 Welcome to the IEA webinar panel discussion entitled How the Future of Europe is Engaged. We're joined today by a very distinguished group of speakers from the political, academic and think tank worlds who will offer perspectives on the COVID-19's economic, social and political impact from different perspectives from the north, south and west of the continent. This may be particularly timely ahead of the European Council meeting at the end of the week and as a result, we've had an enormous interest with almost 400 people signing up to this event. Each panelist will give their initial remarks for about six or eight minutes and then we will go to a discussion and then a Q&A with the members. Please contribute your questions via the Q&A Zoom function. You'll see it at the bottom of your screen. We'll also be live tweeting the event so please feel free to join the discussion using the handle at IEA. This event is part of the IEA's future of the EU 27 project and is supported by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. The three speakers will go in alphabetical order so let me introduce them in reverse order so that the first speaker is introduced last. From Helsinki we have Alex Stubb, former Prime Minister, Finance Minister, Foreign Minister, Trade and Europe Minister of Finland and also how he has been a member of the European Parliament. Now he is the incoming director of the School of Translational Governance at the European University Institute in Florence. From Dublin and sometimes Florence, Professor Bridget Latham, she's director and professor at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies and director of the Global Governance programme of the European University Institute in Florence. She's one of the leading scholars in the field of European integration of regeneration. And from Rome we have Ettore Greco who is the Executive Vice President of the Institute of International Affairs in Rome. He's the head of the Multilateralism and Global Governance programme at the Institute. He's previously been director of the Institute and a visiting fellow at the Brookings institution in Washington. So with that can I hand over to you, Ettore, to give your opening thoughts on how the future of Europe has changed. Thank you. Can you hear me? Perfect. Okay, many, many thanks. Dan is always a pleasure to work for your Institute and if you agree, I will start by making a couple of points concerning Italy's political scene as a way of introducing Italy's position ahead of the upcoming European Council, which will be, of course, crucial. So I will concentrate essential on the problems that the Council will discuss, the package of measures that it could approve, and Italy's positions on the new steps that the European Union should take to cope with the present crisis. Italy's political scene remains turbulent. The current government remains structurally weak for at least two reasons. One, it relies on a 13 majority in parliament, specifically in the Senate, and the two major parties of the coalition have different positions on many critical issues, especially on European policies. The Democratic Party is broadly pro-European, although critical of the austerity policy. Five Star, which is the largest party in parliament, is a quintessential populist movement which thrived in the past on an anti-strongly anti-EU platform. The Five Star has considerably moderated this position and even supported the van der Leyen commission, but there is a radical wing, which has a strongly anti-EU attitude. Five Star is leaderless, nobody can bet what evolution it will have in the coming months, or if there will be sooner or later a split which could precipitate or would most probably precipitate a political crisis. The League, the right wing anti-EU, anti-migrant party led by Matteo Salvini, the consensus for the League has declined, but it remains by far the largest party according to even the recent opinion polls. And the key point is that according to the opinion polls, the center-right coalition, where the anti-EU positions are predominant, will get a large majority of seats in the next parliament. At the same time, the popularity of Prime Minister Conte has considerably increased since the beginning of the outbreak. It has essentially benefited from the rarely round-the-flag effect typical of period of crisis, and indeed this effect has been on display also in other countries. In Italy it has been even more marked than elsewhere, at least when it comes to the consensus for the Prime Minister. Conte now enjoys a higher approval rate, considerably higher than a couple of months ago, around 70%. So on paper he has a considerable political capital to exploit. But the point is that probably his current high popularity is due, at least in part, to his criticism of the EU for not having given Italy enough support during the present crisis. And indeed he has not spared harsh words against Brussels, of course also as a way for keeping the five-star movement at bay, because simply he cannot afford to ignore the wishes and positions of the five-star movement, which after all remains, as I said, by far the largest group, both in the government and in parliament. So that said, it remains to be seen if Conte could survive a possible setback at the upcoming European Council. And in fact this summit has increasingly been depicted by the Italian media, by the newspaper, etc., as a sort of moment of truth for the government and for the relations of Italy with the European Union. As you probably know, Conte has threatened to put the veto on the summit conclusions if Italy's requests are rejected. As you know, in particular, Italy has long been asking for the introduction of the so-called Euro bonds, now requested in many different ways, with different names, which would imply a form of mutualisation. This is one of Italy's long-lasting goals. Now this request is supported by, as you know, a group of countries. So in a sense, Italy is now less isolated in the past in promoting this idea. Particularly important for Italy is Macron, the president of Macron's support for the Euro bonds. This convergence with France has no doubt encouraged the Italian government to take a tough position within the European Union. But as you know, several other countries that, by Netherlands, are strongly against making concessions that may lead to any form of mutualisation. Of course, I cannot now enter into the details. Many forms of Euro bonds are now currently under discussion. But the key point is that Italy's diplomatic position on Euro bonds seems different from the other countries that are promoting this idea. So the other members of the group. Because at least judging by some recent declaration of Conte, the approval of Euro bonds has been presented as sort of sine qua non for Italy's consensus for the other aspects of the package of measures that European Council is planning to introduce. This doesn't seem to be the position of the other countries in favour of Euro bonds. They have a much more flexible attitude. Conte strategy is risky because the Euro bonds proposal is very likely, as you know, to be approved. Although the Council could decide to mention it in the final communique as a proposal to be discussed at the later stage, as it has in fact already done. And the other member states may eventually decide to call Conte's bluff because after all, Italy is vitally interested in the other forms of support it is receiving from the European Union. And that's a second and not least less important point, an immediate almost certain effect of the failure of the European summit will be a destabilising increase of Italy's borrowing costs. Something, and I tend to agree with this interpretation that Conte continues to push for some form of Euro bond as a negotiating card to extract other concessions. And indeed, there have been, as you know, some openings, even from Chancellor Merkel, including yesterday's press conference for the activation of a so-called recovery fund aimed at preparing and supporting the recovery after the pandemic crisis, which could be supported, as you know, by the Union budget. This restructuring fund could be a key part of a reasonable compromise. And then, at the second important point, Italy would be interested in extracting concession on the European stability mechanism. In particular, with regard to the repayment time frame that, of course, it wants as long term as possible, the types of expenditures that could be financed and also Italy does not want any macroeconomic conditions attached. These are, as you know, key points of the current negotiations ongoing. It may be also part of the final compromise. The problem is, as I said, how the compromise will be received in Italy, because thanks to a quite effective populist campaign orchestrated by both the League and the Five Star and other extremist group, the European stability mechanism has become called for the arrival of the infamous Troika, the imposition of the austerity nations, a sort of national taboo. And Conte, in my view, has made perhaps too many concessions to this rhetoric. He now may have difficulty making the Five Star digestive user of the European stability mechanism. In any case, he will go to Parliament to have the support of Parliament for the package that could eventually be approved of the European Council. The Democratic party would be in favor of European stability mechanism with mild conditionalities. Five Star is, as I said, much more skeptical or some of its key figures are strongly opposed. Just two final things, because of course there's no time. Euroscepticism is again on the rise, as in other countries. In particular, the European polls show a growing support for a lethal exit. So the League, for instance, is relaunching this idea. And second, of course, I expect the population to gradually feel the brunt of the impact of the crisis. This is likely to become very soon a major factor that will erode the consensus for the government. And of course, this perhaps could be a major point to discuss during the debate. The economic outlook is very worrying. Italy will experience a construction most probably higher than other European countries. And as a result, national debt is doomed to rise, making again the country exposed to financial instability and it could be seen as weak link of the eurozone. So next week or months, the government will have no doubt a very difficult navigation. In the country, we remain financially exposed. And the problem is in this situation, of course, even our voice, even when we propose, make regional proposals, is not heard as perhaps, in some cases, it would be served. Okay, thank you very much for that. Bridget, we go to you. I know you've got a few slides as well. So they will come up. So over to you, Bridget, thank you. Okay, well, thank you very much. And thank you for the invitation. My take is rather different. The level of analysis I adopt is very different to Italy, but hopefully we'll complement it. So firstly, to that question, how has the future of Europe changed? Well, the answer is we don't know. And we don't know. I wonder where my slides have gone. We don't know because the crisis itself, COVID-19 has introduced a lot of contingency and uncertainty, but it comes on top of already existing contingency and uncertainty and change both at European and global level. So it's given that we were talking on how we get to next Friday, this week, then what I would like to do is how we should think about the future, in a sense, with the crisis, but also beyond the crisis. If I could have the next slide, please, Sarah. So can I take you back to the now forgotten month of January 2020 when a new commission was setting off on its long-term to medium-term agenda, the new Green Deal and the economy and Europe's role in the world? And I would submit that regardless of COVID-19, these remain central to the agenda of the EU and central to its future. So they haven't gone away. And I think when we think about how the EU responds to COVID-19, we have to think about all of those three issues. Next slide, please. Can I also say that I think in terms of COVID-19 and its impact, I would like to stress the sense of shock, the vulnerability, the heightened emotions that it has brought. And I would say particularly in the hardest hit countries, but this is not just economic or social or political. In my view, it's deeply psychological and particularly in the hardest hit countries and has to be understood as that, that we're in a period of fragile emotions, heightened emotions, with a lot of angst and anxiety. I think there's also a great danger of, and we already saw some of this, of seeing this crisis through the lens of the Eurozone. Very struck by the tone and tenor of the Dutch engagement on the issue with corona bonds, that it had that old creditor debtor north-south sense to it. And we've really got to see this crisis as a symmetric crisis external to the EU that has hit all EU member states, but of course not all states started in the same place. Next slide. I would also like to introduce into our discussion this sense in which that whenever there is a crisis of the EU, whenever the EU is challenged, it's never portrayed as a challenge to the regime, it is existential to the EU itself. If we, Prime Minister Conte, Europe will lose its raison d'être if it fails to help. In other words, Europe is gone unless it can handle this crisis. Equally, President Macron in his Financial Times article, Europe faces a moment of truth the EU could unravel. Now, and again, I include on that slide Katie Adler, her report in the BBC when she says, EU collapse coronavirus pandemic threatens to kill the EU. And I think this is not just the way in which politicians frame crises in the EU. A lot of social scientists also retort to the moment of truth. And it's, I think it's important for us to reflect on this because basically what we're saying, if this is dominant frame whenever the EU faces a serious challenge, what we're saying is we're dealing with a very fragile political entity. And is that the case? I think we need to, we need to talk about that. So that these, just in terms of context, next slide please, in terms of how we, how we need to think about this in terms of the future of the EU. So firstly, I think the future of the EU is never determined just by what happens, the agency of its member states and the structural forces within Europe, but most clearly by what, by the world beyond. And I think what is, what will, what we need to pay a lot of attention to over the next year is the impact of COVID-19 on global governance. We already see an impact on trade. And will there be a protectionist turn? Will there be a desire to re regionalize supply chains? What will happen globalization? And beyond that global governance was already under a lot of strain. And what will happen? What is the capacity of global governance? Also, what impact will this crisis have on great power competition? We already saw an acceleration of competition between the United States as the dominant power and a rising power China, but this again will have an effect. And then Europe's neighborhood has become no less stable. There is the focus on Africa, but also the MENA region is, is very unstable. There was the beginnings of a resurgence of a migration crisis in January again, and then of course the ongoing and continuing question of Russia. So I think one, when we talk about the future of Europe post COVID-19, we've got to think about what strategic capacity the EU has and how it will deploy it. Next slide. Then in terms of endogenous, the future of Europe and the, and the dynamics within Europe itself, I think one has to note that this was the most significant display of public power that we have witnessed from governments in a very, very long time. So will state market relations, public private power, will that be altered and impacted by COVID-19? And if yes, how? Then in terms of the recovery, I think it's absolutely essential that for the safety of the Eurozone that there is balanced recovery across the EU, across particularly the Eurozone. And that is clearly the issue of Italy and Spain, the hardest hit countries. I think it's also important that the investment in the future is investment that takes into consideration the Green Deal. Climate crisis has not abated, although of course we have witnessed a reduction in emissions, but that's because the economies are frozen. Inequality, I think this crisis has exposed low wages, the gig economy and labour markets. So again, if public power is to be deployed in the future, one of the areas I think will receive attention is those exposed sectors of exposed workers in the labour market and what happens a gig economy and the welfare system. In terms of the EU as a collective, I think we've had a very damaging decline in mutual trust. And I think that is, in a sense, it's symbolised by, on the one hand, what we hear from Italy and on the other, the Dutch. They're at the, that's in a sense the extremes of the debate. And that repairing that mutual trust is very important. And I think it has to be from both sides. I don't think it's in the interests of Italy to be absolutist about the ESM, for example, but equally the Dutch have got to watch the tone. But also I think there is a need for a European fiscal response and therefore I think the Dutch should not be holdouts. They should be open and reasonable to compromise. On the question of solidarity, this I think is, it's the time is right now for a debate at EU level on solidarity for whom, with what instruments and for how long. Because I think what we don't want to get back into is that Eurozone pathology of the creditor the deserving and the less deserving etc etc. I don't, I think, have to talk at all about domestic politics because I think he very clearly outlined Italian politics but in fact domestic politics in many countries are fragile and not just in Italy. And it's again important to remember that for example the Dutch have an election next year. And then the question of where is leadership going to come from. I think it has been useful to see a return of a level of Franco-German agreement. They are not on the same side on Corona bonds but they've been working very hard together. And I think that's a really good thing for, I think that's really important at this stage in terms of plotting the way out of COVID-19 and the next phase. And then I have a final slide but I actually probably I think have run out of time. Maybe Bridget, could we come back to it? Exactly, it's a complicated slide so I think best leave it for now. Okay, many thanks Bridget and Alex we can come to you and you might unmute yourself just before you go. Thank you. Thanks, no us Finns usually stay muted, I prefer it that way you know. Dan thanks a lot and thanks for inviting me and it's really nice to speak after Bridget. Some of you should know that Bridget was actually my professor at the College of Europe in 1994 to 1995 and then subsequently we ended up teaching a class together for quite a few years at Bruges and now we're colleagues in Florence. We've also written a couple of chapters to books so what I will say will probably sound very familiar because everything that I've learned on Europe is from Bridget. Now I'll give you an introduction and then I will make three points and the three points are about the future implications. Number one, political, number two, economic, and number three, institutional and then I'll make some conclusions and I try to do this in eight minutes and time is running. Now by way of introduction, when we are in the midst of these types of crisis, I think there is a real danger of generalizing. I've been there in a few myself whether they have been institutional crisis, the financial crisis, the asylum crisis or anything of that sort. I think COVID-19 is very specific and very different but my first point is that we as humans have a tendency to do the following. Number one, we over rationalize the past. Number two, we over dramatize the present and number three, we underestimate the future and that's pretty much what I'm seeing also with COVID-19. I am not saying that it's not one of the most serious crisis that we've had but perhaps some of the language used at the moment as Bridget was referring to existential or death of the European Union etc etc. We've been there before and it simply ain't going to happen not because of COVID or anything else at this particular moment. Now point number one, what are the political implications? I think the first one is a heightened tension between the national and the European. This was I think well put by Ettore as well. Here the main problem I think has been communication. In other words we are in the classic dilemma of everything that's bad comes out of Brussels. Everything that's good is thanks to me. I think all of my former colleagues who will be in a teleconflict like this one on Thursday and Friday will know that this is a global crisis. It's a European crisis and it requires global solutions not national solutions but they simply cannot say that to their domestic audiences. Whether elections are this year, next year or the year after that, they simply refuse to give credit where credit is due. So this is a communication problem I think for a lot of national leaders in Europe. A second political point is that I do think that there is a tension here between freedom and control and this is probably one of the most exciting bits of this crisis if I may. How far do you push the bucket of encroaching on privacy or controls applications to check out COVID-19 surveillance? How far do you take the limits of special measures as we've seen in Hungary? This is really a careful balance to do here and you'll see a lot of the perhaps more authoritarian European or other leaders pushing on the accelerator of control and then many others during the freedom bit. I think the most interesting case study of course here is going to be Sweden which is basically continued with the line of freedom completely. The final and third political implication is economic and political and Bridget touched upon it. I think that that's the balance between state and market. I mean I'll simplify grossly but you could argue that post 1989 post Cold War there was an element of market liberalization going on especially in Europe east west south and north. That started to slow down a little bit I would argue in 2008 with the financial crisis when the state came in not only to bail out banks but many others as well and I actually think that COVID-19 will reinforce and push the pendulum of the state a little bit further away from the market so you will see a tension between perhaps those who prefer a little bit more state intervention and you'll see it reflected in every walk of European integration industrial policy competition policy etc etc. My second point is political sorry economic and here you know I really dislike it but there is a sort of a déjà vu about the north versus south debate the austerity versus solidarity debate and I think that's probably the most stupid debate you can have at this particular moment and I think one of the biggest communication mistakes came early on when some governments my will not name were using language which I think was unsuitable to a crisis there's absolutely nothing Italy Spain can do about the fact that they have been hardest hit by the virus and to make this into some kind of an you know austerity versus solidarity debate is simply wrong I have argued that you should use every instrument in the bag then that for me that means the ECB it means the EIB it means the ESM it means also obviously the sure fund or initiative coming from the European Commission and also debate on mutualization corona bonds whatever you want to do however the last one I do think is not going to be beneficial in the in the general debate but we do know we need every instrument in the bag to to get out of this and finally on the economy side I think there will be a debate about regulation versus freedom and the level of regulation as well that will will will have as a consequence of this my final and third point before I conclude in in in my eight minutes is is is the eternal debate about institutions you know who wins who loses I actually think the ECB will come out of this strong again the EIB my former employer will come out even stronger they were strong in the nuclear plan they were strong in pushing for a climate bank and they will be very strong in helping out the SMEs and others because remember that this bank has 60 billion euros of reserves remember that it has 14 billion euros of paid in capital 250 billion euros total capital and assets of 600 billion so this is and it's the biggest multilateral institution or bank in the world and and that way you know it has a lot more flexibility to help out I also think that the ESM will get a new role here and become stronger and believe it or not I also think that the European Commission is going to come out of this stronger it'll be criticized yes but watch what it's going to do on the MFF watch what it's already doing right now on on employment it's going to do well out of this who is going to weaken I don't know I can't really say I don't think the European council is looking very good at the moment I don't think that the Eurogroup Recofin is looking very good at the moment and as much as I would like to see involvement of the European Parliament I haven't seen much of it finally and this is my conclusion two points here number one for all of those doomsdayers who are screaming and shouting about the end of the European Union at this particular moment I hate to disappoint you it ain't going to happen this is at the end of the day going to lead as it very often does to to more integration whether you like it or not that is in the logic and I don't have to be an old school mere functionalist to say that integration in one area leads to pressure to integrate in another one but if you go back to previous crisis that's what's usually has happened my final point is this I think the European Union always advances in three phases phase number one is a crisis phase number two is chaos and phase number three is a sub-optimal solution so just live with it that's what's going to happen again thanks thank you for that Alex so maybe just draw out on on that issue of the the future of the EU and Ettore do you feel easily did you did you did you just lose me on my punchline no no you got the sub-optimal solution very good because that's when I got cut off by the Russians okay okay okay um just like to go to Ettore and ask if Ettore believes there is a would like to put a probability on Italy leaving the EU over the next couple of years and maybe could I ask you Ettore Ettore what what do you think is the probability could you unmute yeah sorry did you get my question Ettore no you're muted again could you hear me okay now yeah okay no I don't think this is a realistic prospect because the vast majority of Italians remains in favor of remaining in the EU and also in the Eurozone although as I said as a result of the crisis I think as happened in 2011 there has been a rise in support of the prospector in Italy Italy exit so we can we should make a distinction between the widespread and deep rooted discontent about the European Union which is a major Italian and the support for the new as the political entity to which Italy should should belong and of course the dynamics is worrying in particular economic conditions of the country are worrying because we know that the debt with the rise increase substantially and this may trigger a chain of events that unless the government behave in a responsible way which I'm sure the current government would do the risk are not negligible and there is the specter specter of a populist government because at the moment in parliament according to to be on poll also within the population these right wing parties enjoy about 40 percent of the votes and thanks to the electoral system they may have a substantial majority in parliament okay thank you so that some of the questions we've come we have had first was from John Bruton former teacher former prime minister he asks how is the single market level playing field to be maintained if some countries can give support to their firms and other countries cannot afford to do so how will this level playing field problem be addressed Bridget do you have thoughts on that well can I say that that's a very very powerful argument because the eurozone is in some senses the this a scaffolding in the EU but the single market is absolutely essential and if government a can in a sense use its financial power to aid its firms whereas other countries have weaker capacity I think it really is a very strong argument in favor of a collective response and Alex could you maybe give your view on that and there's another one specifically for you from Declan O'Donovan how would you describe domestic public opinion in Finland compared to other Nordic countries doesn't specify but I would think around the issue of corona bonds etc yeah sure I mean first of all to to John Bruton John has the best working title in the world which is former prime minister in other words you've been there but you don't have to take the crap anymore so congrats for surviving John I agree with Bridget on that and I think if you want to have a level playing field on the single market I think the whatever financial support you end up getting or creating as a system has to come from the European Commission it can't be national because what you will see and you have already seen is a temptation for state intervention and in that sense breaking many of the basic tenets of the four freedoms and the internal market and I think it's very important that the commission as the guardian of the treaties make sure that you know you don't let the baby go out with the bathwater on this and I do think it's a very relevant question I think to Declan on public opinion in Finland well first of all Finland is if you take the general view it's the most pro-European country out of the Nordics and there's a simple reason for that and it's 1,300 kilometers of border with Russia and a sense of belonging to the west and to the western institutions that's why you know we joined the European Union in 1995 that's why we are the only Nordic country in the eurozone as well I must admit that the whole debate about mutualisation is very complicated in Finland I've always been in favour myself but I have always been in a government which is nothing favour so I've had to defend the opposite view not least actually when I was in government with the true things during the worst part of the euro crisis in the summer of 2015 when we were bailing out Greece for the third time that's when I actually threatened to leave government if my negotiating mandate was not going to be looser than that there's still sort of the skepticism and fear and and also I'll be very frank with you you know we have have had at least some civil servants in the finance ministry who are very much against mutualisation in the long run and when you come in as a finance minister until unless you're really really seasoned it's it's tough to argue against the economy economists on that I'll make one final point on mutualisation I saw an interesting statistic about French and Spanish involvement in Italian banks and and and and the level at which you know they were tied into them and when you look at that figure and you compare that figure to Nordic involvement in Italian banks you start perhaps understanding the realpolitik why some of the Nordic countries are rather skeptical about mutualisation and Alex could I ask a perception about Ireland Ireland was part of the New Hanseatic League along with Finland but it was the only one of those countries to sign the letter of nine on nine countries advocating corona bonds how do you perceive Ireland's position in being both part of the Hanseatic League and at the same time part of the pro corona bond nine well in Finland we have a saying Siberia teaches you the cold teaches you and I think that there is an element that Ireland was one of the first countries and the hardest hit countries in 2008 with the financial crisis and then of course I give all the credit to Andrew McDool for the work that he did and getting Ireland out of the crisis the rest of it but the bottom line here is that when you've been through something that Ireland has been through you understand the basic DNA of a crisis like that and I think Ireland did the right thing may I add also that I'm not a big fan of the whole idea of a Hanseatic League and I did not take Finland into the Hanseatic League I had actually left government when that took place and I wouldn't have done it again a lot of times this is about psychology and perception and the Hanseatic League simply doesn't look good it's an attempt to sort of replace the UK with liberal economics and it's not working it's looking more like a club of austerity I'm afraid okay interesting Ettore question for you from Donald Donovan who is a former IMF staffer he asks about the offer of ESM support for Italy with conditionality and the Prime Minister Conte refused that and rejected he asks was it right for Italy to reject ESM assistance no absolutely I am personally in favour of using the funds available from the European Union mechanism at the moment of course there is the possibility of using a substantial amount of money for specific purposes which had to do with the crisis have to do with crisis and so the discussion now and is not so much on the macroeconomic conditions there is a certain let's say agreement on not imposing this type of conditions but the type of the length the repayment time frame for those who will use this fund and the exact purposes used that each country may may how each country may use these funds for which purposes so there could be a spectrum of possibility that at the moment had been left open by by the new council and non-European council should try to solve this problem so I will be very much in favour and a large part of government is in favour of perhaps Conte himself to use the European stability mechanism the problem is that the European stability mechanism has become as I said the sort of taboo because there was a widespread campaign at the end of the year last year against the European stability mechanism it's just a very ideological characteristics but the problem remains that in the longer run Italy could experience financial troubles also for the repayment of these funds or other funds that it will receive in this case the European stability mechanism could become another source of financing to deal with the financial crisis not so much with the current crisis and so some see this first step in using the European stability mechanism as a sort of a preliminary step to use it in a form that will require for Italy to accept some relinquishment of sovereignty in economic policy and the role of Troika etc this is why there is also this opposition and this is a real problem in a sense because we don't know if we will be in the longer term even medium term in able to repay these loans so we have a question from Kwive Kett on weakening multilateral system European countries having different views on external relations could we get the panel's thoughts on where Europe's role in the world will be will we continue relative decline will that relative decline accelerate and Noel Fahey asked specifically will Europe go back to the fortress Europe idea that was prevalent in the in the 80s is that the kind of regionalization closed regionalization the world is heading towards um Bridget might come to you first on that I think you're muted yeah good all I think all systems multilateral systems are under strain at the moment and not just because of Europe and its role but but much deeper structural dynamics in in the international system I think that there is certainly one way of reading the what we're hearing now and that is the fortress to your Europe read in other words we hear a lot now about European sovereignty European strategic autonomy so yes there are and I think led by Michael there are forces that favor more but but with that with that French tinge of protectionism on the other hand I think countries like Germany but also Ireland would be would not want that kind of Europe and I know that the Irish have actually done a paper on on the dangers of protectionism over the last week a lot depends on how Europe manages to balance or position itself between China and the United States and what kind of US emerges from this and what kind of China emerges from this I think obviously the multilateral system will be impacted on whether or not Trump wins the next US election if he does I would be very fearful and I think the dangers then of a European retreat would be would be serious but I think Europe remains committed to an open international system particularly in trade and I think we'll do a lot to we'll do a lot to protect that but I think we're seeing at the moment very high levels of contingency and uncertainty both at the European and the global level and I think we will see tensions between the views of different EU member states on this. Alex can I come to you just on that issue of accelerating Europe's relative decline what do you think will happen and specifically Paul Sweeney asks is it time for more majority voting within the EU? Like it's always time for more majority voting within the EU but on the big issues you always aim to go for some kind of unanimity I mean you don't want to really isolate anyone so it's very rare that in big decisions you do that. Having said that if you may on China the US and Europe this I guess is a bit of a pitch I'm in the process of working on a book which has the working title digital democracy or digital dictatorship the struggle for global power between China the US and Europe and here my argument is that if you look at the technological revolution and whatever that might entail in terms of artificial intelligence, robotization etc but also in this COVID-19 crisis or in the climate crisis you will have three main players jostling for power and they are China the US and Europe and my argument is that the United States is not anymore the undisputed superpower of the world. The way in which Donald Trump has managed his presidency in the past three and a half years have basically not marginalized not isolated but taken away US predominance and when that happens they're always power vacuums and when they're power vacuums someone will fill them and I must admit that I'm always a little bit baffled about this talk about you know loss of european influence worldwide. I quite you know I fundamentally disagree yes China is going to be a more predominant power it already is. Yes the United States is going to be a less predominant power already the case but the European Union fits quite comfortably in between the two and I could you know cite hundreds of cases from the biggest trading bloc and trader in the world with bilateral and multi-lateral agreements. I could cite its leadership on climate change I could cite its attempts to take a lead on digitalization but there's one thing that goes above everything else and the European Union is a regulatory superpower you may like it you may dislike it but that is simply a fact so if I were to nudge anyone in the direction of looking at european soft and perhaps even hard power read Anu Bradford's The Brussels Effect and I think that gives you quite a good view already and the fact that you know hard and soft power are nowadays inseparable and the line between war and peace is very blurred I in many ways this gives I think the European Union a competitive advantage so I think our expectations sometimes on the foreign policy of the European Union just bloated you know over the top and that's why we're disappointed but I think the European Union is doing pretty well. Okay we've questions from Mary Murphy and Magella Odie on our old friend Brexit probably never hugely important in Helsinki and Rome but Etré any thoughts on hold on hold on I'm married to a Brit with dual nationality and both of my children have dual nationality so yes huge importance especially in this background here Etré come to you first on that presumably Brexit has disappeared off the agenda in Rome. Yes it's not particularly high in the last few months I must say even before the outbreak and the focus has always been on the rights of Italians living and working the UK essentially this is the nature of the subject we discuss at large in Italy. There is of course a serious concern about what we can lose in terms of foreign policy projections and also defence capabilities and also there are some very important industrial cooperation in the field of defence in other sectors there are no key interests for Italy. At that point I would like to underline and of course that in Italy in general it's at least its traditional political establishment would be in favour of a compromise but one that not erode a put in discussion key elements of European construction by making concession that can be contrast with what we have built so that's a not so easy balancing act to perform and so we know that the negotiations are particularly difficult and in general this is a serious destruction because it's of course absorbing a lot of energy this is the last thing we want in this situation but still of course I'm sure Italy the Italian government will remain quite flexible. Okay could I just ask you what you think the probability of an extension is at this point? Well it's very difficult to tell because it would seem to me an extension is necessary that for the UK economy and also for the EU to pile on a Brexit at the end of this year on top of COVID-19 to me seems very high risk but on the other hand I think we can now take seriously the fact that the Johnson administration wants divergence it does not want a close relationship with the EU whether that will survive the cold winds of the economic impact is another matter and we know that he pivoted already to get the withdrawal agreement but it's impossible to tell it's impossible to tell. Okay so just I'm going to very quickly we just got one minute with Bill Emmet is asking the likelihood of populist parties being in government in the biggest countries in the EU's biggest countries let's just take Germany and France as Tuvi mentions just go around the panel what do you think at the next elections that populist parties will will win in or enter government in either France or Germany Alex? It's really difficult to say I mean of course we were one of the first countries in Europe to have populist party the true things in government with us from 2015 to 2019 and I used to say that we had them to death because we would have their population but popularity but now they're back again in double digits and above 20 so it's very difficult to say and you can't really generalize it's going to depend on the situation and before I say goodbye I should say that I saw that Bobby McDonough had a question there so look what I found in my I don't know if you can see it or not it's original sin in a brave new world an account of the negotiations will treat you of Amsterdam so Bobby I still have it in my shelf sorry I didn't get your question Bobby. Etore, France and Germany? I think this won't happen okay no okay good look we come to two o'clock I'd like to thank you all very much for agreeing to participate and short notice and all of that in difficult times so many thanks again like to thank our audience for tuning in let you know that the next public event will be with Jonathan Powell Tony Blair's advisor in during his time as Prime Minister he'll be talking to us at lunchtime on Friday and with that thank you all again and have a good afternoon