 Thank you. I will be speaking very quietly until I will see eyes of somebody closed. Then I will raise my voice and prepare for emergencies. The term emergency, you see, there is no term accident. Why? Because we do distinct between those two terms. Accident is an event which is not intentional. Emergency incorporates also intentional ex triggering event by bad guys. And when I'm saying bad guys, I'm not thinking only on men. So let's see now in this one hour and a half how we can be prepared to respond if emergency occurs. Either by accident, by natural disaster, by negligence, or by bad guys. Now watch. These are all cover pages of the accident reports. And the last one is here. So emergencies, they do occur. So we have to be prepared to respond. Better we are prepared, better or more efficiently, we will respond when there is a need, when there is an event where we need to respond. So what we are going to discuss in this one hour and a half. First, what are the goals of EPR? Emergency preparedness and response. So this acronym you will hear and you will see many times now. EPR. It could be like I'm coming from the IEC that is not International Electrical Commission, but it is incident and emergency center of the IAEA. Then we will go through the key concepts of emergency preparedness and response. We will quickly look at the international framework of the EPR, which is very important. But especially here in this part I will make sure that you will not fall asleep. Because talking about the legal things at least makes me sleep myself. And quickly I will just list for you publications, IAEA in emergency preparedness and response. So let's start with the goals. What is the first goal? Ensure that adequate response arrangements and capabilities, I mean the goal of preparedness. To ensure that adequate response arrangements and capabilities are in place at facilities, if you have, or for activities at a local, national and international level. And we want to be sure that first responders, that responders at all are trained. We need to make sure that they are trained. This is the goal of the preparedness. And sound emergency preparedness helps to build confidence that emergency response will be effective and achieving its goals, goals of the emergency response. And let's see now what are the goals of emergency response. First thing is always to regain control, either in the facility or the activity and to mitigate the consequences. Second goal, sometimes the first, save lives. We need to avoid or minimize deterministic health effects. And Abel was talking about deterministic health effects. So the goal of the response is to minimize, avoid, if possible, or minimize severe deterministic effects. Render first aid, provide critical medical treatment and management of radiation and injuries. Then we come to the stage where we need to reduce the risk of stochastic effects. Most probably we cannot avoid them completely, but we need to reduce the risk. And anyway, you have seen that from Abel that the risk is not very high. To keep public informed and maintain public trust, the easiest way to lose trust is not to inform the public. In principle, I don't know the government who would really have trust of the public. Because they always do something so that public is losing the trust. And in most or in all events, emergencies, I remember there was something where the government lost the trust of the public. So that is a very important thing. And to the extent practical, we need to mitigate non-radialogical consequences. And usually, non-radialogical consequences are more severe than radiological consequences. Abel already told you, neither in Chernobyl, neither in Fukushima, the two biggest ones. They were not real radiological consequences. Most of them were non-radialogical, social, economic, political. Protect property and environment and prepare for the assumption of normal social and economic activity. Now let's go to the concepts, to the main, to the key concepts of emergency preparedness and response. Here on those two tables, you have comparison, you have ICRP recommendations, and comparison between the plant exposure situation and the emergency exposure situation. Abel was telling you this different type of exposure situation. Plant and emergency. And extent, now it's called still existing, but extent, I agree with Abel, it's more appropriate word. Each plant exposure should be justified. He was telling about this principle. In emergency, each protective action should be justified. Inductive or protective strategy. The dose is adding up in a plant exposure situation should be kept as low as reasonable achievable. That's planned. In the emergency, the protective strategy resulting in dose reduction should be optimized. So they are, these principles are in parallel in the plant situation and in the emergency situation. The sum of doses in the plant exposure situation should be kept below specified dose limits. Better would be to use dose reference as Abel told you yesterday and the day limits is not the best term because it may give you a wrong impression. If it is a limit, so above the limit is dangerous to health. That's a normal perception of the limit. And below the limit, it's fine. It's safe, it's okay. But no, that's not the meaning of the term limit here. The first thing is all hazard approach. And now, since September, 11th, September, how many years ago, twins in New York, it's not only all hazard approach, but it is also all tracks approach. So you need to have approach to all hazards you have and to tracks you think you have, you estimate, you assess. Because once you have this, then you have a graded approach to EPR. You don't need to be, I mean, EPR is expensive or maybe expensive. So you don't need to be prepared for something which you think you will never, ever meet, which is again a kind of tricky because many times it happens that you think, ah, that cannot happen. And it does. But if you are prepared for your level of hazard, you will also better more efficiently act if something happens, you did not even think that it can happen. Then we will go to the emergency, there are four concepts. All hazard approach, emergency management system, emergency classification and protective strategy. These are four basic EPR concepts we will go through. And first we go to the all hazard approach. And basic question when you are, is either at the facility or the local or national level is for what we need to be prepared. You need to answer this question before you start to prepare yourself. So you need to identify hazards and threats and potential consequences of emergency that will provide you an answer to this question for what we need to be prepared. It's easy to say for all events full range that could occur either at the facility or activity including those with low probability and nuclear security events. I know if you, most of you who are engineers, you know, ah, you know the term, ah, design basis accidents. So it used to be that the MPPs were prepared only for design basis accidents. And then they realized they are not only design basis accidents. They are beyond design basis accidents. And so I can easily say you need to be prepared if you have for full range. And I'm, let's say, and I don't say anything else. For me it seems full range, but you need to decide what means full range. Is it also that the airplane will fall on the MPP or the meteorite will fall on the MPP? So you will need to decide what means the full range. And of course now practice and experience showed us that you need to be prepared for emergencies in combination with the conventional emergencies. Earthquakes, tropical cyclones, tsunamis. Sometimes they were not, I mean, in the past they were not really, I mean, they take, okay, if the MPP is in the area where principle could be earthquake, of course they were prepared for that. In Fukushima, in principle they were prepared for tsunami. In principle. They had seven meter high wall, but they never really count on or thought that 14 or 16 meters tsunami will come. Events affecting several facilities. Again experience from the Fukushima. Events at nuclear facilities or activities in other states. Typical, typical thing is how austere are afraid of MPP Kershko. You will be there next week. And Croatia. Kershko is 10 kilometers from the border from Croatia. Okay, it's 100 kilometers maybe less from Austria. So in this case, in principle those three countries they need to talk. They would need to talk together. And they would need to share emergency plans and criteria. And you will see how efficient they are when Abel will show you three slides in the afternoon. And that, I will not tell you in advance, but that is one of the major things that criteria among neighboring states are most commonly not harmonized. Criteria for actions are not harmonized. And that may create a lot of confusion if emergency happens. So that's why the agency is striving to harmonize criteria for protective actions in an emergency. Every four to every three to five years we are preparing, I mean when I say we is the agency, the IEA, preparing an exercise usually based on an event in the nuclear power plant. This year it was Hungary. So Hungary is in Europe. Many countries could be affected by the accident in Europe. It's not like Japan where Fukushima was one, the nearest neighboring country was one thousand more than one thousand kilometers away. And the only country who was in one thousand circle was with a little bit of land of Russia. In Europe, I mean Slovenia is three hundred kilometers altogether, the longest distance. You can nearly walk from one part of, from one part of Slovenia to another part of Slovenia. And one of the goals of the exercise was also to see how neighboring countries are consulting, responding. Are they talking to each other? What kind of protective actions they would introduce? No talking, no discussion. I am trying to convince them since at least last 15 years. This is the fourth exercise I was part of 10 days. No, you cannot see a step forward toward years ago. So as I said, Hazard Assessment provides framework for a great approach to EPR. Now we come to the second concept, preparedness categories. This is developed by the agency somehow to help you to have a shortcut from Hazard Assessment to the level you need to be prepared. There are five, we defined five preparedness categories. The first one now in principle is just MPP if you have reactors. So facilities for which on-site events including nuclear security events could give rise to severe deterministic effects of site. That is only power reactors. Then in the second category are facilities for which on-site events could warrant urgent or early protective actions or other response actions of site, but there would be no severe deterministic effects of site, of the fence, of the facility. In the third category, a facility where there is no off-site actions needed at all is only on-site. Typical facility would be irradiator. If the source in the irradiator is stuck, it would not create any off-site actions would be needed, but only on-site. And quite a few accidents, now I'm saying accidents because they were unintentional, happened in the radiation facility. And again, Abel will tell you many examples in the afternoon. The fourth category is activities that could give rise to emergency that could warrant protective and other response actions in unforeseen location. That means that's not something which would be wrong with the MPP, but typically these are radiological accidents, radiological, nuclear, radiological, that means with the sources because it is in the unforeseen place. And I will tell you one example later about this. Just because I was part of the response to that kind of the event and you will see it's a typical thing. And the last one is, let's say, last one would be areas in Croatia because of the MPP in Krzysko, in Slovenia. So areas that could be impacted by emergency in category one or two, located in another state. Why this category is important, you will see, because if you are in the category one, you know, in whatever category you are, you know what you can expect. Yes. And by severe, you die. Severe deterministic effects is not an ICRP definition, it's the IAEA definition because deterministic effects can be also burns. Not a big deal. May not be a big deal. But severe deterministic effects means most probably you may die or you may suffer a lot. I mean, you may be without lack, without hands, something which is severe. It's not only burns. Now we come to the emergency management system. I think I should go a little bit quicker. And again, emergency management system should be commensurate with the results of hazard assessment integrated to the extent into all hazard emergency management system. Typically why? I remember in 2002, no it was 2000 BC, I guess. No, 1980, to the MPP Krzysko start into operation. It was built. At that time, I was already in the emergency preparedness and response because Slovenia, this is civil protection, which is not a military. It's civil protection was responsible for all kind of disasters. Earthquake, floods, fires. But there was a tendency that there was a tendency that MPP is so different that they need to be a different approach, a different system to respond to the MPP. And I had quite a hard time to convince them that evacuation is evacuation. It doesn't matter is it because of floods or fires or earthquake or MPP. So I did succeed that all the preparedness and response for our nuclear power plant was incorporated, integrated in our overall protection system of civil protection. And that is important. You do not invent a specific system just to respond to a nuclear or geological emergency. What are critical response functions? Managing response operations, you can identify, you can identify, you can activate, you can see, you can list of response functions. Maybe the floor would like to hear. Maybe somebody under the floor. And we were talking, you look at this list later, because you will need this list if you are starting your emergency preparedness planning. Essential infrastructure elements, authorities, organizations, staffing, coordination, plans and procedures, logistic support facilities, training drills and exercises, quality management program. See, training, drills, exercises. What is the difference between drills and exercises? Again, in some countries they don't distinguish between drills and exercises. But drills, you are exercising the specific tasks under instructions. That's the understanding in the agency language. And in the exercises with the exercises you are testing the system. You are testing the system. You are not, you are of course also learning by testing the system. But that's not, it's not the primary goal of the exercise is to learn. It's to see how the system works. And how many times I have heard, oh, exercise was perfect. There was no problem. Waste of money and time. Exercise needs to show you your weak points. Because only that way you can improve. If exercise does not show the weak points, it was not a good exercise. And then you come to the key documents. National radiation emergency plan. And this document needs to provide basis for emergency preparations by local and national response organizations. Contains information. Other organizations need to know about national level response. And summarizes, modifies plans and assures all other planning is integrated and compatible. And the group three will try to put together an outline of a national emergency plan. That is their project. And that's what they will do. And now we come to the ten tasks when you start to prepare your emergency plan. The first thing which is not one of the ten tasks is to designate national emergency preparedness coordinator. And you will see why. Then you review national policies, you perform hazard assessment, you develop planning basis, allocate responsibilities, develop inter-arrangements. Don't wait that your plan will be ready. Because it will never be ready fully. So you need to have inter-arrangement. If something happens before your plan is ready, develop the plan, present the plan, implement the plans, test arrangements and establish ongoing quality assurance plan. That's those ten steps. And each of them is important. You should not skip any of them, particularly, I mean particularly, one of the, I remember again, present the plan. In all times it used to be that those plans were confidential. Jesus Christ. How you expect that the people will act and believe you if you have confidential plans. So I convinced my government in Slovenia that the plan was open to the public. Because they need to know what they were to do. And of course then MPP itself, they prepare summary of the plan and the posters and so on so that the local people were aware what they need to do if something happens. Nowadays parts of the plan are becoming confidential again. Why? Because of the security people. Because if the emergency is triggered by the bad guys, by the nuclear security events, they think they will decide what will be open and what will not be open. It depends on those people there. I found, sorry, but I found security people sometimes strange. Because for them everything is confidential. Yes, what they are? Those who keep states. Look, and then I will be talking about that. You need to invite whoever has a real role or is interested in the discussions of the emergency plan. We will come to this. What are the common problems? The most common problem is who is responsible for what? Which ministry is responsible for what? Which agencies? Which institute? And you know what usually happens? When we discuss, okay, who is responsible for this? You will say, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, that's my responsibility. And then you will say, ah, but I think it's my responsibility. So everybody is fighting for the responsibility. If something happens, ah, it's you. Not me. No, no, no, no, it's you, not me. So no one wants to be responsible. So the most important thing is that in the plan is clearly, responsibility is clearly defined. And how you achieve this? You do, I mean, you, means now the emergency preparedness coordinator or somebody appointed by him, a list of all activities, tasks that need to be covered in the plan. And you distribute among all ministries, agencies, laboratories, institutes, you think they will have a role in the emergency plan. And ask them, please, think for what you think you are responsible, either based on the mandate, based on the, whatever. You collect this and you will see that few tasks, activities are triple times or four times checked. Some, no checking at all. So no one. And what you need to do? Again, coordination meeting. You checked, you checked and you checked. Let's meet, now discuss who will be responsible for this. And then you agree, you three agree who will be responsible. And that is then put into the national plan. Yes. What kind of agreement? There's a law, there's a regulation, which can be differently interpreted because it's not so detailed for what, in principle, let's say, ministry of, for environment will be responsible for monitoring, in principle. But ministry of health can be also responsible for monitoring. Oh, civil protection can be responsible for monitoring in emergency. So if it is clear from the law, you have no problem. I'm talking about when it is not clear for this specific task or activity, you need to. Yes? You will follow, of course, you will not say by legal you are responsible and then you will say no, no, no. She will be responsible. That you cannot do. First you go by legal, definitely. But in the area where there is not clear from the legal, you need to discuss and agree. And you need to discuss and agree for those things which are not ticked. That means either I missed that it is in law, but I missed that I'm responsible for this. Or in no law, in no regulations this task is clear who is, who needs to, the enemy need to, no legal framework. That can also happen. Lack of knowledge of kaza. Lack of resources. Lack of organization. Lack of coordination. Training for exercises. You have everything, but you will not be responsible. I mean the responsible people, they really don't believe that it will happen. So this training for exercises, you are training for, not for the real cases. Paper plans, public education, public information. These are all issues and items where they are, where you will find common problems. Putting together a national emergency plan or any other emergency plan, local. Involve all parties who have responsibilities or an interest at early stage of preparedness planning process. Don't mistake that you do a perfect emergency plan by yourself or a group of people and then you go to the ministry. This is your role. This is your role. This is your role. They will not accept that. They will not accept that. They need to be involved from the very beginning so that they will feel it is their plan. It's not your plan for them. It's their plan. Classification and next concept is much easier to act if you have an emergency classification. Because under each class you know in advance what could be consequences and what needs to do. And this is a classification, a generic classification the agency developed. It's more or less, with maybe different terms, all MPPs have more or less the same classification. General emergency, site area emergency, facility emergency, and any other nuclear or logical emergency. Let's go quickly through the characteristics of each. Generally, emergency may be declared or may happen only in the facility category one and two. That means MPP, general emergency. Upon declaration appropriate actions have to be promptly taken to mitigate the consequences on site to protect people on site and off site. Site area emergency, that means already, you know, by the term general emergency means that go off site. Site area emergency means mostly on site. Also could be a little bit off site, but mostly on site. And facility category, that can be also declared in the radiation facility. Not only MPP or research reactor, but also at the irrigation facility. If they have a stock source in the invi-data means it's facility emergency. So there is no need to do anything off site. Alert, these are the minor events which needs to trigger your preparedness if something goes worse. And then the taking actions to assess and to mitigate potential consequences. To assess and mitigate potential consequences and to increase readiness of on site response organization. That's alert. And then you have other nuclear or logical emergencies. These are for, mostly for the logical emergency. And now we come to the protection strategy. As Abel said it should be justified, optimized at preparedness stage. And what means justified? It needs to do more good than harm. Now we come to the, what is safe, what is safe. Term safe is a kind of a tricky, not a tricky term, but it's very personal, very perceptional. The notion of safe can be very difficult. But it's clear that severe deterministic effects are not safe, are not safe. It's also clear that justified that the, when you have a stochastic effects and you need to justify the, to reduce, it's also not safe. However, in the existing exposure situation, I mean, you are leaving, we are leaving there. So we need to say it's safe. Because if it would not be safe, we should move somewhere. But as I said, there is no, we did not agree internationally to do that. What is safe? I'm talking now about the, the logical protection. In many areas, they did define what is safe. Is it flying by airplane safe? Is it driving the car safe? Is it smoking safe? Is it eating food, which is safe? Each of us will have a different perception what is safe. And those industries, they use the term safe. If it is below some tolerable risk, or if it's below some tolerable level, they would say safe. Eating chemicals with small amounts in food, you even don't know, it's safe. However, perception for aviation is it's not safe at all. Any small thing can cause cancer. And Abel told you in the morning. No, it's not the case. So if you have severe deterministic effects, Abel told you above around 1,000 milligrams an hour, you need to have precautionary protective actions. If you may have possible increase in stochastic effects, which means about 100 millisievert in seven days, 100 millisieverts in a year, you will need urgent protective actions or early protective actions. And I will tell you what are now urgent, what are early, what are precautionary. And you need to have criteria. System of generic and operational criteria. You have generic criteria, that is usually in dose, effective dose, sometimes equivalent dose, but that's as he said here, it could be complete confusion when you are talking about the dose. You never define, we never define is it effective, is it absorbed, is it appealing. Based on this, you have for field and laboratory measurements, operational intervention level. For abnormal facility conditions, early emergency levels, action levels. And for conditions on scene of observers and indicators, that you need to define. And IAEA established generic criteria. Acute doses for which protective actions and other response actions are expected to be taken under any circumstances to avoid or minimize severe deterministic effect. And protective actions and other response actions in emergency exposure to patients to reasonably reduce risk of stochastic events. Below these generic criteria, they will not be any severe deterministic effects or any observable increase in incidence of cancer, even in a very large exposed group. Furthermore, risk of cancer and other health effects is too low to justify taking any protective or other response actions. Would you consider the levels below generic criteria safe? There's no deterministic effects. There's no observable stochastic effects. It is safe. Why not? Yes? That's what we are saying. Why not? But many experts say no. It's not safe. Why not? Because there is still a little bit of risk that you will get the cancer. It's not, you will not detect it. It's not observable, even in large population. But in principle, you may have it. And now my question is, is this approach more effective than saying that it's safe? Because if you will say to the population, ah, it's no problem. If there's only a small risk that you will get the cancer, it's completely different if I'm saying it's safe. It's more or less the same statement, much more effective if you say it's safe. However, immediately when you will say this, they will be on Facebook, on newspapers, experts who will say, you, this is not safe. And you cannot win that battle. Yes. I know, yes, you have to. Yes. But people, they don't do it. And, okay, it's not safe. Okay. These are then operational, intervention levels. We will talk about it, the agency that developed them so that from the dose that you know on the instrument, like dose rate meter, if it shows more than something, it's not, you need to do something. If it's below, you don't need to do something. And they are these intervention levels for the measurements that are developed in the way that it protects the most sensitive person caring for normal activities, kids, pregnant women. And you need to remember, you need to be aware and you know, I guess, that members of the public will protect themselves. What that means? Maybe they will take actions. And if they are not instructed properly, they may take wrong actions, actions which may, which will do more harm than good. Therefore, clear communication is important. Typical question. Most frequent questions. Is my baby safe? Ah, no, no, no, no. What is it? One, it's only three becquerels of iodine per kilogram. No, it's micro-sever per hour small. Counts per second, dose, high doses, severs, renegade per hour, becquerels. How can she understand? So, not clearly answering the question resulted in unsafe evacuation of patients, typical Fukushima, not treating patients, again Fukushima, stigma, voluntary abortions, psychological distress, economic impacts, and more, and more, and more. My overnight experience, 1986. What happened at that time? Chernobyl. My friend came to me and said, what shall I do? My wife is pregnant and her doctor said to her, I would think twice if I would have that baby. She is a doctor. Not a clue. Okay, I can say that I saved that baby because I explained. Slovenia, Chernobyl, did I mean? But I said, how many abortions were done in those times? So, to answer this question, you need to know the relation between measured quantities and calculated doses, and then relation to observer health effects. And my question isn't answered because of unappropriate use of ICRP guidance, doses, et cetera. We need to protect her. Agreed? From radiation. Yes? And from experts. In quotes. We need to say, to answer the question, is it safe? We need tools to answer this question. And we need to develop from the measured quantities to the health hazard in perspective. And this was one quote from a health security body more. Forget the educational messages that we prepared. The public wants to know if it is safe or for the reserves and for their kids. And if not, what they do about it? First off, they don't care what is a sewer or backyard. Just tell me, I myself, and mostly we are not able, when I say we means experts, not able. Or we don't want to say safe. Because of the scientific reason, there is a small, always small risk, which is not a fact. Abel showed you. It's a linear extrapolation to zero. And because of the protective strategy, we said it may, each may have effect. But we don't know. We don't know. And we still use it for saying we should not say it's safe. Because it may be something down there. We know that under 100, we receive it. There is no severe deterministic health effects or detectable increase in incidence in cancer. And there is no response action needed to include medical follow-up. Can I say, can we say safe below this under 100? No. Many people, many experts are saying no. You cannot use safe. The term safe. So we are still working on the acceptable word. If you have any good idea what to use instead of the term safe, let us know. Let us know. But what I am personally always surprised is how easy we are using the term safe anywhere in all areas except in the radiation protection. Because I was working my whole life on the premises that it's not safe and now suddenly I need to say it's safe. If it is safe below 100, I may lose my job. Or I don't know. But that's how it is. Now we come to the nuclear emergencies. Wait. Okay. Ten minutes more. When you are planning, when you are starting to be prepared, you will need to define emergency zones and distances. Because you don't need to be prepared, let's say you are a big country. You don't need to be prepared everywhere for the same hazard. So it's good that you optimize your emergency preparedness. And you are optimizing your emergency preparedness by defining emergency zones and distances. Therefore, precautionary action zone, urgent protective action planning zone, extended planning distance, and ingestion and commodities planning distance. P-A-Z-U-P-Z-E-P-G- and ICPD. A graphic presentation. MPP in the center. Then you have precautionary action zone, urgent protective action zone, extended protective distance, preparedness distance, and ICPD. And the urgency of protective actions goes in the same way. Precautionary action zone is based on severe deterministic health effects. In the area where you would expect that they may happen, you declare precautionary action zone. Why precautionary action zone? Because you will evacuate if it happens. Based on the status of the plan, based on the action guides, you will evacuate before release. You will not do that based on the models, but you will do that based on the status of the plan. If you know that you will have a core melt, because you have no cooling of the reactor, you will evacuate immediately before release. Then you have urgent protective action zone. It's based on the, on to reduce stochastic effects. And then you have EPD and ICPD, which you will see now what to do. Now, suggested distances already are three to five kilometers for the protection, for the precautionary action zone. Depends a little bit on the, on the power reactor, but it's three to five kilometers around the, and it does not need to be a circle, as you have seen from previous picture. UPC 15 to 30 kilometers, extended planning distances 100 for the modern 1,000 megawatt reactor, 50 for the, between 100 and 1,000, and then injection and commodity spending distance up to 300 for the 1,000, and it's 100 for the, up to 100 for the 100 to 1,000 megawatt. Yes. Yes. Same method. Depends on the power. Unless it used to be like in Slovenia, where we said, okay, let's make it instead of 1510, because that will not cross the border. So there are also political reasons. Used to be before. But, but from where, let's say from where we get the, those numbers. They are based on the experience, and they are based on the modeling. Both. 300, let's say, it's Chernobyl, because Abel told you that they were, the kids were drinking the milk, and there is, and there was an, a race in the, in the, thyroid cancer. 300 kilometers from the, and you, when you are putting this together, deciding on the, on the borders, you need to take, they need to be based on the local conditions to be effective. You cannot have a circle, and then the circle will go through, through the, through the town, or through the houses. And then what, half house, you will, you will evacuate, and half of the house, you will not evacuate. So you need to take natural rivers, roads, those things into account when you are putting together the, the, the border of those zones and, but of course, for the sizes, it's a circle. I mean, it doesn't matter. But for the urgent protective actions and, and precautionary actions, it needs to be taken into account the local geography. Because it would go through the town, and what? Yes, and what? You will, you will evacuate the lower part, and you will not have a greater doubt about it. You think that the people will stay there? Of course not. So you should not do that. You should either completely or avoid, but not through the town. Yeah, it's up to you. There's no should, there's no should. If you have one million, if you have one million town population in the town, what are your evacuation plans? Can you evacuate one million? If you are prepared, then you take the hold in the really needed case. But as Abel told you, many problems are associated with evacuation. And first, here is again terminology about what's telling you, to you. Japanese were using evacuation for, for three kinds of protective actions. For sheltering, they used the term inside evacuation. That's how they translated. I don't know what term they originally used. That, then it was evacuation because evacuation means two to one week maximum. If it's longer, one year, it's a resettlement. You resettle the people. From the point of view from the, but you need, you use the term evacuation only if you play, if you think that they will be moved for two days to one week, maximum one month. Then they return. And if they, if that is explained to them, and you say evacuate, they know that they will come back. But the term is also misused for the, where you know that they will not come back for a year or more. And that is not, you should not call this protective action evacuation. So if you want to prevent, so you, you have protective precautionary action zone and UPC to prevent severe deterministic effect, but that's the goal. It's an urgent action. And it should be taken within one hour of declaration of general emergency. Within one hour, once done, MPP declares general emergency within one hour evacuation of the precautionary action zone need to start. Rather earlier, but in practice it will not happen. But it needs to be within one hour. And within one hour also in the UPC, but not at the same time, not to interfere with the evacuation from the precautionary action zone. After evacuation from the precautionary action zone is finished or will not be in, interfered anymore, you start evacuation of the UPC. UPC. Do you recommend the public to live in? To live in. I mean that, that is a matter of, of citing. And then there are guidance how to cite the MPP, but let's say in, you will see next week in Kerskot there are two towns, one is three kilometers from MPP and one is five kilometers. Better not, but three to five, because three kilometers is pretty close. I mean, it is not far. And within three kilometers, usually you do not have many people. You cannot throw them. If you, if you did choose to build there, but that's another. What you do, I would entirely blocking, reduce, in other words, ejection, safely evacuate, restrict excess. This is quite, you will, you may be surprised how many dirt we eat. Quite a lot of those may come from the inadvertent suggestion, hence dirty hands, not washes, fruits or vegetables. So you need to point out to the people. In UPC, you first share the and then safely evacuate. And of course again, restrict excess. In EPD, you can read this. You can read this. Today, there is no special dinner. You can go to your room. You take this lecture, you read, and I guarantee you in two minutes you will sleep like a baby. In EPD, reduce inadvertent suggestion, locate hotspots and evacuate or relocate, local produce milk and rain water, protect food, milk and drinking water sources. And do not rely on models for protective action. Models can be used for planning, for preparedness, even during emergency for planning, because you will never have enough resources, manpower, to deploy. And you can use models to see where you would deploy, but do not rely on models for protective action. Example, after release, that was the model in Fukushima, giving them where the plume will go. And that was the actual situation. Yes. Don't rely on models for protective actions for deciding on protective action. Never ever. If there will be a modelist here, he would be now loudly protesting, loudly protesting. But I always say do not rely for deciding where protective action is. Suggesting response time in 15 minutes after classification of general emergency, no, general emergency need to be classified in 15 minutes. Something happens in 15 minutes need to be classification by the MPP. Is a general emergency or emergency gas. In half an hour, off-site decision-makers need to be informed. Whoever it is, regulatory body or whoever it is by your plan, public needs to be notified to act in less than one hour, 45 minutes. Public starts to act in one hour. That's ideal timing. Media briefing in hours and monitoring in days. I think nowadays I would change this timing for media briefing. That's, I guess, that is, that timing is still from the time where there were no Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, BBC breaking news, CNN breaking news. They will know immediately. Don't count that the workers in the power plant when they will hear something, that something is going on, immediately on the phone, on the Facebook, immediately. So I will suggest that for media briefing it needs to be earlier. Earlier. You don't need to know all the facts to have briefing for the media. You just tell them what you know or that you don't know that something is going on but you don't know. Better than be quiet. Better than be quiet because there will be rumors immediately. Immediately. An expert will be on the BBC immediately. As I said, that's the system we developed. It's from the measured quantity to the health hazard in perspective. And first, how do you monitor? You have a measured quantity. Then consider all the important and the behavior. Consider the most sensitive members of the public. Consider all the important exposure pathways. Perform the organ dos calculations. Compare with genetic criteria and you get health hazard in perspective. And for that, we already prepared charts where we did to say safe. Safe but it says what means safe. Safe according to international safety standards. Safe means below 100. But again, we are still searching for the better terms. And I don't think we will find. So quite a few of these charts you will find in this publication. Actions to protect the public in an emergency due to severe conditions as light water reactions. It's free PDF and it was published four years, four years ago. And it already incorporates all the experience from all the emergencies accidents, particularly Fukushima. Fukushima accident. And I'm saying Fukushima accident not emergency because it was an accident. It was triggered by bad guys. Yes. Most of the things, yes. Sometimes timing cannot be the same. Release cannot be the same, but you can use as a base. Okay. Now. The logical emergencies. I will just go to the examples here. Serious over exposure, dispersion of fraternities, innovation, the rate and variation levels of our knowledge and so on and so on. And the comparison between nuclear emergency and the geological emergency is that the nuclear source term is limited to products of efficient chain reaction. And in the logical, it's any radioactive source. Few persons or small population in the logical and the large population may be impacted in large areas. In the nuclear long transition periods from emergency exposure situation to existing exposure situation. And in logical is short period. And the priority is save lives. By providing critical first aid at the scene. That's how the scene set up looks like in reality. In practice. Here you have in a corner area and if it is outside, in a corner area, if it is inside. Then we have, then you have nuclear security events includes criminal or intentional acts involving nuclear or other radioactive material. Sabotage use or threatening to use logical dispersal device, dirty bomb. And it's clear that not all nuclear security events can trigger or can evolve into the nuclear or geological emergency. And the most important thing is that security response and emergency response must be integrated. Which is easier to say than to do. Because again, if there will be intentional, there will be always, maybe that's a terrorist and then security takes over. And sometimes I found security people less reasonable from my perspective than safety people. What is the main change in response? Responders are almost the same. Except that there will be some investigators in addition. And security experts. Command and control may change. If it is only safety, a different control will be a different agency ministry will take care. If it is, then usually it will switch to, but if it is switched, it must be seamless. So with no problem. Some priorities may change. Let's say to preserve evidence against removing hazardous material. Because if it is an intentional act, you will need to preserve to collect the evidence. And then that may... And I'm persistent, I don't want destruction. Because I know that you're hungry. International framework, legal instruments, safety standards, tools and protocols. And the legal instruments are two conventions, convention on the notification, convention on assistance. Incredibly, these two conventions were developed and accepted in six months. When? Did I guess? Only one possible time. That international convention, which is obligations in six months. Most of them. Of course. That was the only time when international convention were developed. Accepted, agreed in six months. And this is the part which I said that... It's very... In March, there were 121 parties, including the internationalizations. And for assistance convention, 115 parties. And now I will not go through this. This is the thing you should read before. If you want to sleep with it very quickly. Early notification convention, assistance convention. And we come now to the safety standards. IAEA is our... And the newest one is now this GSR7. If you want to start with something, you need to have this. Then we have EPR series, a lot of documents. One of them is, you see, actions green. There are different colors. About the exercises, about maybe the first responders, about... For each of them, for each of the areas, there is... EPR series guides on how to do something with experience gained in all those years. You have CDs with the training material, training courses, operational arrangements. Remember, IAC 3. And IAC is not in the National Electrical Commission, but it's incident and emergency center. And what I always say at the end, my favorite sentence is, luck favors prepare. So many times I would say, oh, I was lucky. Yeah, but you were prepared. If you were, if you were, if you would not be prepared, most probably you would not be lucky. So, let's be prepared. Thank you.