board, opened up accelerating down the line. Near the second tunnel gap and travelling at about 79kmh, the tram was roughly 340m away from the left hand tight corner into Sanderlands. Usually the trams would begin to break here, but this morning, 2551 didn't. Some aboard the tram noticed the unusually high speed approaching the exit of the last tunnel. The driver made a small brake application around 185m from the 20kmh speed sign, but the speed was barely reduced. Tram 2551 exited the tunnels into heavy rain, travelling at a speed of about 78kmh, roughly 95m from the tight corner. Another brake application was made, 57m from the speed restriction. The tram went past the speed sign at 73kmh, or 45mh, at 6.07am. As it slammed into the tight Sanderlands left hand curve, the tram began to overturn onto its right hand side. Passengers were thrown against one another. The momentum of the tram coming to a stop ejected around 34 of the occupants through the tram's windows and doors. The tram had moved 27m from the place where it left the rails. Most of this distance was during the tram's overturning, would remain from the slide. The tram was now battered and laying across the opposite track, due to the severity of the shock to the electrical systems. The passenger saloon was in complete darkness. Passengers desperately tried to light up the cabin with their mobile phones and attempted to clamber out. Tram 2554 had just departed Sanderlands, heading towards the junction that 2551 had crashed into. The tram had lost power. The driver contacted control, who told him to walk towards the junction to investigate. The driver of 2554 saw 2551 on its side. By now some of the passengers had tried to escape via the left side doors, now above their heads. The driver of 2554 ran to 2551 and began attempting to cut a hole in the windscreen of the tipped over unit, with some within also trying to escape through the windscreen after helping the crashed tram's driver. Two officers from the Metropolitan Police were the first emergency responders on the scene, arriving at Sanderlands tram stop at about 6.12am. They reported the situation to their control. More responders arrived from the London Fire Brigade, British Transport Police and London Ambulance Service, as well as more Met Police officers. The fire service cut away parts of the tram, including the windscreen, and used specialist equipment to raise the tram out of the way. The walking wounded were evacuated and the last surviving trapped passenger was freed from tram 2551 at around 8.16am. Seven passengers were fatally injured during the accident. 19 suffered serious injuries and 42 received minor injuries. Within an hour the Rail Accident Investigation Board, the UK's rail version of the NTSB, had arrived and began collecting evidence. Obviously the question was how did the tram end up here? Well the investigation would find some very worrying points. The investigation. The RAIB reviewed the on-tram data recorder and saw the worrying lack of control inputs from the driver. Further investigation of tram 2551 found it was indeed working how it should be, which led investigators to suspect the driver as a cause of the crash. It was quickly apparent that the crash wasn't a case of attempted suicide and drugs tests excluded any substance abuse to be a causal factor. A medical examination also ruled out seizure or blackout, which really left only one human factor, loss of concentration. Investigators thought that a temporary loss of awareness of the driving task during a period of low workload was the cause, which was possibly caused by micro sleep. They thought this was a reason for the apparent non-reaction of the driver as the tram approached the Sanderlands curve. The RAIB would summarise the cause in its report. Although some doubt remains as to the reasons for the driver not applying sufficient braking, the RAIB has concluded that the most likely cause was a temporary loss of awareness of the driving task during a period of low workload, which possibly caused him to micro sleep. It is also possible that when regaining awareness the driver became confused about his location and direction of travel. But although the driver was the initiating event, a serious question was raised as to how there was no safety system in place to prevent this. The tramway was pretty modern after all. How was it just down to one individual to ensure safety of the passengers? Well the investigation would delve into this and show a pretty worrying lack of awareness of the dangers of such a tight curve. The RAIB discovered that the speed board was placed too close to the curve, leaving little time to react if the driver had lost situational awareness. No form of train protection was in effect on the network, like what is employed on the mainline, for example TPWS, which would be provided for such tight curves and a drastic reduction in speed. Even on the underground Trippcock train stop protection is provided to stop a train if travelling too fast, although this is usually used in the form of approach controlled signals. Earlier light rail systems had been built with protection systems in mind, such as the Tyne and Wear Metro in the 1980s as well as the DLR. It seemed that to all concerned, the risks that were apparent for heavy rail wouldn't appear on the tram link system. In the aftermath of the accident and the RAIB's investigation, the Croydon tram system would receive various safety improvements, such as lowering of the maximum speed from 80kmh to 70kmh, roughly 45mh. Although the RAIB determined that a check rail wouldn't have prevented the disaster, I personally think there should be one there. Further improvements to the network would result in the installation of chevrons at tight curves, like what you see on the road, and a driver awareness system that employs a camera to scan the tram operator's face. If it notices a microsleep, then the driver's seat would vibrate and an audible warning would sound. Eventually in 2018 an overspeed system would be installed at high-risk locations, that would intervene in the case of a tram exceeding a safe speed. The RAIB was pretty damning of the CR400 rolling stock, as its toughened glass windows were not strong enough to contain passengers in the case of a rollover. It was also highlighted that the only way of egress from the tram was through smashing the windscreen. Roster planning was investigated by the tram operators to improve the risk of fatigue issues. Unfortunately, it is an issue with shift work, and the roster did follow Lord Hidden's working rules implemented after the Clapham disaster. This disaster highlighted the lack of safety systems on the third most popular method of rail transport in the UK. Eventually improvements were made to the network, but the event shows just how lucky passengers have been in the 16 years before the Sandylands accident. The trams have always had a special place in my heart, due to seeing the network being built in the late 1990s. And the tragedy at Sandylands just shows that you need more than just one person to ensure safety, which is pretty similar to the 2017 Washington disaster. You always need the safety system as a backup for when things go wrong. This is a plain difficult production. All videos on the channel are creative commons that we should share like licensed. Plain difficult videos are produced by me, John, in a currently wet corner of southern London UK. I'd like to thank my Patrons and YouTube members for your financial support. And if you're enjoying this outro song, you can check it out on my second channel which is made by John. I've got Twitter and I also now have Instagram, so you can check them out for photographs and hints on future videos. And all that's left to say is Mr Music, play us out please.