 40 years ago to this very day, the 9th of May 1973, Europe Day, Garifus Jail rose into his feet in the ministerial benches to present his statement on foreign affairs to Dyle Aaron, which after the debate unanimously endorsed it as the policy of the state. In terms of its broad trust and orientation it remains in force to this day. In a piece of good fortune rare in Irish history, Garifus Jail became foreign minister, as you would now call it, at the moment Ireland joined the European community. It was a new world, a new government, and a new minister. He was as a consequence able to fashion and implement the policy Ireland would from the outset pursue in Europe. Going back 20 years later, he said, I was conscious of my great good fortune and the opportunity thus offered to me. It was our collective good fortune, due in great part to the Taoiseach, Liam Cosgrave, who had appointed him. At a time, a surprise, in retrospect, a stroke of genius. It just seemed the right thing to do, Liam Cosgrave explained once, indeed it was. This paper analyzes the formulation and implementation of the policy Garifus Jail fashioned 40 years ago. His primary focus is statecraft, the business of managing the affairs of a nation in its relations with the outside world. It is not a biography of Garifus Jail, and neither is is a review of his involvement in domestic politics. Rather it is a short three-at-ties on his European policy. It is, in my view, one of his great legacies the modern Ireland, ranking in importance with his contributions on Northern Ireland, his constitutional crusade, and his rescue of the economy in the 80s. It is appropriate that on Europe Day, his contribution shall be commemorated by recalling his thoughts and actions and reflecting on them for their relevance to the present and their importance for the future. This lecture in his memory draws on two lectures he gave himself on the theme of a small state in a large union. The first of the Royal Irish Academy in 1975, two and a half years after he had taken office as Minister for Foreign Affairs, and the second to this institute in 1993 after he had retired from politics and had been asked to reflect on the first 20 years of Ireland's membership of the European community. It also draws on his two autobiographies, two autobiographies, and his two volumes as reflections on the Irish state and its role in the world, as well as that ministerial speech that first went in Dal-Erin, a subsequent speech over a decade later in the Shannad when Tishock, and indeed on memories of numerous conversations and discussions over a period of 50 years. From this great volume of material, three phrases stand out. The first appeared in the Irish Times article in the late 60s to the effect that membership of the European community would be a psychological liberation for this country, a liberation from what he described as its neurotic relationship with Britain. The second appeared four decades later again in the Irish Times in which he said that the European Union was a friend Ireland had always been looking for, a judgment which sprang from his deep familiarity with Irish history. The third is a reference in that speech of 20 years ago that Ireland was self-evidently a small state with a very limited capacity to get its own way, and hence the imperative in European affairs was to be smart, and that would become the watchword of his statecraft. These three insights of release from domination, of having allies at last, and of being small in the big world are key to understanding the policy he created with typical speed in the first weeks of being minister. His starting point was that membership of the European community represented a complete break with the past. Traditionally, international affairs consisted of bilateral relations with other states, occasional engagements in alliances, and voluntary membership of international bodies. In virtually all of these cases, the participants engaged in a zero sum game. They were protagonists, there were winners and losers. Win-win relationships only arose in the face of a common threat, a common enemy, and just as quickly, were just as quickly abandoned when the threat of real or potential disappeared. The conduct of international affairs was, especially among the great powers, a series of shifting alliances. It was a bleak world given over to the pursuit of self-interest, a world best summed up in Parmesan's dictum that in international affairs, nations had no permanent friends or allies, only permanent interests. Now the European community stood that on its head. It represented a world in which nations undertook to be permanent friends and allies, for after all the Rome Treaty on which it was founded declared itself to be a treaty in perpetuity. It was neither limited in time nor bounded in ambition. Its first aim was to create a never closer union amongst the peoples of Europe, an ambition that was undefined and unbounded. Indeed the national sovereignty that had been so hard won in most cases and prized by all was to be shared with other nations and exercised by common institutions in accordance with law. A new legal order was being established in which member states undertook to be bound by collective decisions even if they were outvoted on an issue. This was unprecedented in international affairs and it meant that the word European took on a new meaning. It was no longer just a geographical or cultural expression, it was now invested with real political and economic content which affected the conduct of everyday domestic affairs. And this called for a new form of statecraft, which can be defined as the management by a state of its relations with other states, a process usually conducted by foreign ministers and diplomats. And up to this point Irish foreign policy, Irish statecraft, was almost exclusively anglo-centric indeed for good reasons. But having arrived in the new Europe the context for the conduct of Irish statecraft changed utterly and it was at that point Gareth Fitzgerald became foreign minister and constructed a new foreign policy for Ireland within which or perhaps more accurately in parallel with which he devised a policy on Europe. He had to do so de novo, there were no precedents to follow, no models to copy, no template to hand. The obstacles were formidable. Culturally, politically and economically Ireland had been separated from continental Europe for over a century and a half. Ireland belonged to the Anglophone world and had little contact with the countries conventionally described as the continent. There was little experience of European politics and in a sense we were the forgotten people of Europe. But the problem as an American diplomat observed at the time was that membership of the European community was teaching Europeans to talk to each other instead of fight. This meant that the country had to know what to say and to have people to say it. Ireland was ill-equipped for this state of constant conversation. In terms of diplomatic resources Ireland had a tiny foreign service with only 21 embassies abroad. Denmark, for example, having twice that number. The Oroctus had no foreign affairs committee or little or no expertise in European affairs apart from a desultory relationship with the Council of Europe and linguistic skills were in short supply for conversing in what was then an Anglophone or Francophone organization. But the most deep-seated obstacles which arose from the nature of Ireland itself and consisted of the size, the poverty and the peripherality of the country. By any criterion Ireland was a small country and if statescraft is the projection of power in international affairs it is far more difficult if there is little power to project either economic or military and more difficult still of the country is the monstably poor and geographically peripheral as Ireland was. The intellectual challenge posed by these realities was to work out a strategy enabling Ireland to overcome its fundamental weaknesses and face with the absence of any vestige of hard power in terms of population size, economic strength or military capability. Garifus Sherrill sought to offset that disadvantage or these disadvantages by developing soft power essentially by making Ireland politically central a strategy that also compensated for being geographically peripheral and by making it a player in big ideas which compensated for being small. This meant being relative or relevant to the enterprises as a whole and engaging in all of its affairs as well as making a political contribution that was unique to Ireland but valuable to the Union. It also meant being willing and having the capacity to play on the large scale on the large stage. Now the foundation on which everything rested from the very beginning was Garifus Sherrill's recognition that a new Europe was a joint enterprise by France and Germany and intended to be a permanent reconciliation between them by replacing a century and a half of repeated warfare with a long lasting peace. The project was after all the brainchild of a Frenchman Jean Manet and had been publicly launched by another Frenchman, Francis Foreign Minister Maurice Schumann and had been immediately accepted by the German Chancellor Conrad Ardenauer. In a sense all other European countries in the European Union are guests of the French and the Germans. At the time of its formation there was no compulsion to join and there's no compulsion now to join the Union. But if a country elects to join then it does so in the full knowledge that France and Germany are at the core of the project and largely determined the pace and direction of its progress as well as the manner of its responses to political and economic challenges as they emerge. The first tenets of sound statecraft are to recognize the obvious and to accept the inevitable which more difficult than it sounds for politicians. Gareth Fitzgerald complied with both in recognizing and accepting France and Germany as the cornerstone of Europe and did so without complaints and without trying to undermine their joint achievements or frustrate their ambitions. For the Ireland of Gareth Fitzgeralds this meant replacing London with Paris and Bonn as the center of Irish foreign policy. In these circumstances he saw that his immediate task was in a quote to convince the Germans of our commitment to European integration and the French of our independence of British influence. This was far more difficult than it seems now in retrospect because at the time very little was known of Ireland and Germany apart from Heinrich Bohl's romantic account of his stay in Eichel and John Ford's film The Quiet Man. While the French suspected us of being a British satellite not least because we spoke English. Thus amongst the many tasks to be accomplished in the first years of membership rebranding Ireland was one of the most urgent because a small state has to establish itself as an independent actor and positive participant it was to have any influence on the policies of a large union. Within the special world of European diplomacy the rebranding was achieved almost immediately due largely to Gareth Fitzgerald's capacity to project himself on his interlocutors. The Germans were impressed by his grasp of economics and his commitment to removing trade barriers while the French were enchanted by what he himself called his idiomatic but ungrammatical command of their language. On a continuous basis it meant Ireland investing disproportionate resources in the study of French and German politics, policy formation, economics, political parties and personalities so as to have an informed understanding how each state functioned and of vital importance how the Franco-German alliance worked. So if getting out from under the shadow of Britain was an immediate task then re-engineering the relationship with that large neighbour was equally urgent. The relationship had always been tricky due to the disparity in population and economic strength and of course due to the legacy of history whereby one party in the relationship felt itself superior to the other and behaved accordingly. But the challenge facing Ireland was managing the shifts in relationship from being exclusively bilateral and claustrophobic as Gareth Fitzgerald called it, to the multilateral and the expansive. The character of the relationship was now changed by virtue of the two countries sitting as formal equals at the council table in Brussels but while it would be absurd to claim that it had been turned overnight into a political, a relationship of political equals a subtle psychological change would nonetheless take place. Irish economic prospects were no longer solely dependent on the goodwill of Whitehall and the psychological liberation Gareth Fitzgerald had forecast began to happen indeed at a speed faster than anyone anticipated. When the British government for example decided in 1975 to hold a referendum on the UK membership of the community the Irish government even formally concluded that were Britain to leave then Ireland would stay put. Still the British would expect simply out of a habit of mind that at the council table Ireland would support them as a matter of course and in extremis would do their bidding. Now this introduced a new tension into the relationship because on the one hand the two countries had opposing economic interests which would pit them against each other in the council table especially on some of the grand agenda items such as the common agricultural policy and the community budget. On the other hand especially at this time Northern Ireland was drawing them closer together in a common endeavor to defeat the IRA and cooperation with the British government was never so strong or so necessary and was growing stronger. I think the obvious point here is that geography plays a dominant and sometimes the dominant role in international affairs. When asked how do you become rich Oscar Wilde answered choose your parents with great care but you can no more pick your geographic neighbors than you can your parents and in both cases you're stuck with them. So for a small state within the union that means in addition to managing its relations with France and Germany it will simultaneously manage its affair with its largest neighbor in such a way that binary choices are avoided. That is to say either our choices are kept off the agenda that is between France and Germany on the one hand and the big neighbor on the other. The task for the foreign minister is to sail between Silla and Caribdis as serenely as possible. Sometimes the choice is unavoidable and these painful circumstances the decision to be made must be preordained as it were by being consistent with the state's basic policy stance on European integration. Now this introduced the task of defining it for Ireland with clarity and with firmness. Garfus Gerald understood that the crucial issue for Ireland was the stance to be taken on economic and political integration. The question for resolution he said in that first speech was whether that stance should be minimalist or maximalist. The other two new member states the UK and Denmark adopted for a minimalist stance but the hymn, the arguments for a contrary approach seemed to be compelling. Our immediate concern he told the Doyle must be to define our attitude on the question of community supranationality and the development of the community institutions and to relate this to the community's progress towards economic and monetary union and the question of European union. He reasoned that Ireland would fare best in a supranational structure within which the larger countries will be constrained from exercising their sovereignty at the expense of other countries. He had Britain in mind of course particularly in regard to the low prices it paid for Irish agricultural produce. By virtue of its size he said Ireland had no equivalent opportunity to exercise its sovereignty to its own advantage or at the expense of others. He concluded that in terms of real as distinct from nominal sovereignty Ireland was bound to be a net beneficiary in a system designed for sharing sovereignty. Hence it followed that Ireland should support moves towards integration. There was a paradox here. The paradox was that by sharing sovereignty it was automatically enhanced. Shared sovereignty would stimulate economic growth. The more the economy grew the greater degree of economic independence. The greater the degree of economic independence. The greater the extent of political independence. He also reasoned that the further economic integration developed the more it was bound to involve a growing transfer of resources to the community budget from which he said Ireland would particularly benefit. Furthermore because Ireland would gain from the common agricultural policy it would emerge as a major beneficiary of community monetary transfers hence economic integration should be supported. However that brought another reason into play and this time it was purely political. As he said in the circumstances where this country became a major net beneficiary of transfers there was a danger of Ireland being perceived negatively by its partners as a, and I quote, a drag on and a burden to the community, unquote. Moreover the danger would be accentuated by the fact that Ireland would be making no contribution to European defence for a long time ahead if ever. Hence he believed that a positive and constructive approach to the future development of the community which was clearly distinguishable from that of the UK and Denmark would safeguard Ireland's position as a net beneficiary. In the words that George Bernard Shaw put into the mouth of Arthur Doolittle in his play Pygmalion Ireland would be part of the deserving poor rather than the undeserving poor. In the 1975 speech he expressed this rationale in dramatic terms. The nature of our economic interests dictate a very positive attitude towards the institutional development of the community and of strengthening its decision making structures. In practical terms this very positive attitude meant that Ireland would favour movement away from making community decisions by unanimity which put the use of the veto at the centre of the process to making decisions by majority vote which automatically eliminated its use. His judgement on the utility of the veto was entirely pragmatic. Large states were relatively immune from backlash when they used it but small states had to face the fact that their use of it was quite limited. In this matter he said before the deputies it is realistic to recognise that some are more equal than others. An application of George Orwell's Animal Farm in which it was said that some animals were more equal than others and he added quite iconically that we had to learn to take the rough with the smooth. In fact Ireland never used the veto although Gareth Fitzgerald appeared ready to do so and the question and build quotas ran as a t-shirt. He walked out of a European council meeting in March 1984 because of what he called the objuracy of his opponents and the walk out was sufficient to produce a satisfactory solution. At the behest of France and the support of Germany be it said an instructive example of how his general strategy worked. As a consequence of his reasoning Ireland became and remains what is best described as a psychological insider within the European Union but this has meant a member state which as a matter of course is part of the general consensus under governance and politics of the Union and routinely supports the deepening of the integration process whenever circumstances so demand. The instinctive response to a proposal from the commissioner council is in the affirmative contrasting with the psychological outsider where the spontaneous response to new proposals is the reverse. The starting points could be hardly further apart when being positive even enthusiastic on occasion and when being negative sometimes dismissive. I think three examples stand out of Ireland acting as a psychological insider and they are the decisions by Jack Lynch to join the exchange rate mechanism in 1979 by Gareth Fitzgerald to support the calling of an intergovernmental conference at the Milan European Council meeting in 1985 and by Albert Reynolds committing Ireland to the Treaty on European Union at Maastricht in 1992. In fact, today's could be added the recent decision by T-Shack and the Kenny at the European Council in December 2011 regarding the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance and on otherwise as the fiscal compact. The context for Gareth Fitzgerald's decision was the joint determination of President Mitterrand of France and Chancellor Kohl of Germany to deepen integration in the face of economic sclerosis in Europe and this was to be done by going beyond the common market established by the Rome Treaty and creating an internal market. This step had been recommended by a committee of the personal representatives of the heads of state and government chaired significantly by Professor Jim Duke the foreign minister and Gareth Fitzgerald's first government a position that Gareth Fitzgerald had himself engineered. Now although she had reluctantly agreed to the establishment of the Duke Committee, Mrs. Thatcher resisted the idea of implementing its recommendations when they were put which would involve amendments to the Rome Treaty. To start that process an intergovernmental conference was required and when Mitterrand and Kohl sought a vote on the matter at the Milan Council Mrs. Thatcher in his words reacted with fury. A brief break was called and she stormed up the room saying Gareth, I hope you are going to oppose this. Remember our negotiations on Northern Ireland referring he said to a difficult meeting held earlier that morning on Anglo-Irish relations. Some recall him describing her intervention in slightly different words as Gareth, you can't do this to me. Now the politics of the council meeting were very simple. There were ten leaders in the room, six represented the founder member states all of whom were in favor of calling the IGC. Four represented the new member states of which the UK, Denmark and Greece were opposed. Ireland was the swing vote. If it sided with the new member states there would be a schism between the old and the new and perhaps which would prove to be irreparable and irreversible. Faced with the choice between the old and the new are put in another way between national priorities on Europe and those on Northern Ireland Gareth has shared on hesitatingly chose Europe and elected to vote with the original six members. I was in fact he said in the 1993 lecture delighted to show in the most definitive way where Ireland stood and really had. The significance of the Milan decision taken on his own initiative was at least fourfold. It confirmed Ireland's strategic positioning as a psychological insider one which could be relied upon to be part of the pioneering group of states even in circumstances where opting for that role put other national objectives at risk. Next it prevented a clear cut division between the old and the new member states which otherwise might have led as I said to the emergence of two opposing camps within the union. This contribution was widely appreciated at the time especially by President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl and added immeasurably to Ireland's reputation with both. Ireland was obviously not a drag on the community, indeed the opposite. It also communicated a toughness of mind to Mrs. Thatcher that probably worked to his advantage in dealing with her on Northern Ireland. Finally it opened the door to the IGC which went on to produce a single European Act establishing the single or internal market, a development which Ireland strongly supported. I think that the significance of Gareth Fitzgerald's decision at the Milan Council can hardly be exaggerated nor can his role within it. From the perspective of a small state it demonstrated that being a psychological insider multiplied its influence that having a clear set of priorities properly ordered led to the right strategic choices even under intense pressure. His Milan decision had a further lesson for small states. He was later able to strengthen the cohesion provisions of the single European Act as it was being drafted and to write the provisions on security as it applied to a neutral state like Ireland. In one case the national interest was advanced in the other it was defended proof that the best way to do both is to position the state as a proactive partner in the task of deepening interdependence. And this was the paradox that Gareth Fitzgerald understood and it determined his choice at Milan, a decision that serves as a fundamental lesson in statecraft to all small states. He had argued that from the outset that for a small state like Ireland a narrow defence of the national interests without regard for the common European interests would be self-defeating and ultimately counterproductive. He was proven right. The cohesion funds which were later offered to Ireland proved, shall we say, substantial. And the scale of the transfers during the 90s proved the key factor in modernising the economy and launching the Celtic Tiger. And adopting the role of the psychological inserters saw two other problems, how to avoid being that drag on and burden to the other member states and simultaneously how to advance or defend the national interests knowing that a small state has few opportunities of accomplishing either and that in an ever-enlarging union the opportunities for doing both become correspondingly fewer. Now the role of the demon there or in international affairs or the demandor is never easy for a small state. But in the European Union requests however pressing have to fit in with the need of the union as a whole to reconcile competing national interests. In these circumstances an intelligent strategy is to be both a demandor and a contributor. And the rule is to be a contributor all of the time and a demandor some of the time indeed keeping demands to the very minimum. The goodwill we have always enjoyed in the community and which I should say has brought us so many tangible benefits have been enhanced, he explained to the Senate in 1985 by our positive attitude on so many issues. And it followed logically that if Ireland was going to be a positive insurer then it would make sense to work with and become an ally of the common institutions. And this was in recognition of the reality that the decision-making process laid down by the Rome 3, he was sui generis quite literally speaking it was one of a kind for which there was no analogue. And he followed the logic which is rare enough in politics. He reckoned that understanding the dynamics of the decision-making process was essential and he recognized that the pitfall to be avoided lay in confusing union institutions with those of the state. The commission is not a government and the council is not an executive nor is the parliament a source of ultimate power. And a small state has to develop a sophisticated understanding of this triangular relationship especially as it is one which constantly evolves. Indeed, decision-making involves a quadrangular relationship in the light of the role being played by the European council. And the legacy that Gareth Fischel has left behind in respect of the institutions has been to position Ireland as an ally of the commission, a supporter of the parliament and an opponent of attempts to create a direct toire within the council a framework which should commend itself to all small states. In respect of the commission he was instrumental in securing not solely but instrumental in securing the appointment of Jacques Delors as president and developed strong and institutional bonds with his and others commission. And this has positively influenced Ireland's relationships in my view with commissions ever since. In his relationship with the parliament he favored the extension of its powers as a legislator and expansion of its role as the institutional expression of the peoples of Europe. During the first presidency of 1975, for example, he attended and reported to all seven plenary sessions of the parliament and introduced Gareth's style of parliamentary questioning to innovations which have endured to some extent. But now that the parliament is a co-legislator with the council, this inheritance grows more valuable. Since working with the parliament has become the sine qua non of intelligent statecraft and especially for small states like Ireland. I think that's the good working relationship with the commission and the parliament was the direct result of a strategy he devised to the first Irish presidency of 1975. A strategy which he recalls in his autobiography as emerging from a thinking with friends while on holiday with Dennis Corba in Dennis Corba's place in the south of France, the profitable use of a vacation. Its distinctive feature he said later would be style and procedural innovation. Perfect examples of the concept of self-power. But for a small state to prosper in a large union it must have said earlier contribute something special to the capacity of the union to function internally and to operate externally. And in the case of Ireland, there are at least four national assets of value to the community, to the union as a whole. And the first relates to the UK. Here Ireland is seen by other member states as an informed source of advice on Britain's European policy and an expert analyst of British politics. On occasion Ireland has acted as a catalyst in resolving major disputes, such as Harle Wilson's and Margaret Thatcher's problems under community budget, which Garifus Gerald helped to resolve in both cases with great skill. Or of smoothing out difficulties, such as John Major's problem with the word federal in the draft Maastricht Treaty, which Albert Reynolds handled with great tact. Such a role can be invaluable to the rest of the union in managing what has been described as, maybe charitably, a difficult partner. But it carries the danger of impinging on Ireland's independence and reviving French fears of being no more than a British satellite. It carries a particular danger now that Britain is trying to, quote, repatriate, unquote, it's at its certain competences. Yet it's going to be inevitable that Ireland will be engaged in this delicate exercise and will be called upon no doubt to interpret what is happening, especially about what is going to happen in Scotland. And to evaluate the repercussions of Scottish independence should it arise. The second asset is Ireland's special relationship to kind of phrase with the United States. And Ireland's inside knowledge of American politics and access to the White House and Congress are unmatched. Suffice it to say that the use of Irish personnel in the EU mission in Washington is an intelligent use of Irish strengths to the advantage of the union. The third asset arises from Ireland's past as a colonized country, in contrast to those member states who were colonizers. And this inheritance can be of positive value, for example, when dealing with former European colonies and was put the best use in the negotiations on the Lomé conventions. First time round it was Garthus Gerald himself who led the European side to universal acclaim. And the fourth asset arises from the past because from the outset of its membership at the UN, Ireland became a peacekeeper and in the interim has built up formidable expertise in peacekeeping operations, which are not only is being put to use by the EU, but is growing, growing in value as can be seen and demonstrated in Chad in 2007 and 2008. I think that these assets add up to a significantly and uniquely Irish contribution to the combined assets of the union. Handled intelligently, they can place Ireland's center stage when Europe is dealing with certain sensitive issues. We should have no illusions, said Garthus Gerald in the Doyle speech, that our contribution can be more than a modest one, but at least there is one to be made and it ensures that when done properly, the problems of peripherality and size are minimized if not eliminated, at least temporarily. There is, of course, the fifth asset that nuts people. Intelligent statecraft will ensure that only the brightest and the best were sent out to the common institutions and that a conscious effort will be made to put them in positions where they could enhance the country's reputation, defend its interests and contribute to the general welfare of Europe. Starting with the European Commission, where the government itself has the responsibility for choosing the Irish member, it should be expected that the appointment would represent a conscious decision in statecraft. The positive impact of some of our commissioners has been significant and underlines the point that a small state should not use the commission as a rest home for the redundant, a dumping ground for the difficult or a nursing home for non-entities. Remembering Oscar Wilde's admission that he could resist anything except temptation, it was insensible to avoid that fate by constructing a selection process in which the best candidate emerges. The penalty for sending out the wrong one can be severe and if for no other reason, small state governments should restrict their choice of commissioners to their best and their brightest. On the other hand, the people choose their representatives in the European Parliament. Now when the issue of direct elections to the parliament first arose in the 1970s, the national coalition government decided to extend the use of a single transferable vote to European elections, thereby multiplying the manifest disadvantages of that system in promoting the best and the brightest as MEPs. Admittedly, the system did produce a president of the parliament. But where the country has only got 12 members out of 736, then the quality is at a premium. Furthermore, as said, the parliament is now a co-legislator with the council on most matters, thereby adding to the requirement on quality. I think the revisiting decision on the use of STV and examining the list system as an alternative would be consistent with the principles of sound statecraft. And finally, there is the broader question of peopling the institutions. Now while Ireland has been successful in providing two secretaries general of the commission, there is no overall strategy for promoting the concept of a career in the European institutions. I'm introducing interchangeability between national and European administrations or targeting the type and position, the type and number of the positions that would ensure a critical mass of Irish functionnaires across the system. At present, there is a sense of impending crisis about Ireland's presence in the institutions, now which may very well be misplaced, but it should be addressed for the matter surely is of perennial interest to a small stage. Garifus Gerald had a deep interest in public administration and an appropriate way of commemorating would be to use the Institute of Public Administration, the Institute for Ireland in Leuven and the Irish College in Paris to train high level public servants in European affairs and indeed to create an Irish equivalent of ENA, the Echo National Administration in Paris. And I think it's disturbing that we have no way of retaining institutional memory in statecraft and public service or transmitting it between the generations. A small state that was Glick or street smart would have had that as a high priority. And that brings this memorial lecture towards its close. And in respect of the small state being Glick or street smart, let me say that in the words of the Boy Scout motto, be olive, a small state has to be ready to be constantly assessing what is likely to happen in the union. Informed insights ensures optimum strategic positioning and avoids costly mistakes of being caught off guard. Gareth Fitzgerald understood the teleological nature of the European project. That is to say the inner purpose and design of the process where teleology is sometimes defined as purposeful development towards an end. He first saw, for example, that a common market led to an internal market, which necessitated a monetary union, which in turn required an economic union and led inexorably towards a political union. On this line of reasoning, the euro was not going to implode. Banking, fiscal and economic unions will be created because of the necessity for sectoral federalism which will in turn require a form of political union to confer democratic legitimacy on the European project and to ensure consent among the electorates. In practical terms, the euro zone has become the core of the union. A core which will grow progressively larger. Those outside the core will constitute a new form of union membership as yet undefined with Britain as its most prominent and perhaps ultimately its only member. As a psychological insider, Ireland has chosen to be part of the euro zone, but membership will raise two sets of difficulties over the next five to 10 years. A growing separation from Britain, which will have to be managed with great care, and a deeper integration with the other member states affecting taxation, economic governance, internal affairs and external security, all of which developments will have to be managed with extraordinary skill. We can anticipate there will be further referenda. On each occasion, our membership of the core Europe will be on the line. And as is now widely accepted, we can only vote once on any new treaty. Voting no twice would be a definitive rejection of the next move to deep integration and a parting of the ways with the core. Each referendum therefore puts Ireland's membership of the European Union at risk. If a referendum is lost, it would unravel the achievements of Irish statecraft as pursued since 1961. Being the realist he was, Gareth Sherild understood this existential threat to Irish, to Ireland's future. That is why, despite his advancing years and many competing demands on his time, he campaigned for a yes vote and all the European referendum up to his last days. But neither he nor his contemporaries intended that Ireland would become a referendum country. When it came to deciding whether or not the latest treaty on integration should be ratified or not. Indeed, the merits of direct democracy, well, whatever they are, it is at odds at least those merits with the demands of managing the affairs of a small state in a complex and large union. One course of action will be to enshrine membership of the European Union as a permanent feature of the Constitution. That was the intent of the Eroctus and the path chosen by the people in the referendum of 1972 or so they thought. So at the conclusion of this short three o'tires on Gareth Sherild's thoughts and actions as foreign minister and his T-shirt, his thoughts and actions on European policy, it's possible to draw up a series of guiding principles for a small state in a large union. And without being too fanciful, they might be called the Fitzgerald principles of which there are 12. One, except that the European Union is essentially a Franco-German enterprise, that they set the direction, the content and the pace of the integration process and operate accordingly. Two, to not become a satellite of another member state, create and sustain a national brand for independence of mind and action. Three, be politically central to the life of the union by working closely with France and Germany. Four, manage the relationship with large neighbors so as to avoid binary choices between them and France and Germany. But if the choice has to be made, then decide unhesitatingly in favor of the Franco-German Alliance. Fifth, maintain a positive working relationship with each of the common institutions and adapt to their agenda so that they adopt yours. Six, become a psychological insurer and use that psychological positioning to advance the national interest as part of the overall European agenda. Seven, support moves towards enhancing the super nationality of the union sourced in large rather than diminish national sovereignty. Eight, be selective in the choice and frequency of demands on other member states. In other words, hesitate before becoming a demand there. Nine, position demands within a general framework designed to produce win-win outcomes for the whole of the union. Ten, identify the national assets that can be brought to the service of the union and make them available as and when required. Eleven, people, the administrations of the common institutions with high caliber functionnaires. And last, think big, be relevant, be street smart, and be fun to be with. On this Europe day, it is proper to recall that there were other influences that work in the mind of Gareth Charles when he devoted so much of his energies to advancing the cause of Ireland in Europe. He was also motivated by a deep Christian conviction that Europe had a moral dimension more important than economics. Europe is for us, he said, not merely a matter of national interest when addressing the Senate. It is also an ideal and an imperative. But the examination of those ideas are for another day. Today has instead been devoted to an examination of statecraft to the role of a small state in a large union and to the strategies that are essential for success. In the sphere of statecraft, Gareth Charles made a singular contribution which would on its own be sufficient to elevate him into the pantheon of great Irish leaders. 40 years ago to this day, he set this country on a course of action which has conferred such benefit on his own generation and this and which will continue to confer benefit on the generations to come. There can be no statecraft without statesmen. Strategies alone are not sufficient. Small states need big individuals with a big presence, with big ideas ready to play a big role on the big stage when the need arises. By any standards, Gareth Charles was a big man and Ireland was the bigger because of him. It was indeed one of those rare strokes of good fortune in Irish history that he was appointed foreign minister 40 years ago on this day, Europe Day. Thank you.