 Good afternoon ladies and gentlemen. I'm Michael Fully Love, Executive Director of the Institute and it's my pleasure to welcome you today to this event with the Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs, Senator Penny Wong. I hope you all enjoyed the democracy sausage rolls that we put on as a special edition today. Ladies and gentlemen, when we advertise this event last week, it's sold out within hours and this is probably a demonstration both of what the bookies tell us that Penny Wong may well be foreign minister in three weeks time. But also of the widespread respect in which she's held. Penny was first elected to the Senate in 2001. She served in a number of important portfolios, including as Minister for Climate Change and Water, Minister for Finance and Deregulation, leader of her party in the Senate and now as Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs. But I don't think this description of Senator Wong's career does her justice. Senator Wong has always been known as a diligent person. In fact, I gather that whole generations of law students at the University of Adelaide only passed their exams because of Penny's law notes. And that same attention to detail shows up in estimates where she's become a cult figure for her forensic but respectful questioning of officials. She's motivated by social justice, but also as a former finance minister. She's mindful of costs. She's a figure of great integrity as she showed during the debate on marriage equality. But she can also be fierce as Senator Anning discovered. She's one of one of the most formidable characters in Canberra and it's for this reason as much as her past experience and a future potential that all of us are looking forward to hearing what she has to say. Please join me in welcoming Senator Wong. Thank you very much for that very kind introduction, Michael. The Lowy Institute has lecterns which are made for Michael Fuller Love. I'm just saying that I am not a short-awaited. Every time I come here, I think it's definitely made for Mr Fuller Love. Can I first acknowledge the traditional owners of this land on which we meet, pay my respects to elders past and present and say that I hope one day we do have a government, a country and a parliament which can enact can reflect a voice to the parliament in Australia's constitution as a great act of reconciliation. I acknowledge also Stephen Lowy, David Gonski, our members of the diplomatic corps, members of the foreign policy community and many others and thank you very much for being with me today to hear from me. I hope I make it worth your while. I'm here to talk about foreign policy under a shortened Labor government and I've named my speech Australian values, Australian interests, foreign policy under a shortened Labor government. Labor's foreign policy is founded on the belief that we deal with the world as it is and we seek to change it for the better. We are an independent multicultural nation confident of our place in the world. We know our values, compassion, fairness, equality, democracy, the rule of law and individual freedoms. And we know our interests, security, prosperity, a stable region anchored in the rule of law and working constructively with international partners to deliver collective benefits. And we know who we are. An inclusive, diverse, multicultural nation which draws strengths from the waves of immigrants who have come to this continent and from our First Peoples. Labor's foreign policy speaks to who we are, the confidence we have in ourselves, the values we believe in and the region and the world in which we want to live. As the lead of the opposition, Bill Shorten characterised it, foreign policy with an Australian accent. Now foreign policy may not be front and centre in this election campaign, although Michael Fuller love-joked with me that I must be having a very stressful time because it was so much in the limelight, not so. But I would say this, amidst the grabs, gotcha moments or issues of the day, it is important to recognise that who governs our country has implications, not only for us, but so too for our region and the world. We live in a time characterised by disruption, power is shifting, and the global order we have known and relied upon since World War II is being transformed. And the disruption we face is driven by structural economic and strategic dynamics. We see it in rising economic and social inequality, greater numbers of displaced persons, ethnic tensions, pressures on democracy, heightened security threats from terrorism to cyber security and the erosion of support for international norms, rules and institutions. We see these trends in Australia with the rise of right-wing fringe groups like One Nation, Fraser Anning and Clive Palmer's UAP. And I regret to say in the failure of some of our political leaders, including our current Prime Minister, to take a clear and unambiguous stand against the politics of prejudice and division. There is preference to deal with one Clive Palmer and his refusal to ensure One Nation is preference last by all members of his government. Scott Morrison is supporting figures who promote fear and division, figures whose views hark back to the white Australia policy, harming the perception of our nation in the region. This is beneath the standards we should expect from any Prime Minister, and it only serves to feed these disruptive forces. The global dynamics I referenced earlier are accompanied by changes in the relative economic weight of the US, China and major powers, and by the way in which economic power is being refocused and reorganised. In these circumstances, Australia's international engagement is of even greater importance. Indeed, in today's world, our future prosperity depends upon improved capability at home and greater engagement and collaboration abroad. This is the terrain a shortened Labor government will need to navigate and protect and promote Australia's economic, strategic and foreign policy interests. We recognise and accept the responsibility of these times. We know that the playbook of decades past may be of limited utility in dealing with the challenges and opportunities ahead. As Bill Shorten said here, last October, foreign policy should be shaped by our national interests, first, second and third. Labor looks to the region. Whitlam Hawk, Keating, Rudd and Gillard, and so too, Shorten. Australia's prosperity and security is shaped by the region which we lived, the Indo-Pacific, and the features of this region are critical. Australia wants a region which retains a system of institutions, rules and norms to guide behaviour, to enable collective action and to resolve disputes. A region in which those seeking to make or shape the rules do so through negotiation, not in position. A region with an open trading system and investment transparency to maximise opportunity. A region where outcomes are not determined only by power. And a region where all people can live in peace and prosperity. A region with these characteristics reflects Australia's national interests and Australian values. Protecting and promoting this kind of region in this time of disruption is one of the principal foreign policy challenges Australia faces. It is not a challenge we face alone, nor something we can achieve alone. And central to achieving this are closer ties with our region, both across Asia and the Pacific. How successful we are will have profound consequences for Australia's future prosperity. Labor will ensure the Pacific is front and centre of our foreign policy. We will engage with the Pacific with respect to promote the well-being of the region for the benefit of both Australia and the 10 million people of Papua New Guinea and the Pacific Islands. We need to demonstrate that we understand the region's challenges and offer support and partnership to assist our Pacific friends in their pursuit of security and prosperity. And unlike the coalition, we will ensure our commitments to our Pacific neighbours are reflected in our actions. We want to see improvements to economic and development outcomes, fewer women dying in childbirth, more children vaccinated and nourished. Those with avoidable blindness treated enabling them to participate in their communities. We want to see gender-based violence reduced, sexual and reproductive rights protected and women's voices represented and heard. And we want to see more communities across the Pacific powered by renewable energy in line with Pacific countries ambitious climate change plans. We want to see the ocean protected from illegal fishing and from plastic debris. We want Pacific nations to have improved infrastructure and connectivity that is sustainable and resilient and we want an Australian Labor government to make an important contribution to these achievements. We want there to be deeper ties between our communities. We want Australians to hear and listen to Pacific Island perspectives and we want Australian voices to be heard in the Pacific. Australia's economy benefits from the availability of Pacific workers and our society benefits from the connections with Pacific communities. So a shortened Labor government would work closely in equal partnership with our Pacific neighbours to help support and create opportunities and possibilities for realising the Pacific's own vision for the Blue Pacific continent. But unlike the coalition, our increased focus on the Pacific will not come at the expense of our engagement in Asia. The Abbott Turnbull Morrison government's short-sighted cuts to development assistance in Southeast Asia demonstrates a disconnect with the realities of Australian foreign policy. Supporting the Pacific region to the detriment of other nations will not serve our relationships, our influence and our long-term prosperity and security. Labor has outlined in considerable detail a policy blueprint for deepening and broadening our engagement with Asia. Future Asia is a step change in our relations with Asia. It will help secure Australia's future prosperity, improving our capability at home and driving greater engagement and collaboration in the Asian region. It is a comprehensive nationwide plan for advancing Australia's interests and contributing to the prosperity, stability and security of the region. Under Future Asia, we've announced initiatives that focus on improving Asia capability in business, better leveraging Australia's diaspora communities, strengthening high-level economic engagement with Indonesia and India, including through APEC and the G20, greater support for Southeast Asian studies and importantly, Future Asia also includes initiatives to improve Asian language capability in Australia. And I have also announced that we would expand our diplomatic presence and capabilities in the region. Engagement with Asia requires working across government and with business, the education sector, industry and across the community to deepen our ties, improve our Asia capability and enable more opportunities for Australians. Our Future Asia policies will enable us to draw on Australia's strengths, experience and expertise to maximise the benefit of our engagement with the region and in doing so, it will enable us to deepen ties with key partners like Indonesia and India, countries that are crucial to the nature of the region and to Australia, the China relationship. This is a critical relationship for Australia. It is both complex and consequential and Labor's approach to foreign policy will bring a more considered, disciplined and consistent approach to the management of Australia's relationship with China. That is not to say it will be easy or straightforward. Indeed, I have said before that the relationship may become harder to manage in the future. Many of the current pressures will persist. At times our interests will differ and challenges in the relationship may intensify. It is not simply a matter of a diplomatic reset. Fundamentally, we are in a new phase in the relationship. And I have spoken before about the realities and the principles that will underpin our management of this relationship. First, we don't preemptively frame China only as a threat. Secondly, we must be grounded in the realities. China isn't a democracy nor does it share our commitment to the rule of law. Differences between our systems and values will inevitably affect the nature of our interactions. But those realities include the fact that China will remain important to Australia's prosperity and that China will be critical to the shape and character of the entire region. In fact, it is hard to think of an important issue for Australia's future where China will not be an influential player. We also recognise China has a right to develop and a right to a role in the region alongside other regional powers. Third, we need to consider the relationship as a whole. The idea of an economic strategic bifurcation was probably never really accurate and certainly is not now. A Labor government will protect Australia's interests and values and this means there will be occasions where decisions may not accord with China's preferences. We will be clear about where Australia and China's interests come together and where they differ. In this next phase in the relationship, we believe that engagement remains in the best interests of Australia and China and the nature of that engagement needs to be redefined. This is not just a task or responsibility for government alone. All stakeholders, government, the foreign policy community, business and industry, need to work together to identify those opportunities for deeper engagement where our interests coincide and to manage difference constructively. As we work together as a country to navigate the relationship, we need to include a wide range of Australian voices including those of Australia's Chinese community and we must guard against racial fault lines from our past being allowed to resonate today. Australia's Alliance for the United States is a pillar of our nation's foreign policy. It has been fundamental to our security since Curtin's famous wartime turn to America over 75 years ago and it will continue to be central into the future. The alliances enduring nature reflects the fact that Australia and the US have shared histories, interests and values. Maintaining a strong alliance relationship with the US strengthens Australia's national security. It provides our defence forces with access to leading edge technologies and opportunities for cooperation and training. It provides our security agencies with intelligence sharing so important particularly encounter terrorism efforts and it gives Australia an opportunity to influence the world's great power. Of course this does not mean that we will always agree with every aspect of American policy. Labor will always act in Australia's national interest and we will let our ally know when we disagree with its policies and decisions. Both Labor and the Coalition for example have disagreed with decisions by the Trump administration to withdraw from the Paris Agreement on Climate Change and the Iran nuclear deal. It is a reflection of the closeness of our relationship with the US that we are able to discuss our differences frankly and it is a reflection of the importance of the relationship to Australia that it has bipartisan support across the major political parties. I was disappointed to see Mr Morrison seeking to politicise the US alliance this week. Mr Morrison likes to promote his national security credentials but he is the only leader in this election campaign who has sought to play politics with national security including by questioning the bipartisan nature of Australia's commitment to the US alliance. A shortened Labor government will work with the US to advance our mutual interests and benefit the broader international community and we will work to maintain and strengthen constructive US engagement in the Indo-Pacific because this will be critical to the region's resilience, prosperity and security into the future. Indeed Australia's strength and value as an alliance partner lies in part in the fact that we are a substantial power in this region sharing much in common with other regional partners including Japan, Korea, Indonesia and India. We have a shared interest in protecting and promoting the kind of region I outlined earlier and we must work together to navigate the challenges in our region. The second key element of Labor's foreign policy agenda is constructive internationalism where Australia works with other countries to achieve common benefit. Constructive internationalism reflects the pragmatic observation that there are certain interests which cannot be effectively pursued without international cooperation and that some issues such as climate change, nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament space the oceans require a collective response. Constructive internationalism encompasses a commitment to collective and cooperative processes which is reflected in Labor's tradition of multilateralism and regionalism. This tradition is about forging groupings, associations and partnerships to act in the common good. It is about Australia acting with like-minded partners to deliver effective sustainable and long-term action. It is a tradition which would be built upon and advanced by shortened Labor government and our approach here builds on the work begun by Gareth Evans 25 years ago. I've spoken previously about Labor's intended contribution to global challenges like nuclear disarmament, oceans, multilateral trade liberalisation, space and counter-terrorism. Today I want to speak briefly about three areas that would be early priorities, climate change, development assistance and the promotion of democracy and human rights. First, a climate change. The coalition's continued refusal to accept climate science and take meaningful action has had a direct cost to Australia's reputation internationally, to our relations with our region and particularly with our Pacific neighbours to whom this is a threat to their very own existence. A Labor government will restore Australia's place as a collaborative and energetic member of the community of nations committed to reducing carbon pollution and we will advocate globally for more ambitious climate action. We will rebuild DFAT's skills and capabilities for the international climate change agenda and there will be close coordination between the foreign affairs and energy and climate portfolios on the international dimensions of this challenge. And our work internationally will be backed by comprehensive domestic policy to tackle climate change. This is a key challenge for our nation and a challenge a divided coalition is utterly incapable of meeting. In terms of a development assistance, we believe our development program should once again reflect the generous spirit of the Australian people. It is something we should be proud of. The Abbott-Turban Morrison government proudly declares that it has cut Australia's international development program by $80 billion, $80 billion over the medium term to 2028. So these cuts haven't only had a real impact on some of the world's poorest people. They have damaged Australia's reputation as a reliable partner in the region and reduced Australia's influence at a time when our national interest requires us to engage more deeply. So Labor will increase official development assistance as a percentage of gross national income every year starting with our first budget. In this era of disruption marked by the rise of illiberalism and authoritarianism, democratic principles, the rule of law and human rights are under pressure. We need to find ways to ensure the resilience of our own democratic institutions as well as support the protection and promotion of democracy abroad. A robust Australian democracy is not only fundamental to the country we cherish, it is a necessary prerequisite to our ability to advance our interests and to advocate our values internationally. Even as Australia rebuilds confidence in our own system, we will still continue to be affected by developments in democracy in other parts of the world. So we will have to work with like-minded nations to promote, protect and defend democratic values and democratic practice. The role of civil society in promoting democracy and human rights should also be recognised. A strong civil society is vital to democracy, inclusion, transparency and openness, accountability and also the protection of minorities and marginalised groups. Ensuring the viability of civil society, NGOs, business and professional organisations, unions, media and religious institutions is even more pressing in the face of rising authoritarianism and attacks on freedom of speech. So over the course of this campaign I have been asked some questions about foreign policy. Amongst those is this. I've been asked about the significance of an Asian Australian being our foreign minister should labour win the election. What is significant about that possibility is not my personal attributes. What would be significant about an Asian Australian being our foreign minister is what it says about us. What it says about who we are. Narratives matter as do perceptions. And there are times when Australia's past attitudes on race can be evoked in ways which are neither accurate nor helpful. So this was brought home to me during the first iteration of Pauline Hansen. When my father, still living in Malaysia, asked me if I would need to leave Australia. But just as historical negatives can be evoked, so too they can be shifted. When Paul Keating spoke about our place in Asia, it spoke to our region and the world of a different Australia. When the Gillard government embarked on the preparation of the White Paper on Australia in the Asian century, this prompted interest and discussion in the region. And when Prime Minister Rudd gave me the honour of representing Australia as climate change minister in the international negotiations at Bali. And when I sat as our finance minister in AG20 Finance Minister's meeting, this said something to the region and to the world beyond about who we are. An independent multicultural Australia confident of our place in the world. Of course, like any minister, I would inevitably bring my experiences and perspective to the role. Southeast Asia isn't just our region, it's where I was born. And I grew up with stories of the fall of Singapore, the occupation of Malaya and the unique American contribution to peace in the Pacific. China's rise and its future place in the world was far more likely to be a topic of discussion than nostalgia over the Anglo-sphere. So like Chris Bowen, Richard Miles, Jason Clare and my Labor colleagues more broadly, the import of Australia's place in and our relationship with the region is an accepted fact. And my intention, if we are elected, is to make my first overseas trip as Foreign Minister to Indonesia and to the land of my birth, Malaysia. And I finish on a note about values. There is one imperative which has been a feature of my public life from my first speech to the parliament and since, and that is the imperative to stand against prejudice and against discrimination. It is an imperative for the health and resilience of the Australian democracy, and it is also critical to our ability to advance Australian interests and advocate Australian values internationally. So those who have been willing to toy with the race card in recent times, are not only damaging national cohesion and eroding our national identity, they also diminish our national power. So from my perspective, both personally and as someone with the honour of serving Australia as an elected representative, this election, whether it be in foreign policy, economic policy, environmental policy or social policy, it presents a choice. A choice between Labor's open, expansive and inclusive vision of the future of our nation, and the divisive, chaotic, impoverished and cynical approach of our opponents. Thank you very much. Ladies and gentlemen, I'm sure you'll agree we had a very interesting, substantive, wide-ranging speech from Senator Wong on everything from bespoke lecterns to important, substantive issues, the United States, China, the Pacific, climate change, Southeast Asia. We detected a very strong focus on Asia, and of course, Penny made some news by telling us that her first visits as foreign minister would be to Indonesia and Malaysia, and we always like it when our visitors make news at the institute. Senator, so thank you for that. It was always pressuring me. I want to come, I'm going to come back to, we're going to have a conversation for about 20 minutes, and then we're going to go to the audience and give a few lucky people the opportunity to ask some questions, and then we'll have the opportunity to ask some questions, and Senator, I'm going to come back to some of the specific comments you made on those substantive issues, but I want to start at a more general level actually and go a little bit higher. You mentioned a range of Prime Ministers that you admired. You could well be Foreign Minister within a month. Which of Australia's former Foreign Ministers do you most admire? I think you're going to say Prime Ministers. Well, we can come to PMs, but why don't you start with Foreign Ministers? Whose work did you admire on the diplomatic front? Oh, Gareth. I mean, I think that he, I think, demonstrated it was a different time. I probably, look, not as disrupted a context in which, in terms of where the international system was, but I think that the same idea about values and interests and working, I mean, his phrase was good international citizen, working internationally with others to achieve common objectives, I think, is something consistent with the way in which I articulated. The other thing, I spent quite a lot of time with Gareth when I first got the job, and one of the things he really impressed upon me, and I have taken a board, is he said, you have to really work on thinking through your frame. And I went back and looked at a lot of what he had done, and his early, his writings in opposition and then also in government, little pamphlets he'd done for the Fabians, et cetera. Always pamphlets. Yes, all of that. But it was interesting, you could see, he had worked through a quite systematically an international framework around that, and that appealed to me. So that's probably one of the priorities I've had, actually, is Foreign Ministers, Foreign Shadow Foreign Minister, Foreign Foreign Minister opposition, in opposition, is to work on that. I do want to say something about Prime Ministers, though. I mean, we love all our fast Labor Prime Ministers, but I wanted to, I nearly put this in the speech, this anecdote, because it was so profoundly important to me, and I do want to share it with you. One of the reasons why I think I so, I have such a keen sense of narrative mattering, and what leaders say mattering was my own experience of that. And when Paul Keating started talking about our place in Asia, and talked about Kokoda in the form of Singapore as being as important to who we are, and our history as Gallipoli, and talking about our engagement in Asia, it was profoundly important to me, and I have such a clear memory of going back to Malaysia to see Dad and my family. Coming back, landing in Kingsford Smith on a very hot Australian bright, sunny morning. And when the wheels hit the tarmac, the thought that I had was, this is the first time I have felt like I'm really coming home to my country. And that was profoundly important to me, and it really, it stayed with me in this job and previous jobs that what leaders say, what public figures say, how we describe who we are, means a great deal about who we are including and who we are speaking to. Let me ask you about the division of Labor, if you like, between Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers. In that period, in the early 90s, for example, Paul Keating took APEC, he took the Indonesia relationship, the US relationship, and he left most of the rest of the world to Senator Evans. If Labor's elected, do you have some sort of sense of the kind of issues that a Prime Minister shortened would focus on, and how you would work with him as Foreign Minister? Oh well, I think, I'd answer that this way. Bill is, if there's a Prime Minister, the description of how a Prime Minister works, if there is one, the description of their working style that most reflects, that Bill's as most like it is, Hawke. So he is, I suppose, he's collective, he wants to engage, he doesn't dictate what people are doing in their portfolios. He engages, and at times, obviously, he's the leader, he has to make a call, but he is very collaborative in how he approaches things. I mean, he has particular interests. He's obviously has a pretty deep interest in the Pacific, and that's a good thing. You want a leader-level engagement, and in the Indonesian relationship, I think that's self-evident. But I would say how he operates is very collective. You mentioned where your first visit would take you. If you would broaden your scope a little bit and talk about the first term, do you have a couple of things that you would like to achieve in your first term as Foreign Minister if you're elected? So I suppose, how would I describe, I would hope that, what are my hopes for our first term if we are elected in this portfolio? I hope we would have contributed to both maintaining and enhancing constructive US engagement in the region. I would hope we would have a more productive relationship with China, where we've maximised cooperation where we can and navigated disagreement well, and given the flux in the world, I hope we could have made a substantive contribution to a stable, peaceful region that is anchored in the rule of law, where disputes are dealt with in the rule of law. I hope we would have made, that's my press sec, you're dinging at me. I hope we would have made a substantive contribution, as I said, to the region. In the Pacific, I hope we would have made steps or progress towards a sort of vision that I sought to outline today about what our hopes for the region would be. Let me ask you about political appointments to embassies, if I can. Sorry, can I also say, I hope on development assistance too. I hope we would have turned the trajectory around, which is going to be a really hard task. I hope, and this is a plug to everyone in the room no matter who wins the election, I hope we can make development assistance less partisan. Because it has been essentially bipartisan for most decades, it is not now, and we will continue to have challenges fiscally in returning to a growth program, if it continues to be as partisan. I hope also, this is something I think all of us ever were all in. I hope also the Australian people would have a greater sense of what it means to the lives of those in our region and what it means to Australian influence. Now, you want to ask me about political appointments. I'm still going to ask you about political appointments. Governments of both colours have appointed their friends, and sometimes their enemies, in fact, to prestigious posts, and there's been some criticism of the rate of that rate increasing under the current government. If you're Foreign Minister, would you like to reduce the number of political appointments that are made overseas? Well, I've been in Parliament 17 years, and I have never seen as many political appointments smashed through before an election as I have in the last three months across portfolios. I have never seen it. And it is not just in foreign affairs. They get a lot of profile around that, but there are appointments across a range of portfolios which have been announced and announced and announced, you know, we get multiple appointments in press releases at six o'clock at night or not announced at all. So, I will just make that point. I do think appointments should be on merit. I think political appointments may well be meritorious on occasion. I think Kim Beasley, no one would argue that Kim Beasley's appointment as US Ambassador was not a meritorious appointment. But we have said we will judge appointments on their merits. What about, for example, some of the high-profile appointees like Mr Hockey, for example, Mr Brandus? Would you let Mr Hockey see out his term, for example, or would you recall him? I've been interested to see a fair amount of media of them telling us publicly why they should keep their jobs, which was an interesting way to approach it. That's a judgment we'll make. We'll certainly have a look at both of those and a range of other appointments. What about former leaders, Senator? Mr Turnbull famously refused to back in Mr Rudd, for example, when he was a candidate for Secretary-General. Would you consider backing Mr Rudd or, indeed, other former leaders for big international jobs? Is it important that Australians put their hand up for international jobs? I thought that was a mistake by Mr Turnbull because there are people in this room who would have much better knowledge of the details of the UNSG election processes and the time frames around them. But that was our opportunity, which will not represent itself for a very long time. And having an Australian in that role, not a bad thing, is it, to actually, in terms of Australia's influence. We supported Kevin's bid. We would have liked the government too. There were Liberals who supported it as well. All right. Let me ask you about some of the comments you made in your speech. You talked about China. Obviously, there's a huge amount of interest in... Yes. The room went quiet at that bid, didn't it? Yeah. Everyone listened closely. And I caught the word redefined. You talked about redefining the relationship. I guess if you were to simplify the Australian strategic debate on China, you could simplify it to two views. There's a, if you like, an orthodox view or a traditional view where strategic analysts are increasingly concerned by China's international posture, and they think we should be pushing back in order to ensure our own freedom of movement, if you like. And then there's another view which says, well, Asia is really China's backyard. And what it's really looking for is what any great power would like, and that is more strategic space. You've done a lot of reading, I know, on China in the couple of years you've been in the job. Where would you put yourself on that spectrum? You see, I just... Well, first I would reject the binaries that you've outlined. And in fact, what I would say to the foreign policy community who is here today, they are not helpful. When I talked about reshaping and redefining the relationship in the speech, and I jotted down some notes before I came and thinking about, well, how would I explain it simply? Well, basically we have a changing world and a changing region. We have a changing China, both in terms of how China perceives itself and operates, but also its projection into the region, its assertiveness. We have a changing relationship, and that the economic and strategic bifurcation of the past I don't think is helpful. And what I would say is I have found it at times... How shall I put this? Frustrating to watch some of the foreign policy debate around the China relationship, which does seem to descend into those two extremes. And I know that, you know, journalists and so forth like to do that. But we need to address, deal with the relationship in all of its complexity as a whole. And that is a difficult task because I don't think to date we have managed that as well as we will need to. And as part of making sure we can chart our course in that, it would be far better if we actually had a more productive conversation about what lies between and beyond those binaries. Well, let me ask a question another way. I mean, how would you characterize the way China's changed in terms of its external behaviour in recent years? Well, of course. I've given a number of speeches and made a range of public comments. I mean, China, we have... China has changed and is changing. China's perception of itself and its views, its assertiveness about its role in the world differs now from 20 years ago. And that is something that we will need to navigate. And I thought what I tried to do in the speech is to lay out some principles around that and reassert that constructing the relationship or defining the relationship in accordance with our national interests means we need clarity. We need to work, I think, as deeply together as we can where our interests converge. And we also need to navigate difference as well and to ensure that the relationship affects the whole of Australia's national interests. Part of the difficulty at the moment is you get a discussion. I remember going to a particular forum and there were a lot of business people who have a lot of interests in China. And then there was a range of members from the strategic community. And I thought, wow, this is a conversation where people are not listening at all to each other. They are talking past each other. We have to manage the relationship as a whole in accordance with Australia's national interests. And there are things on which we recognise we're not going to agree. I've referenced it previously. I said it against today. China is not a democracy. And that fundamental difference will mean we have differences of opinion. I also think it is important in terms of our relationship with China or other nations in the region. Not to only focus on each transaction in that relationship but to keep front of mind what sort of region we want. And because fundamentally that is what matters most to Australia. What is the nature of the region we want to live in? Let me ask you about the Pacific. It's striking how there is this new bipartisan consensus, if you like, on the Pacific. Certainly not on foreign aid, as you alluded to, but that's true. But both parties in terms of Australia's engagement with the Pacific, making spending commitments, you know, sending new diplomats to the Pacific and so on. How much of that is driven by concerns about China, do you think? The point I would make today is the same one I've made. I think if we engage with Pacific island nations on the basis of a discussion about competition, then that does not lend itself to constructive engagement, nor to us being the partner of choice that we seek to be. I think that we recognise that there are more competitive dynamics across the whole of the region. But our engagement with Pacific island nations and Papua New Guinea should be driven by a focus on their development objectives, their aspirations and their priorities. And this is where fundamentally there is a problem for the coalition. I think they have an economic problem, which is a major economic issue, climate change, which even the Reserve Bank says is a financial necessity to address it. They are incapable of addressing it and I think you cannot have the sort of relationship I think Australia wants and needs with the Pacific if you are so constrained and divided upon what you can do on climate. And so whatever the coalition government says to Pacific island nations about infrastructure, maritime support, all of those things which are worthy, fundamentally the problem in the relationship is Pacific island nations know what the Australian people know, which is this lot are not serious about climate change. Let me ask you about the United States. You mentioned Prime Minister Curtin's role in his famous call in 1941. One of the interesting things about the alliance is that both major parties claim ownership in a way of the alliance because a liberal foreign minister will date it to the formation of the ANZUS Treaty a decade later. And I think that shows how, as you say, how bipartisan the support for it is. We know how Mr Turnbull's first phone call went with President Trump. There was a lot of detail in that reporting. We recall that Mr Shorten had some stern words for Mr Trump in 2016, so we look forward to the post story on their first phone call. But let me ask you this question. If you're charged with managing Australia's relationship with our great ally, how do you navigate these unique circumstances in which the President of the United States holds so many views that are really contrary to the Australian public's view of the world, but also our interests as a trading nation, a multicultural nation and so on. How do you manage that? The point I made after Mr Trump's election to the presidency. Was that I was first and foremost this, that our alliance and our fundamental relationship is with the nation, not with the individual. And there have been and will be occasions where the views of a particular administration are not the views of the Australian government of the day. And you have enough deep knowledge of the Australia-US relationship to know that. And we remember, for example, Gough Whitlam had a difference of views on Vietnam. Simon Kreen, as opposition leader, had a difference of views on the Iraq war and I think has subsequently been proved correct. Part of what we, I think, offer as an ally and partner in the region is, as a friend, we obviously will disagree on things where our national interests and the US policy position are different. Even the coalition has disagreed on the two points I made, the Paris climate accord and the Iran nuclear deal. I would also say what we offer, what's more important about the relationship, thinking about what we want to do in the relationship in the next few years, is to think about, as a substantial power in the region, what do we offer the US in terms of our thinking as to what maximal constructive US engagement in the region looks like. Because in today's world with the sort of disruption we've described, that is a key question. And I would hope that that is something Australia could do. I think it is something Australia has done and it is something we do need to focus more on. One of the significant states in the region that matters a lot to us and matters to the regional balances in Indonesia, you said you'd visit that on your first trip. I guess many analysts have been a little disappointed with the presidency of Joko Wododo in the sense that Indonesia has become a more inward-looking country and he seems to be less interested, for example, in the world than some of his predecessors. Where are the opportunities, do you think, to reinvigorate the Australia-Indonesia relationship but also nudge Indonesia towards looking beyond the horizon and taking on a more positive role as a security contributor in Asia? Well, first in terms of how we deal with it, I think we've got to remember how big they are and how big we are and maybe not lecture them too much. That might be useful. Second, I don't know that it's so much nudging as I think there is trying to engage with Indonesia and with other nations of ASEAN in a way that generates as much congruity as possible around things we all care about and I do think it is primarily about what sort of region we want. I think the other thing about President Joko Wododo is that he does have a very clear focus on improving economic outcomes and on development. I don't know that it's fair to dismiss that as somehow not having any interest over in terms of regional and global affairs because an economically stronger Indonesia does have greater weight in the region and does have greater weight internationally. So, it is a relationship that matters greatly. It's obviously one of the focuses of the future Asia policy is not better engagement with Indonesia and also more coordination, for example, ahead of the G20 Finance Minister's meetings and Finance and Trade Ministers increasing their dialogue. One of the reasons I mentioned Chris Bowen and others is that I think this is a, if we are elected, this is a Labor Cabinet with a generation of people for whom the importance of Indonesia and the importance of the region is an accepted truth. It's a political heritage, I think, that we've grown up with as people in the Labor Party. All right, let me take a couple of questions from the audience. Please put your hand up. Well, there we go. There's a couple of interested characters. I saw Paul Maley over here from the Australians, so I'll go to Paul first and then I'll go to this lady in the second row. Can I ask you to mention your name, any affiliation you have and please keep it to a short question so we can fit in as many as possible. If you could wait for the mic, Paul. Senator Wong, thank you, Paul Maley from the Australian. Thank you very much for your address. I was wondering if I could just sort of draw you out a little bit on one of the points that Michael was talking about and that is Labor's position on the relationship with China. I'm just wondering if you think that the government has got the settings, the balance, if you will, about right between security and the need for sort of foramity and cooperation and so forth or whether or not you think that the security agencies or the security concerns have been given too much emphasis, perhaps at the expense of trade and diplomacy and so forth? Well, I actually, I think we need to think about the relationship someone differently to the way in which you've defined it which was the point I was making. I think that we need to focus on our national interests and we need to ensure that we don't, we need to focus on our national interests. We need to navigate difference as best we can and we need to work together where we can as deeply as possible. I said in the speech and I've said previously, I do also recognise and Labor recognises that there are challenges in the relationship which may intensify, that the relationship may become more difficult to, there may be more challenges to manage, but my, I suppose the approach I would like to take, I would like to see us taking, is one where we engage but we also are very clear about the structure and nature and contours of that engagement in accordance with our national interest. Yes. Amy Sinclair from the Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, we're an international NGO that reports on the human rights impacts of companies around the world. And thank you for your address today Senator Wong, I enjoyed it very much. My question relates to the human rights impacts of Australian companies operating both here and overseas. International standards articulate the human rights responsibilities of companies. They were endorsed in 2011 by the Human Rights Council and are called the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. Since 2011, many like-minded nations around the world have implemented the UN Guiding Principles domestically and encouraged companies to take up their international human rights standards via policy statements called National Action Plans on Business and Human Rights. Yes. My question is, I wanted to just refer to the fact that under the current government there was initial steps in 2016-2017 to implement a National Action Plan on Business and Human Rights, which, which halted without due explanation. And I'm curious to know whether if elected, we could anticipate steps in the future under a Labour government to reignite this process and whether we could anticipate a National Action Plan on Business and Human Rights in Australia? Well, we are certainly supportive of the principles. The primary locus of work of this has been done by, I think, Clara O'Neill in the context of slavery. And obviously there are domestic policy issues about how you manage that, but we've indicated support for the principles. I'm going to do one more round of questions. I will ask people, please keep your questions as short as possible so we can fit as many in. I saw Angus Greig from the AFR. I think Shane McLeod from the Lowy Institute was trying to catch my attention. Shane, there he is over there. And I'll take this lady as well for the last question. So we might take three questions in a row. Okay. I'll try and write them down. Thank you, Senator Angus Greig from the FIN review. You said you wanted to make the Pacific the front and centre of your foreign policy. One of the biggest issues in Papua New Guinea at the moment has been getting a bit of press and we've been writing about it has been a loan that was advanced to the PNG government, the O'Neill government, $1.2 billion by UBS here in Australia. Now, the opposition is saying that this loan should be investigated for being illegal. The Swiss authorities are investigating it. And I'm wondering if you're looking like a little blank on this one, but I'm wondering if it is the sort of thing that you see, given that we give so much aid to PNG, given we want to make this front and centre of our foreign policy, do you think there is an ability to have some oversight? Would you, if elected, would you look into that? Would you investigate the legality of those sort of transactions? All right, Shane. Pacific afternoon. I'm from the Lower Institute's Pacific Island's research team. My question is about your comments about projecting Australian voices into the region. Does that mean you're looking at more investment in say international broadcasting from Australia? Or do you think that it's a case of priorities for the organisations that are already funded to do that? I guess I'm talking there about the ABC. So we got from the Fiji Contrary and Trade Commission with Fiji and Consulate here, Zarek Khan. We're just wondering that Bill Shorten recently announced his 2030 targets for climate change. And you said using the language that a coalition is utterly incapable of dealing with it. I just wonder how different your policies actually are because his recent announcement is just quite conservative. We also have just the last point that you mentioned Gareth Evans and it would be remiss not to mention respect for Julie Bishop that made a lot of progress in the Pacific. There you go. That's a small report. Well, yeah, I'll do that. I'll do it backwards. I think I've actually been quite respectful of Julie Bishop in my remarks. I was asked which foreign minister I most admired and probably most saw myself being closest to its unsurprising. I'd probably choose a labour one. I don't agree with you that our climate policy is not ambitious. I could take you through the reductions in emissions, the renewable energy goals and so forth. But I'm going to answer by saying this. I was the climate minister in 2009 when I took a carbon price at a carbon emissions trading scene to the Senate, agreed with Malcolm Turnbull. The Greens then ran the line you just ran with respect. They said, oh, it's not ambitious enough. And they voted with Tony Abbott and Cory Bernardi and people who deny that climate change is happening. And the consequence of that I would argue with you is 10 years of inaction and division. They also subsequently voted two years later for a screening scheme that was actually browner that actually gave more assistance to what they were describing as the big polluters. Do not let the perfect be the enemy of the Lord. If the only way we're going to get action on climate change is electing a government that will actually do something about it. Shane asked a question about the Pacific. It's a really good question. I think that the decisions by the government, some in ABC management around our presence in the Pacific has been a backward step for Australia. I do not understand why we have a soft power review and I think a broadcasting review but then give money for Pacific broadcasting to free TV who'd say quite publicly they didn't ask for it. So I will make clear and if there's anyone from free TV here, we will hold any spending on that $17.1 million that has been given to them if we win government. I would encourage them not to spend it. Our preference would be to actually look at what the review says and to work at how we best put Australian voices and Pacific into the Pacific and have Pacific content in the Australian discussion. What was the last one? Oh PNG. Yes. So I think there are a number of questions that do need to be investigated around what has occurred on a couple of financial transactions in PNG. One was, and I have momentarily forgotten, was it Paladin? Yes. And I have forgotten the amount. I remember pursuing it at estimates. But a lot has happened since then. And it seems clear that the process around that and the timeframe around that was highly problematic. My broad answer to your response is any government should ensure that you have proper probity and proper standards around aid effectiveness. And that certainly would be something if we were to win government that would remain a priority. Senator, I might ask one final cheeky quick question if I can. Which cheeky today? Last month, everybody saw that the Australian provocateur Julian Assange was removed from the Ecuadorian Embassy and arrested. And I'm probably the happiest people in the world that day with the Ecuadorian diplomats who had to live with him for the previous seven years. There's been some criticism from his people of the consular assistance that Australia has provided. Do you have a view on that? Would you change the assistance that Australia provides? And I'd also invite you to reflect on Mr Assange if you would, and WikiLeaks. Reflect on it. I think the latter is a sort of lengthy discussion. I did think Peter Grest wrote a very interesting and useful piece on that and which reflected, frankly, a lot of views that I would share. But Mr Assange is entitled to representation. He is entitled to due process. He is entitled to consular assistance like any Australian. And he should be provided. But whatever we think, whatever individuals or people may think about his actions, and there are very strong views on that. He's an Australian and he should be afforded proper process and the appropriate consular assistance by the Australian government. Ladies and gentlemen, that's all we have time for today. Let me give you a quick add and that is that yesterday the Institute published a terrific digital infographic on the election where we look at some of the big international issues, what the coalition has said, what Labor has said, and what Lowy Institute experts say. So please have a look at that. Thank you for joining us, Senator Wong, and for explaining how Labor sees Australia's place in the world. Thank you for taking our questions. I think some of our audience members could do a good job in estimates themselves. As you know, Senator, pretty soon the Institute's going to move down the road back to our historic headquarters at 31 Bly Street. And if Labor wins the election, we very much hope that you would consider returning to the Institute at 31 Bly Street to give your first speech as Foreign Minister. And you're allowed to answer that.