 Lieutenant General Nadeem Ahmed, thank you very much for your time this morning. We might begin by having you explain a little bit about your very impressive background. You know, I started my career in the military in 1971, served in the military for 39 years. But more importantly, ever since 2005 when our country had the biggest earthquake, which kind of was spread over an area of 30,000 square kilometers, and we lost about 73,000 people, that I was pushed in by the military as the chief military coordinator to carry out a massive relief rescue operation. And once the first phase was over, then they asked me to be in charge of the reconstruction and rehabilitation effort that the government of Pakistan put in along with the close association of the humanitarian community and the donor community. Later on during 2009, as you would recall, we had a huge complex emergency in the area of Swat and the federally administered tribal areas. And as again luck would have it, there was a law enforcement operation being done by the military. But at the same time, it was thought appropriate that military should also initiate a kind of a winning of hearts and minds battle through another maneuver and they created special support group of which I had the privilege of being in charge. And we looked at this huge operation where we had a massive displacement of about 2.5 million people. And within three months, when the military operations were going on, I was responsible to take care of them outside the conflict zone in making sure that they are able to fed and provided for all the amenities. And once the law enforcement operation completed, then I was responsible to take them back. And probably that is one instance in the history where in within three months, normalcy was returned to Swat. And within four months, we were able to return about 2.4 million people back to their original abodes. Then later on as we proceeded, as I retired in 2010, soon after I was appointed as the chairman of the National Disaster Management Authority in Pakistan. And right from day one, we've been handling small little emergencies here and there. But of course, the floods that happened this year in July probably are the worst ever disaster on the face of the earth. And we went through the initial rescue relief operation and currently we are busy in the early recovery operations there. And hopefully we'll start with the reconstruction. So that's a little brief on how things have gone ever since I joined the military as well as the disaster management community. Are there some fundamental differences between the management of a civil disaster as opposed to a military disaster? I think the two are greatly different. In a natural disaster, the coping mechanisms that the government and the people have from within are much strong, much robust. And people tend to bounce back much earlier. Yes, actually when they see the disaster and they see their houses or the near and dear ones who have lost their lives and once they bury them and once they start clearing the debris of the house, the process of normalcy starts in their mind. They exactly know what has happened and what it takes to rebuild their lives. And there's a lot of assistance from the international humanitarian community, the government who will come forward with all kind of relief assistance. So they get busy right after the disaster which may happen for maybe a few minutes. It may extend for months. But in a complex emergency, there are too many variables which continue to traumatize the people. You exactly go through a very long gestation period in a complex emergency of being punished by the bad guys for no fault of yours. And whenever there's a law enforcement operation which is planned and starts to unfold in an area, you see large-scale displacement of the people. In our case, as I said, it was something like 2.5 million people who were displaced. Now when they're displaced, they exactly don't know what has happened to their homes, to their crops, to their animals. And in many cases, they have to leave back the elders of the family in the conflict area because they cannot undergo the hardships of traversing hundreds of kilometers. And once they are in camp, of course, camp is no substitute to a proper house. And therefore, hardships of the camps kind of bother them. Second, they don't know when, what time the peace will return, what time will they go back. It can extend for as long as maybe two decades or more. In our region, in Afghanistan, in Sri Lanka, you have seen displacement for more than two decades. So that continues to bother them. Then they are worried if at all they are able to go back, whether there will be peace and the control of the government or the bad guys will still be ruling the area. So during this stay in the camps, will they be looked after adequately or will they not be looked after adequately? I think all these pressures tend to create a very, very unhappy situation for the people who are displaced because of a conflict. And therefore, I personally feel the outfall or the humanitarian aspect of the complex emergency or a conflict is much more difficult, tedious as compared to a natural disaster. So then how do you adjust the way you handle a situation like that to deal with these frustrations? I think when I look back at my own experiences, again, it has to work very closely, not only with the military but the provincial governments, the humanitarian community and the donors and to understand the need of the people. Now, for example, in our case, we had a huge element of trauma management in our relief programs when the people were living in camps. We created children friendly spaces, we created women friendly spaces. Then also we utilized their time because if they're doing nothing at that time, you know, the pressure is more. So we created a lot of skill development programs for both men and women, boys and girls to make sure that they spend their time, you know, optimally rather than just wasting and brooding over the tragedy that has befallen. Third thing that we needed to create was to somehow establish a linkage with the people who are back home and have not been able to come out. So, you know, they're all the time worried what has happened to their elders. So we created a system along with the military where we could get the feedback on the well-being of the persons who stayed back. Fourthly, again, you know, not many humanitarian operators will work in the conflict zone. They will work in the relief zone but not in the conflict zone. So in the special support group, we created a mechanism where we had an extensive deployment of the humanitarian part of the army to look after those people who were like stuck into the conflict zone. Their medical needs, their food needs, their fuel needs at any time. They need to be evacuated. So there was a whole system which was taking care of the people in the conflict zone. And I think that was very, very critically important so that people get some kind of a kind of a comfort in knowing that they're near and dear ones, though they are stuck in conflict zone, but there is someone who's taking care of them. And then remaining constantly in touch with the military's operational arm to get to know what is the situation in different conflict areas and keep announcing it to them that things are all right, things are not bad, the bad people are losing. So and that's what they want to hear. And then giving them hope as to when they go back, probably they are going back to better future. And small little interjections like a cash grant program which can help them to do small little things here and there. So I think we've managed that pretty successfully. We were able to take these people back. And to be very honest, when these people go back, though fully traumatized, everyone was shouting long live Pakistan because I think the way we looked after them during this crisis when they were displaced was phenomenal. Are the funding requirements similar or are they vastly different? And are you able to even compare the two at the time? No, when you're going through a natural disaster, you exactly know what your funding requirements are because you know the disaster and you know how much it will take to reconstruct. In a complex emergency, everything is fluid. You don't know how long it will go. What has been the collateral damage that will happen? How much money you will take really to rehabilitate these families because you know there is a huge issue of de-radicalization and reintegration of the bad guys into the society finally. So that also has a cost. So I think when you're looking at or comparing the costs between a natural disaster and a complex emergency, then a complex emergency has, I think, you will have to spend much more. What we need to also understand is that in a natural disaster, you are privy to the entire caseload. Whereas in a complex emergency, this caseload gets divided into conflict zone and into relief zone. The requirement of providing assistance in relief zone is much more, by the way, as compared to the conflict zone because in the conflict zone, people are living in their own homes. They have a bit of coping mechanisms available to them, maybe some grain and some. In a relief zone, you are dependent on everything. So even for water, for washing, for everything. So probably when you look at the costs of both, complex emergency is more. Within the complex emergency, the cost of providing assistance to the people in the relief zone is much more than the people in the conflict zone. Now having said that, the kind of assistance that comes from the international humanitarian community, which is, I think, the most critical part, will depend upon the nature of complex emergency. As you know, Pakistan is fighting the global war on terrorism and therefore the support from the international humanitarian community has been immense, incredibly. The whole humanity stood by us during this crisis because everyone realized that probably this is the battle that will prove that the government forces can overcome the evil forces and that we, I think, very, very clearly prove to the people of Pakistan as well as international community that given the kind of commitment to make sure that you want to protect your land and protect your people, you can take that difficult step of going extra mile and use all the available means that is at your disposal to, one, crush this militancy and then start the rebuilding process. People and all the planners must know that there are two edges to it. The military can do only that much. It can crush the militancy thereby creating enabling environment for the development as well as the political authorities to take over the process from there for sustainable peace and this sustainable peace will come at a cost. If we don't address the underlying issues by virtue of which this emergency in the first place started then probably we will go back into the insurgency phase and that's what we don't want and therefore we need to plan this entire operation in its entirety both the military part and the humanitarian part the crushing part and the rebuilding part so you have to create a balance while retaining the damages to the minimum. What about the challenge of managing expectations not just of the so-called victims of a situation but also of your own people? It has to go side by side. You just cannot isolate one from the other. It has to be in sync, closely integrated and coordinated. The only thing that I wish to sensitize that when you are planning an operation like this you need to be prepared for a mission creep by the military if you are succeeding then they would like to go an extra mile and do things for which probably there were no initial plans. Second, the insurgents are not restricted to a certain terrain or certain borders or control lines. They will tend to fan out in those areas which may be peaceful just to draw the attention of the military forces away from the center of gravity and therefore there is every possibility of a geographical expansion of an insurgency. So you need to be prepared right from day one that this thing can go bad, this thing can expand the number of the affected population may go more and therefore if at that time you are not prepared then probably you will be beaten. So we need to be very sure how what will be the fallout of this operation will there be a geographical expansion will there be more IDPs what kind of support that this additional caseload will warrant and if we can do that right probably we will come out looking better. You just mentioned the term military creep how important is it in these scenarios to be on one hand I suppose flexible to the situation and yet on the other stay very much within the guidelines to ensure success. You know this situation is very dynamic and probably when you are going into a situation you have to look at different possibilities that this can happen, this can happen, this can happen and be prepared for it. Position adequate resources right from the word go while hoping for the best you should be prepared for the worst. So you can't really fix it geographically in terms of numbers in terms of resources deployed you will have to remain dynamic and adjust to the positions. When I talk of mission creep that comes in when the success comes easily you are expecting that you will be able to you know bring an area under control and peace let's say three months using so many forces and it just gets into peace in one month and you have then a tendency and let me go finish out this piece or pocket of insurgency as well let me go there as well that is a decision which every military commander will take probably at that particular time looking at its fallout looking at the resources that he has at his disposal and looking at the humanitarian impact somehow the humanitarian part tends to go away from the focus of a military commander but in our case what we did since the military was also responsible for winning the hearts and mind so we never left that area like out of focus that was always our focus that should it expand then it has a humanitarian cost are we ready for that and if we're ready for that let's go ahead do it if you're not ready for that then there's something wrong you need to then develop your capacity to provide the humanitarian assistance when there is an evolving situation whether it be a relief situation or a conflict who do you perceive that it is most important that you manage the expectations and the behaviour of is it the victims or is it your own forces your own people who are probably the most important I think when you are starting purely speaking from a military perspective you are looking at the goals that you are trying to achieve and that is the primary focus but at some point in time and every military commander realizes that into their calculus of planning this humanitarian aspect will start to come in and start to impinge on your liberty of action and what is the line where you can say I have stabilized the situation what is that cut-off line because it's not clear where you need to know that you are now winning and the bad guy is losing and running out and there are different ways of finding that out that's not an issue but I think that threshold understanding of threshold is critical from where for the bad guys it's law of diminishing return which has started to set in and you are on the up and if you think that it is reverse is true and you need to sit down look back and see what's going wrong with my way or scheme of things and maybe again make adjustments what is most important do you think in a disaster situation is it structure is it understanding what is the key it's delivery no matter what kind of a structure you have if that structure cannot deliver at the user then then it's of no use you have to ensure adequate service delivery in the right amount at the right time it's just planning if you can get your most of us get kind of stuck into like analysis looking at the damage and need assessment in a relief time or a period I have always said overdone is not overdone you just need to move forward and you will keep getting additional information and then keep expanding if there is one person and he is to get one loaf of bread if he gets three I have no issue but I should make sure that there is not a single person who deserved one and has not gotten one so my worry is go and overdose the whole relief effort in a zone you don't have to really become kind of go totally off-balance in doing so but overdone is not overdone and with the passage of time you start to adjust to the ground realities is there a particular pearl of wisdom which you have pulled upon? this is what I have observed and the three major disasters that I have handled I think it has stood the test of time and I think all both kinds of disasters I would call coordination is the king there is always this kind of reservation amongst the relief providers be it from the military or the civilian humanitarian agencies of somehow coordinating their effort into one synergistic whole and if we can do that right then we will come out as a winner because what I have seen is that most of the relief providers are comfortable in providing assistance in high visibility areas or high accessible areas the peripheral areas where it's difficult to reach are normally thrown into the lap of the military because of their capability to reach that area but we need to know that such and such area has been left out and someone needs to go and provide assistance there so the matrix that we develop in the humanitarian world of who is doing what and where is critically important because that helps us in getting to know that which are the areas which have fallen through the the net and I think in that in certain cases of disaster you can introduce technology to establish that for example in the recent floods we used a satellite imaging very very extensively to know the extent of flooding to know the communities which are which were marooned by the water and were not reached by the relief providers and there we pushed in the military because the military has the wherewithal of helicopters and boats as compared to the NGOs who do not have the kind of wherewithal to reach a certain peripheral area so if we can coordinate that such areas which are easily accessible could be given to the to the implementing partners or to the relief providers from the civil humanitarian world the difficult areas could be taken on by the the military themselves as we finish do you have any polls of wisdom that you would offer to personnel that are about to be deployed I think as far as natural disaster is concerned it's pretty much simple it's not a complex issue because everyone out there is doing the same thing providing relief to the affected population and you have your areas cut out like the more difficult areas will be taken on by the military the less will be with us by the civilian relief providers but in a complex emergency is totally different and the biggest pressure on the mind of a soldier is who is a friend who is a foe and the rules of engagement you know tie him down and at times he may have to lose his life because he was not able to discern the black from the white guy so I think if I am the commander in a situation like this I will have to come up with a strategy where I isolate the bad guys from the general public so that it gives me or my troops greater confidence to enforce the law using anything that he has available to him rather than remaining confused all the time and therefore because it's a very complex thing you are firing at your own people and it creates a kind of a mental pressure on the soldiers which is totally different than what you do in a conventional conflict where you have very clear black and white lines that he's a bad guy and you need to kill here you are more on decapacitating rather than killing and making sure that you pick up the bad guy amongst so many maybe good guys and then you just don't have an arrangement where you can find out you have to be literally mentally too sharp to pick up such signs where you can think yeah this is the person who is my enemy so you have to be very very careful with collateral damages in a complex emergency you have to protect yourself a lot I think protection will become a major issue in deployment of forces in complex emergencies then you have to deploy or protect the people who are white because lot of intelligence that you are drawing you are getting that intelligence from the local population and you need to know that they will only provide you information if they know that they are safe because tomorrow if there are reprisal attacks against them they will lose confidence in the government so I think when you move into a complex emergency the situation or the demand on the soldiers is extremely high and again there may be a split difference if the troops are deployed in a counterinsurgency operation outside their own country the pressure may not be as much but if the troops are deployed to do counterinsurgency in their own country then the pressure is just too much because they are just your brothers and your family members you belong to that area and that creates a lot of pressure on the troops you know it's going to be a decision of that particular soldier at that point in time under the environment and circumstances you can't be with him all the time but I have always said follow your instinct because about 70 to 75% your instinct will be right it's good advice my pleasure