 I'd like to welcome you now to our second panel, which is going to broaden the lens a little bit so that we can talk about the regional and international implications of Iranian-Azerbaijani relations. Unfortunately, as you heard, one of our panelists, Dr. Liu Xiang, is not feeling well and is not able to join us today, so we're going to have a slightly abbreviated panel here, which hopefully will leave a little bit more time for discussion. I think again we'll just go along the order that we have printed on the program here. Let me turn the floor over to our first speaker, Sergey Markodonov, who's a visiting fellow in the Russian Eurasia program here at CSIS. Good morning, everyone. Thank you for coming. I see this event has a great interest because of many people here. Thank you for the opportunity to make presentation today. Which topic, Iranian-Azerbaijani relations and their implication for their regional and international security? I'm going to concentrate on three basic topics. The first one, general trends in the security developments in the South Caucasus for recent year, the role of Iran, because Iranian topic produced many hard discussions and estimates for previous panel, but some of them were missed. It's necessary to return to them and estimate. And then I'm going to stress on the Russia's role in the regional security and its attitude to the South Caucasus as whole and Iranian engagement in the development of the region. Since 2008, we have been witnesses of the shaping new status quo in the South Caucasus. The first status quo was formed there after the USSR collapse. And it provoked many ethnic conflicts and instability. Just today, the South Caucasus is one of the most unstable and unpredictable regions in the former USSR area. Six or eight ethnopolitical conflicts have taken place here and three or four de facto states are still existing in this region. But after the events of 2008 with recognition of Abkhazia and South Asia by Russia, many problems were transformed. And now we are witnesses of new status quo shaping with new role of Russia with the suspended cooperation between the countries of the region and NATO and some other very important influences, especially Arab Spring after 2011. And here it's necessary to pay special attention to the role of Iran. Just today, the Iranian problem stands out on the international agenda. But it's much broader and more diverse than Iran's desire to acquire a nuclear bomb. Speaking about the Iranian engagement in the South Caucasus, it's necessary to understand that this area is not front line for the Iranian foreign policy. It's kind of backyard because front line is a Gulf region and the Middle East as whole. As for the Caucasus, of course, the role of Iran is very interesting, but especially interesting and crucially important in terms of possible transfer of Middle East challenges and problems in the Caucasus territory. It's interesting to especially stress that Iranian foreign policy looks like combination of pragmatic approach on the one side and loud revolutionary rhetoric on the other side. One factor was missed for previous presentations, previous panel, I mean here the cooperation between Azerbaijan and Israel. It has a special concern for the Iranian foreign policy. And Iran is especially concerned by the penetration of non-regional actors in the region. For Iran, regional actors are Iran itself, of course, Turkey and Russia. And it's not coincidence that after events of 2008, Tehran proposed after the Turkish initiative, its own initiative, 3 plus 3, meaning here the cooperation between three countries of the region, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia, and three neighboring countries having historical impact on the development of the Caucasus, Russia, Turkey and Iran itself. And just today, the most important challenge considered by Iran is penetration of international actors. This is why Iran is the only country which is protesting or criticizing the updated moderate principles because one of the points of the updated moderate principles recommended the presence of international peacekeepers. Who would be those peacekeepers, Americans, Europeans and so on? For Iran, it's a kind of concern and this penetration is considered like a threat. What's about Russia and Russian estimates of the Caucasus security issues as well as Azerbaijan, Armenia, Iran, Iranian engagement? As for Russian-Iranian relations, they are not limited by the Caucasus, of course. They have much broader context. But in the Caucasus dimension, those relationships are very important because don't forget that for two military campaigns in Chichnya, Iran supported the territorial integrity of Russia and even for the second campaign when Iran was a chair of the Organization of Islamic Conference. Iran supported the Russian position and the situation and especially stressed that it was not dealing with separatists or Islamic extremists, radicals connected with the Sunni direction of Islam. At the same time, it's impossible to overestimate the relationship between Moscow and Tehran because there are some problems in terms of the Caspian Sea partition and delimitation, first of all. It's the most important issue. And there is a specific concern of Iran. It's very, to Russia, of course, it's very different from the perceptions of Russia in the West because in the West, many experts and policy makers are afraid of strong Russia. Iran is afraid of weak Russia, which would be controlled by the West. And there is a specific fear that Russia would be kind of puppet figure of the West and Putin would be kind of puddle or puppet figure of the Western policy makers. As for Russian policy, let me go back to events of 2008. That time here, the most popular question was about the next, the next victim of Russian ambitions and so the future prospects of Ukraine or Azerbaijan or Moldova were discussed that time. But for me personally, that time and nowadays it wasn't, it is now clear that for revisionism, Russia has had no sufficient resources. This is why Russian policy in the Caucasus today could be characterized like selective revisionism. Russia preferred to be a status quo power before 2008 and facing the unfreezing of the conflict between 2004-2008. Russia changed this approach only in the Georgian direction, not in the direction of Azerbaijan, Armenia or some other countries of the post-Soviet Spaces Hall or the South Caucasus. Just today, speaking about the Armenian and Azerbaijani relations and Russian approach, this policy could be considered like swing policy. Because Russia recognizing the independence of Abkhazia and South Asia lost many resources for direct impact or even pressure on Georgia. On the one side, Russia could be considered as a winner in events of 2008 because the NATO cooperation with Georgia was practically suspended. And of course, rhetoric is brilliant and many promises, but no concrete deadlines and concrete dynamics around. And Russia demonstrated that for this country it was impossible to violate its own national interests. But on the other side, it's kind of loss of influence on Georgia and problems with the relationship with the West, of course. They are not so tough right now, but those contradictions are still existing. This is why Russia is interested to have more or less reliable relations in both countries in Armenia and with Azerbaijan. Russian position to Nagorno-Karabakh resolution is very different from approach to Abkhazia and South Asia, which we recognize like independent states. As for Nagorno-Karabakh, Russia is not ready to recognize this entity. Moreover, Russian representatives for the electoral campaigns in this de facto state practically every time didn't recognize the electoral campaigns themselves, not only the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic as a non-recognized entity. I mean, here presidential election in Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, previous year and so on. There were many statements stressing the Russian position on territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. At the same time, Armenia is considered as one of the most important military political allies of Russia in the South Caucasus. Don't forget about base located in Ghumri and common cooperation of two border guard services of Russia and Armenia and Russian military presence in the East Republic. But at the same time, I could not characterize the relationship between Russia and Armenia like complete honeymoon. There is a problem of Eurasian Union and there is a problem of different perceptions of Yerevan by the strategic cooperation with Russia. Yerevan is very interested to have military support of Russia and cooperation in the framework of CSTO. Very interested. But as for Eurasian Union or Custom Union, there is no such interest because with no sharing common border idea to have Custom Union looks like ambiguous at least. This is why Yerevan is not seriously eager to accelerate the process of joining the Eurasian Union and Custom Union. It's also considered like a challenge in Moscow. Moscow is not completely satisfied the level of cooperation between Armenia and NATO. It's interesting question, by the way, because speaking about Armenia and Azerbaijan, we could not conclude only about regional arms raising or Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. There is also competition for NATO. There is another direction, competition for Russia. Because in terms of this competition, Yerevan is not interested to lose its influence or even simple connections between Armenia and NATO. And to liberate this territory for Azerbaijan and for Azerbaijan activity. This is why practically two countries in parallel realize the goal to have more corporations with NATO, European Union. In Russia, it's also considered not like threat, but with no satisfaction. Now let me finish. Because there are many other issues and I hope to have your questions for the QA session. There I am going to be more detailed with the information, which would be interesting for you. Thank you. Okay, well we'll look forward to that. Our second speaker is Nicar Guxo, who is the editor-in-chief of the Turkish policy quarterly and is going to talk about the Turkish perspective on Iranian-Israel relations. Thank you very much. I'm actually going to start by underlining something that Mr. Ivanov said, and that when he was talking about Iran's areas, which areas significant for Iran most, he said that the Caucasus is a secondary and the Middle East is primary. And I would say actually in Turkish-Iran relations as well, particularly now, the Middle East is much more the scene of rivalry versus cooperation. And the Caucasus is somewhat in the back burner. Also just because of the conjecture of the Arab Spring and where the world is also more focused nowadays. But in my talk today, I'm going to focus more obviously on Turkey and Iran as it relates to the Caucasus. Traditionally, Turkey's added value, at least for its traditional allies, in the Caucasus has been its ability to counterbalance Iran and Russia for Azerbaijan and Georgia in particular. It was Turkey's ability to extend the Western strategic reassurance to the Caucasus. I think the single most tangible demonstration of this role was in the Baku Tbilisi-Jehan, sorry, oil pipeline. But for Azerbaijan, there was another case that was symbolically, I think, demonstrative in which in 2001 when Iranian warships were threatening vessels of Azerbaijan or related to Azerbaijan and the Caspian, Turkey had a military exercise over the Caspian Sea, driving home the message that Turkey's there if need be. And symbolically, I think this made a strong statement. But then there was a period where Turkey seemed to shift. Starting from 2006, but particularly between 2008 and 2011, you see Turkey acting at critical junctures more in line with the Russian and Iranian perspectives in certain instances as opposed to the Western ones. This was the case in the NATO efforts to penetrate or be present in the Black Sea. It was obviously the case in the procedures, the period in which NATO's nuclear capabilities were on the agenda and Turkey was sort of playing the role of a spoiler in Western perspectives. It was also obviously a dimension of this was also the spoiling of Turkey-Israel relations. And from Azerbaijan's perspective, the Turkey-Armenia rapprochement actually played directly into this sort of shifting axis picture. And ultimately, from the perspective of Azerbaijan, the souring of Turkey-Azerbaijan relations can only play directly into the hands of Iran and Russia, in particular on issues that are of strategic significance for the West, such as a southern corridor for natural gas or stronger U.S. or NATO presence in the Caucasus. So the axis at that period seemed to get off track when we look at the strategic alignments. Since 2011, we can say that Turkey has conjecturally at least re-aligned with its traditional block. Why? I think I sort of underlined conjectural, because I don't think it's necessarily something that can be taken for granted. I think Turkey's efforts of mediation or of creating multilateral platforms of cooperation, most of them fizzled. Turkey's efforts to guide Egypt or Syria into one direction or another also didn't seem to yield results. I think Turkey had a reality check as to what it could do alone. And it became clear that Iran and Russia were not necessarily interested in Turkey expanding its own influence in the areas that they see as their primary areas of influence. It was clear that sectarian and ethnic divisions in the region were going to drag Turkey perhaps into them or create problems for Turkey that Turkey would have a hard time dealing with without a Western umbrella. And I think it also became clear that the new partners that Turkey was courting, the relationship with them was going to be more fickle and less reliable than would be worth losing the benefits of the traditional allies. And in this case, Azerbaijan, Turkey, the restoration of Azerbaijan-Turkey relationship, so the strengthening of it and the derailment of the Turkey-Armenia process I think is directly related to this recalculation of cost versus benefit of this new track. So the Armenian normalization process was shelved. The Obama-Ardogan relationship got even a stronger collaboration climate. Turkey's accepting to host the early warning station of the missile defense shield of NATO was an important milestone in that sense, something that bothered Iran significantly as well as Russia most probably. The Trans-Anatolian pipeline project was decided upon and put into action, let's say, in this period with this realignment, so that would carry, at least, Azerbaijani natural gas to Europe. And the response by Iran, and I'll focus more on Iran because this is not about Russia necessarily, has been thinly veiled threats towards Azerbaijan and Turkey. Thinly veiled, I must say, but one can say that there's another with Israel's apology as well. You know, you have this sort of appearance of going back to where we were five years ago, before five years ago with Turkey, Israel, Azerbaijan, the United States on one side and Armenia, Iran, Russia on the other. So you can see it that way if one looks at it within these changes. I would definitely argue that this is conjectural, though, and I think it's important to keep that in mind and that there's still, I think, possibilities for change much more than one would have expected in the past. There's a very strong Western skepticism in Turkey. It's not going away. There's a sense of double standards and sort of a normative uncredibility about the EU in particular, but also the United States. Trust is a big problem. There's a perception of a declining West. The economic situation has fed into that with the Turkey's economy going well and the West having crisis. There's a sense of impotence that the West has been impotent in dealing with Russia, in dealing with the Middle East, and that you don't necessarily want to deal with a power with a block that's not on the winning side. I think Turkey still has a strong sense of vulnerability towards its neighbors, be it Iran or Russia, where Turkey does not want to confront them. Turkey still has a problem in reconciling the with the Turkish-Kurdish problem, and that seems like it'll take some time. There's a vulnerability in the country. I think long-term interests, Turkey's interests do align in terms of open borders, resolved conflicts, better governance in the region, but in the short term, in any given time, the political leadership may not be in alignment with Western interests. You also have the public opinion in that you don't have these blocks that we were just talking about really reflecting on the public opinion in Turkey. Azerbaijan is, yes, by far in many cases, the leading country in Turkey's sort of the public opinion's positive view, but Iran is not far behind. And when you look at the questions asked to Turkey, who's your number one threat? It's the United States, by far. Like, 40-something percent United States, three-something percent Iran. You also look at the transatlantic trends of the German Marshall Fund. Turkey is actually the Turkish population is much less critical of Iran than Russia is. So, you know, when asked, you know, what should the response be, Turkey, the plurality of Turks say that Iran should just be allowed to develop nuclear weapons, whereas the plurality of the Russian responses is that economic sanctions should be implemented. So I think, you know, in terms of public opinion, one can't take that these strategic divisions are going to necessarily continue. I also think that two game changes that strategists would need to take into consideration. One is that it's not clear exactly how Turkey is going to carry itself once it gets to leverage as it will get if things go the way that is planned right now. If a threat by the Shia block reduces, if Tanap is built, if Russia gets a little bit less capable, then what is Turkey going to do with those leverage? I don't think it's very clear. There's already a process where Turkish democracy is undermined by its strategic importance and that I think a very powerful government and power consolidation, which is necessary for Turkey to take advantage of its current historic opportunity, also has negative effects on Turkish democracy and ultimately Turkey's soft power in the region or its attractiveness in the region is very much tied to its democratic performance. So I think that something to keep in mind is something that the European Union would probably be in the forefront of ensuring and that with the lack of the EU integration process, I think there are more question marks about how Turkey will use its strategic position in the future, also taking into consideration the leanings of the government and the leanings of the public opinion. In conclusion, I don't know how I'm doing with time, I'm okay? Okay, great. I think there are a few critical years ahead of us and the US engagement in these critical years is key. For one, it's TANAP, it's the Trans Anatolian Pipeline until I think that's secured. There's going to be a lot of pressure on Azerbaijan, on Georgia, on Turkey coming from the north and the south and so I think it's a critical period for that. 2015 is a critical period, it's the centenary of 1915 and there'll be a lot of pressure on Turkey in facing up with its own historical wrongs and how that's going to translate into the triangle of Turkey-Azerbaijan-Armenian relations is important and I for one think the pressure should be on Turkey in the sense of dealing with its own history as opposed to making geopolitical sacrifices. It's not about geopolitics, it's about history, it's about rights, it's about democracy and I think that's where the focus of the pressure on Turkey should be. I think it's critical also because Georgia has a new government and bringing Georgia into the fold is going to be a process and the Turkey-Azerbaijan-Georgia integration process is very important in terms of what we're talking about, Iran. I would wish that Armenia would also be in that fold but even if Armenia isn't or can't be, it has to go on, we can't, I don't think it's a good idea to not continue with integration in the region because you can't all be on board right now. The Kurdish settlement in Turkey, very important, that I think will determine Turkey's strength in the region, Turkey's capabilities in dealing with its neighbors including Iran and maybe first and foremost Iran. But like I said, once that problem is resolved or once it proceeds in the right direction, let's say, then you'll also have a Turkey that's much more powerful than it is today which is also worth thinking about how to check and balance. Thank you. Okay, great. We've got about 45 minutes for questions because we were one panel short so hopefully we can have good discussion here. I would just like to remind all of our audience members to please keep your intervention short and please keep them in the form of a question, okay? So with that, let's get going. Yeah, here. Thank you very much indeed. And please identify yourself again. Well, I'm still Hovanas Nikogosian from 2Q University. Usually after either Niki Aril or Sergey Spick, I have much less to add or comment but today I'm kind of, I was looking forward to see three following observations which I have been making about the discussion today and I will be really much appreciating if you can say whether I'm talking nonsense or not. But the first observation of mine regarding the role of Iran and the Iranian-Syria relationships in the region, my observation is that since the early 90s and this solution of the Soviet Union, the biggest ever contribution of Iran to regional security was the blanket rejection of religious layers in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and which is much better in my observation, in my assessment contribution to the regional peace rather than its detailed position regarding the conflict itself or siding with either of the three sites of the conflict, etc., which leads me to a second observation adding to your point about peacekeepers, Sergey, that ever since 1994 the ceasefire was established in the Nagorno-Karabakh front line, the Iran continued its role as a status quo power in the region which was much more than the rejection of peacekeepers or its own understanding who shall be the peacekeepers in the right shorts of the Araxas River and I maintain that absolutely the Iranian position regarding the conflict is that it is benefiting the Armenian control of the bordering regions from the Araxas River bordering to Iran as long as it is not militarized in a hostile way towards Iran given its international standing which leads me to a third conclusion that the Iranian continuing talks about its readiness to mediate the conflict are at least not genuine I'll be looking forward to have your comment how you look at Iranian efforts to meddle into the conflict and arrange some mediation and follow-up so these are the three observations which I'll be very much appreciating your comments thank you okay do you want to thank you this is why as far as I understand you proposed us to make comments on comments our observations on your observations yeah yeah the first one on the ratio between nationalism or national egoism and religious factor I completely agree that many aspects of the Iranian foreign policy are predetermined not by a religious factor but factors of national egoism and desire to play a role of regional power in the South Caucasus first of all in the Middle East and in Central Asia I wish to remember one more example and add to your role of examples mediation of Iran in the Tajikistani civil war the first agreement on ceasefire was made in Tehran in 1994 the final ceasefire agreement was signed in Moscow in 1997 July but the first one was orchestrated by Tehran and I could agree with you that religious factor is used but instrumentally the most important thing is national egoism and national desire as for religion don't forget that Iran is multi-ethnic country and religious factor as well as previously factor of Shah could be considered like a unifying factor factor for strengthening identity because without any unifying factors what's about the territorial integrity and so on the second point on... as for status quo power thank you for reminding me I missed this very important topic in this way by the way Russia and Iran look like the same powers, powers desiring to have status quo is the best option because many people stressed similarities in approach of Iran and Russia but forgot that Iran publicly rejected the idea of recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by the way in this situation paradoxically Iran is on the one side with the western countries and the most countries rejecting their recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in this way status quo is the best option for both powers and third observation I think for Iran peacekeepers themselves are not treated like real threat penetration of foreigners a special concern of Iran is paid to three powers non-regional powers United States, United Kingdom and Israel and those countries are especially suspected by Dehran in the region this is why not peacekeeping operation itself but penetration of... Did you want to add something to that? By and large your point I think is that in a sense the continuation of the conflict as it is is in Iran's interest I would definitely agree with that but I would also think it's actually the country with the most to gain with the resolution of the conflict is Turkey not that Turkey is able to make that happen but I think Turkey is the most to gain with it I also think vis-à-vis Russia as well Turkey is probably the most to gain which in a way is ironic Let's go here Thank you I have a couple of questions to Mr. Markidonov on Iran issue again that a lot of... not a lot of but some Russian analysts say that in terms of relations between Azerbaijan and Iran the more Iran pressures on Azerbaijan the higher the chances that Azerbaijan will shift towards the west so there is a sort of a contradiction in this triangle Russia, Iran, Azerbaijan and the second, so what do you think about that the second is that Mr. Putin sometimes mentioned that if something goes wrong on the border with Iran and Azerbaijan so there is no other chance for Azerbaijan potential refugees but to move to Russia so that's also a rationale behind the Russian activities and the third question is you remember that when Iranian press and analysts were talking about the green pine systems sold by Israel to Azerbaijan there was a big issue and Russian analysts also joined that and the fact was that they were saying that these systems are sold to Azerbaijan again as to Iran but nobody said that a year and a half before S-300 was sold to Azerbaijan which hadn't been sold before to Iran so it sounds like Iranian aircraft could be shot only with Israeli aircraft anti-aircraft systems Russian analysts didn't mention about S-300 and one more comment concerning the religious factor well that's right that Iran shows that in terms of South Caucasus policy religion is not that important for it although some other parts of the conflict in Karabakh don't, I can bring an example as Mr. Sarkisyan said to his Serbian colleague that by supporting Azerbaijan you're throwing the crosses that are on your chest under your legs so this is a rhetoric which tries to bring the religious factor to the front of the conflict, thank you it's time to start answering the first issue I am not overestimating the Western Russian geopolitical dimension in the relationship between Azerbaijan and Russia because some Azerbaijani analysts try to stress their pro-Western character of the Azerbaijani foreign policy it's much more complicated for me the Georgian t-shirt is so small for Azerbaijan and I think that any reproducing of the Georgian experience for Azerbaijan wouldn't be so good first of all many experts in Azerbaijan and outside of this country stress on their strategic cooperation between Israel as the most reliable partner of the U.S. in the Middle East and Azerbaijan but those relationships are strictly limited first of all by domestic policy agenda you know about some stories on hijab some meetings, rallies and so on it's the first restriction the second restriction is a relationship between Baku and Palestine administration it's a very sensitive point for Israel and the support of Palestine future state is a very important very sensitive for Israel and it's the second restriction the third restriction is the strategic cooperation between Turkey and Azerbaijan you know that just today Turkey has reconciled its role its position in the Middle East and in the South Caucasus because previously Turkey was older brother of Azerbaijan and younger brother of NATO and United States nowadays situation is much more complicated Turkey pretends to play a role of self-sufficient Eurasian power and this is why it has provoked some problems, tensions with Israel and it's also factor of influence for the Azerbaijani foreign policy and elaboration of agenda for this country and also kind of restriction and many other problems in terms of democracy and human rights Russia is much more reliable partner for Azerbaijan the problem of succession by the way it's also so sensitive for the West especially for the European Union of course oil factor is so important and sometimes it overshadow it how to say it in politically correct terms some bigger things of the domestic policy of the country but anyway those problems are not ignored for Russia those problems are not so important let's remember the results of previous presidential elections where Mr. Roushaila recognized their results before the official statement of the Central Electoral Committee of Azerbaijan it's also good and from time to time Mr. Roushaila of Azerbaijan criticized the West for the violation of sovereign democracy I could remind you some statements of Aramis Mikhtiev who is man number two in Azerbaijan a hierarchy who criticized Condoleezza Rice or some statements of another official of United States because our country, sovereign country was the problem for us we are so important for you also it's also your interest to have us because in 2006 Azerbaijan was the second country after Turkey which was called here in the United States as Islamic ally of United States previously Turkey was granted this title Azerbaijan was the second country and taken into account the rate of popularity of United States in the Islamic world the Islamic partnership with Azerbaijan it's tending to zero maybe below zero in this part of the globe and in this situation it's good to have such a partner as Azerbaijan but on another problem don't forget about public opinion in the West which is more important than both in Russia and Azerbaijan as some other factors this is why Azerbaijan is interested to have Russia as a counterweight or the Islamic world also as a counterweight taking into account very serious problems with the search of identity religious revival within Azerbaijan as for pipelines I am not great expert because I think honestly in order to be expert on pipelines it's necessary to have two educations at least physics and economics I'm not specialist in physics and economy I know that many guys both in Russia and the West like to speculate about the wars of pipelines and so on I think that it's extremely politicized topic here and in Russia I think it's possible to make some way gains in this area yes, all the way in the back Stanley Kober a few weeks ago the Saudis rolled up in operation in the east of their country the indications where they thought it was to stir up the minorities there their reaction seems to be if that's the Iranian game we can play that too I'm looking at an article from the Arab news of Saudi Arabia from April 7 the convening of conferences for people from Awaz who have demanded independence from Iran should not be seen as an isolated incident while Iran is a modern country it is also a vulnerable one subject to disintegration and destruction there are a number of indicators that ethnic national groups are waking up in Iran which may create a new reality in Iran if the Saudis decide they're going to stir up or try to stir up the Azerbaijanis in Iran what are the implications of that for the region yes, historically Saudi Arabia is well known to be an opponent of Iran in terms of religion in terms of geopolitical interests and so on but speaking about potential challenges of destruction of Iran or partition of this country or creation of new realities I am so skeptical we spoke about the Azerbaijani community in Iran but don't forget that for Iranian-Iraqi war many operations were wage on the territory inhabited by Azerbaijanis and many of them defended their countries and were awarded by the medals and honors of the country and the policy of Iran is not so simple many Iranian analysts specially try to stress to underline the role of different ethnic groups for the creation of their country including Azeris yes, there are some tensions, problems and kind of discrimination but these policies much more complicated in the country I think given the fault line shifts in the region I think there's a lot of sectarian and ethnic provocations that are going on which is one of the reasons why Turkey really had to urgently take this Kurdish, its own Kurdish minorities issues into its own hands out of concern that these kind of divisions can also jump into Turkey I think Turkey is an interesting issue when it comes to that, the particular interesting actor when it comes to the question that you posed and there was a visit of the Turkish president to Tabriz in Iran in 2011 and he was met with overwhelming celebratory embracements by the Azeris of Iran and it really sort of created tension or concern about whether Turkey might play a role in activating that community but Turkey is extremely cautious about this and extremely hands-offish so I think for the foreseeable future caution will prevail when it comes to the Turkish stance about the ethnic Azeris in Iran Ok, thank you. Is this a two finger question? Go ahead. Do you mind if we come back to you? Ok, yes, over here. My name is Kemal Makil Aliyev I am from the Center for Strategic Studies Azerbaijan and my questions will be to Mr. Markidov. First of all, a small comment on the Israel-Palestinian obvious issues we do have an excellent state of relations with Israel but at the same time it should not be forgotten that Azerbaijan also recognized Palestine as a state and have a cooperation with that and we are part of the Muslim world and this also defines a little bit the situation that we are in My question is actually about what you mentioned as pragmatism and approach of Iran towards its policy on South Caucasus Can you elaborate a little bit on the what kind of pragmatical steps do you see coming from Iran especially in light that when it comes to its strategy towards Azerbaijan you can see that the more Iran actually applies pressure and pushes towards Azerbaijan pushes us to the cooperation with its other partners which Iran does not necessarily approve of. Thank you. First of all, I completely agree with your first thesis about Azerbaijan as a part of Muslim world it's a restriction for the strengthening or development of cooperation with Israel. Azerbaijan is a rather sophisticated country having good relations with the West with Russia balanced relations it's not looking like Georgia but it tends to have balanced relations with different centers of power by the way including Iran also. Don't forget that previous year October, November I don't remember exactly but November President Ahmadinejad visited Baku and contributed especially for the organization of economic cooperation and he said that we are brothers we are two neighboring countries and the problem is outsiders try to make or provoke wars between us and so on and I agree with Alex Vatanka that relationship between Azerbaijan and Iran look like up and down. It's a combination. As for Iranian foreign policy I'm repeating once again this foreign policy is a combination of loud revolutionary rhetoric, some concerned threats phobia spheres on Israel on the West, some conspiracy theories on the one side the pragmatic approach. Let's see on the relations between Georgia and Iran. Georgia is considered to be like the most pro-Western country in the region but it was not real obstacle for Tehran and Belisi to restore direct flights between Belisi and Tehran to open consulate in Batumi the most beloved city of Mikhail Zakashvili who used the city for his political advertisements and so on it was not a problem for Georgia to ask Iranian foreign ministry on engagement in the peacekeeping format in Iraq or Afghanistan Belisi permanently provided consultations with Tehran and so on. It's kind of pragmatism and I also addressed to the experience of Tajikistan where national egoism, national interest were could have had the ideas of religious solidarity or religious fraternity and so on in the case of Azerbaijan it's not also so simple to estimate the policy of Iran. Yes, of course there are some problems of sheer identity and translation of it for former USSR entity controlled previously by little satan big satan is here but little satan the USSR don't forget about it national interests first it's not bad, it's not good and I also could completely agree with Alex Vatanka that if in the case of Russia we are discussing the different towers of Kremlin in the case of Iran we could also discuss different schools like towers can't beat in each other Okay Hindi did you want to jump in now Thanks there's been a fair amount of discussion today about the possibility of domestic instability in Iran there hasn't really been any discussion about the potential for domestic instability in Azerbaijan and I was wondering if our panels could address how they see that potential from the perspectives of if you can Turkey, Russia and Iran if possible there's been some talk about the Iranian attempts to catalyze their Islamic groups presumably in the south of Azerbaijan Iran's however as well of cross border Islamic groups coming from the North Caucasus into Azerbaijan how dangerous potentially is the Islamic factor for Azerbaijan and or how dangerous is the possibility of a more Arab spring like event in Azerbaijan starting from social economic issues or some combination thereof First of all I don't believe that Arab spring is a virus I don't believe that it would be automatically transferred from Syria, Egypt or some other Arabic countries to Azerbaijan for any change or any negative dynamics first and foremost this country would have to have prerequisites for such scenarios. Speaking about windows for opportunities for destabilizations let me make some general observations on the Azerbaijani domestic policy I hope my honorable colleagues would not be against my small intervention on this topic. On one side a situation in this republic looks like predictable and stable and unlike some stereotypes Ilham Ali proved to be not only the son of great father he was very effective really faced to some challenges of color revolution in 2003 to 2004 and the problem is not only authoritarian methods of Ilham Ali he has real resources of popularity in this country because many people really compare situation in Azerbaijan not with principle of 1776 but with realities of the early nineties in this country and this comparison is in favor of Haidar Aliif and Ilham Aliif maybe the price of question is disputable I don't forget that secular opposition in Azerbaijan is weak not only due to repressive policy it's weak by itself, by default like Russian opposition or some other opposition in the post-soviet countries because there was guys which were not only against the current leadership but between each other who is the best opponent of the current regime and so on and this is why they failed and fail right now the problem is not only repressive policy I'm repeating once again but resource of popularity and weakness of the secular opposition is only one side of the coin but another side is absence of a real opposition, secular opposition practically it's zero tends to be a zero below the zero but the problem is real presence of protest aspirations or critical estimates of the situation connected with corruption recent story with Ismaili raised this problem even Ilham Aliyev was forced to press on the local head of administration to resign because his relative was engaged in the scandal and he was arrogant in his attitude to the local population previous year incident in Guba the northern part of Azerbaijan took place in this republic that's why there are some protest views or opinions but no leaders in this situation the problem of bazaar and mosque is really dangerous because this environment not right now but maybe short long term perspective would try to privatize those views to grant some benefits from this situation because you know that radical Muslims are eager and they love to work with problem of social injustice corruption, social division and so on and so on speaking about radical Islamism in Azerbaijan we could talk about two parallel waves groups of ideas the first one as my colleagues rightly noted is connected with Iran but this group of the people and ideas predominantly concentrating the southern part of Azerbaijan Lin Karan and so on visit Lin Karan and you could feel a serious difference between Baku and this part of the country is connected with Salafis Wahhabis more or less moderate and jihadis who are concentrating first of all in the northern part of Azerbaijan Khachmas, Guba Ghusary territories with Lesgins those groups are not so good integrated not only in terms of Azerbaijani language even in terms of Russian language I travelled around those districts and tried to ask questions in Russian only one settlement was very fluent Krasnaya Slavada, populated by Jewish people and the impact of Russian Dagestan is so serious this is why one of Azerbaijani human rights activists spoke about the virus of Wahhabism it was connected with some attempts of terrorist attacks in 2006 in Azerbaijan it is good for this republic that those groups are not connected those potentials are not united and even different groups like Salafis or Wahhabis are organized due to network principles not CPSU principle and so on but anyway Dagestani part of the interstate border is very important don't forget by the way that Russia became the first country which delimitated and interstate border with Azerbaijan this problem is not resolved with Georgia, Iran and Armenia but with Russia this problem is resolved but at the same time this problem raised a huge wave of criticism in Russia and especially in Dagestan because of two Leskin, Anklavs, Hrachoba and Uryanoba and this problem is actively discussed previous November the government of Dagestan made a resolution to launch the problem of a repatriation of Leskins from Hrachoba and Uryanoba to the territory of Dagestan and it's interesting that Russia which is so suspicious to any regional initiatives and attempts closes eyes for cooperation between Dagestan and Azerbaijan Russia is appreciated their development of cooperation and exchange of delegation between Makachkala and Baku and here the personality of Alif who was relative of Alif's family and in the period of World War II he was the first secretary of Dagestan Upcom party regional committee of CPSU and it's also considered like symbol of good relations and friendship between Dagestan and Azerbaijan this is why there is another dimension of Russian-Azerbaijani cooperation Dagestani border and regional engagement of the Dagestani government in this situation I think it's very useful and this is why Russia is interested to have swing policy in relationship between Armenia and Azerbaijan of course Armenia is military politically a lie but at the same time Armenia and Russia don't share the common border Azerbaijan and Russia do and the problem of Dagestani party is crucially important for the security of two countries I'll try to compliment a few of the points already made one is that Turkey is playing a role in counterbalancing the effect of radical Islamist groups in Azerbaijan not Turkey per se as a state but Turkish religious groups or networks are quite active in Azerbaijan and they're also very they're very non-confrontational when it comes to the government and the administration so they're really working the field more and trying to get a different pursuing their own interests but also a much more moderate version of Islam making it more appealing to the Azadi people who are actually drawn to it from a Turkish source much more than they would be from an Arab or otherwise and because of the affinity of the two societies export actually ends up sticking a little bit more and it also helps it's more moderate so it's easier to stick in a relatively secular country first and foremost the Gulen movement which is quite active in Azerbaijan I mean just to make a point about your question I would say in Turkey's case at least and the same thing I think is true for a number of other western countries that the geopolitical importance of the current regime in many ways is in the forefront and that the concern would be that if anything were to change if any other strong man were to come it would be much more risky that it would be more anti-west and if there was a fractured political situation then that would also be risky in terms of its ability to be manipulated or lack of opportunity to get things done and pursue a vision so I think that geopolitical priority is trumping other considerations in the case of Turkey and a number of other countries where this isn't taking place as some European platforms which are much more normative in their approach but then the leverage of the European Union or European countries over Azerbaijan is relatively low no less because the carrots that they offer are not clear or not necessarily needed by Azerbaijan as the resources for one and is able to also balance Russia and Turkey and what not in a way that Georgia wasn't able to that's needed the EU more so I think pressure on this issue is not necessarily effective it's also of course a problem of how Europe's general problem of how to deal with these issues in its neighborhood also reduces the credibility of Europe in Azerbaijan and that the Council is also not able to pursue its goals in other countries of the region and lastly what was not mentioned was economic resources and I think that also plays a role in the continuing stability of the country because compared to the neighbors compared to other countries that have been through more dramatic change I think the resources are able to keep people much more comfortable okay we have time for maybe a couple more questions yes thank you very much Mr. Markanov mentioned the problem of delimitation in the Caspian Sea and the previous panel delimitation of the borders delimitation of the interstate border not the Caspian Sea only interstate border between Russia and Azerbaijan I make a agreement of 2010 I'm sorry I'll take your presentation the previous panel mentioned about the military buildup in the Caspian Sea taking into account the fact that all the littoral countries have the access to the Caspian Sea what does necessitate this military buildup and the second question once this delimitation of borders within Caspian Sea is completed can one imagine demilitarization of entire Caspian Sea thank you very much for your views on that thank you I'm repeating once again I mentioned the problem of interstate borders delimitation is for the Caspian Sea it's much more complicated because those relations are this issue is not limited by bilateral relations of two countries you know that Turkmenistan Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan and Russia are engaging this delimitation and there are many problems not only between Russia and another actors of this problem but between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan, between Russia and Iran and so on I'm not sure that this problem would be really resolved in the short term perspective as for the Russian position it's position of the country or status quo power now status quo is better than resolution with not taking into account the Russian injuries and of course Russia has a special concern about militarization of the Caspian Sea and penetration of other actors for example in the relationship to with Turkey on the Black Sea issues, set of the problem Russia and Turkey are ready to be guarantor of joint-stock venture of the Black Sea Convention of Montreal and so on in the case of Caspian Sea Russia is also preferring to keep status quo considering it like less evil in this situation okay maybe one more question here, yes ma'am in the back my name is Mindy Reiser and I've worked in the region we don't have the gentleman who would have said something about the Chinese interest in the region and I know this is not necessarily your areas of expertise but I'd be interested in any observations you might have on the role of China now and in the future good question just today China is not so active in the South Caucasus, first of all China concerns about the Central Asian because it borders on some countries, it borders on Afghanistan it's the key issue as for the South Caucasus issues China addressed to them only for Shanghai cooperation directly addressed of course for the Shanghai organization summit in August 2008 when China rejected to recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as well as Kosovo and so on, the position of China is understandable, we have some problems with territorial integrity this is why we are not going to criticize us, this is why it was kind of position of China in those areas, I know that China is developing some business contacts and first of all it stresses on the business penetration at first, I think that in South Caucasus the same scenarios in Central Asia would be realized when not ideas of geopolitics but first of all business interest would be at first, as for Iran it's also critical to the Chinese penetration because China is considered like United States, United Kingdom, Israel as non-regional actor this is why there is kind of fear phobia on the Chinese penetration of course, yes they are ready to discuss something on anti-Western ideas and so on but not I mean the territory having priority interest for Iran, in other case it would be considered like competitive interest I saw, go ahead Thanks it was my initiative to invite Professor Lu Xiang on the panel after having a long discussion with him about this, I'd make a couple of observations in representing myself not Lu Xiang first of all the Chinese-Iranian relationship is very deep and comprehensive this is an important relationship for China for a number of reasons energy one of them for sure but not but not only and it's interesting if you look at the comparison let's say that the trade relationship between Russia and Iran which is quite minimal actually it's only about 3 plus billion dollars a year the Chinese-Iranian bilateral trade relationship is about 10x 30 plus billion dollars a year but I think more significantly maybe from a strategic standpoint the China looks when China thinks of Asia they don't just think about East Asia as typically we Americans do they look at Eurasia and they look at the importance of developing not only trade but transit corridors from China Western China obviously through Central Asia into the Caspian area to get them to the Greater Middle East and so while the South Caucasus is not a significant piece of this for now it's a larger whole and there are some interesting articles that have come out from significant Chinese geopolitical and international relations thinkers one of them by Wong GC based at Beijing University while the United States is talking about it's pivot to Asia and again well what we think Americans think of Asia as simply as East Asia the Chinese should be thinking West that ironically when the Americans are thinking about the pivot to Asia they don't really think about if the pivot to Asia is about containing or managing the rise of China Washington is not really thinking about what's north of China what's west of China and what's southwest of China and so that maybe Beijing should counter in a way that takes them to the West and this sort of brings in the Caspian region and of course Central Asia was mentioned already by Sergey okay I think that's probably a good way to pivot to our next conference but we're basically out of time so once again I want to thank you all for coming and if you could please give a round of applause to our speakers