 Good afternoon. I am Dwayne Kim here at Carnegie. This second session, we will take a more future-oriented discussion that considers three major future national strategies slash policy areas from the Japanese and Korean perspectives. We will touch upon the North Korean challenge, the continued rise of China, and fostering and economic priorities. And we will also discuss the U.S. factor in this conversation. We have an excellent panel today. Speakers don't get any better than this on these issues. To my immediate right, we have Ambassador Oshima Jotaro from Japan. He is the Chairman of the Institute for International Economic Studies in Tokyo and after a decorated 40-year career at the Foreign Ministry in Japan. His service included serving as the Deputy Foreign Minister and the G.H. Sherpa and the Ambassador to Saudi Arabia and South Korea. To his right, we have Ambassador Shin Gaksoo, who is another Foreign Service veteran with a very decorated career as well, who rose to the first Vice Foreign Minister position along with serving as Ambassador to Israel and Japan. And right now he is currently the Director of the Center for International Law at the Korea National Diplomatic Academy. And he is also a Research Fellow at the Institute for Japanese Studies at Seoul National University. And last but not least on my far right is Alan Romberg, who is currently the Distinguished Fellow and Director of the East Asia Program at the Henry L. Stimson Center here in town, where he has been for quite a long time with sharing his wisdom on these issues. He also has enjoyed a very decorated distinguished career in the Foreign Service. He served as the Principal Deputy Director of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff and he has a very long resume of service positions, but just to name a couple more, he also served as the Director for the State Department's Office of Japanese Affairs and a staff member on the National Security Council and as well as the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State and Deputy Spokesman of the State Department. So the first session really laid out a firm foundation and background that sets up the stage for this panel discussion. We will try to take more of a future-oriented projection and discussion rather than looking back too far, but we will have a bit of an overlap and I'd like to begin just by throwing out the first question to all of our distinguished speakers today. And going forward, what do you think are the most important internal and external factors and to what extent might the next 50 years of our OK and Japan relations resemble the past? How might it be different? Let's also begin with Ambassador Shimak. Thank you so much. Well, first of all, I would like to express my appreciation for the economy, for inviting me for this very important session and also like to express my interest, how to express how impressed I was with the last panel, very interesting discussion on the past 50 years of our relationship. I was in Korea between two, five, two, and seven. If you remember the graphs, Professor Kim I showed, I was one of the bumps going up, more difficult periods. But other than that, I never had worked on Korea, so this panel before us, the discussions, taught me much more than perhaps the two years I was in Seoul. Because it was much bigger. If your ambassadors are on the spot, you're dealing with everyday issues, more or less unbearable issues. And you learn a lot, then you try to work to improve the relationship. But sometimes you lose the big picture because you're working on everyday issues. But the three people in the last panel showed me once again how to look at the eJapan relations from the past to the present in the context of the big picture. And now the question before us is how are we going to go forward in the next 50 years. But I have a couple comments about the length of the time. If I may challenge the 50 years future, it's too long. Many of you in the audience are not even 50. So 50 is a very long time. And one point I would like to stress was, although it was indirectly mentioned in the discussion earlier, that one of the deflection points, the major change, took place around 25 years back at the time of the end of the Cold War. It was mentioned, but I think it should be stressed that the background of the relationship I used the word of paradigm changed around the time of the end of the Cold War. But at the same time, the one element which was only indirectly mentioned, which was not clearly mentioned, was the change in the Korean political regime. 25 years since 1965 until the mid-80s, it was under the military regime. Of course, sometimes it took the form of a constitutional system, but there was a military rule, nevertheless. But then there was democratization, and the Kwan-Ju incident is very important. I was struck by the importance of the change in the assessment of the Kwan-Ju incident before and after. If you remember the importance of the Kwan-Ju incident, when it happened, it was sort of suppressed by the military, by tanks and guns. And now if you go to, and as I did, I go to Kwan-Ju and observe the memorials. It's totally different. It's heroes of the democratic movement sacrificed by the military regime. So that is the mood after 25 years, or during the past 25 years, which is quite different in the internal Korean politics, which colors the way it looks at Japan. And there was some mention about civil society by Professor Khan. I think that's reflective of the change, how civil society became more active or very active, which have affected the relationship indirectly because of the activity. So what I'm trying to say is, 50 years too long, 25 years, maybe handled, managed to handle. So looking forward, I will look at the next 25 years. You'll see, because looking next 50 years too long, not anything can happen in the next 25 years, 50 years. And the two points I was saying, internally, I don't think there will be a major change on both ends because, as has been stressed, both Korea and Japan are now fully liberal democracies. If you have liberal democracy, governments change according to the mood of the population, of course affected by international relations or international environment, economic exchange, but the political structure does not change, basically. But if you look around the neighborhood, you have many governments or political entities which do not have a liberal democratic structure, which means while we, Japan and Korea, may not change in terms of the political regimes, our neighbors may change. That's the uncertainty which governs the regional strategic security environment, which will have impact on the relationship. So internally, between Japan and Korea, I don't think there will be a major change which would affect the basics of the relationship, but we have neighbors whose structure may change, which will have an impact on us. One point, another point I was struck was the fact that stressed by Professor Chow and other people as well, but the importance of the difference between Japan and Korea on the security outlook for South Korea, it seems that the most important security issue is North Korea, which is, of course, understandable, which is, of course, true, but for Japan, which has a little bit broader, wider perspective. China, somebody said that China is a threat. I don't think, in a way, it's a threat, but more importantly, China is a challenger. Challenger to the system now, it's to the system which Japan belongs to, led by Americans on security economy and other side as well. So if you will, the League of Liberal Democratic Countries. So we have to, in Japan, worry about the challenge from China. Of course, we are not, we don't consider China as an enemy, so we have a very good, you know, I should say good, we have a very important relationship, which we have to work on on a everyday basis. So anyway, the point I would like to say is, yes, on the external side, as we look 25 years ahead, what would happen, I think the structure of the region would change drastically from now because of the continued rise of China in terms of economy. Even if it goes only by three, four, five, five percent a year, I was talking to somebody this morning who said six percent for another 10 years possible, Chinese growth. If you have seven percent for 10 years, you know it's going to double the size. So it's three, four percent, 25 years, I would say, three times four, so it's a huge change. So if you're looking forward to 25 years, you have to understand Chinese economy will be much bigger. And of course, I would assume US is also going to grow. So between US and China, Korea and Japan will be sort of squeezed. And unfortunately, we will not be growing at that rate. We will be lucky if we can grow by two percent because of the population demographics on both sides. So that kind of situation will be determinative of how we would look at the strategic, security, economic relationship around us, both of us. And I think the pragmatism will prevail as it had in earlier times. We will join together to work together to deal with this kind of a new change. And I would suggest that Japan could also contribute to the reunification of Korea. It's a long-term challenge, but we should be welcome in the process. Mr. Shin, your views on going forward internal and external factors, but if I can perhaps reframe the question and make it a little bit more detailed and ask what common strategic interests in these different areas, security, foreign policy and economics, can contribute to a stable foundation for future relations, because we did hear in the first session that Victor mentioned that Japan and Korea are looking away from each other and have forgotten what their common strategic goals are. So your views, please. Thank you, Dwayne. And first of all, let me join Ambassador Oshima in thanking Carnegie Endowment and his staff, especially Jim and Dwayne, for inviting me to this kind of important meeting to reflect on 50 years of Korea-Japan ties and outlook for the next 50 years. Well, the evaluation of 50 years of Korea-Japan ties haven't already touched upon at the first session. Just before touching upon the outlook for the next 50 years, I would like to just analyze what drives Korea and Japan to just plunge into this kind of dismal situation for the past 30 years. I think there are some structural changes since the early 2010s, internally and externally. Internally, the first element is that the post-war generation has been dominant in both Korea and Japan. So that makes it very harder for the post-war generation of the two countries to bridge the perception gap over past history. And the second factor is that the economic gap between the two countries, which was roughly nine times in 1965, has been shrunken. In terms of purchase power parity, maybe Korea's pocket national income will match Japan's next year. And accordingly, Korea's dependence on the Japanese economy in the early stage of its economic development has been quite drastically reduced. Thirdly, the rival drips of the Japanese society is also affecting the way the South Korean perceive Japan, especially causing the advent of historical revisionism, which is getting on the nerves of the South Koreans. And fourth, I think the weakening of the network between the two political circles might have affected the presidently long standoff between Seoul and Tokyo. In the past, the political circles in both countries have closed contacts. And then at the time of crisis, they intervened and helped the government to stable the crisis. But that is no longer available nowadays. And from the regional perspective, I think the rise of China is the primary driver of the schism between Seoul and Tokyo. Maybe as Professor Khan showed us, the Japanese public's dislike of Korea has increased by 30% within two years from 2012 to 2014. But some may be accountable for history issues. But another great portion might come from the perception gap between Seoul and Tokyo over the rise of China. And the perception gap between Seoul and Tokyo over the rise of China is like this. Japan is looking at China as a threat. And their main pillar of foreign policy is focused on how to respond to China flexing its military and diplomatic muscles. On the other hand, Korea is taking a little bit of a pragmatic approach because their threat perception of rising China is certainly different from Japan's. And furthermore, Korea's economy is quite dependent on the Chinese export market, accounting for roughly one quarter of its entire export, which is larger than the U.S. and Japanese combined. So these two factors, and one more factor is the North Korean problem. Korea wants to get the Chinese influence over North Korea because China is providing food and fuel for each of the lifelines for the North Korean regime. So we hope that in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue as well as the North Korea problem as a whole, we need China's leverage against North Korea. So that kind of practical needs make different the approach of Seoul and Tokyo. And then it drives a kind of wedge between Seoul and Tokyo. And in Tokyo, the Japanese think that Korea is turning to China, but that's not the case, as I explained right before. And the other element is, I think, the decline, the relatively decline of U.S. leadership in East Asia. There are many factors, for instance, the public fatigue in foreign involvement as well as budgetary constraints in America, along with the seasonlies were in the Middle East, is just throwing doubts on U.S. policy of rebalancing toward Asia. So it is affecting not only Korea, but also Japan. So that's the second element, and the third element is that there are many historical and territorial maritime disputes in this region. And this is also affecting the issue of Tokdo, Takashima, between Korea and Japan in the 2000s, and then it continues to the south. And according to the poll in Korea, the most acute issue between Seoul and Tokyo is this issue, not history issue. Of course, they consider Tokdo issue as a historical one, but anyhow, this is the most outstanding issue between Seoul and Tokyo, while as Professor Kimura mentioned, Japan has not attached the same importance to Takashima issue. And let me move on to what to do for the next 50 years. Ambassador, if we may talk about what to do a little bit later in the next round of questions, we'd love to hear your insights on that. Both ambassadors have really given us a lot to work with, and before we start unpacking each of their excellent points, to bring in Alan, and to hear the American slash Alan perspective of the points that our two ambassadors have made. And also to add on to that, how you see the next 50 years, or the next 25 to 50 years resemble the past, what factors will lead to that. But also if and how the U.S. could play a role in shaping or contributing to the future evolution and progression of ties for the next 25 to 50 years. I feel somewhat like a person who's in a position where everything's been said but not everyone's said it. So I may repeat a bit as I go through this. Let me come to your question about the U.S. last, if I may, in talking about this. I think that we've already had late on the table pretty much all of the elements that we're going to see at play over the next 25 to 50 years, whatever it is. I tend to agree with Ambassador Oshima that 50 years is a long time to project into the future. I'm not sure if it was Yogi Berra who also said it's a lot easier to predict the past than the future, but you may not have seen his paper. But he had a paper entitled, as Yogi Berra said, when you come to a fork at the road taken. The paper is forthcoming, you'll be able to see it later. I tend to be optimistic because I think it's in the interest of both countries to manage their relationship well and lead back to what one might call a normal relationship. But I'm probably more inclined to cite some of the negatives because I think they're what we're going to have to wrestle with. And when everything goes well, we tend to say that's great. So I'll do a mix, if I may. First of all, North Korea, as long as it exists, as long as it is a problem not just in the nuclear realm, but in a conventional sense. I think there are different perspectives, to some extent, on North Korea by Japan and the Republic of Korea, in terms of how urgent it is, what the likely resolutions, which we can talk about later, might be. And how important it is in the overall scheme of things. I think that, as Ambassador Shin pointed out, South Korea's security focus, I wouldn't say as entirely, but it's very largely on North Korea. And that simply is not true for Japan as important as it is both for Japan and for the United States. So that's an issue that I think we have to think about. China is obviously going to be a major player, even if it has much slower economic growth. Unless something really unexpected happens, it's going to be a major player for everybody concerned. But on the other hand, it represents a different kind of relationship, as both the ambassadors have pointed out. It has an overwhelming, but maybe it's too strong, where it has an extremely important role in the economic future of both South Korea and Japan, as well as the United States. But if China's economy doesn't do as well as it has done for the last decade or so, cumulatively, we may find that that has an impact on competition, for example, for markets. And so this will also potentially be an issue. If the security issue, clearly Korea does not want to become engaged or involved in a security challenge to China. I think the Bush administration, as I read it from the outside, seemed to ask the Nomo Hyeon administration whether it would be okay to use bases in Korea if we ran into trouble with China. And the answer was not favorable, shall we say. And I think that that wasn't just the nature of the Nomo Hyeon administration. I think that while South Korea is a very strong American ally, it really doesn't want to get into the middle of a confrontation with China. And that affects how Korea and Japan will also relate to each other. And that goes back to North Korea because you can't defend South Korea and the United States can't contribute to defending South Korea without relying on our alliance relationship with Japan. And I'm not sure how much, I'm sure the professionals understand this, I'm not sure how much the Korean populace really understands that. I do think that values matter. I think the commitment to democracy and market economics or economy, as Victor Cha said, matters. And that's not just a throwaway line, I think it's real. But I also think how much it matters and how it matters depends on the situation at any given time. And so I think we can try now, which we're, and I think we actually have an opportunity to build on that and to deepen the kinds of relationships that would reinforce positive ties between Japan and Korea. There could be circumstances where national interest, just hardcore national interest, will seem to be at stake and where perhaps those values will at least be pushed to the side. There are a lot of global kinds of issues or regional kinds of issues where I'm sure we could find a reason to think that they may have differences, but it seems to me the overwhelming perspective should be one of cooperation. Climate change, for example. Energy security. Health issues. I mean, these are issues where sure you can find that if one country does one thing, maybe the other country would find that maybe not entirely the way it would like it handled. But those are common interests that go way beyond any national boundaries. And I think these are the kinds of things that over the next 50 years would help bring them together. One thing that Ambassador Shin said that I found intriguing because my experience has been a little bit different, and I say this with a lot of deference because you're Korean and I'm not. And that is the generational change issue. I mean, it seems to me that the degree of nationalism among the younger generation is not weak, shall we say. And that in the preceding decades, there has been a sense of responsibility. It hasn't always worked out terribly well. But there's been a sense of responsibility, particularly by those in official positions, to try to get around these history issues, to manage them, to resolve them as possible. And I've got a question in my own mind whether the current generation, for example, shares the commitment to doing that, whether it sees the issues in the same way, whether they experienced the post-war period in the same way so that they have that commitment and understand that despite the history that there is really a critical issue, a critical responsibility to try to manage those relationships. Finally, just before I get to the U.S., what the U.S. can do, history is still going to matter. And it is particularly intense in Korea, and again this is what drives to some extent my point about generational change. I have had people who are sort of middle-aged, certainly not older, but not here, who have really come across with very strong emotional statements. You know, we will never forget what happened, that kind of thing. So I think that managing the history issue is really critical. I'm very pleased, at least as I understand it, to see that President Park has now picked up on the idea of separating the history issue from current relations, not saying the history issue is either unimportant or can be put aside and not dealt with, but it shouldn't govern all aspects of the relationship. And I think that's really a very positive thing, and we can see how that, I hope that will continue. And I think in that case, one further point on that, the issue of sincerity always comes out when we hear Koreans talking about Japan's attitude toward history and Japanese responses. I don't know how to deal with it. All I can say is I think it's an issue that's very critical in the relationship, and that it really needs to be looked at. For the U.S., a lot of people have thought about this, and the U.S. has tried for a very long time to help this relationship get closer, get friendlier, get more cooperative. I recall when I was on the Japan desk back in the late 1970s, and I went out to Tokyo to the embassy, and there were efforts underway at that time to try to do something to make Japan and Korea work together more closely. This is not a new issue. We've done some things. I give President Obama full marks for bringing his Korean and Japanese counterparts together in the Hague. And I think that actually has had a follow-on effect where we've seen over the 16 months at the bureaucratic or the cabinet level and so on a lot of progress. So we can encourage. We can't do it for them, and there's always the risk that we get accused of being on somebody's side, and that never works very well in my view. So I think we will continue, both on a practical day-to-day level, to say to our Korean and Japanese allies, we need to make this relationship work not only in the security realm, but in other realms, but they've got to do the heavy lifting. In hearing both ambassadors' opening remarks, there are some points of convergence that I heard, and they largely fall into three different categories. One is in terms of practical next steps in dealing, going forward in the future and cooperating and improving relations. One is dealing with the rise of China. The other one was reunification. The third was North Korean. This leads to a bigger question, a more overarching question of does it take a common enemy to converge and cooperate, or does it take a common cause to bolster bilateral cooperation? I'd like to start with the first point of dealing with the rise of China, and I'd like to ask both ambassadors in more practical terms. How do you see that type of cooperation playing out? Well, we have to just come to terms with the rise of China in a way that does not create a disadvantageous environment for maintaining peace and prosperity in the region. In that context, we need to see two prerequisites satisfied for the proposed. That is the continued presence of the United States in the region. Because I think the weight or the power of China will increase year by year. For instance, actually China just out passed Japan in 2010, and then within five years, China's GDP just doubled. And it is expected to triple in 2020. And so does military expenditure. So the overwhelming weight of China must be considered in assuring balance of power in this region. Otherwise, even Japan cannot counterbalance the overwhelming weight of China in this region. That's why we have to just keep the presence of the United States in this region. That is the first prerequisite. And the second prerequisite is to build up a multi-layered network of regional or sub-regional mechanisms that enable other states in the region as a whole to just check the Chinese juggernaut under the common rules, norms and standards. That's the way we can assure the peaceful and prosperous East Asia. So in the sense we have common interests, both Korea and Japan, in just meeting these two prerequisites. That's the first one. And the second one is Visabi in North Korea. Both nations are just experiencing mounting threats from the North Korean nuclear program and possible collapse or some unusual contingency in North Korea. So we have to make a preparation for those contingencies as well as just bring together other three nuclear weapons states, the United States, China and Russia to come together to put pressure on North Korea to come back to the negotiating table. That's the common interest for us from now on. I think those two issues are quite important for both Korea and Japan in strategic terms. And the third, as Trion mentioned, it may be long-term objective, but we don't know yet because the North Korean regime is not stable as it appears. So the issue of Korean reunification must be worked together hand-in-hand between Seoul and Tokyo. That's maybe the third strategic interest we can share. And the unconditional support from Tokyo for Korean reunification might help it just win the hearts and minds of the Korean people just to fulfill a historical reconciliation between the two peoples. I'd like to get to the reunification just a little bit, but Ambassador Shim, I guess. I was going to touch on reunification, but I'll save that for you. On the question of rising China, I cannot agree more with what Ambassador Shim said, but I might say it put it in a little bit different way. As I said, the rising China is something over-fact. How big it will be, you would depend on the future, but magnitude might be judged differently, assessed differently, but the fact that it will be a huge presence is undeniable. So how to meet the challenge? The question is, in my view, as I mentioned earlier, it's a systemic challenge. So it's not in how Japan relates with China in conjunction with Korea or with the United States. I think we should think in terms of the systems. In the sense that, as I said earlier, the rise of China is challenging the system we have been benefiting from over the past 70 years after the end of the war. The multilateral economic system and the security system. So we need to sort of think through as to the response. I think it's very important for the two capitals, together with Washington, to always be talking from the same page, trying to understand what each other is doing, what their perceptions are, and not to have any differences. We might have different measures to take, but not in terms of a different strategy. With respect to North Korea, of course, we have our own concerns because of the abduction issue and things like that. But at the same time, we understand the fact that South Korea is the nation which is threatened first and foremost in the region by North Korea for obvious reasons. But I would like to touch upon, and I cannot discuss North Korea and how to deal with it without going into the reunification issues. Let's go there now, please. Obviously, of course, immediate issue is how to deal with the threat of the military threat, the nuclear program threat, missile threat, but at the same time, the uncertainty threat. Because it's so unpredictable. In terms of the way the government, the regime is running itself, at the same time, there's uncertainty about the regime itself. So there's so many uncertainties on how to deal with it. But in the long term, that's a very critical issue. The near term, as Mr. Shin said, we need to work together. But in the long term, we have to have the goal of reunification. And I think, of course, Korea, Seoul has taken the initiative. We'll be working together with Seoul's program. Why? This is what I would like to say. This has been my idea for some time. In order to find the final reconciliation between the Korean people and the Japanese, we need to have reunification. You see, because it's very simple in the sense that what the Japanese had done to the Koreans on the peninsula was to colonize and rule over it with all the negatives, which we have very much removed from that apologetic. But it was done to the Korean people as a whole. So it doesn't make sense to have the final reconciliation only with the part of it. You have to have a full union of the Korean people's regaining its own identity in order for Japan to have the final reconciliation with the people of Korea. So everything else is tentative, unless we have that. Staying on the reunification topic, because we have three longtime practitioners, I'd like to ask a practical question on this topic. Practically speaking, what type of support does Korea want and expect from Japan in terms of support reunification? And on the flip side, what type of support, in practical terms and in more detailed terms, can Japan be willing to and can provide in support of Korean reunification? And then I'd like to bring in Alan for your views on everything that's just been said on Rise of China and Korea and its reunification. Well, I think it depends on the mode of Korean reunification, what kind of support and cooperation we can expect from Japan. In my view, there are two ways of Korean reunification. One method is just the two for both sides to agree on reunification as two German states 25 years ago. Another possibility is that there might be implosion or explosion in North Korea. And then it can offer us an opportunity to seek reunification. So in the first case, maybe in both cases, we can expect economic cooperation from Japan in providing unified Korea with funds necessary. And therefore rebuilding the modern North Korean economy and maybe infrastructure construction. And in the pursuit of Korean reunification, Japan can help us to handle North Korea in a way that helps us to draw North Korea out of its diplomatic isolation and embark on opening up and reform. That is quite necessary for just realizing Korean reunification. So I think those are two big areas of possible cooperation we can expect from Tokyo. Of course, we have our own agenda, so to speak, with North Korea. Beyond the security issues, we have the issue of the abductions, we need to have them back. To have them back, we need to have a very difficult relationship with negotiations with the North Koreans. But further down the road, as I said earlier, we need to have reconciliation and reunification. But I failed to mention it has to be nuclear free, obviously, that the reunification should come free. And we need to have a program either way, whether it's implosion or hopefully not implosion or negotiated reunification. But we'll be able to support diplomatically, as everybody expects financially, although our economy is not as strong as it used to be, but we'll try our best. But one element I wanted to mention, which was the role of Russia. People always talk about China. In dealing with North Korea, people would talk about China on the other side, US, Japan on this side, supporting South Korea. But we always have to worry about the Russians. Although Russians are not really as big as they are in Europe, in East Asia, but they have their own games playing in East Asia. And for us, we have been dealing with the Russians for as long as we have been modernizing. And one element sometimes missed by Koreans, the island issue, is from our point of view linked with the North Korean issue. From our point of view, it's a post-war settlement issue. Of course, Koreans have a totally different perspective. I respect that, but from our point of view it is. So in that sense, it's sort of linked with where Russia is in this whole game. So although we need to draw in the Russians, it's also, from our perspective, a very difficult issue and a delicate one. Let me go back to the way you first phrased your question, whether common cause or common enemy tends to bring, or might in this case, tend to bring countries together. I guess my sense is that, having thought about it for 20 minutes here, that common enemy can lead to cooperation on a whole range of issues from a very pragmatic perspective. North Korea contingency, for example, clearly would do that. But I think in terms of longer term knitting together of the two societies and countries, that a series of common causes is going to be much more effective. And you mentioned the climate change and other energy issues. Yeah, climate change, energy, there are health issues, management, even the oceans issues. I mean, there are management issues that are common to these countries and to others. So anyway, that's how I would look at it. I think that probably you will have both operating at the same time. But you should not expect, I think, as I say, to get sort of more permanent, more satisfying knitting of the relationships, just because you have a common enemy. If we take a bit of a more macro look at this. President Park and his NAFSE initiative, her Northeast Asia peace and cooperation initiative, starts with some of what she calls soft security issues to bring countries in Northeast Asia together and start cooperating. In Japan's perspective, what will it take, and also for Korean and American perspectives, for that matter, what will it take for NAFSE to actually work? And to actually succeed in Northeast Asia. Well, coming back to the whole point I mentioned earlier, we have to think in terms of systems which serve the interests of each of members of the region as well as the region as a whole. And with, you know, of course, we need to have a closer cooperation with all the members, but you need to also have to understand the differences in the systems of political and economic. And that could be a very difficult one. So if I may just throw in, away from these initiatives, we don't need to, for Japan, to work closely on TPP, but I know this is not the time. Well, as you know, TPP, 12 members have recently concluded the agreement. Of course, we need to have a few more months, three months to be exact, to have it signed. But my sense is that Korea should, and the 12 members should welcome Korea's participation as quickly as possible. And I'm telling you why. Korea took the initiative in the FDA approach by this Korea-U.S. FDA, which is a very important one in the relationship. We have had, for some time, difficulty in negotiating FDA with Korea and even be more difficult to even discuss the possibility of use Japan FDA. But now, if you look at TPP, in essence, it's Japan-U.S. FDA. So among the three triangle relationships, you have chorus, and now we have Japan-U.S. And one thing, one leg, which is missing is Japan and Korea. So it's only logical for the three to get together to strengthen the system is to have Korea take part in TPP, which will be, of course, it's not going to be an easy one, but it's only logical. Personally, having worked on these issues are very much like we see successful accession. Just, I would like to touch upon some economic potential for bilateral cooperation between Seoul and Tokyo. Well, FDA issue is quite important for both nations. Actually, Korea originally started this FDA negotiation with Japan right after the first FDA with Chile. So we have attached great importance to an FDA with Japan, but it was suspended after sixth round of talks. And then resumed around 2008 or 2009. But again, it failed to get steam for the progress. But I think that the wrapping up of TPP might offer us an alternative to having the similar effect of Korea-Japan FDA through TPP when Korea joined TPP. And actually the Korean government has already expressed its desire to join the TPP. So I think we can just, actually the crux of the TPP is economic partnership between Japan and the United States. So we have already FDA with Washington. So we can just start informal, maybe formal negotiations with Tokyo before TPP enters into force. Then we can save maybe one or two years before the full entry into force of TPP. And it is quite important for both countries in the sense that both economies are very much complementary, even though they are competing with each other in manufacturing factors. For instance, they are cooperating with each other in the third country market from 2009 to 2011. They conducted joint projects worth 1.7 trillion yen. So it's almost at the time, the exchange rate was 79, so roughly 20 billion US dollars. So quite a huge amount of joint projects between the two countries. And especially Korea is strong in manufacturing and marketing, and Japan has capital and technology. So if they combine these two complementary factors, then they can expect a lot of synergy effect in both economies. And still Japan can give Korea assistance or cooperation in terms of capital and technology, in terms of bilateral trade and investment. Japan was the number one investing country in 2012, recording 4.4 billion US dollars. So a huge amount of Japanese capital came into the Korean market. So it must be resumed and magnified. So there is a great potential for cooperation between the two countries in the economy fields too. Just one quick word on TPP and investment. Although I haven't seen the text for obvious reasons because I'm outside of the government, but according to what I know, investment chapter is most important. And in that sense, the importance of the investment chapter sort of doves tails with what Ambassador Shin just mentioned. A couple of points. First on NAPSY, in the same way I look under the Six-Party Agreement of 2005 in the Northeast Asia peace and security mechanism, I find it very difficult, in what I often say is the Japanese sense of that term, that means impossible, to consider such an organization with North Korea that is not denuclearized. So going back to Ambassador Shin's point about nuclear free North Korea, I think it's really critical. And I don't think creating that mechanism on the expectation that then you can somehow induce them to denuclearize is the way to go. I don't think it'll work. On TPP, just a couple of points which don't necessarily fall together in some logical fashion. From an American point of view, I've never heard an American involved in this kind of issue who doesn't think it is really important that Korea joined TPP. I think there's a very strong, in fact there was some frustration on the part of international economists that Korea didn't in the end join the first round. So I think there would be very strong support from the US for this. Two, as Ambassador Shin pointed out, the government has expressed a desire to join. I also understand there are a number of serious people, however, in Korea who are not so sure, it's such a wonderful idea. And I don't know whether, as this goes on over a period of years, which I think it would, whether there'll be a political shift in Korea that would change the Korean government's position. I just don't know, and maybe you have some thoughts about that. Part of that, I think, is because some Koreans assume that the negotiation with Japan, which would be essential if you have bilateral talks in the process, would be extremely difficult. And that Korea has arrangements with virtually everybody else that gives them a free trade or free access, market access. So why should we do this? Well, I think there are good reasons to do it, but all I'm saying is I think I understand that there are folks who are not, who are serious. That is in the sense of being important in the economic, international economic arena, who do have some questions about that. The best part of these types of discussions is to have a conversation with all of you in the audience. So while you think of your questions you would like to pose to our speakers, I'd like to take a very quick poll. We'll just go down the row. Multiple choice question. The question is if we say, let's just say Japan-Korea relations have gone from near zero score to, let's say, about 50 today. It's not 100% yet. What should the future goal be? So you have three options for your choices. A, we should strive to bring it up to maybe 75% as Professor Kim Teo talked about, or maybe even 100%. So raise it up. Try to strive for the 100%. B, plateau. Keep it at around 50 where we are now. Manage the relations. Or C, prevent it from slipping down to about 40 to 30%. What's your time frame? In the next 25 to 50 years. So A, B, or C? Very quickly. Well, obviously the answer is A. Okay, Professor Shin. A. Alan. Yep. Okay, we've got a consensus. But, you know, you guys can ask that question, the harder questions. Let's take maybe about two questions together. Chris in the front and Larry in the back. We'll take them together, please. Thanks. It's coming. And we'll have one mic over there waiting for Larry. Thanks so much. It's a terrific discussion. I wanted to build on a point that Oshima-san made. When you're talking about Korea, whether it's unification or collapse or whatever, don't forget the Russians. Obviously this is implicit, but the way it was talked about today, you didn't forget the Chinese, but you talked about, you know, Korea, Japan's got to work these things out, South Korea. We've got to have a U.S. role, you know. But how can you have any kind of discussion with the North Koreans or with anybody else about unification if China is not right there at the table with you, given China's interest in their roles, their refusal to let North Koreans collapse, etc.? And if we're in one of these collapse scenarios, how can you possibly have any kind of contingency plans or arrangements that don't include already fixed agreements with the Chinese about whose role it is? Who's going to guard what borders and who's going to go for young men and all that? So my question is, wouldn't it be going back into the way you talked about it important to insert and China with any discussion of Korea, Japan, the U.S., and the North Korea situation? Thanks. Larry. Larry Nicks from CSIS. I have a question about impact on Japan-Korea relations of Japan's new collective self-defense policy. The Japanese upper house gave final approval to the new collective self-defense policy on, I believe, September 21st. The ROK government issued a tough statement immediately stating that Japan cannot implement its collective self-defense policy on the Korean Peninsula without the specific approval of the ROK government. Now, on the face of it, that sounds like a simple rule, but it seems to me this issue is very complex. I can see down the line U.S. military planners in revising military plans for contingencies on the peninsula looking for greater Japanese military support for U.S. military operations on the peninsula in various types of military contingencies. You also have the question of Japan's right or non-right of retaliation, if North Korea should commit in the future, a military provocation against Japan. So my question is, is this issue, or do you believe this issue, will be the subject of future negotiations among Korea, Japan, and probably also the U.S.? Aimed at working out agreements with regard to the kind of role Japan would have under various kinds of military contingencies, or do you expect that, given the strains in South Korea and Japanese relations, and given what I perceive at least to be a kind of diplomatic timidity on the part of the United States, that this issue will just be allowed to kind of drift without being resolved until or unless one of these military scenarios or contingencies actually happens? Who would like to? Well, since Chris's question was addressed to me, I was trying to describe the need for Korea to take the initiative in mapping out the roadmap of how it wants it to have the peninsula reunified and how it wants to have the allies, or I should say its allies and practical allies, U.S. and Japan, to take part. But I did not mean to exclude other important parties, which is of course China and to some extent Russia. I was only thinking in that triangular relationship, as we tried to address the issue of reunification or dealing with the security of North Korea, with, of course, within that roadmap we have to have China and Russia. Since I have a floor on that very delicate and sensitive issue, I wish I knew the right answer after that, but I can only say at the moment, first of all, my sense is that the whole legislation, which of course is based on this new interpretation of the Constitution that would allow certain elements of our collective self-defense. Sometimes the details are missed when you only read the words of our collective self-defense, and people react to that notion, but it's very carefully constructed notion legally as well as politically. So we really have to go into the details of the legislation and what could be done under the legislation. So to try to be much more specific, but I'm not in an area which I know very well, but it has to be discussed by the planners. Whether it will be publicly done or politically done, I doubt it, but among the experts it has to be done. Well, just regarding the Korean reunification and consultation with China, I think it is inevitable for major stakeholders to have consultation on how to respond to any contingency on the Korean Peninsula. So it is quite natural that we are seeking strategic dialogue with China on this issue, but as you are well aware, China is refusing to have such consultation just in fear of North Korean reaction or opposition. But we will continue to have such dialogue with China, of course together with the United States. So we don't know yet when and how such contingency can take place. So given the increasing instability in North Korea, we have to come up with such dialogue as early as possible. That's the position of the Korean government, but the reality is a little bit away from our wishes. And regarding the right of collective self-defense, it's a very delicate issue because it has to do with the possibility of deploying Japanese self-defense force on the Korean Peninsula. And the position of the Korean government is that when Japan decides to exercise right of collective self-defense on the Korean Peninsula, it must get the approval or assent from Seoul. It is well established international law or principle. And of course it is a principle, but we cannot figure out what kind of situation will take place in the future. So what the Korean government wants to emphasize is that any kind of military involvement by Japanese self-defense force in connection with the exercise of the right of collective self-defense, it must be done with the consent of Korean government. That's the principle. But the application of this principle in concrete situations we cannot envisage as of now. So it depends on the consultation between Seoul and Washington. That's very crucial for how to apply this principle in concrete situations. That's what I can say. The only thing I would add to these very thoughtful responses is that your third scenario, Larry, is not really collective self-defense. Individual self-defense. Japan is attacked. So it's probably the most fraught of those three things you raised, but it doesn't really, in my view, come under collective self-defense. It's a matter of individual self-defense, not collective self-defense, if those Korea attacks Japan. I saw a hand way in the back, gentlemen in the back. We'll take one mic there and a gentleman up here, please. We'll take two together. Please state your name, your affiliation, and a brief question. Sure. Hi. Steve Luck at Georgetown and Hopkins. Thank you very much for the forum. I guess at this point it's really more a remark than a... Could you please stand up? I'm sorry. Could you please stand up? It's a case of altitude sickness, so I'll stand up briefly and then sit back down. I'm pretty tall, man. I will commend, I guess, to the last questioner. There have been exercises, as far back as 2013, United States and in Japan along the Southern California coast, essentially an operation on the assumption that the United States would come to the aid of Japan if there were any mischievous peninsula activities. So all that stuff's archived. I spoke as recently as last night with a three-star who essentially vouched the same, and that our interests along that peninsula, whether it be Japan giving up the U.S. security umbrella or aggression from North Korea, that stuff's readily available for you to check out online, sir. So thanks for the window, ma'am. Steve Winter's consultant. I guess this is for Ambassador Shin. I have heard from some Korean experts that in the Korean thinking there is some connection, whether it's accurate or not, where the increase in historical revisionism in Japan, as we've heard, is somehow connected with the Abe administration's revision of the Constitution. Of course, some see that in this context as a return or denial of the militaristic heritage and dealing with that. So to what extent is that connection leading to doubts about Japan and the mind of Koreans? Well, I don't think historical revisionism itself is connected with Prime Minister Abe's desire to revise the article line of the peace constitution. Of course, Prime Minister Abe belongs to maybe the most right-wing camp in the LDP, and actually in the 1990s there was liberalism in the Japanese political circle at the apex of Murayama administration. And then in reaction to that liberal trend, the right-wing camp just gathered together. And then to argue that such historical view must be revised. And then they continue to move around that kind of platform. And then they just included the revision of article line of peace constitution as well as just so-called, I don't know, the English version of Jigakushikan in Japanese. They want to just counter such historical view, a kind of historical defeatism in the liberal camp, they called it. And then that continued in the 2000s, and then Prime Minister Abe was one of the leaders in that camp. That's what I know. Well, Ambassador Shin was in Japan in a meeting, I'm sure, all sorts of people from the liberal democratic party as well as from other parties as well as the pundits. So he may know Japan much better than I do. But a couple of things I wanted to mention. Now, people who are advocating change in the constitution. So there are so many different types of views who even belong to the camp which says we need to change the constitution for this or that reason. So the changing of the, revising of the constitution itself is an issue of force because there are some people who are saying don't touch the text of the constitution. But to me personally, I think in any democratic country, if the people want to change the constitution that's possible, our constitution allows for changes. So what's the big issue if somebody really wants to, I mean, advocate change? Now, the question is, then goes into much more detail. Now, does the change focus on Article 9? Now, sometimes yes. But then the question is how do the people want to change Article 9? Does it want to undermine the basic pacifism contained in the constitution reflected in exactly Article 9 but also in other preambles, in other elements? Is that an attack? I doubt it. I mean, I'm sure there are individuals far right who would say let's rewrite the whole constitution. But people who are even saying Article 9 should be revised to meet the more recent international security situation, that doesn't necessarily mean we would do away with the pacifism. I doubt it very much. And if you really think about the Japanese public, after all, the Japanese constitution is a constitution based on the popular sovereignty. So whatever you need to do to change the constitution, you have to have the popular support. If you follow what the public opinion changes during the recent debate on the security legislation, you get the sense as to where the majority of the Japanese population is on the pacifism. So even if there are people who like to change Article 9, it all depends on the content, direction, and whether you would get the support of the population. I would urge you to focus on the trends of the population because after all, we have democracy based on popular sovereignty. And even if you're based on popular sovereignty, or maybe because you are based on popular sovereignty, you change your constitution every now and then to meet, to make it a leading constitution. That's the word I learned from the American constitution history. Okay. There was something I wanted to talk about. Okay. We have room for time for two very quick questions. Jim and the gentleman in the middle over there. Thank you. Sorry to take the floor again, but I just wanted to connect the first panel a little bit to the second in connection with the question that you asked at the end about should we shoot for 70 or 75 or 100, hold on to this 50 that we've accomplished over these last 50 years. And I wanted to ask the panelists what's the right, if we, first of all, what I've heard a little bit today, certainly there are a number of challenges and things that are changing in the region internally, externally, that are going to make it difficult to move up, maybe even difficult to hold on. What is your strategy for trying to reach that higher goal? What are the building blocks of how you begin to put that strategy together based on today's discussion? Thank you. Thank you. The gentleman in the middle. Yes. Hi. Prashant from the Diplomat Magazine. A question, I guess, for the panel. I'm wondering if you could expand a little bit on TPP. So there's a little bit of a discussion about the relationship between that and the relationship between South Korea and Japan, the economic relationship. And I wasn't sure what, how the panel came down on it. So what the relationship is, so TPP, my understanding is for the U.S. and Japan, because they didn't have a bilateral agreement, TPP was a way to basically effectively substitute for that. But I wasn't sure whether some panel members were saying that there should be a, Japan and South Korea should enter into negotiations to iron out differences before Korea starts showing the TPP, or whether that should be worked out within the framework of TPP itself. And then going off of Alan Romberg's comments, I'm just wondering what the, I guess, the obstruction or some of the obstacles are to Korea actually joining. Some other countries have expressed interest in joining TPP as well, but for some countries, it's a matter of time. For others, there's actual serious obstacles. And I'm wondering what are the obstacles to joining? Thanks. The building blocks of strategy for reaching 75 or perhaps 100. We'll start with that. Okay, well, quickly. Understanding the systemic nature of the challenge actually. I'm sorry. Yeah. I could go on and on forever, but that's my pitch. Okay. Let me respond to Jim's question. I think what is important in the long-term perspective is to try to reach historical reconciliation between the two peoples. Of course, that should not prevent cooperation in other areas. Without historical reconciliation, the drive for further collaboration and cooperation between Seoul and Tokyo might be plunged into trouble from time to time. So just while trying to achieve historical reconciliation, both countries should tap into the potential area of cooperation and collaboration. Enormous potential for both countries to cooperate with each other, as Alan told us. There are many regional and global issues we can work together. For instance, in the UN General Assembly, both countries share the same position with regard to 70% of the entire resolution every year. Because we are the only two Asian OECD members. So we can share the same value of democracy, market economy, human rights, and the rule of law. So many things emanate from those shared values that drive us to work together toward not only bilateral dimensions, but also at the regional and global level. And I think today's discussion has been focused on a challenge-oriented approach, not a potential cooperation approach. That's why I stress the enormous potential for both countries to work together in the future. And I think we have to anyhow overcome the current crisis. We have to get out of this more as less possible. And then we can start our common agenda. We have discussed this. Alan, do you want to take the TPP? Well, I want to actually address both the history issue and this. It's going to take a lot of political courage, I think, to really do away with the obstacles. And I suppose you go back to the, I'm not sure if it's Hippocrates, but anyway, first do no harm. And there are things that both governments can avoid doing, saying, that will not sort of pick up the scab and irritate it. I think I'll refrain from specifics, but there are things that could be done. And then I think it takes, in a way, if I may put it this way, a generosity of spirit to really reach out and do things positively, which can really affect the perceptions, the feelings of the other country. And I don't think that's impossible. I think it's hard, but I don't think it's impossible. But you need to, in the old cliche, think outside the box. Because if everybody just keeps doing what they're doing and say, oh, we can't do that, it's not going to work. On TPP, my point was there will have to be bilateral negotiations within the TPP process. I'm not talking about settling it outside. And you know a lot more about the obstacles than I do, so I'm not going to try to enumerate them. But there are issues that will come up, and particularly, at least as I've heard both Japanese and Koreans talk about it in that discussion. So, again, both sides need to really have a positive approach to make that work in their own mutual and self-interest, which I think it is. Thank you. On the question of reconciliation, of course, as I said, we should shoot for 100%, which means we need to reconcile. The question is how? And earlier, Alan mentioned the need for sincerity. I forget how he mentioned it, but sincerity. Yes. And I cannot agree with him more that there's a need for sincerity on both sides. And I mean, I say both sides with very much a way of what I'm saying. Obviously, the word often is used by the Koreans against the Japanese, but I'm saying that it works both ways. We feel, when we are so often criticized that we are lacking sincerity, when we are thinking we are sincere in doing so. Of course, we have to reflect and say what we have done not enough, which results in this kind of criticism. At the same time, there's a sense that maybe the other side could also try to be generous to use Alan's word and understand that we are trying to be sincere. And if you're not accepting our effort, which comes from a sincere sense of remorse and nails or whatever, how can we find the reconciliation at the end point? So we need to be sincere and also to once again stress the word Alan used, the generous on both sides, to find reconciliation. If we have the right spirit, I'm sure we can get to it, but we need the spirit. Matthew Shin, did you want to respond to? Yeah. I agree with his point that both sides must be sincere in seeking historical reconciliation. Of course, Korea as a victim demands apology and contribution from Japan, but on the other hand the South Koreans must appreciate what the Japanese has done up to now. And we must have also a sense of tolerance as victims. Otherwise, it's a vicious cycle of harsh actions and reactions, a kind of endless game between the two peoples. So we, both perpetrators and victims, should work together to reach this very difficult but necessary common goal for the good-name relations between the two countries. Well, we could talk for days on this topic, but we are unfortunately out of time. We'll have to leave it at that. All four of our speakers from Korea and Japan, they will be coming out with articles very soon. So if you'd like to read up more on their insights, stay tuned. And if you would all please join me in a round of applause and thanking all of our speakers.