 I'm Jay Fidel. This is ThinkTech. More specifically, history is here to help, and we have two historians. We have Peter Hoffenberg and Carl Ackerman, and we're going to talk about the trajectory in Europe between 1945 and now, and what factors have changed Europe and how Europe has changed, like taking two snapshots then and now, and I suppose an expectation about where it's going to go. Peter Hoffenberg, a history professor at UH. Peter, can you introduce Carl? We need to know more about him. Only the good stuff. Only the good stuff. All right, so then it'll have to be very brief. A great pleasure once again to see Dr. Ackerman. I think most folks recognize him today. Jay and I corralled him for one of his yarmulkes, which he wears, and that is as a PhD recipient and earner in Russian and modern Europe in history from the finest university in the Bay Area, University of California, Berkeley, and Jay and I would like him to be able to help us. I think as Jay suggested, what's going on in Europe? We can open the newspaper, we see Putin, and we see Ukraine, we see Congress, and after earners of Brexit, we see continued questions about the US role in immigration. So Carl, welcome. We look forward to your expertise and let me turn back to my mentor, Mr. Jay Fidel for questions. Thank you, Peter. Let's take a quick snapshot of the way it was in 45. Europe was a wreck. It had gone through a very destructive war on all levels. The Jewish people were scattered all around Europe and displaced personnel, what they call the DP camps. And the economies of all those countries were a wreck. And the great savior was the Marshall Plan where the US used its leadership as the winner of that war to try to bring Europe into a more acceptable condition. It was a wreck. And then the snapshot now is different. So can you give me your views of those two snapshots? And then we'll talk about the dynamics between the two. Jay and Peter, thank you for that wonderful introduction. And I just, anyway, it's a pleasure to be with these two fine distinguished and scholarly men. It's just a pleasure. And I'll always say that. Anyway, so I was thinking about this or talk today. And I think that in 1945, if I were to characterize important things, I would suggest that it wasn't too much longer after 1945 that both the Soviet Union and the United States versus the United States had a pre-1945 nuclear weapon. And that will shape most of what has come in terms of strategy for both of these countries and for the rest of the world. The second thing I would say is shortly thereafter of 1945, you have the European community, first, the things like coal, and then later the European Union. And if you understand these two things, many of the problems, for example, the United States facing with Russia right now are based on these two things, meaning that the United States can't go in with a lot of military action and fight the Soviet Union directly because we're both nuclear power. And the other thing is that what Putin is objecting to, and of course, after World War II, and going back to your original question, Jay, the Soviet Union had buffer state in Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union under Stalin had enforced five-year plans and collectivization and their strategies on Eastern Europe. And I think that those things especially have influenced the mindset of Vladimir Putin. So especially because there is this really strong, not mythology, but a heroic notion that the Soviet Union really defeated the Nazi warriors or Nazi horde. And in some ways, rightfully so. I mean, that's not really a myth, but a truism. So this shapes our contemporary framework. And I want to say one more thing because Vladimir Putin is dominating the news is generally in Russia, since the time of Peter the Great, have two forms of leaders. One is Western thinking like Gorbachev. And the other is more intrinsically Russian and wants to defend the focused on Russian attitude. And so I think Vladimir Putin is up a ladder. And I'm just trying to frame this and I don't want to say anything else because we have limited amount of time. But anyway, that's my answer to your question, your thoughtful question, Jay. Okay, well, let's look at the current snapshot. You know, we have issues around NATO, issues around the EU, issues around the migrants. Issues about the economies, issues about climate change, issues about Brexit, you know, and COVID. Europe has been buffeted by serious issues over the past few years. And query, is it in better condition now that it was, say, 10 or 20 years ago? Is the direction up? Or is the trajectory not so up? Peter, what's the current situation vis-a-vis all of these factors in Europe now? In Europe today, if you ask what its future relationship will be, it sounds like that's what you're asking. That's a third question. I think if you look economically, Europe will recover from Brexit. And there are still economic relations between Russia and the West. So we're not talking about economic anarchy. But as a region, I think it's pretty clear it's not going to be able to compete with China, right, as an economic region. I doubt it can compete with India as an economic region. And really, if Brazil ever got its political action together. So I would say, and probably the answer is not going to satisfy you, there will be a Europe. It will not be an impoverished Europe. But I think, and Carl can correct me, I think probably since the First World War and Europe has had to constantly reconsider its world role. And so the idea that Europe at the central 19th century. And what I would add to both of your questions, I completely agree with what Carl had said. There are a few other connections I would make to help answer your question, Jay. I think if we're looking at 1945 to 2021, the history of the relationship between Europe and its colonies needs to be factored in. 1945, hence, was a series of decolonization. It's not complete yet. And that has meant vis-à-vis the issues that Carl was talking about, European confidence, European's wealth, Europe's wealth, Europe's military position. All those certain degree have been lessened. It has also made Europe consider what America and Brazil and the Spanish Empire considered, which is a multiracial democracy possible. I mean, honestly, that's not an issue in Britain, really until 1949. It's not really an issue in France to the end of the Algerian War. So to answer your question and to build upon Carl's excellent points, I think one is a social change as far as race and ethnicity. And secondly, the change in power vis-à-vis the colonies, which meant, of course, vis-à-vis the rest of the world. How about the move right, the emergence of a stronger right wing, the emergence of autocracies? Would you consider that part of this analysis? Carl, do you want to go first? Sure. My take on the right, unlike in the United States, where there's been an emergent right, well, for a long time, but I mean, but more recently, very dangerous. I think the right has been in European parliamentary politics for a fairly long time. And you've had Le Pen in France, et cetera, et cetera. And you go back to the pre-World War two days with Mosley in Great Britain, et cetera. So with parliamentary democracies, there's room for sort of fringe right group, but these right groups are ascendant. And I think that, J.U. asked the critical question, which is, what role does the sort of migration of immigrants largely as a result of destabilization and things from colonial ventures in the 19th century back four or 500 years? So I think that this is a more dangerous phenomena with right groups coming before. And there are exceptions. I mean, if you look at the recent elections in Germany, Merkel is replaced by someone who's probably a little bit more left than she was. But no, she did a wonderful job. So I'm not convinced that this is going to be the outcome. But if we have, again, I mentioned this last time, I'm going to give it to, like, Dr. Carlson welcoming Hungarian dictator into the show, which doesn't surprise me now with what Fox is doing. You know, this is problematic. Peter? I would say, building upon that important riff, one of the differences is there is much more of a global immediate interaction. So the Nazi party, for example, had clearly influenced the U.S., there were 25,000 people at the Nazi party. But these days, and J, I know this is one of your interests with mass media. There isn't really just a European right. The European right talks to the American right when they can put aside their racist blinders. They talk to Modi and Hindu. And I think that, to me, is more dangerous than specific right-wing groups in Europe. There's a long history of that. You could at least go back in many ways to the counter revolutionaries, the French Revolution. These people speak a lot like those folks. But I think the real danger is European right influencing the American right. Well, listen, we ought to talk about this. This is very important. I mentioned that the Marshall Plan followed 1945. It was very positive. It was a high moral track for the United States. It was consistent with global leadership and the way we saw ourselves as a world leader. And then you'd have Trump running down NATO and running down the EU and running down our relationship with Europe in general and leveraging his special connection with autocrats. So I ask you this question, Peter. How is our diplomatic relations with Europe doing? How is our standing with them doing? And where is all that going? Because we no longer, I believe, have the same kind of clout. They no longer say, what did they say in Paris? Speak French, you guys. We are all American. We are all American. I don't think that they would say that these days. I don't think they feel the same way about us. And that's largely due to Trump. But it's also been a pattern over these years. We're no longer with the Marshall Plan, we're in some other place. And they are in some other place with us, right? Very much so. It's probably worth inviting Carl back to have a discussion about that. But the immediate response to you is it's a relationship. And both parties have changed. So the America that liberated Italy and France and the rest of Europe in 1945 was also the America that killed three to five million Americans. And so when we talk about the Marshall Plan, the Marshall Plan was replaced in Europe by many people over the Vietnam War and the point that Carl made early on. One of the largest movements in Europe between 45 and our time was the movement for nuclear disarmament. A major movement throughout Europe. And we were the bad guys. So I'm not disagreeing with you. I'm just saying if we look at that, we also have to look at what the US did. Now as far as European relationship, I think those of us who have time, and I maybe don't have time, we got to get behind the headlines. So the headlines might say there's a spat. And clearly there are plenty of spat. But even under President Trump's regime, there were still contacts and diplomacy being made. You know, if there were not diplomacy, probably Putin would have already invaded. So I think my answer to you, I may not satisfy you, but I've got to get behind the headlines, behind the screening and notice that in general, I would say our reputation is better now. But our reputation now is better than it was during Trump. Right. But it's also, let's remember, connected to the killing of George Floyd. There was a Black Lives Matter movement in Europe. And whereas there are plenty of reasons for Europeans to be upset about racism, that was a good part inspired. So we have to look at what does America mean? You know, in 1945, unless you were an absolute stall on it, America meant you saved us. Right. You would all know the photos of Paris and Rome, etc. Okay. Other than limited example, you know, usually referring to Berlin has rarely been that kind of generational response. But I would put to you that most Americans have changed the spell. Most of most Americans don't look at us the way you look at yourselves. That's true. 45. I think it's a great topic we should buy Carl back. You know, Carl, I want to just ask you one thing. You know, the leadership that we demonstrated after the war has continued. It may be modified. It may not be as robust as it was. And maybe it's like unconscious, subconscious. For example, I give you this and see what you think about it. So we had, I think it originated in the United States, this anti-vax movement, where for religious reasons or political reasons or a combination of those, maybe it's all conflated. You know, people didn't want to take a vaccine, even though they were taking vaccines for every childhood disease you can think about for our lifetime. Okay. And then you look again, you look at Europe. And now there's an anti-vax movement in Europe. Now, is that indigenous to Europe or is that merely copycat? Is that merely this kind of negative leadership, this momentum leadership that the people in Europe see emulating what goes on in the US? What do you think? You know, if I had to come down on one of those two sides, I would say probably it's indigenous to Europe. I'm, you know, I think the thing about the vaccine is very personal. And there are people who are generally not well educated or sometimes people who are just well educated in a kind of cookie, you know, won't follow scientific research. And because it's being something that the government is ordering you to do yourself, I think there's a natural inclination doubted, even if that it's, even though if it's, it's science to do as much to my chagrin that's happening like this. But I think going back to your question that you asked Peter and myself about, about our role, the American role in Europe, I think with Joe Biden, it is the typical thing. I think, and I think it's for two reasons. One, the European leaders know Biden and they trust him. You know, the smarter leaders know that Trump was the Everett personality. And even if you had a conservative, Mike Pence comes to mind, you know, conservative, sort of, crazy, right wing person. And I, you know, in some ways, Mike Pence, not that, but I mean, in general, you know, things, positions are pretty far right. They wouldn't have had the same reaction. And the danger, my feeling is that the danger that Europeans thought is they couldn't predict Donald Trump doing things in a way that made any sense to anyone who had been in sort of like geopolitical culture. And so, in that way, I mean, even our foes didn't know what to make of this guy because, you know, he's, he's very shallow and intellectual. And as soon as people realize that, then they realize that we're, gee, as one might say in Hawaii, when it comes to foreign policy. But I think Biden has a responsibility. And of course, you know, if, if, you know, with Macron, and if, if, if the French don't know about a deal that the United States is making with some sort of, you know, armament and, and they leave the French out. It's been a great problem, no matter who's president and what's going on. But I think there's been a great rapprochement with the, with the European leaders since Joe Biden has been traveling. And, you know, even what's interesting is, you know, not so in Joe Biden's case, but if you have, you know, a secretary of state, like, let's take George Bush Jr., who's, you know, who probably at the beginning had limited foreign policy experience. He had Connolly Sarais by him. And, you know, this is a political scientist of Stanford stature. And, you know, who knew at least what she was doing, even if you disagreed with her, she was, you know, on, on, you know, the normal within the, within the normal framework. And just to conclude on one last thing is the notion of Vladimir Putin going back to Russia for a bit. Vladimir Putin is a real polity guy. You know, I mean, he's, he studied, he knows, he's a really sharp character. If you listen to what he's saying, he has to please his local audience. He's on, he's in an economy that's shaped by natural gas. And a lot of this is posturing and things like this. But as we know from the Soviet period, strength is the only thing that's going to push this guy back. And I'm not talking about you being really aggressive. I'm just saying strength. And I mean, rather than just words. Well, rather, I mean, if you talk about sanctions, I'm not sure what kind of sanctions you're talking about. Now, I think it's very clever of the United States to start focusing on his, his little cabal and removing their assets or even focusing on Putin's assets like this. And, you know, I think if we were smart about it, you know, you know, I think Biden is doing a pretty good job. But I think we have to really, you know, the kibosh on this thing and know that Putin just wants. And from his point of view, for very good reason, Ukraine never to join NATO, because he's, there used to be a buffer. And now, I mean, you know, if you look at Russia, the Soviet history, you know, people have invaded Russia, Napoleon and Hitler. So in other words, you know, he's scared. He sees it as losing territory and an incursion. Can I, I want to ask you one more question that has to do with it, you know, the future. And for that, I want to put a map up. So, Eric, can you put the map of Russia up? I'm sorry, the map. I'm leading myself here. This is a map showing you all the countries as they exist today. So Peter, Peter, how, how is this map? How is Europe going to change going forward? Let's leave it on the screen for a minute. And you can sort of draw us the map of the future of Europe. Well, I personally, and Carl, please correct me from your point of view, I personally don't see that map changing significantly. I see potential devolution in Britain, potentially Ireland will be united in Scotland will go in separate ways. But most of those nation states are protected in one way or another, either militarily or politically. So I think the issue, and it's what you're getting at slightly tweaking it is in a way not the map, but the map of ideas. So will Putin's ideas about autocracy, or let's say Macron's ideas about republicanism, will they have influence across those borders? And I, again, and we've talked about this every week, because it's important with social media, we just don't know. We know those ideas and spread, both good and bad. And we know also that governments and high tech companies can take measures to prevent them. So I think, you know, Yahweh willing, I have a grandchild that kids map is not going to look all that much different. But the societies and politics within them, like I don't really see him talking, I don't see Putin, you know, doing much beyond Ukraine, even if it's Ukraine, I don't see him pulling, you know, an Alexander or Napoleon, and I don't see anybody in the West doing that either. Same question for you. And let's show Carl the map. Carl, to what extent do you agree with Peter and to what extent would you add to that? I completely agree with Peter. And I, you know, he noted that Scotland, I mean, for independence, but they're, you know, I mean, how independent will they be? And I think that, you know, the Europe, you know, my feeling is that most logical people who have very in some form of parliamentary democracy, you know, curbs coming, curbs going away, realize that, you know, that some form of mixture between socialism, capitalism, and most of their countries has produced, you know, a pretty good life for most Europeans. And of course, they have great healthcare systems for most European countries, and they have great cooling facilities and facilities to go to school, although one might say that in the United States we have more access, but probably less people than it's going to school. But so I agree with Peter completely. And I think also one of the things that Americans, I don't realize is that when the Soviet Union was involved in Afghanistan, Russia was involved in it. And Russians were weren't happy about their voice coming home in boxing. And, you know, if he goes into the crane this time, there's going to be there's going to be Russians die. And I think that, you know, I don't think that I think that Vladimir Putin fully have a lear enough to do that, but he's going to suffer the consequences. My theory about that, Carlos, he's going to try to take Ukraine without firing a shot by using, you know, strategies of communication and diplomacy, negative diplomacy, but I agree with you, he's not going to go in and send boys home in boxes. Let me ask you one more question, and that is this. We follow China. And China was recently in the newspapers, you can take a train now from Shanghai to Lisbon, Portugal, part of the Belt Road. This is quite remarkable and that we should be living in the time when this, this, this possibility is turning into a reality. How is China's influence, and I know it's, it's, it's futuristic, but how is China's influence through the Belt Road and, and trade and manufacturing and, you know, economics in general, global economics going to change Germany in competing with Germany and Europe in general. Carl, do you go first? Well, I'm going to have to leave in one minute, so I will go first. I'll be very brief. You know, the influence of China is going to be twofold. One is going to be, of course, which we know if anyone, if you go to Walmart, the tremendous economic output of China. And so I think, you know, it's the major player that the United States is going to say that's why a lot of our attention is focused on China. The second thing I think is in the military capacity in the Pacific, which we're going to have to pay more attention to because China's build-up is quite significant, and if not to any, you know, a sing-pack or any military leader in the Pacific, they are very worried about this, and I think they should be. I think China is much more reasonable in terms of geopolitics than Russia is, but I think that, you know, if you're talking about economic output, and especially for our state of Hawaii, China is the big gorilla. China is really going to be quite significant. Having said that, it's been a joy to speak with two Ashkenazi, and it's such a pleasure, and I'm off to a board meeting, but thank you, Jay. Thank you, Peter. You both described the work and, you know, in your personalities, and it's always a pleasure to speak with you. Carl, Carl, don't turn your machine off just now. Let's give Peter a chance to summarize and close before you leave. No, Carl needs to go. So Carl, thank you very much, and I think in response to Jay's question, Europe today is fundamentally different than 1945, but in a way facing some similar challenges. Carl mentioned nuclear war. Well, Europe is also facing the question of war. Jay mentioned displaced persons. Europe is also facing the question of migration. So whereas the still photos look a little different, I think behind the scenes, Jay and Carl, we've seen some very similar dilemmas, and I look forward to talking to both of you guys very soon again. Aloha. Thank you very much, Jay. Thank you very much, Carl. Thank you, Jay. Thank you, Peter. Thank you, Carl. Aloha.