 Well, I think what social media and apps in general do is they create arbitrage and they make it impossible for operators to try and segment different parts of the connection and charge different uses of it at different rates because what happens, you have a data connection, you can do any application or any service you like over that data connection. And so you see mobile operators shifting from having a segmented tariffing structure with a voice and an SMS and a data section to or data label in effect to integrated tariffs where voice, SMS and data are all included in one category. And that obviously creates quite a lot of challenges. Firstly, just from ipsofactor if you change your entire tariff structure that creates all sorts of disruption and scope for churn. But also, you need to be careful about how you set maximum RPs. So if you move to a tariff that has unlimited voice and one gig of data and then another tariff that has unlimited voice and two gig of data, then all of the people who are using very large amounts of minutes will go on to one or other of these unlimited tariffs. And so in effect, you can cap your total RP and lose revenue from your highest-ranking customers. So there's a lot of careful management and coordination issues for mobile operators in making that transition. And of course, if you don't do anything about it at all, then your SMS revenue can disappear with all that say overnight and that's what's happened to a certain number of European markets. Well, that's kind of a big question. I think the fundamental difference between markets is pricing and customer's disposable income. And so that tends to drive everything else. And so in relatively low-income markets, different kinds of handsets get brought to higher-income markets. And higher-income markets have tend to have a subsidy model, whether that's 50% of the base in Europe or 90% of the base in the US. And that drives a different churn behavior, different usage behavior, different handset purchasing behavior, and therefore different penetration of apps and mobile platforms and so on. Whereas as you go to low-income, then you have more focus on price sensitivity and a lot more of the focus is on how can you make money from a five-year offer, a five-dollar offer to your customer or a one-dollar offer to your customer, and how do you provide them with a data plan, how do you service them, what kind of operating structure do you need in that environment? Well, I think it's pretty clear that we're going to see more and more domestic Chinese brands trying to go international. And domestic Chinese manufacturers trying to create brands of their own. And you can see that most obviously will show me at the moment, but there are half a dozen to a dozen other companies that are also trying to do the same thing. And then you have a lot of other companies that aren't even really trying to create a brand on their own right, they're just trying to go international. And they're doing that with product that looks to customers as though it's half the price of what they would get from a traditional brand. And so all of these companies are trying to do is work out the right route to market, the right countries that they can sell in, and the right balance of price versus build quality and feature setting in order to appeal to customers in those markets. And so very obviously if you're trying to sell a handset in India, you've got 10 different types of customer and 10 different types of market. And then if you look at Indonesia or Vietnam or China or Burma, you all have markets that have very different characteristics, different routes to market. And so as the Chinese go international, they discover a much more complex landscape that they have to navigate. And so they start looking for local partners. Well, I think it has great symbolic value. I mean, it points to the resolution of mobile operators as being utilities in effect of being water companies. And it's very telling that Vodafone is giving the great majority of the cash it's got for Verizon while it's back to shareholders. It's not going out and spending $100 billion buying assets. It's giving it shareholders. And so I think the days of people building vast global empires of mobile operators are kind of coming to an end now. I think Microsoft Nokia, well, it depends what you think. If this hadn't happened, it's quite possible that Nokia would have got out of the smartphone business. And so for Microsoft, this was clearly a necessary step. It is probably also an insufficient step because nothing that's happened is going to make people more likely to buy Windows phones. And nothing that's happened changes the structural problem that Nokia in every other feature phone manufacturer has, which is right now about half of sales of feature phones, but that's falling fast. And of course, the best ones are converting to smart fastest. So the value of the smart in the feature phone business is really slipping away very quickly. And hence the value of Nokia's feature phone business as well. So the question for the future is, it's not so much that Nokia is going to disappear, but is it going to be back on the market with really credible competitive products? We're starting to see Windows phone at getting grown close to $100, at which point it becomes an interesting product in emerging markets and in middle income markets. But it's still not that competitive when you look at the flood of Android products on the market at the same price or lower. So I think Nokia has a real struggle to remain relevant in this market. Microsoft, of course, has never really been relevant, and it still isn't really relevant. And so it's certainly the end of one era. It's no compression whether it's the beginning of another or whether we all see Microsoft simply retreating from the space entirely.