 Welcome back to The Breakfast on PLOS TV Africa and thank you for staying with us. Our next major conversation this morning is going to be, of course, reactions to President Obama de Boiri's statements yesterday where, of course, he threatens to deal with those who are misbehaving and, of course, have forgotten what happened in the Civil War and some of all of that. He also spoke about INEC offices being destroyed and said that they will support INEC and provide everything necessary for the elections to still hold in 2023 and there will be no third term according to, you know, the statements from the President. We're speaking this morning with Ikemesit F. Young, the head of research, SPM Intelligence and also Nikolas Ibekoe, an investigative journalist. Good morning. Thanks for joining us. Good morning, gentlemen. Good morning. All right. I'm going to start with Mr. Ibekoe. The reactions to the President's tweets, mostly on social media, for those who didn't also see the video clips, have been, of course, very, very loud. A lot of people have complained, you know, that it didn't seem presidential, you know, to put out a statement like that. Do you agree or do you think that, you know, this was necessary with regards to the events in the South East in the last few weeks? Well, it was not only unnecessary. I think it was a reprehensible statement that the President put out. Yes, there have been insecurity in the South East. People have been killed. Most of these killings have been blamed on the unknown government, but I basically think that it's something like an unknown government. These are those IPOC or ESN, which is the IPOC militia carrying out targeted attack on police stations and INEC offices, which was the reason why the President tweeted in the first place, the reason for the meeting from which he tweeted. But going back to the President's statement, it is quite unpresidential. This is quite the reprehensible. I think every Nigerian should come out and condemn the statement because we need to break down that statement to understand what the President was trying to do by putting out that statement. The President was going back 50 years back to, so, unarguably, the Nigerian Sardis history. I mean, this is the darkest history of the country, the Civil War. We've not had anything as bad as the Civil War. He went back that far to break that statement. Because he has this transparent attitude about him and the Civil War, about, I mean, for a particular region. What he was saying, basically, was that a war that is generally referred, I mean, considered to be a genocidal war, over three millions evils. I mean, over a women number of them were civilians. Over 90 percent of those of that number were civilians, were killed. Most of them died of starvation. And it was not a starvation that was, let me say, it was a deliberate state-sponsored starvation then. He was going back, there was rape, there was total destruction of Igbo Heartland. And the President is going back to make reference to that. And look at his choice of war. We would teach them in the language they understand. What do they mean by that? Basically, he was saying that, oh, older Igbo's did not tell the younger Igbo's the horror of the war. We will revisit that war. We will revisit the horror of that war to them so that they can know what that means. And it's basically what the President is saying. And this is a country that is a deeply divided country. And any same person at this time should be seeking reconciliation, should be looking at building bridges rather than deepening the division that has turned the country into the security mess that it is right now. So there is no, I don't know where those who think it was presidential. I don't know what they were reading. It wasn't written in Eskimo Spanish. It was written in English. I mean, it wasn't an ambiguous statement. It wasn't a clear court statement that the President made. I mean, let's not, I heard when people started beating about the Bush. It was bad. It was reprehensible. It was not nowhere around. There's no way to look at it. There's no positive you can take from that statement. Honestly, I don't see. Okay. Let's bring in Mr. Effion. Mr. Effion, can you hear me? Yes, I can. Okay. So the newspapers this morning were flooded with statesmen from President Mohammad Buhari. And he said he would shock terrorists and shock all those who are, you know, instigating a violent and inter-curity Nigeria. But should Nigerians find any sucker in those messages? If recent experience in terms of how the conduct of security of the security authorities have been, right, in terms of countering these elements, then I don't think that there is much space for, you know, anyone acquiring any sort of comfort. The fact of the matter is that you are dealing with a, we are in a multi-dimensional, you know, security paradigm, right? Right now, where the country is confronting at least seven significant security threats. And each threat has its own unique profile, right? And demands, you know, it bespoke, right? You know, and, you know, an individualized response. But what you've seen from policy makers, you know, primarily, you know, chaired by the President, right, is that there appears to be a one-size-fits-all approach, right, to our security problems. And that is, you know, that leaves a lot of, that leaves a lot of room for comfort. In a region like the Southeast, which, you know, has a historical hangover, right, with, you know, how the deployment of violence, you know, has led to the achievement of certain political outcomes, right, historically. You would have expected that the tone, right, of the President's comments would have been attuned, right, to that heightened sense of sensitivity. The Southeast isn't like any, you know, other region. Probably you could argue maybe the South-South comes close, right, in terms of, you know, how organized and state-sponsored violence has been consistently deployed against residents, you know, of that region. And you'd expect any Nigerian President, and not just this President, but any Nigerian President who has the slightest understanding, right, of, you know, this country's historical context to be acutely aware about how he communicates his priorities, right, to, you know, and concerning that region. I didn't see that from the President's comments yesterday. And so, furthermore, you're also dealing, right, with a President, right, that has the fundamentally skewed perception, right, of how security issues should be addressed. This is, you know, largely as a result of, you know, you know, his background, right, in the military, fed also, and also, you know, largely contextualized by his own experience, right, of the civil war, obviously being, you know, on the federal Nigerian side of things. And he hasn't been very shy about communicating how, you know, that bias, right, has informed, you know, not only his thinking, but also, you know, overall decision making, especially with respect to, you know, issues around the South East. So, you'd have expected, you know, that his mind has, or, you know, other members of his policymaking circle would have been able to intervene to at least, you know, garnish or properly define, you know, what his comments, you know, would have been. And let's take note of the fact that the President really speaks out on issues concerning security. So anything which, you know, he eventually comes out to say, right, you know, acquires a heightened sense of, you know, importance, and will be seen and perceived, you know, by Nigerians, right, with a higher degree, you know, of sensitivity, and for him to have come out and said the things he had said, the way, you know, he said them, right, in the context and the manner in which he said them, on the platform in which he said it, right, just, you know, is a classic textbook case of, you know, how not to understand and how not to communicate your non-understanding of a very, very sensitive situation. All right, back to Mr Aibikwe. Is there a possibility that maybe people are misinterpreting the words and the tone with which the President spoke? That's one. And then second, what are your biggest fears with regards the actions that can be taken after such a statement is made? What are the fears that people across the country, maybe particularly in the Southeast, should have with the President drawing up narratives from the Civil War and saying, you know, that they would be taught lessons or they will be treated in ways that they know best or they understand. What fears do you have as a citizen? Let's take the part of people misinterpreting what the President has said. Because, I mean, the thing with most people is that there is always a pattern. I mean, most people, as human beings, we work with our pattern. And why most people get what people say is wrong is because they have refused to do the same. Most people take their statements at the face value and try to interpret it. But let's go back to what we have seen. Since six years ago, that this President has had this warning, what has been his response to security issues in the Southeast. It has been heavy handed from the World Goal. Let's not joke about this. This is not the first time the President had made reference to the Civil War and the role he played in the Civil War in relation to security challenges in the Southeast. This is not the first time. This is just the most egregious of all of those statements that he has made. Now, let's go back to his response. What has been his response? His response has always been that of deploying the military, deploying soldiers. We have to forget that very recently, the intelligence of police basically gave policemen a blank check to shoot at anybody in the most case. That is in the Southeast. That is the epicenter of these violence in a way. He gave the police, and he told them that when a question of human rights abuses arises, that he knows what to do to handle all of that. That is the recently appointed IG of the police, who reposts to the President. So let's take it that he is commander in chief. He will not make those statements if he hasn't gotten the backing of his boss to say go and do this. Now the President is coming out to say this. So there is no ambiguity here. Okay. Now, for those in the Southeast, if I was in the South, because the Southeast is caught in a whirlwind of violence, Namdi Khanu and his Ethiopian militia are also perpetrating violence. That is here. We saw the sit at home order. I can tell you for a fact that this is not the first time Namdi Khanu will call for a sit at home order. Why is it that the sit at home order this time was too tough? And why is it that the other sit at home orders have not been that successful? You know, the only changing dynamics here is the erosion of the militia ASN, iPod militia ASN. It has gone around causing mayhem in different people and creating fear. So people sat down at home not because they didn't want to go and do their business or something or because they support Namdi Khanu that much. If you go to the Southeast now, people will tell you that people are worried that Namdi Khanu and iPod are bringing violence to his home state, to his home region. People are basically worried. A lot of people will tell you in hot voices. I mean, a few weeks ago I traveled around the Southeast and people would tell you in hot voices that they are worried that they literally don't support ASN. But what do they do? People can come out to challenge Namdi Khanu because even the security forces that should protect people are even under attack by the ASN. They can't even protect their stations. So where do you go to? So if I was in the Southeast right now, I would be very worried. We have seen Operation Python Dance, Ego E.K. have one, two videos. So now we have an Operation Restore piece or something, which is a little bit mild in this language. But it is still the same thing. It is Restore piece. We are going to the Operation Restore piece that the IG basically gave to his men, the black chest to shoot at, I mean to kill anybody and don't care about human rights abuse. And don't forget that the context says that the Nigerian security is like, I mean, they act like capital. When you see a problem, they think hammer and they think nail. Just hit it on his head. And it's the only solution they have to solve in any case. Force, force and more force. If that more force is not enough, should put the force and add more force. But that is what the Nigerian security operative understands. I need to ask you this question because I want us to take a look away from what the president is saying to what he is doing or not doing. We know that the president has, you know, military experience, military background. And when he came into the country, you know, he rode in the manifesto of tackling corruption and fighting insurgency and insecurity. But looking at how security has worsened since President Mohammad Ubu Harry became president in 2015, would you say you're maybe shocked or disappointed to see that despite his military experience, he doesn't seem to have a grip on security? I'm not shocked at anything this president is doing. I'm not shocked. Some of us know that this government was going to be an abysmal failure. I mean, it goes back to patterns again. People don't understand this pattern. I mean, go back to the first coming of Mormon February as the military era. That was until now, that was the time we faced the worst economic crisis in this country, rice, sugar, everyday staple, what will ration. I mean, people queue up to get ration, to get ration of rice and sugar in the past. This happened under Ubu Harry. Let's not go into all of that. But again, what we are seeing here is we are seeing a man who basically is he has failed. He can't take care of security in the North East. The whole of the North West is being run around by terrorists. That's what we call bandits. Look at South East. Namdi Kano has become the most influential person in the South East and his ESN people are spreading the campaign of fear, I mean, among the people. The police and the army are in five and six. Nobody, I mean, are in six and sevens. So nobody knows what is happening. It's a total fear. I am not shocked. I am really, I'm not sure because go back to Warren. What has it, what, I mean, when he left, what did he do since he left as a military leader in the 80s? What did he do to update his knowledge? Is he in tune with modern solution of problem solving or conflict solving of tackling security? Even the country, the biggest army in the world, the USA, sometimes will suffer that and seek alternative measure to, I mean, to conflict resolution, other than violence. But what have you seen here? Is violence, violence and more violence. Okay. All right. All right, Mr. Ibekwe. Mr. Effiong, I want to ask you this same question to say, how do you score President Muhammad Buhari's hold on security vis-à-vis his military experience? Abismo would be the word that comes that comes to mind. The fact of the matter is that in 2015, there was a unique opportunity at least, you know, if you take the optimistic view, right, about the President for him to, to reach out to every part of this country and to, to build the kind of consensus that would have, which is required in democracies to begin with. But that would have also served him well in terms of, you know, how do you win the hearts and minds, right, of people, not just in the South East, but across the country, right, and, you know, get them on board, right, in supporting your agenda. He has done none of that, you know. He, he has, he has had the guns first, tanks first, military first approach, right, to resolving issues which have structural drivers, which are not violence, which have structural drivers, which are not rooted in insecurity, which have structural drivers, which are rooted in the social and economic contradictions that continue to define this country. He has done nothing to address those issues. His economic policy thinking, which is a feeder point to whatever kind of security containment or countering strategy that you would have had, right, has been peaceful to, to, to say the least. Nigerians are poorer now than they were in 2015, which is say something because we were quite poor in 2015. And so, on whichever lever you look at it, there is very, very little for you to point out, right, that you can use as an anchor points to give the president a good grade on security, on the economy, or just general policy thinking. And as long as this current state of affairs continues to persist, there is nothing to indicate that we, we, that any of these issues, right, will be escalated anytime soon. If anything, we are on an escalatory path. And I think that's very worrying, not just for people in the Southeast, but especially for people in that region, but for Nigerians everywhere in this country. All right, Mr. Ifing, I'm staying with you. I want, you know, your thoughts on the point where it is expected to be the responsibility of the, of the Nigerian government, President Mamadwari and security agencies to ensure that they track down and they apprehend everyone who has been responsible for the destruction of INEC offices and police stations and those attacks. The tweets and, you know, the things that we're speaking about this morning, are they, you know, an evidence of failure in that regard? And of course, taking a totally different approach instead of, of course sticking to what your responsibility should have been. That's one. And then second, speak also on his statement with regards INEC. It says, I have a short INEC that would make available to them everything they need to operate efficiently so that no one would say we don't want to go or that we want a third term. Okay. I'll start with the second point, right? Because the second point is pretty easy to knock down. There are lots of people that have had fears. As a matter of fact, there are people who have theories that the security situation in the South East is in part orchestrated to make the region, right? So inconducive to any form of democratic practice that, you know, elections would essentially be dispensed with or the government would exercise its constitutional powers to declare state of emergency or martial law in part or for a large part of, you know, of the country, right? Come election time. And in fact, the matter remains that, you know, nobody in Aso Rock has done anything or said anything to disabuse that perspective. That's telling, that's concerning. And concerning the, you know, considering the long arm, right, of Nigerian history, that's not unprecedented. And I think that's what worries, you know, those of us who actually, you know, look at these issues or monitor these issues for a living. To the second point, you could make the argument that if anything, the government is walking into their hands of, you know, dissidents and separatist movements like iPod, right, and militias, you know, like the ESM, in giving them a costus bella, really, you know. So when the tone of, you know, the conversation, right, or the narrative coming out of the government is nonconciliatory, is belligerent, is, you know, up in arms and basically telling every element that is countering it, that it's ready to, you know, to use that Nigerianism to meet fire for fire, you're only going to perpetrate and deepen the level of hostility, right, against you. And you've seen this clearly, right? That's a clear trend in terms of how the government has tried to manage the iPod issue since 2015. So prior to Buhari under Jonathan, Biafra was essentially ignored by everybody, ignored by everyone in Azor, ignored by everybody in the South East, ignored by anyone, right, who had anything, you know, close to a political head. But under Buhari, you've seen narrative after counter-narrative, you've seen elements, you've seen efforts through the courts, through the security authorities, first the police and then the military, right, to actively, you know, suppress this movement and that's actually elevated the status of this group, right, from just a fringe non-relevance to a culture which is increasingly like Nicholas has, you know, actually pointed out, you know, owning and dominating the narrative. And so even though they still find on the larger, you know, scale of things, relatively to support, right, within and outside the South East, they've been able to own the narrative to the point where they have significantly discolored the conversation. And so everybody starts from a standpoint of what are we going to do to deal with iPod. They've owned the conversation to that extent and the government is just merely playing into its hands by coming out and issuing these statements, which let's declare iPod and ESM will take and use as propaganda materials, iPod and ESM will take and use, right, as giving more evidence that the Nigerian state is out to disabuse and to counter the legitimate quote-unquote aspirations, right, of this movement and that's only going to lead to more radicalism, it's going to lead to more recruitment on the apart, and it's only going to worsen the overall security picture. So whichever way you look at it, from a message and the policy making standpoint, right, the government could have done a lot better to manage this issue. Okay. It's only if anything, emboldened these actors. All right, I want to follow up on what you just said, you know, how do you suggest the government does about it? What should be the message rather than this, you know, tough speaking, high-handedness, so to speak? What should the government be saying to Nigerians at this time? Okay, right. So even though iPod is, you know, if you look at a broad political spectrum of the issues which are important to the South East, iPod has taken one very far end, right, of that spectrum, which is that, you know, being part of Nigeria does nothing to advance the cause of the Igbo ethnic group. Our best bet is to leave Nigeria, but that political spectrum is what it is. It's a spectrum. They are long-standing demands, right, by all sorts, you know, of political and economic and cultural elements within the South East that have not been properly engaged with and addressed by the Nigerian state. If you go along with what's having that political conversation, towards making concessions, towards decentralizing power to the point where, you know, past centers, not just in the Southeast, but in every part of the country, feel an ownership and a participation in the shaping of their destiny. You've gone a long way towards, you know, delegitimizing the cause of separatist movement. And so in the end, this issue is not just a security issue. It's a political issue. It's an economic issue. And the government needs to begin to engage on those long-standing aspirations and demands. Okay, Mr. Igbo Kuei, all right. Mr. Igbo Kuei? Yes. Do you agree with your colleague when he says that what we actually need is the volition of powers and we need to, the government needs to begin to, you know, dialogue and solve whatever it is that is making these people agitates for a separate country? Yeah, I mean, I just predicted that a minute before I came here, we need to see the narrative from Nnam De Cano and his extremist view. I mean, by using false and jagged root method that this government had done since 2015, we are just playing into the hands of Nnam De Cano. I remember in 2011 or 2020, as a young reporter then, I was traveling to the Southeast and you see the flag of Massov, the ID, the Biafran flag, all over the Southeast on the major roads. But the Biafran architecture was not, I mean, was not the major issue there. That was Massov, but people didn't take them for, I mean, people, they had their people, like Ikemesi said. This was a fridge group. They never got out the kind of support that they needed. But look at what has happened since we decided that we have to squash them by all means and all of that. So I think we should be breathing bridges now. See the narrative from, because there are moderates, there are people in the Igbo Heartland who are concerned, who have, like Ikemesi said, have also said, who have also given, there's a long list of concerns about magnetization, about stuff that Southeast people have been asking for several years, even before the government. Has this government made any moves to address any of them? No. So the only thing it does is to use force and it's not going to work. So, so, Mr. Ibekwe. Mr. Ibekwe, other than violence or force. Mr. Ibekwe, I want you to also then speak on Namdi Kanu and, you know, ways that he can put out this message, you know, in a, you know, a lot better. The ESN, Stroke IPOB doesn't necessarily have a voice in the Southeast or anybody who speaks for them. There's a certain Ima powerful that once in a while puts out statements, you know, but there's nobody who can speak on their behalf and say, yes, we are responsible for the attacks in the Southeast or no, we have no hand whatsoever. We're not a military militarized group. We don't have, would you know, arms and ammunition. These attacks are being carried out by other elements and, you know, we are, of course, being painted as the perpetrators. So do you think that that is necessary? Do you think that Namdi Kanu himself, you know, should be able to change the tone of his speech? And also the responsibility of the Southeast leadership, governors, House of Assembly members, National Assembly members, I beg your pardon, and also their traditional leaders at a time like this. Arnaz and Liko and the likes. Where do they come in? Let me quickly dispel one misconception. Namdi Kanu has made statements repeatedly and he's still making statements about the nature of these attacks, about how they are, how they should be carried out, and how they should be done. There are statements all over the internet of him being saying that, I mean, soldiers should be killed, police officers should be attacked. So there is no, there is no confusion about who is responsible for all of this. Those who are saying that because they have not come to claim responsibility for particular, I mean, specific attack, it doesn't mean that they are the ones are just burying their head in the sand like ostrich. I mean, the thing here is, again, the other thing again, Namdi Kanu is not somebody you can have a conversation with. I mean, have you tried to have a debate with any, an iPod member, even in Lagos? Yeah, I have tried. It's a dead end. They are impossible to reason with. So we are not going to talk to Namdi Kanu and his supporters. Rather, we are going to seize the narrative from him by boycotting him and by creating other channels, other incidents. I mean, what Ikemechi just said, by addressing some of these concerns that have been there for years, but start to do all of that. This office has companies of several things. Yeah, but who should do that? And that's the reason I'm asking about South East political leadership. Nobody should do that. The government should do that. But the government has ignored this order. I mean, these are that concerns. And as they said that, the government has, like Ikemechi said, the government is still fighting the war that ended 50 years ago. Great. So since that has been established, Ms Aibikui, and it doesn't seem like the Buhari administration will be able to understand the perspectives that you've put out, it doesn't also seem like there's a lot of people in the administration who can advise that they take a totally different approach from what they're taking now. What is the role of the Southeast political traditional leadership at a time like this? The reason why Namdi Kanu has also become this popular, it's also partly because of the feeling of Southeast politicians who are endemicly corrupt, who are in there for what they can do, who have left their region to degenerate to this extent. So because the Southeast leaders don't have legitimacy. I mean, in the eyes of many evils, these are the leaders as bad as the Buhari government in the Central. Look at what is happening in emo states. Most of these people don't have legitimacy. They've come to their people. So it's hard for them to come back and start appealing to their people. What we can do now is to find influential people who are not in government, who are not, I mean, who are very, very neutral, who could appeal to people who start movement, NGOs should set in there and we need to start creating a different narrative from the one that the federal government has put forward and also the one that Namdi Kanu has also put forward. The people of the Southeast are basically, I mean, between a rock and a hard place right now. So we need somebody to come there and extricate them from that, I mean, tough position that they find themselves. I'm not looking towards the politicians in the Southeast or Hanezi. Look at this statement. Have you seen any Southeast politicians coming to condemn it? Nobody would say anything. I mean, several months ago, they announced that they were going to form a Buhari group. What have they done? Well, how long did they take the Southwesterners to set up a Buhari group? No, no one of them has sent any bill to the set of assembly to legitimize a Buhari group. They are claiming the fire brigade. Just yesterday, they had an emergency meeting saying they are going to do this again. That's what they have been doing. They have lost initiative. They don't have the legitimacy. So it's difficult to look at that. So we have to look at alternative approaches to solving this problem. Okay. Because people are not in government to begin to bring up different narratives from what the county and the government and politicians both in Assawak and in the states, in the government houses in the Southeast are putting forward. Okay. All right. Mr Iwakwe and Mr Effion, we'll come back to you both in just a minute. Let's take a quick break. So do stay with us on the breakfast.