 Good morning. I'm David Berto. I'd like to welcome you to CSIS this morning for the rollout of our study, National Security and the Commercial Space Sector. I, with me is Greg Kiley, Senior Associate at CSIS, who is my co-author on this report. So I'm really grateful to you all for coming out here this morning. First administrative announcement, if you would silence your pagers and blackberries and cell phones. Somebody said to me, nobody has pagers anymore, but I will tell you there's at least one person in my contact file that still has a pager. He's not here, unfortunately, but it leaves open the possibility that somebody else still might as well. When I got up this morning and I shaved with cold water in the dark with a flashlight, I thought to myself, it's not going to get any worse than this today. But then I got here and discovered it was about 120 degrees in this room. Air conditioner is now working and those of you on this side are probably feeling pretty good. Those of you on that side will feel good by the end of the morning. But I really still am very grateful to you all for coming out here this morning. It's cooler here than in our homes even now for about 200,000 of us in Montgomery County, and the lighting is a little better also, I think. I also want to thank our president and CEO, Dr. John Hamry. Due to his schedule, he's unable to join us today, but he did provide us with some written comments. And those were on the back table, I presume that you were able to get them as you came in. If not, I would ask you to pick one up on your way out. I won't read it in its entirety, unlike some of our events here that have memos read in their entirety, but I want to recognize it and his contribution. I also want to thank all those who made this report possible, not only the writers and researchers who assisted us, but all of the companies and government personnel who gave of their time and information as we went through it, and all of those who submitted thoughtful comments and insights in response to our draft report, which we issued back in April. Let me describe our agenda very quickly this morning. You have the printed copy of our report. Mr. Kiley and I will present a few short briefing on the report. It has a lot of charts, but it's not going to take very long. And then we'll open the floor up to questions and comments and reactions. And for that, we'll follow our usual procedures, which I will review for you at that time. So, Greg, do you have any additional opening comments? Let me just go on to the next chart then. The report has essentially the same elements that our draft report did. The first four of these, we now have added a fifth section in which we produce the results of our evaluation of the option sets. Next chart. The key elements of our methodology are the independence of the assessment that it built heavily on our previous work as its starting point. We got input from many sides. I'm sure there are those from whom we did not hear, but it wasn't from a lack of effort or intent. We focused on, in fact, the medium to heavy geosynchronous orbit, mainly because that was the greatest importance from a national security focus. I think that the findings can be extended elsewhere, although the data change a little bit. I'd be happy to discuss that further if somebody wants to raise that as a question. We also paid close attention to the studies that were ongoing, both in and around the federal government going forward here, with an eye towards taking account of those as they emerged. And of course, right as we were going final, the President did release and issue the new national space policy from the administration, and we took account of that as we went into here as well. And of course, we took the comments that came into us from the draft report. Next chart. We concluded that national security depends upon commercial assets in space that comes as no surprise to anyone in this room. But we also concluded that the current implementation of the policy of assured access to space does not adequately recognize or deal with that dependency on commercial assets. And our discussions reflect that in the report. It also reflects the seven areas of concern. Next chart. These are essentially the same as were in our draft report. Let me call your attention though to the last one, because we found that the question of failing to act and the long-term implications was probably the single most uniting factor of all of our discussions. Individuals would disagree with one or more of the principal findings, one through six, based upon their own view and their own interpretation of what constituted goodness. No one disagreed that if we didn't change things, the long-term road we were on was not the right path. That was I think a very powerful remark. The codependency of national security and commercial space is under-recognized, but it's not undervalued once you get down to it. And we think that can be fixed. Next chart. These are the parts of the study. As I mentioned, part five is new. Let me go through them quickly. Next chart. We've already discussed our finding that commercial space assets are critical to national security, but we found a fairly widespread thought throughout the national security arena, particularly in DOD, but also elsewhere, that somehow those commercial assets were just going to be there. That there was no responsibility within DOD to make sure that they were launched or maintained and that access was assured. You know, 80% of worldwide DOD bandwidth use comes from commercial assets and between 93 and 96% over Iraq and Afghanistan. But that availability was neither planned nor deliberate within the national security arena. And we're pretty certain you can't count on it being there next time. It'd be nice if we could pick our wars based upon the availability of commercial satellites overhead. And if we did that, it'd be pretty easy for folks to take care of it. We clearly need to embrace commercial systems as part of our national security architecture. And we need to make sure that the launch capacity exists to support that. Next chart. Our study has considerable detail on the market and on the policies and regulations and statutes that affect that market. We've got a good bit of material in particular on export controls and where we might go in that regard. That draws on the theme that we had in our 2008 study. Today, even though we have the capacity to launch commercial communications satellites, by and large we don't. Companies need to have the right price and the right reliability and schedule to meet their business needs. And our national security needs take a different approach to those questions. Next chart. So we looked at some options. And these options are a few adjustments have been made from what was in the draft report. There are four sets of options, if you will. I'll go over them a little bit on the next chart. They're largely as they were in April. Next chart. Mainly it's increased our use of foreign launch providers, increased access to U.S. launches, increased the government's role itself. That is U.S. actually provides service. Let the government do it. And an additional, the fourth is actually an additional set of actions that sort of defy categorization, but all of which generally lend themselves towards increasing or enhancing demand for launch. I would like to point out that including an option for evaluation does not constitute endorsing that option from a CSIS point of view. An analytical approach rather than an upfront endorsement, if you will. Next chart. In order to evaluate them, we developed a set of criteria. There are five categories of those criteria. They're listed here, reliability, security, affordability, feasibility, and timeliness. And we covered these in great detail in our report. We refined them a bit as we exercised them and as we ran the options against the evaluation criteria. And that led to the new part of the report. Next chart, which is the results of that evaluation. It incorporated some public comments or some comments from the public, if you will. The comments themselves, however, are not public and were never intended to be public. We have protected those who submitted those comments. We used those evaluation criteria to analyze the option sets. The first three criteria, that is reliability, security, and affordability, focus on the impact of actually doing those options, what would happen. The last two, feasibility and timeliness, has to do with how hard it is to implement them. Can you get the votes? Would it take so long that by the time you finished, you wouldn't have made a difference, if you will? And so we laid those out in that regard. And that pretty much gets us to the end. We are briefing this around with interested parties. We've had a number of meetings on the schedule already. There's a lot of interest on this inside the government. Those of you who are at the event last week on the national space policy, know that it came up a couple of times and we didn't bring it up. Government people brought it up. So the report is out there. We are also identifying some areas of concern for continued work here at CSIS, particularly in the supplier base where notwithstanding the national space policy of a commitment to a robust industrial base, there is a bunch of weak spots and we think they deserve some attention and merit some solutions as well. But most importantly, I think, is we would like to do what we can to foster and support dialogue and ongoing conversation between the national security community and the commercial companies in the space business. And we think that dialogue up to now has been fairly lacking and we think there is some interest in pushing it forward and we would like to do what we can to support that. So given the temperature and the speed with which you all have read the report, first I was going to open up a question, but Greg, you may have a couple of comments you want to add. Just on the last bit there, and that's sort of the, from my perspective, one of the reasons why we undertook the five-month effort and next steps going forward. We recognize that there were some 29 other studies right now inside the government that have been recently completed or were currently ongoing on space launch. And we wanted to get out into that dialogue talking about the connectivity between commercial space and national security. And last week when some administration officials came over to brief the national space policy, they recognized that it's time to start moving forward. And although it was enough for attribution and Chatham House rules, one of the government officials there did express that the space posture review is also back on track. In other words, the government is actually starting to engage again on space policy. And I think that's a positive thing and that's part of what we were trying to do was get into that dialogue mix and I think we're right there right now. Are we using the wireless mics for, yes we are. Here's the way we work our questions. Most of you are very experienced at this so I know I don't need to. I feel like the flight attendant with the seat belt sign, right? Although I did not too long ago sit next to a woman who had never put a seat belt on before and was really struggling with it and I hate to tell you this, but the flight attendant's instructions were not particularly helpful to her. But let's set that aside because you all are a much different audience. So raise your hand, wait for the microphone. When you get the mic, I'd ask you actually to stand up so everybody can see you and identify who you are and with whom you're associated and then you can ask your question. So let me open the floor with that. Questions, comments? You're all as hot as I am. I know from experience as a professor that if you wait long enough, class will be over. We have one question for the record. This is on the record by the way. Thank you for your presentation. Did your report say anything about the secondary payload issue? Would you state your name? 40-pits one from the Cohen Group. Okay, thank you. Talk about secondary payload issue, hosted payloads and that sort of thing. There is some mention and discussion of that. We don't go into great detail on either the nature of such payloads, but we do note that there seems to be a correlation between US interest in using domestic launch capacity and the nature of the payload and we think that's a pretty obscure way of getting at the fundamental question which is responsibility for access as part of our assured access to space policy. You want to add anything to that? Just that the administration officials we did discuss hosted payloads with, theoretically and conceptually, that's an interest area, especially for people inside the White House, but as far as how that's being implemented, we did not get into detail. Seeing no further questions, I am happy to release you all back to a better air conditioned part of the building or of your life. Thank you all for coming.