 rights. And that can be done by engagement. You don't have to like, you know, you know, educate them on Western philosophy or all those things. No, simple things, simple rights that Afghan wants for themselves. Just support them on the local level, engage them, you know, meet them and on all level. So just as simple from my side, I think the best way is engaging the locals. That's the best way to go forward. And that will bring Taliban into a lot of into the table to talk about a lot of things. Scott. Thanks. I want to I want to continue on that's point. And there in fact is a question that was on top of my list, which is from Ben Farmer. And he asks how at all has Taliban governance or decision making been conducted at the local level since the 1990s? So you're already partly answering that question. Maybe I'm curious to press you on, okay, what is working with the locals mean? Is it are you talking about a funding relationship, funding to do what? Or is it more of the political attention? And I also want to give Pawash's views on this. But can you just elaborate on more specifically what is working with the locals look like for you? I think the political attention. Monetization has actually contributed to the fall of the Republican in August 15, 2021. That was monetization. It just more a political attention, you know, that giving them supporting them. For example, the example of Professor Jalal who was arrested and everybody raised their voice and he was released. You know, that's a big achievement for the civil society for the people. He was happy and Taliban to some extent treated them well, you know, so that kind of things. I mean to recognize, not recognize, don't recognize Taliban just, you know, work with the locals. How like this is the time to work with the locals. So for example, forming a body like there are a lot of young women, men, boys, you know, young boys that are actually, you know, willing to stand and take the risk, you know, to ask for their rights. It's not something that they want, you know, like international community to come back. No, they just want a simple things. Go to school, you know, go to adversity, wear what they want, you know, share their views. Very simple things that are not in contradiction with Islam, that is not in contradiction. Afghanistan, you know, Taliban will slowly crack down if the international community politically engaged. I'm not talking about humanitarian engaged. That's a completely different thing. It's more about, you know, but political engage will decide the future. Yes, humanitarian will a different, it is a different angle where because if people get angry, they will go to the street. That was, you know, that's why the crime rate in Kabul hasn't gone down is because there are no jobs. People have to, you know, commit crimes. And, you know, Taliban actually also underestimate that. So for my is that the more people, you know, the international community engage with the locals on, for example, meeting them, political attentions, meeting them, actually bringing like, for example, like the way that the international community brought Taliban with the Republic. The same they can do is to sit them together. You know, if the international community can bring Taliban who are sanctions, and, you know, why can't they just do it now, you know, when the things are actually worse. So, so this is, this is how I see things to, you know, things will get better for Afghanistan. Thanks, Paul. Let me get, let me get your views. You might have a different perspective. Yeah. So, you know, some women are calling for another bond process similar to what Amiri was saying in terms of bringing people together. But I think even at the local level, there's been, you know, I'll cry that as international are coming to meet the Taliban, where are they coming to meet the women? Where is the engagement at the local level? So if they're engaging locally with people, they'd also need to engage and make it very clear they're engaging with women. We have examples in Libya when Deborah Lyons was working on a peace agreement that she made initiative to make sure women were in the room where she was in the room and really advocate for that. That made a huge difference on the peace process there. So we have evidence that this is really important. And that can be done in Afghanistan in a lot of those level meetings. It has to be done carefully and of course, thoughtfully, but it can happen. And that's another thing about a local meeting. The other thing is that women themselves have repeatedly, local women in Afghanistan have repeatedly demanded to talk to the Taliban about their issues. And we haven't been able to facilitate those kinds of conversations yet. And so again, in the same line as what Amiri is saying, the importance of facilitating those local conversations, we need to facilitate some of these conversations that women want to talk about their demands to the Taliban directly. They haven't had those avenues to do that. How are we supporting that kind of those kinds of dialogues that happen that can happen at the local level? So those are some of the things that adding on to that it's important to recognize. And then figuring out the role that particular groups, I mean, if we're thinking about women, we also need to think about minority groups as well and the inclusion in some of these local meetings. And also thinking about how we can facilitate those kinds of conversations, whether it be locally or internationally, for broader inclusion. Yeah, thanks. And I'll just note that Secretary Blinken did just recently appoint a special envoy for addressing Afghan women's issues and broader human rights issues who many in the Afghan policy community know. And so hopefully there is now more means to facilitate those kinds of interactions. Let me take another question. This one from Kareem Merchant, who says, looking at the diverse approaches of the international community, won't the Taliban exploit these differences and continue to seek legitimacy from, quote, less demanding international community members? So playing one off against the other region against the broader community. Andrew Watkins, let me get your thoughts, and then maybe I'll also bring you to Asfandiyar on that. Sure. I think this question speaks to a lot of what Asfandiyar was speaking about earlier. What has interested me is watching the Taliban's own posture as it has changed, I suppose, from some point in the thick of U.S. Taliban negotiations with our special representatives, Namik Khalzad, in 2019 into 2020. And then as, especially with the change in the U.S. Presidential Administration, as the Taliban began to read the tea leaves and see that they might not get everything they had hoped to in their understanding of the Doha deal, you saw a real shift in the year before their takeover of the country as they sort of pivoted towards what I've thought of as a regional first strategy. They began to place less importance on meeting benchmarks or moving with a sense of purpose or speed through the negotiations with Khalzad and certainly not with representatives from the Islamic Republic for supposed peace talks. But they really began ratcheting up their regionally-oriented diplomacy to the extent that in the first weeks after their takeover of Kabul, you heard some really almost ecstatic public rhetoric from some Taliban officials about the idea of cooperating with China. And indeed, there's a sense of optimism, perhaps overblown optimism that we've heard from Taliban officials and spokespersons and supporters, especially in the first weeks and months after their takeover, the idea that the region would, that they would be able to play different elements of the international community off one another, that they would be able to go to, for instance, China, and that China would be able and willing to put in so much of the funding that they assumed they would lose from the United States and European powers. It hasn't played out that way. China has not put forward actual money, hasn't made any firm commitments, and hasn't even gestured towards the idea of major projects or investments coming in the near-term future. And at this point, the Taliban have, if they haven't already, are beginning to look around and realize, oh, there really is only one part of the international community that ponies up the kind of money that we might need to run a state or to deliver certain services or to meet certain goals. And so you've seen the Taliban lurch one way, but then begin to reconsider their position. I'm not certain that they're going to be as successful as they may have thought in terms of trying to play different sides off another. Thanks for that. Asfandir, what's your take? So I partly agree that the Taliban have been able to play countries off each other, have been able to exploit the lack of cohesion in the international community, the lack of an international consensus on what needs to happen in Afghanistan. And my diagnosis is that at least since August has been 2021, this is because of lack of U.S. leadership on Afghanistan, on a license that there is no real U.S. policy on Afghanistan for now. And so my prescription is that the U.S. government, the administration needs to take more active interest. Current policy is in drift. It is unclear to me at least what the goal of withholding assets and blocking financial channels to Afghanistan really is. That's not to say that the U.S. should recognize the Taliban. It should be doing active business with the Taliban. I think the U.S. government needs a more calibrated coercive policy, which involves proposing a roadmap, conditions under which the relationship with the Taliban can improve, and conditions under which we might see more punishment against the Taliban. I think there's a need for some real political energy, more senior-level involvement. And I also think that the multilateralism that we saw at one stage needs to be revived. We need a consensus among major powers on the situation in Afghanistan. And finally, the USC has to go back to the region, which, as Andrew noted, it has more leverage, some real tools that the U.S. government doesn't. And one of the threats, which I think the international community at large, not just the U.S., has to put on the table, is meaningful support for the Taliban's political opposition. Right now, that's off the table. I think the political opposition, even though it was backed by the U.S. the last 20 years, is not getting any real support. And that trend needs to be on the table. And I think that provides some leverage. The Taliban are sensitive to that fact. Okay. Sure. Yeah, that's great. I want to continue on that and bring in a question as well. I mean, you mentioned a road map, so that's a good conceptual tool. What would be on that road map? So human rights concerns are one, and that's where I'll get in any four-timers question, which is, what are the top human rights demands that the international community could realistically make of the Taliban in exchange for incremental improvements to the Taliban standing or increases in funding? So that's one piece. But I also want to get other thoughts on the road map, because you mentioned, importantly, the political opposition, which has not been mentioned very much at all. And I'll be the first one to say the words Karzai or Abdullah Abdullah. I don't know who the political opposition is per se, but that presumably some kind of inclusive politics would be on the road map. Let me ask the other panelists, the human rights question, but what else would you put on a road map that you could see as being productive in terms of leveraging recognition, money, and other things? Pawasha, let me go to you, Amiri, and then Andrew, briefly. Right. So of course, all the demands around women and girls' education is out there. That's been something that's been loud and clear. Women's right to work, not being as limited. All of these things are out there. But I think some of the really important pieces are around the human rights abuses that we're seeing more recently that are much more troubling in terms of the detention of women and men for things that they say, either protesting or things that they say against the government, the Taliban government. So ending those kinds of detentions, abductions, people disappearing in the night, stopping the unknown gunmen from killing people, those are the kinds of things that need to really end to show difference and ending both human rights abuses against women and men alongside of showing exclusive governance options and making sure that women are part of the equation at all levels. Amiri, what are your thoughts on both the human rights demands and a broader road map? I think, I mean, the human rights is obviously one of the main one, but besides that, it's freedom of expression, freedom of speech. That's the other area. One of the things is that the Taliban definition of national interest, what is national security and all those things are very narrow. So far, they've been collaborating into a large extent, especially the leadership, but the local level, I think the local level commanders and fighters, that's a big problem on that level. So yeah, I mean, the thing is like people are like those superficial things, like for example, what do you wear? Probably not a big thing for the international community, but that's what they interfere even in those superficial things, like what are you wearing, why you catch your beard, why you have long hair, why you have this kind of like those like simple things for an Afghan. So my point is to look at not just from the international perspective, if you want to be succeeded in Afghanistan, look it from the Afghan perspective, if you want to depend something, yes, I mean, there are some national, there's standard things that you want to put it in those standard terminologies, but before you put it in those standard terminologies, what you need to do is actually map it up, what are those things? So for Afghans, I mean, they just need like political inclusions, like especially the Yod, I mean, they studied a lot of things, they wanted to play a bigger role. It's not about I mean, nobody is a big, you know, I mean, from my perspective is a big, you know, thing of elections, but what they want is some sort of representation, you know, how, what that representation will be, that's a question, you know, like, for example, we have in the Kingsar Shatam, we have, so representation, inclusivity, freedom of expressions and human rights, those are some of the things. And also, you know, the personal sphere, which is one of the main things. I know it's not a big thing for the international community, but if you go to Kabul and other major urban centers, that's one of the main issues that people are really afraid and scared. And, you know, so I will say these are the few things that I think are important. Thanks. Any additional points for you, Andrew? Yeah, a thought or two. I appreciate in this format, Forzheimer's question, the need to be pragmatic and realistic about what the international community, especially Western states and donors, can reasonably go to the Taliban and ask them to consider and to work with them on. I think one thing that the Taliban is a movement have postured themselves and have tried to demonstrate not just to the international community, but to Amiri's point, to Afghans and domestically as a movement, something they believe and care about strongly is the idea of anti-corruption. The Taliban in order to survive as an insurgency made a lot of deals with various devils, ranging from smuggling from the country's vast narcotics production and illicit trading industry and sector, but a whole host of other illicit activities. And this was something that they did to survive in order to achieve their goal and to move forward. But they're in a really unique position now where they can either uphold their own rhetoric about anti-corruption, about the purity of their movement and of striving towards a more Islamic system, or they can permit the same kinds of hypocrisies and corrupt practices and money-making activities to go on as the prior Afghan government to be quite frank, and so many other central governments in Afghanistan have in the past. This notion of whether or not they will take anti-corruption seriously is something that I think the international community has a window on, maybe not through the United States directly, but certainly through the UN mission and its agencies, its presence on the ground, it has field offices that don't just sit and cobble but stretch out across the country. I think there's a real opportunity for number one, dialogue at a more local, at least provincial level. And number two, potentially even monitoring, holding the Taliban to account if you say to your own people that you will do X and Y, why not allow us to come and observe and to see that being demonstrated? And that could be the monitoring of, over time, a more robust form of pressure, first monitoring and then discussion about the very basics of rule of law and not rule by might. Thanks. Thanks. I want to interject my own question here because I think this point about inclusion has been made and I want to continue to try to drill down on what inclusion means, what inclusion might look like. Amiri, I also appreciated your use of the word representation and that relates to what I asserted was the fundamental unpopularity of the Taliban, at least as an insurgent movement. We have an interim government now, self-declared interim government by the Taliban. That raises the question of what a permanent government might look like and it raises the question of what a process for a permanent government might look like. So in this space from interim to permanence, do we have any indications of how the Taliban plan to structure a longer term government? How will they represent people? How will they include people? Amiri, I'll go to you back on that, but I welcome other thoughts. Oh, that's a very important question because that's what's been discussed among a lot of Afghans. They're trying to pitch all kinds of ideas to the Taliban, but Taliban so far literally does not want to even say a word. They just say, well, this is the government, that's it. And they do not just go further like, well, this will be forever the government that we want. So they do not want to go further down and share what how it's going to look in the future. But like I say, Afghanistan, like all the governments, Taliban are also reactionary. If they see something moving, they will react to that and make a certain decision. That was one of the reasons why, because this was initially the actual government that they would announce, but then after like a lot of, you know, discussions, discussions and a lot of, you know, international media and a lot of actors, they actually came under sort of pressure to announce this as an interim government, not as a as the government, you know. So if so see, that's one of the things. So, I mean, right now, I mean, the questions a lot of Afghans ask is what is the internal legitimacy of the Taliban, you know, and how the state is going to look under the Taliban. And, you know, what is the constitution that the Taliban hasn't really provided any answers to those things. I mean, right now the Amir just appoints people. He doesn't really interfere much in the local politics and implementation in those things. He's, I mean, so far that we see is mostly the appointments. I mean, there is, I mean, always tell people that we lost the change Taliban the very last minute, you know, Taliban were changed, you know, we lost it the very last minute when the Republic collapsed, collapsed in August. So that kind of, you know, all the things that they thought of it kind of, you know, washed up, especially the Taliban leadership and they kind of got themselves in the situations that where they kind of thought like, well, there's no need for anything, because everything has just, you know, we got everything, you know, there's the international community give up. And, you know, even in the back then there was a chance, even like in early August, there was a chance of some sort of, you know, even Taliban controlling Kabul, there was a chance of some sort of, you know, bringing Taliban into some sort of engagement with the political, with other political opposition. So, I mean, so the good point is that just I don't know how it will look in the future, but the good point is that there is a chance. So that's the most important thing. It's not about what it would look like. The good thing is that there's a chance to shape in, you know, if Taliban is going to remain as a government, there's a big chance to make a lot of, you know, to put pressure to bring a lot of reform changes. It's how it's a million dollar question, it needs a lot of more time. Scott. Thanks, Pawash. A million dollars on the table for the how. What's your, do you see that there's a chance and how do you see the Taliban maybe moving from interim exclusive to maybe permanent, more representative or inclusive? Yeah. So in terms of the process that Mary was talking about in terms of that there was a different kind of a Taliban that could have taken over, that was more progressive, and we might have gone to something different, but then we lost that chance. I think that, you know, those elements are still in the Taliban. And so we have these different groups within the Taliban and they are at odds with each other and we saw, you know, some of that play out where Malabra that had to go to Kandahar because, you know, they couldn't get along in Kabul. So there are these groups and tensions we still have yet to see who, you know, how that will play out and what will happen. And I do think that, you know, the regional countries and international community has a role to play in supporting various groups within the Taliban to support some of those more inclusive approaches or different approaches. I think that's something that has to be considered clearly because there are those tussles and tensions and what happened with the current announcement of the government was also, you know, supported by regional powers in order for this government to be announced. So that tension needs to be recognized. In terms of, you know, what will happen next, what the process will be, it's a good question. I think that there's a lot of options within Islamic governance. You know, we're looking at the different models, even within Hanafi jurisprudence, within Islamic governance, looking at the rightly guided caliphs in the early times, how head of state was elected, inclusive processes that already exist within Islam. And, you know, if there is appetite for looking into those models, there's a lot of hope that there, you know, we could have a different kind of governance system. The question is, is there still appetite? And what are the different powers within the Taliban in terms of who went out over these different arguments? And I think that has yet to play out. Great. Let me ask the final question now. We've had several in the chat that get to the question of leverage. Who has the leverage and how to use it? I think we have been talking about that. I'll ask one in particular and use that as an invitation for final thoughts. Julia asks more specifically about the reserves, the central bank reserves, almost $9 billion that are frozen. And so is it in the interest of the international community to put Afghanistan in the same situation as Iran or Venezuela? With no access to foreign reserves, it doesn't seem to foster progress in the long term. You know, I want to broaden that. You can take that on, but also just broaden that to this question that is underlying a lot of the debate. You know, do we want the Taliban to succeed or to fail? You know, how do we support the state but not the government? Final point question on leverage is the international community or even the U.S., let's say, acting against its interests by starving the state of resources, or is that in fact a productive lever to get the changes that we want? Andrew, let me go to you first. I'll do a Spanbier and then see if there are any other points. Quickly. Thanks, Scott. It really is the key question. And you know, the U.S. government still seems to be grappling with that question and how it wants to answer as many other previous donor states. I think what Pawasha was just describing gets to the heart of this question, while the U.S. and other states deliberate over whether or not they want to see the Taliban succeed or whether or not there is a way to keep the state alive without strengthening this movement or perhaps getting some moderation or good behavior out of the Taliban. Every day that goes by while we're either deliberating or waiting to see how things go, that's one more day that the more militant aspects of this movement, that the more extremist aspects of this movement are engaged in internal debate within the Taliban, and they get to say to whichever moderates may exist, to whichever personalities within the Taliban may want to do more in terms of service delivery or of a truly inclusive form of governance, that's when the more militant minds get to say, see, they don't want us to succeed, they don't want to work with us, they have nothing to do with us, they're just waiting for us to fall apart. There's great risk and there's no guarantee that we're going to be rewarded with more moderate Taliban behavior if we as the international community engage, but every day that we don't and we sit back, we're only strengthening the hands of those voices within the Taliban who feel as if they don't need us at all and as if they have their own draconian way of running a country with brutality and the bare minimum. Thanks. Thanks, Amir, you were nodding just very briefly, do you agree? What's your very quick take? Yeah, I totally agree with Andrew at this point. The more the U.S. and international community wait and thinking that the Taliban will collapse or they will come to, the more they will crack down on the locals and strengthen their positions inside the country once they're in better positions than bringing them or squeezing them, squeezing any other deal out of them will be even more difficult, you know? I mean, Taliban has the potential to turn things into much more, into much more problems. So, and the only way is, I mean, at this point in time is engagement and not just engagement, like just, you know, providing them with assistance. I mean, the reserve, I mean, those that directly benefit them should, yeah, I mean, to some extent can be whole, but those large is someone that actually goes to the population, the Afghan people. I think that's going to make Taliban more popular and eventually, you know, and will make them stronger and push for more crackdown and further control. And that would be, and that will have a horrible consequences. That's fine, dear. Look, I'm most concerned about terrorism issues. I mean, that's my beat. That's what I follow. Taliban's ties with all these groups that have been documented in my writing that spoke about them. That said, these financial reserves are not a source of leverage for terrorism issues. And most certainly not the $900 or so million dollars of savings of, you know, ordinary Afghans. I think they're not a source of leverage. They are not going to change the behavior of the Taliban. And I think the international community at large, and the US government in particular, have misdiagnosed sources of leverage at one point, the Doha process was doubted as a source of leverage that it would provide the Taliban with international recognition, but it wasn't. So I think the US government needs to more carefully identify leverage. And in this context, in the current situation, do the right thing by letting the Afghan people have their money back. And I would make a strong case for looking for some real sources of leverage. And I go back to support for the political opposition. I think it is going to make the Taliban really unhappy. And the international community at large needs to very seriously consider that. Thanks. Very briefly, Pulasha, you have the final word. Wow. I wasn't expecting that one. Yeah. So, you know, I agree with Espanyar in terms of, you know, the money not being the leverage at this point, particularly those that are owned by the Afghan people. And I think we have to go back to figuring out what is best for the Afghan people. And, you know, I think it's a very difficult question to unravel in terms of how do you support the Afghan people but not support the Taliban? How do you support the success of a country while not supporting the Taliban? And we have some clues here from Andrew Watkins telling us about how there are these internal dynamics and how you'd understand that as well as supporting the people and people's voices, as Amiri mentioned. And I think within that we need to pay particular attention to women and to minorities as we're moving forward to make sure that the Afghan people are successful and come out successfully from this and are able to save the crisis this winter particularly. I think that's in everybody's minds at this point. So, thank you. Well, thank you. Thank you very much panelists for really useful insights. Thank everybody in the audience for watching. I think I'm going to end with the three-word takeaway which is the need for engagement. I've heard that a lot, the need for representation and also the need for respecting human rights. So, I'm going to end on that and thank everybody for their interest and we'll continue this conversation as events unfold.