 Ready to go, Jim? Yes, sir. OK. Well, we got a false alarm that Chairman McCall found his way so I came back a second time. But given the uncertainty surrounding the scheduling here, I think I should probably just go ahead, although I would like to say that I would prefer to have been here with Chairman McCall together because I think it's important that this is both a bicameral and a bipartisan effort in leadership of the CSIS report. I want to say first how much I appreciate Chairman McCall agreeing to participate as co-chairman. He has significant responsibilities on the House side as chairman of Homeland Security, and he has demonstrated a very strong commitment on cyber issues. I have it on good authority that he is a good man on cyber issues, that good authority being my Democratic congressman from Rhode Island, Jim Langevin, who knows Chairman McCall well, and who serves with him both in Congress and on the committee. So I think we're off to a promising start in that sense. Having mentioned Jim Langevin, I also want to mention my appreciation for Congressman Langevin's leadership of this same report eight years ago. Jim takes an extremely sincere and determined interest in cyber. He is viewed, I think, in many quarters as one of the House's strongest experts on cyber, and he threw himself into this effort with real diligence and created a terrific result. So I want to take some of my time today to commend my fellow Republican congressman Langevin. The work that he led in the CSIS performed eight years ago, I went back and reread the report once it was clear that I was taking on the co-chairmanship. And I have to say, after eight years, in an area of expertise where both policy and technology are changing very rapidly, that report still holds up very well. And a considerable number of its recommendations were put into action. So that report sets a very high bar for our efforts with this report. And I pledge to Chairman McCall and to Jim and the terrific CSIS staff that my staff and I will work as hard as we can to meet or exceed that standard. This is a very promising opportunity to bring House and Senate, Republican and Democrat, together on an issue that is vital to our national security, that is vital to our economy, and that has very few implications for our law enforcement. So we have considerable work to do. This is a beginning and not an end. But I accept the co-chairmanship with gratitude and with a strong sense of both the duty and expectation. And I'm glad to take any questions that anybody may have as we await Chairman McCall's arrival so we can just transpire. Yes? Tom Grimman from Let It Go For A Cyber. It seems like inside your legislation through Congress has always been difficult. It may even be getting more difficult this year seeing a couple of false starts on information sharing with the Senate. It's unclear if it'll actually manage to get over the finish line. Are you guys going to be taking a look at whether the difficulty of passing the legislation is an impediment to real progress in this area? If there's anything you can do with your colleagues to spur more substantive change in that regard? With respect to the CSIS report, it is designed as a policy recommendation to the incoming president of the United States. So I expect that it will recommend legislative action for the new president to support. But I expect it will be heavily dedicated to actions that the executive branch can accomplish on its own. With respect to the first part of your question about the difficulties of moving forward with a cyber bill, I think actually we have a very good chance of moving forward with a cyber bill right now. We were very close to a comprehensive cyber bill not long ago until the minority leader went to the floor and announced that he was going to attach a repeal of the Obamacare Amendment to any cyber bill that came up. That was in his role as a minority leader when he wanted to make sure no legislation passed the Senate. Now as a majority leader, there's a very different attitude and we have not responded in kind as a minority and we are looking forward to working constructively on a cyber bill. We have a bipartisan vehicle to go forward with on the information sharing legislation that has come out of the Intelligence Committee and been commented on by other committees. We have a significant bipartisan piece of legislation that Senator Gray and I have just held a hearing on in the law enforcement area. We have a significant bipartisan piece of legislation that Senator Blunt did with me in the awareness and notice area of cybersecurity. So I think we have a terrific opportunity in the Senate to get to a core bill on the floor and then through the process of amendment add significant thoughtful bipartisan amendments that are truly directed to cybersecurity and get on and off the bill in a timeframe that can give the majority of your confidence that you should dedicate the effort. So are you saying you're going to seek to add that draft UN Senator Graham are working on as an amendment when CISA comes to the floor? Very much a version of it, it's a draft right now. We've just had the hearing we're looking for input we're hoping to helpful suggestions but we very much hope that a version of that can be made a part of the bill or voted to do it on the floor by amendment. I think the same is true for the Blunt White House legislation. Yes, sir. Senator, we discussed cybersecurity 800 plus pounds of real life is the Department of Defense and it's associated with intelligence and the same is typically part of defense. What, how does A, the legislation of the floor now and B, the people looking at this issue for the report square the circle of making use of all those resources over in DOD without militarizing the problem because DOD itself is very important about this. Yeah, well Barbara Mikulski, who is a great leader in this area and takes the issue very seriously not only as a matter of policy and national security but also as a matter of constituent service as NSA is in her state is fond of saying that the National Security Agency is the mother ship. Upon which defense and other agencies depend for a lot of the substantive technical work that takes place in the areas that we are legislating. The question of the militarization of the internet is not really an issue. It is important that the independent service providers and the government be able to exchange threat information and then be clear where the liability should lie when. That I think will be worked out in the bill that should be the core going forward and whatever amendments to it are made. The notice bill is just really a question of making sure that the public is aware of what is happening out there. Putting the government agencies on notice that they are obliged to report more to the public on what's happening in cybersecurity and the law enforcement component addresses primarily the difficulties of dealing with overseas bad actors that law enforcement within the United States faces but also correcting some penalties and some over prescription of certain conduct. So I don't see any of that as contributing to the militarization of the internet. Yes sir. So what role are you personally in your office going to have in the creation of this report and what are some of the specific things you'd like to see it? I am told that Chairman McCall's and my role will be to make sure that in the scoping of the questions that are asked, we are satisfied that the important questions that we think need to be answered are in fact in there. That we're in a position to provide advice as to what some of the answers might be although we're not in a position to dictate on that and that where there are policy disagreements or log jams that arise during the staff process that we will use our efforts to try to propose solutions to those log jams so that they can be clear and we can move on to other issues. So I think those are important roles. I have some very expert people and my staff who I think can provide very considerable substantive good advice to me and to the process and I know Chairman McCall has the same. So I hope to be a very helpful and active force in a very robust and useful process. And then what specific policies would you like to see in that panel? There are a number but I think that to the extent that we can find ways to regularize a more secure internet in areas where the public understands that it needs to be more secure around our electric grid, around people's financial records, around bank records, things like that. I think making recommendations to regularize the way we reinforce those parts of the internet without having to fight over what websites people wanna visit in their free time or how do you leave the wild west of the internet, the wild west while also making a fourth cyber in which critical infrastructure can reside securely. I think it's a good general question to ask. I also think that it's a good general question to ask that given the speed of change and given the national security, economic, and law enforcement importance of this issue, are we presently structured to write in government to address the cyber threat? And if we are not, what mechanisms need to be put into place to see to it that we turn our headlights on, look to the future and are ready to deal with this with an administrative structure that is suitable for the tasks that we foresee. So those would be two areas right off the top of my head. Yeah, just a point, Paul. Are you talking about within government itself, or abroad? Within government itself. Yes, sir. Sean, let me ask you something. To what extent will the task force assess offensive measures or punitive measures for cyber intrusion, since there's been a lot of talk after the OPM Act about not having enough punitive measures in place, will you tackle that issue? I suspect that we will end up looking at it in three ways. First of all, within the Department of Defense, what recommendations we might have to an incoming president on what a offensive capability might look like from a traditional military point of view. The second would be what we need to construct internationally by way of a regime of sanctions, agreements, and understandings, so that it's clear where the lines are and how deterrence can be organized and all of that. And the third is addressing the question of private active defense, so-called, and the limits upon a private organization's ability to defend its own networks by putting systems and mechanisms in operation that might affect other users. Hacking that. Hacking that. Hacking back would be the sort of far-extreme, but between sitting there and doing nothing and complaining about it, and actually hacking back and counterattacking who you think isn't the source, there's a wide array of activities that could take place, and at the moment that's one big rather sloppy gray area, and I think we could, conductively provide some analysis and support for ways to begin to chop up that space in different analytic quadrants. I just said analytic quadrants. Clearly, we're at a wildly technical and somewhat tedious topic. But nevertheless, very important, and I'm happy to do the work, so thank you all for coming, and I expect Chairman McCall will be along shortly, and I hope you'll be worth your wait, I'm sure you will. Very much look forward to working with him. I appreciate Jim and Karen and Mason, whole team, we really do look forward to working with you, they've pulled together a terrific array of private sector and other advisors to help do this work. I'm really optimistic about this process, I think it's one of the best policy development processes that I've seen in Washington, and it's something done from a very good-hearted, not-partisan, let's get this right point of view. So, very pleased to be a part of it, look forward to doing a lot of work on it, and hope we can match the length of the report for merit and lasting value. Thanks very much. Thank you. Good to see you. Good to see you. Good to see you. Thanks for doing this. I'm going to build a market, and so I've got to cheer it up, so I know I'll be sort of... Oh, you're going to be there soon. Yeah, I don't want to be in the next one. Yeah, that's fine. Yeah. We appreciate your time. Yeah, thanks. Thank you. It's going to be fun. Yeah, it'll be great. And they're all looking forward to your remarks. We're stuck around for you. Wow. It's a great experience. That's awesome. I'm not going to be reading this. Just make a whole lot of news really quickly, and then we'll get to it. What do you want me to... What's the format? Stand up. That's a great question. Okay. No. You don't want to hear remarks? Yeah. No. Well, let me just thank Jim, Lewis, and CSIS, and Senator Whitehouse for reconvening what I think was perhaps one of the most downloaded reports that ever came out on cybersecurity that we introduced last and go around and where they feared leadership on this issue. I think 10 years ago, and I've been talking to Jim before, some campaign for some, people didn't know what cyber was, and members of Congress certainly didn't know what cybersecurity was. And I think we've come a long ways in terms of education on the issue, which is so important. Unfortunately, I think the events have produced interest, and I think the vulnerabilities and the attacks have never been greater than they are today. All you have to do is look at the breach on OPM from when I believe it's the Chinese, Anthem, Blue Cross, and it takes all different forms, whether it's Target Home Depot, which is more credit card criminal enterprise to what happened at OPM, Anthem and Blue Cross, which looks like more big data theft done for espionage purposes. So our federal government's under attack on a daily basis on a lot of levels, but also our private citizens are under attack with their personal private information and their credit card information. So it's a theft, espionage, and Jim and I talked a great deal about an event that we would never want to see happen, and that's an event to bring things down, which would be a cycle of warfare. We know the capabilities there. We certainly have it. Other countries have it. They've chosen not to exercise it well, I shouldn't say completely. Some instances have been. Estonia's a good example, of course, it's stuck so I can't get into the detail. But we don't want to see that kind of attack in the United States. On any critical infrastructure, there are power grids, water systems, transportation, and everything connected to the internet's vulnerable to that kind of attack. And so the key, I think there are several issues, I think what we're looking at, I would be great if the Senate would pass my cyber security bill, and you can write that down. Because I think that bill goes a long ways with the Department of Homeland Security sharing private information with the private sector, private sharing with the federal government, which could have helped prevent the breach on OPM, but also private to private words, not taking place right now. We're not sharing the Moses codes as much as we should to protect our infrastructure. And a lot of it's because of liability protection reasons. And the bill provides a liability protection. It provides a civilian interface. It's not a spy agency or a prosecuting agency. It's a civilian agency that we believe is designed solely for cyber security purposes, and that is the sharing of the information. So we, I do know that the Senate is going to start taking in cyber in the next month. And I think it will support to do both House and Senate. And of course, I'll allow your good judgment advice as I proceed on that as well. But just let me conclude because I do have to return it, unfortunately. I'm really looking forward to this. I think the last time we did this.