 Good morning, everyone. And welcome to the third annual Georgetown University conference on Asia. I'd like to thank first and foremost the US Institute for Peace for cosponsoring this conference with us this year and hosting us in this beautiful space. There were a lot of comments on the way in from students, from SFS, about all the windows and the big spaciousness of the building. And most of them said they were thinking that's what Georgetown University would be like before they showed up. It's really a beautiful, beautiful building. It's hard to compete with a place like this. This conference was also made possible through the generosity of the Building Asian Security Studies Fund. Created by Georgetown University graduates Philip Building, who graduated SFS in 1986, and Patricia Building, who graduated from the college in 1985, the fund's purpose is to further the understanding of the role of Asia and of China in particular in the world's security environment. To offer you an official welcome, I would like to introduce first George Lopez, the vice president of the Academy of International Conflict Management and Peace Building at the US Institute of Peace, followed by Thomas Bingchoff, the vice provost for global engagement at Georgetown University. Thank you. George. Ariana, thank you. And good morning to all. Welcome, indeed, to the US Institute of Peace and this wonderful day of good reflection on China's roles in the world. I'd like to begin by thanking all of those who've played such a big role in planning this conference and especially to meet again my colleague Dr. Thomas Banchoff, vice provost for global engagement at Georgetown University Center, Georgetown University. We've had some prior contact because I'm here at USIP as a recovering academic having spent 27 years at the Kroc Institute at the University of Notre Dame. So the notion of partnership across policy think tanks in universities is a natural one that a number of us want to bring to USIP and this connection with Georgetown in particular our partners at the University Center for Strategic Studies and many of the speakers and participants today is a very natural one. For those who don't know, the United States Institute of Peace is an independent nonpartisan conflict management center created by the United States Congress nearly 30 years ago. Our mission is to prevent, mitigate, and resolve violent conflicts around the world. We do this by engaging directly in conflict zones and providing analysis, education, and resources to those in those zones who are working for peace. As you might guess with the charge of this kind, we have our work cut out for us. This event today represents a new foray and phase of our work that we most welcome. This is the first USIP Asia-Pacific program partnering with Georgetown Center for Strategic Studies on the Asia conference, as Ariana mentioned. My friend and colleague, Stephanie Klein-Albrandt joined USIP in August, leads our Asia-Pacific program in some new and exciting directions. This partnership with CSS, made possible by Stephanie and who you've just met, Oriana Mastro, seeks to foster a new understanding of China, how China defines itself, how it both makes and breaks rules, how it's evolving political, security, and economic issues could have significant consequences for peace and security, as well, of course, for US-Sino relations. We're especially honored today to have Sir Peter West-McCott, the British Ambassador to the United States, speaking at USIP for the first time at lunch this afternoon on China and the wider West. Again, a very hearty welcome to all of you to USIP. I very much look forward to our discussions today. And it's now my pleasure to turn the podium over to Thomas Banchoff, Vice Provost for Global Engagement at Georgetown to begin our conference. Have a great day. Well, good morning, everybody, and welcome. Thank you, George, for those kind words of welcome on your part, and thank you for inviting us into this beautiful space for what promises to be a wonderful day-long conversation on a critical topic. As was mentioned, I'm a professor at Georgetown. We're trying to rethink what it means to be a global university. And part of that is certainly engaging in partnerships like this with USIP to engage and explore some of the world's most pressing problems, to bring our comparative strengths to bear, to collaborate together. And in that context, I'd also like to congratulate but also thank Oriana and Stephanie for their tremendous work in organizing today's program, as well as the Philip and Patricia Building Asia Securities Studies Fund. This is the third in a great series of conferences made possible by the fund, the first with Chatham House, the second with CSIS, and here we are at USIP. A tremendous series that will continue into the future. I think it's fitting that Georgetown and USIP should collaborate on a venture like this. We're neighbors after all. We're both in the education business. And we are both committed to building a more peaceful world. Now, USIP has it in its title, the idea of peace. But Georgetown has it in its identity as a Jesuit institution that draws on Catholic teaching on social justice, war, and peace. And the first institutional expression of that identity is, was, and still is, the School of Foreign Service founded in 1919, the first professional school of international studies of its kind, still a leader in what has become over the last century, of course, a much more crowded field. And our Center for Strategic Studies is just one of many dynamic programs that have evolved over the past several decades in response to changes, globalization, and the changing meaning of security and peace itself. I'll just mention another couple of programs. This is not an infomercial for Georgetown, but another couple of programs which have also collaborated with USIP over the years, our MA in Conflict Resolution, and our Berkeley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs, which I direct. We've worked together on conferences and publications around the issue of women, religion, and peace. Just a final word about what a university in general and a global university can bring to a conversation like this, I think it's really the breadth and depth of our disciplines, the fact that the multiplicity of disciplines and the ability to engage in interdisciplinary work, whether it's combining history, economics, politics, international relations, religion, cultural studies, is embedded in the very structure of the university. And of course that ability to tackle things across disciplines now maps more than ever onto the nature of the global challenges that are out there, onto their complexity. When I was starting off as a political science, studying international relations back in the late 1980s, security was predominantly about US-Soviet relations, the nuclear balance of power, balance of terror. Security studies was part of international relations, which itself was a sub-discipline of political science. There wasn't a lot of interaction with other disciplines. That has changed dramatically. And that complexity, I think, is an invitation to universities to reach out and work with policymakers, work with institutions like USIP in new and creative ways as we are today. In that context, I really commend the structure, the theory behind this conference, if you will, the idea of China's roles in the plural in the world. I think the idea of roles gets a complexity in a number of ways, not just the simple military versus economic versus political roles, but the very idea of roles suggests an institutional framework, a framework of international institutions with rules and norms within which China, like the United States, is continually repositioning itself. And therefore, this focus across the panels on China as a rule maker, a rule breaker, and a partner is, and will be, a wonderful way to shed light on China's evolving roles in the world. But it's also a framework that I think is relevant to the United States and other countries as well. As a student of domestic politics and how it shapes international relations, I just have to mention, I love the fact that you're starting off with a question in our first panel, how China defines itself. That intersection between domestic politics and international relations, so complex, we feel it every day in this town. It's something that we as, those of us who are based in the United States and who study China need to always place, I think, at the center or at the beginning of our deliberations about that great country and its role in the world, how China sees itself, how China is coming to see itself, its identity, not only with respect to international institutions, but also, its self-identity, its view of itself, its history, its politics, its culture, and society. So it looks to be an excellent discussion. Again, I really commend the organizers for putting together such a rich program. And again, Georgetown is delighted to collaborate with USIP in this important venture. So thank you all for being here. All right, on that good note, we're gonna get started. Hit the ground running with the first panel. Great, so this panel, the first panel on how China defines itself is looking at China's current role and how the Chinese people, the Chinese government might see their place in the region and globally. We have three fantastic panelists today. The first one, Dr. Zheng Wang, is the director of the Center for Peace and Conflict Studies at the School of Diplomacy and International Relations at St. Hall University and a global fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Dr. Wang has also been a Jennings Rudolph Senior Fellow here at USIP, so welcome back. And I would also like to mention he is an author of a fantastic book on Chinese nationalism and title, Never Forget National Humiliation, A Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations. Our next speaker today is going to be Andrew Scobell. He's a senior political scientist at Rand at the Washington office and an adjunct professor of Asian Studies at Georgetown University School of Foreign Service. He is also the author of one of my favorite books on patterns of Chinese use of force that I use in all my classes on the topic entitled, China's Use of Military Force Beyond the Great Wall in the Long March. Our last panelist today, Dr. Zhu Feng. He is a professor at the Beida or Beijing University School of International Studies. He is soon to move on to be the dean of the Institute of International Studies at Nanjing University coming this August. And I'm sure he will do great things for that school. Dr. Zhu Feng is actually partly to blame for the inspiration of this panel's topic, though he doesn't quite know that yet. I'm not sure if he remembers this, but my journey to understand China's perspective on security issues began eight years ago with my first time conducting interviews in China with the first person who was willing to meet with me to discuss then China's policy on North Korea, which was Dr. Zhu Feng. So it's great to have him here today and it all comes full circle. I'm still students, still learning all these topics as well. And I look forward to everything they have to say. So I think we're gonna queue up a PowerPoint. You said yes. I do wanna see if, there you go. Okay, good morning. I'm so happy to be here. And so thanks Stephanie and Irina to kind invitation. And I was actually among the first group of people moving this building in 2011 because I was at the Thanos program. I always miss my office. So so happy to come back to this beautiful building. And also I very much like the way you structure your framework today's conference. I think it is several very important topics. And also especially this one, the first topic we are going to talk today, how China defines itself. Because very often when people talks about China, they overlook how Chinese, they say their perspective or how Chinese they say themselves. But I don't know whether you agree with me. I actually think that there is a huge gap between the China's self image and how the outside world see China. The gap is so wide, it's probably wider than Pacific Ocean. And I somehow believe this should be the starting point for us to talk about any foreign policy issue of China. Just like most of my American students, they were so surprised the first time they saw this map China is in the center. And they finally understand why Chinese call themselves Central Kingdom. And also my Chinese students coming from China, they also told me they were so surprised to say the Eurocentric word map and they finally understand why people call China or Japan, Korea, Far East. So that's the thing goes like that. You have to put yourself on other people's shoes so you can say from their perspectives. But this is not an easy topic when we talks about how China defines itself. It's not easy question to answer. And I also don't think only Chinese knows the answers. There's probably different approaches we can use to answer these questions. But I think when we talks about how China defines itself, it's not a political issue, it's not a policy question. Today I think I probably will use approach of looking at the identity formation of the Chinese people. I think that probably provides some help for us to understand how Chinese defines itself. So here I used a table, this table is just based on the theory of social identities and other theories of identities. It talks about the four different types of identities. Identity content, like the constitutive content that defines the norms and rules of a group's membership, interest, and group goals. Answering question like, for example, what that mean to be a Chinese? What is the interest of this group of people? What is their group goals and purpose? And there are also relational content such as, which group or which country they always compare themselves with. And the cognitive content is some of this identity content which has a major influence how they interpret the outside world and how do they understand themselves. And also the social purposes content like whether they have some socially appropriate rules to perform, they put themself. So I know I have only 10 or 12 minutes so I cannot to talk very detail about all these questions. I think maybe it's helpful if I just use a recent speech of Xi Jinping, the Chinese president. He gave a keynote speech when he visited Belgium and he gave a speech at the College of Europe. And I think that he provides some answers to the questions I just mentioned, the identity questions about China. He actually made five statements how he defines China. If we just look at the titles, it sounds like something new. China always sings things like that. China has a time of civilization. China goes through many of the traumas and suffering, something like that. But if we look at some of the details, actually I think this is a very important speech. Actually a couple of his senior assistant actually mentioned this speech is kind of like Xi trying to provide a statement of his foreign policy. So I just quickly to go through several points he made in the speech and I recommend if you could find this speech to read it. For example, when he talks about China's time-honored civilization, he emphasized the national confidence, the patriotism, and he even mentioned China has been leading in the world for several thousand years. And he used the longest paragraph to talks about China has gone through many sufferings, traumas, foreign invasions, and he particularly mentioned the memory of foreign invasions and bullings has never been erased from the minds of the Chinese. And he particularly mentioned that China is a socialist country with Chinese characters and emphasized the uniqueness of China's political system. And he talks about China is the world's biggest developing country and he used some very interesting, very important figures, statistics. For example, he mentioned that there are more than 200 million people are still living and the poverty line and that is roughly the population of the French, Germany, and the UK combined. And he particularly also to highlight that his job is to conducting reform and this is his favorite saying is that, you know, reform was forced upon us by problems. And he also saying that China has entered, China's reform has entered a deep water zone and needs some courage to move forward. You know, I think you agree with me that whenever we have a Chinese official speech, we need some interpretation. It's not only just something from the text. So if I could do some interpretation of his speech, I would probably first say that from his speech, we can identify, there's one very point, a very important, you know, sense we need to know when we're trying to understand the question how China defines itself. That is, which I highlighted here is a mistrauma complex. It emphasizing China, you know, has a lot of glories, Asian glories, but also emphasizing China also has humiliations and traumas. And this mist and trauma complex so profoundly influence the way how China says self and how China says outside world. And I probably also will say that his speech also, you know, highlighted that he is something like, he's trying to telling people China is special. We got the history, we got this traumas, and we are the socialist country. We are the biggest developing country. My job is so tough. There is a legitimacy problem for my regime. There is a social crisis, environmental crisis. I have to do reform. You know, you should understand what on my plate and it's really tough and give me some time, something like that. And I think he also emphasized one thing if we're trying to interpret it, especially his number three statement, the Chinese socialist country. I think he's emphasizing if we're using the framework of the identity. For this government, the interest of the party is more important than anything else. Than any other national interest. This is kind of like a bottom line. And also emphasizing that China has some basic, what is the Chinese saying, that has a basic national condition, that is the population, the social problems, the gaps between the different part of China, the development problems. And so that's the reason we better understand that he talks about the Chinese dream. And particularly using the word, when people ask him what is Chinese dream, he said that that is rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. He used the term rejuvenation, not rice, because I think he's trying to emphasizing China is not rising from nothing. China, that is going back to his first statement, China has time-ownered civilization, this choosing glory of China. Okay, so I just quickly, using South China say a sick example. This is the old map, 1947 map, the South China Sea. This is actually the map made during the, Chiang Kai-shek during the nationalist government. And here I just use a page four of the grade eight geography textbook used, the national geography textbook used in China. In this page, you can see there's a full, you know, call out box, it's pointed out to the Northmost, Southmost, Westmost, Eastmost point of China's territory. And they ask the students to use a ruler to measure, for example, from the north post near the border of Russia and to the south post, Southmost point, which is the James shore, only 50 miles from Malaysia's beach. And to measure the distance. I use this map just trying to say today when people talk about China's behavior in South China Sea, many people will say China has been very aggressive. So, but if we understand that China got this kind of perception that this is belong to China, then it's probably better, it's, you know, helpful to us to better understand about China's behavior. So if we use China, South China Sea as an example, we can say actually, in terms of South China Sea and East China Sea, many of the Chinese say themself as wicked, rather than aggressor. And they also, there's a perceived great threats and pressure from the outside. They believe United States and together with Japan, with Philippines is to contain China, there is a huge conspiracy, there is a master plan behind that. And they also believe China is a country status quo's power, rather, and it's mainly defensive. And it's very interesting. I just finished an article about South China Sea and some of the Chinese scholars, they begin to use the term, what they call the ancestral rights, Zu Quan, they believe this is China's ancestral rights, South China Sea and East China Sea. So because of that, they believe, you know, China is far from taking advantage of others, but they are just simply restoring the justice. They used to belong to China. So we can say, like I mentioned, that there's a huge gap between how Chinese say themself and the outside world say China. So I think I will stop here and I believe we have more discussion and presentation following that. Thank you. Good morning. It's a great pleasure to be at USIP this morning. My body is still on soul career time, but my brain is fully in Washington. I hope to demonstrate that in the next few minutes. Anyway, Oriana neglected to mention my latest book, which is not about war, it's about peace. It's less war-like, I should say, but more relevant, it's about trying to explain how China sees itself. China's search for security. Columbia University Press, 2012. Good plug, which I co-authored with Andy Nathan. Now, an attempt to try and, as I said, understand how the Chinese see themselves. So today we're talking about, this panel is about how China defines itself. Maybe I can summarize my remarks this morning. China, one, two, three, four, plus two. Now, if China's not a simple, China cannot be summarized in China, one, two, three. That's way more complicated than that. But first, one, the China one refers to the China dream. And I'll just summarize these very, very quickly, and then if anyone, you can either read the book or ask me a question in the Q and A. China two refers to the two obsessions that I believe China has. I'm getting some feedback up here. Are you getting any feedback? No, okay, good. Two obsessions refer to a preoccupation amongst China's Communist Party rulers with domestic stability, internal security. And the second preoccupation or obsession is with the United States. The United States is both an opportunity, poses an opportunity for China in many ways, but also presents what China's leaders see as its greatest threat. You combine those two obsessions and you get a Beijing that is quite insecure and perhaps even paranoid. And that really influences how China engages with the rest of the world. China three refers to three lenses or three perspectives that Andy Nathan and I argue, with which China looks out at the world, the first being a culturalist lens, the second being a international relations lens, and the third being a, what was that third? Oh, an ideological lens. And I won't elaborate on those now, simply to say that those three lenses tend to be mutually reinforcing. So some people may hold one of those, some others may hold more than one, but the point is those three lenses tend to be mutually reinforcing and they, through those lenses, China looks out and sees a world that is quite threatening and challenging. And yet, China has embraced the outside, engagement with the outside world, reform and opening, notwithstanding the trepidation, considerable trepidation in doing so. China four refers to the four rings of insecurity with which China looks out at the world, the first being domestic. So national security for China's leaders begins in the street outside the policy makers window. They're concerned about that. The second ring being China's immediate periphery. And the third ring being the Asia Pacific region and the fourth being the greater, the big wide world beyond China's own neighborhood. So fundamentally, China looks from the outside, from the inside, I'm sorry, from the inside out. The plus two, to get to the two major points most closely related to the topic this morning, how China defines itself. I think that building on the remarks of the previous speaker, you know, talking about two identities that Chinese leaders see for their country. The first, which was well covered by Professor Zhang, the traditional, what I call the traditionalist national identity. And that's really a more of a backward looking, in a sense, or strong reference to history. And the second is what I call a more modern, great power identity. So in fact, I would suggest that those two identities are quite consistent, but one is looking backwards, the other is looking forward. Let's see. So the traditionalist national identity is really emphasizes a strong cultural distinctiveness that China has, and that was again referred to by the previous speaker very well. But the stereotype, I think it is a stereotype. And yet stereotypes are very powerful. As a student of Bob Jervis at Columbia, I'm sold on perception and misperception. Those are more important, perhaps than actual reality, how countries perceive themselves and each other. So China's view, or stereotype of its cultural, a traditional identity is very much a pacifist, defensive-minded, sedentary, virtuous, non-expansionist, everything that's great and good in the world is manifest, is represented by China. The point I wanna make here is also, even though that's a very powerful, enduring identity, it tends to be defined on a quite almost daily basis with reference to the other. What is the other? The other tends to be the West, epitomized by the United States. So everything that China is not, that's kind of the United States. The US is expansionist, has sort of a selfish, militaristic, maritime culture. And so this is the way China helps to define, seeks to define itself or helps to define itself, but it also influences how they see the United States with, I think, quite predictable results that the perception that many of the things that the US is trying to do, that the US sees as well-intentioned, China sees quite differently. The second, oh, and a good example for all the China specialists in the room know this, but good example of China, what I see is China's backward-looking dimension of this identity is how did Chinese refer to their own country? They don't talk about the motherland. They don't talk about the fatherland. They talk about zhuguo, right? It's ancestor land. So if it's ancestral territory, it all goes to, it all makes sense from a Chinese perspective. So this more modern other identity, what I've called a modern great power relationship, or I'm sorry, great power identity, we hear a lot of talk these days about a new type of major country or new type of great power relationship. Of course, this presumes that China is a great power and I don't think there's much doubt that China is certainly, in the 21st century, a great power. And what are the contours or dimensions of this? I'll just outline a couple. China has for, or the People's Republic of China has for many years now insisted that China stands firm on principles. And from the five principles of peaceful coexistence, et cetera, et cetera. But increasingly in the last few decades, China has also referred to interests. That's not a dirty word because interest is more of a selfish context and Chinese don't like to think of themselves as selfish either as individual people or as a country. But I think this is an evolution that suggests a significant evolution in Chinese thinking as a great power, that increasingly thinking as a great power and great powers have interests and not just national interests, but core interests or vital interests. So that's, and these are espoused and articulated on a frequent basis these days, emphasizing Chinese thinking of itself as a China thinking of itself as a great power increasingly. Another dimension, what Andy Nathan and I concluded on book is that China may have a global presence and it may have global interests, but fundamentally China is still a regional power. So meaning that most of its attention and influence is exercised in its own neighborhood. Of course we know that China is involved all around the world, thank you. And so, but still fundamentally, and you think of it, look at how it defines core interests, I think that's, they're fundamentally internal and regional. You contrast that with the United States, we define our vital interests globally and China notices that and is concerned by that. A couple of other points to make about this great power, emerging great power identity that China has. Chinese not only talk about hard power these days, but they also talk about soft power. If you are a little country, I used to add the word piddly little country, but that's not very politically correct. But if little countries don't have vital interests and they don't really think too much about soft power, when you become a great power you like to think in terms, you start to think in terms of not just hard power, but the soft power or influence that you have. And so it's quite clear that Chinese leaders have been paying increasing attention to Chinese soft power all over the world. And in many ways trying to compete with the considerable soft power of other countries, notably the United States. Another dimension of China's modern, more modern great power identity is that Chinese diplomacy and strategic efforts are not just bilateral anymore, even though that's the, China prefers, I think bilateral to operate bilaterally if possible. But also China now has embraced, conditionally embraced multilateralism. So China is very active in a whole realm of multilateral fora, including the United Nations and other regional, other organizations. And indeed China has also established its own multilateral entities. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization is a significant example. Another that has had a rockier time of it, the Six-Party Talks on North Korea. They're currently in extended hiatus, yet China has been actively trying to restart this to serve as a framework, not just to deal with North Korea, but to involve and coordinate and even manage perhaps other relevant, other interested countries, concerned countries. So to, I think I'll, oh, one last point to make and then I'll stop. Another thing, so there's a, China has a distinctive approach, I think, to great power relation, it's great power identity and relations. One thing China does not do is alliances. That's, they insist that this is not, this is sort of a manifestation of Cold War thinking, the kind of thing that the United States does. China doesn't do that. What China does is strategic partnerships. So it's a different way of thinking about relations between China and even countries that it's quite close to. I'll stop there. Thank you. Yes, please. First of all, let me extend my thanks to organizers truly my great honor. I want to just to follow up from the two previous presenters and very shortly present some sort of my source on what is now at the centerpiece, affecting the China's identity and to low definition in the world. First of all, I think definition of the China's role in the world has been long-term paradox for my country. It's to prevent, to presenters also, very powerfully demonstrate. Such I think a grappling started from the Opian War that back to 1840. I think at that time the China craps the front of some sort of, what's the hell, at least Asia. So China got very, very victimized and marginalized. So I think up to in 1949, that kind of lasaki, of course, was a dominant one for the most of Chinese. Then it's also decides some sort of, we say justification of extremist revolutionary thoughts which finally just prevail in China. So then some sort of China's elites one after another just getting very, very extremist. So they resort to the Maxism as some sort of a remedy for China's marginalization and a victimization. So then after in 1949, China become revisionist until in 1979 because we completely armed away such a Maxist ideologies then we believe the world should be not just liberated, also needs some sort of emancipation from the Maxist doctrines. So then Maoist China was also very interesting indoctrination of some sort of Maxist theory and Maxist idea. Then it's brought to the disaster for my country. So as Andy very powerfully pointed. So after in 1979 when China embark on reform open that, it's also a bigger journey my country was back to the anomaly. Back to the national interests that driven rather than the ideological driven. So I think it was from in 1979 over to we say present, then we'll see a leading factor affecting the Chinese view is when needs came after greatly the Chinese national interest were also some sort of respectful member of international community. So the definition of China's role in the world could be very vividly and explicitly characterized as integrationist. So we are integrating into the world. We leave up behind a lot of commonest ideology. Despite China's some sort of official slogan of building a socialist country was Chinese character. But I have to say today China is more like a capitalist system. Rather than socialist system. So adequately a library of my country is capitalist system with Chinese characters. But of course a couple of things remain haven't just been completely wrong. For example, one party rule, socialist ideology, even just how say some sort of superficial you know the incarnation into the Chinese political system by such an official ideology remain very obsolete. Then it's also existential. So then even the China dramatically and greatly integrating to the world assisting. Then the grappling ways that China's definition of low in the world continues. First is for example, how China could identify ourself in the broader context of the world community. Traditionally we see there is a separation between the Western and the West. Now it's a still factor dividing the Chinese. We belong to the West? No. We suffer a lot of some sort of critical bias from the West because China's socialist system usually perceived as some sort of bad one. So until the China could be very successfully democratizing ourself, I don't think such a sense of affinity also will build up between China and the US, China and the West. So eventually China has no such an identity to belong into the West. Then we have to still sitting on the camps of the non-West. But now China's bigger. So another I think the factor also just emerged and getting the China's definition of unbelievably complicated. Now I mean, what's some sort of destination of China's future journey for our national and the power rise? So if China could be getting powerful enough, then we will win the full haggar from the West. Then we could be part of the West. If the China's critical system persistently were not just a house and match up the China's growing inference, then China will continue to be victimized and marginalized. So such a discrepancy remains there. On the other hand, we also see another very important factor now is leading to some sort of growing controversy in the definition of Chinese rule. Now I mean, the ambiguous between some sort of China's greater power status and it's some sort of a fraud approach in the world stage. Now a lot of our Chinese believe China now is back to the grave. We should win with respect. But if we look at the China's foreign relations, the mass, unbelievably, just the magnified and leave the China at a very awkward position. For example, South China Sea, East China Sea. So then it also allows us some sort of growing resistance from the Chinese, some sort of their in-depth heart on how continue such an integration-ness, integration-ness approach. For example, someone is very skeptical U.S. is conspiring to take China down. Now it's like Japan's turn to not just counterbalance the China, also to like to hurt the China. Then some people just say very, very badly, do you mean? Future's power stress will unbelievably intensified. So future China, whatever the law could be defined, then China have to prepare to break the way by resorting to great power politics. So then I see, yes, since the reform and opening up, 30, 35 years past, but the China's some sort of ways of controversy over the role definition in the world deepened and broadened. But in the policy, I think the level, I also see the China's approach to the world of community and to the world of politics persistently just continues or going forward, for example. The China's international role usually just a little bit of switch between the two kind of such an expectation of a role. One is competitive, of course we are competitive. On the other hand, we are a cooperative. So then it's also very fundamentally just a project to some sort of China's image internationally, the international stage. Then it's also housed the main parts of the China's understanding of a role in the world. So it's very interesting combination of competitor and a cooperator. But the key question here is to why extend China well feel comfortable resting yourself on competitor or cooperator? Or in one way, such some sort of two part of role could be very inherently just a co-related in the Chinese approach. Then I see a couple factors now is truly resurgent in a way very affecting the China's some sort of a sort of an extent of the low assignment international relations. First is I think the China's such a sense of a critical insecurity and ensuring international recognition. I think that will be a leading factor because I think the critical elites in China assume we can't just easily duplicate the case of a successful democratization in the rest of world. China's historical peculiarity will decide and drive the China's methodology for democratization. So I see there's some sort of very formidable resistance for Western style we say, such rule of law or democratic exercise. So then I think that also will be a leading entanglement. Probably it depends on how confident China's ruling elites will be if they truly more confident about some sort of integration of a futures relations between the China and the world. Then we'll give them more energy and the concern to the competitor or to the operator. If the relations between China and the US is truly getting unbelievably stressful, then probably we're leaning towards or tilting towards the competitor. Then second factor is domestic equilibrium. I think of my colleagues as mentioned for example, there's a lot of a nationalist loose cannons in China. Yes, today's China unbelievably diversified. So if we have a full spectrum exam of what China now is in terms of the view of the world in general and the view of the US in particular, then we'll see there stands almost of five contending camps. In my English publication I also covered this some sort of categorization of the contending Chinese thoughts. So such a five campus of China's idea from father left to father right. It is there we say for example, nationalist, populist Chinese, nationalist Chinese, realist Chinese, internationalist Chinese and liberalist Chinese. So then such a diversity of course is good because China is one party rule system that China's open society. But the problem is the ability of the government to strike a very delicate and a balanced balance among such contending camps hasn't been assured. So future policy outcome will be some sort of very interesting balance among such a five campers. Then last one, I think it's action and a reaction cycle between China and the US and the West. So today China's become a very open society as I say. So then there are a lot of such a penetration. No Chinese at least no matter who he is, how strong he is, then no one can manipulate the Chinese ideology and the Chinese thoughts. So then such an action reaction circle usually will just offer a lot of consequential input to the Chinese policy reaction and it probably will be more inferential to lead the Chinese views on how we could just react to the word into some sort of uncertainty. So that process will be very interesting. Okay, my conclusion is this. If we look at today's China's definition of rule, in the past 170 years, it's really projected some sort of completely new game and a new outcome. So today's China's confident, somehow we're comfortable, but the problem is the key variable remain and resolve. Now I mean, China's rise will be mainly for for some sort of reemergence of a great power status or we can some sort of very tactically and smartly redapt ourselves to the new reality in the 21st century. That means the leader should have paid more attention to the people sped off. That kind of thing hasn't been answered explicitly. Let me stop here. Well, thank you to all the panelists for their insightful and concise remarks. I'm sure they have sparked a great deal of discussion. So at this point, we are going to turn to the audience for questions. If you do have a question, we have I guess where people are bringing mics down. So just raise your hand and Mike will come your way. Please feel free. You're going to introduce yourself when you get the microphone. People usually forget that part, but don't worry, I'll remind you. Say who you are, your question and make that as concise as the panelists remarks were. So this gentleman up front. Thank you very much. I'm Harley Balzer, I'm a professor at Georgetown in the government department, the school of foreign service and the history department. Also a former Jennings Randolph fellow, so it's nice to be back here. My question is about Xi Jinping's first trip abroad, which was to Moscow. And in many countries, that's a real indication of priority and orientation. I'm wondering if that's the case with China. And if it is, Professor Wang talked about China being a status quo power. In 2008, Russia raised questions about that. The last three or four months have shown very definitely that Russia is not a status quo power at all, has been opening Kendra's boxes. So I'd love to hear some comment about that and China's role. Yeah. Xi Jinping's first trip was to Russia. And somehow we can say that there's a more closer relationship between China and Russia since Xi Jinping came into power. And somehow that we just talked about before the session's beginning, we talked about the Ukraine crisis. The current Ukraine crisis somehow is even pushing, I think, China and Russia get even more closer. And there's a common interest between the two countries. And also I think going back to this question about China's role in the world, and we talked about the huge perception gaps between the outside world to China and also to Russia. We can say a lot of similarities. The way Chinese say themselves, the way Russian say themselves, and their understanding, their interpretation about the US policy. So here is really, I think is a big question, is that I think is two parts of it, is whether there's a possibility that Xi Jinping and Putin were kind of misinterpret the US foreign policy. And also whether China's foreign policy, Russia's foreign policy, and China's reactions towards South China Sea and East China Sea could also be misunderstood, misinterpreted by the United States. I think maybe, yeah. One more point. Xi's selection of the Moscow as his first overseas fellow, I think is reflection of his personal, I think, the preference. So pressure to buy the West usually is some sort of very popular impression in China. And Beijing should have some sort of, we say, lots of result in the counter-measuring. So then, proving closer the relations with Moscow, of course, is some sort of, we say, Chinese preparation, if necessary, can lay out some sort of new pattern of power relations, for example, realignments with Moscow. But it doesn't mean that Beijing's foreign policy gravity shifted it to some sort of, we say, alignments with Moscow, and small interest in, we say, the state school change. I don't think, for example, yes, it has a lot of such a labyrinth of China's policy for growing a certainness in the South China Sea and the Eastern China Sea as a state school change. But I think a such a point's really, really unacceptable in China, because we're considered, for example, joining of Lenin and Dashuang could get it back to in 1947. That time, there was no international opposition. US did not disagree. And even 10 years ago, 15 years ago, then China used the military coercion, vis-à-vis the Philippines, then there was no bigger ban from international community. While China now has such a policy, just to cause us so much concern, the reason is China's naval capability now is building up very fast. So then we also see some sort of such a little bit, you know, contradictory, allergic to different policy narrative. But at least I see Xi Jinping's domestic preoccupation will much drive his agenda. So internationally, I think his preference will be some sort of state school keeper. I mean, he don't want to make the mess. He don't want to cause a lot of a stir. But of course, he also needed to satisfy the China's domestic nationalist. So then I have to say some sort of controversy now is growing up. Please. Take two quick points. First on China, Russia, what's going on here, I think, is geostrategic balancing against the United States. When you think about it, I said China doesn't do alliances. But China does strategic partnerships. You look around the world and how many countries are significant of sizable, you know, stature and hard power to balance, counterbalance the United States. There aren't that many that have seen eye to eye with China on a lot of issues. Russia is one of those key countries. So it's very understandable that there would be a relatively close relationship between the two countries and China having every interest in demonstrating that from literally from day one. Second point on the Ukraine crisis, I think the silence out of Beijing has been deafening. On the one hand, they don't want to cross their Russian friends. On the other hand, they don't want to be seen as endorsing Russian behavior. Because if China is seen to endorse it, then does that mean that China will engage in the same kind of behavior? All right, next questions. Robert, go ahead. Hi, Robert Daly with the Wilson Center. Thank you for an excellent panel. I thought all three presentations were very valuable. I wanted to address a question first to Zheng Wang with reference to Xi Jinping's speech. And you said that he pointed out that China had, for many centuries, led the world technologically, economically, et cetera. And of course, this is central to the resurgence story in China, that China is now reclaiming its birthright. It's once in future glory. So what words did he use for led the world? Because in English, there's a very telling confusion. There's a difference between stating that China was, in fact, number one, sort of DE or Tsui Shima Shima, in terms of culture, technology, economics, which was true. But it was, in no wise, true that China led in terms of dialing the world towards something or inspired it. And the confusion occurs readily in English. And it can occur in Chinese, depending on how he describes it, to create a myth that China was not only number one in terms of achievements, but in fact, led something called the world in the past, which seems to be untrue. And how that's confused or not could have implications for how China sees its resurgence. Thank you. I believe the word, the Chinese word he is using was linxian, linxian. China has been linxian for thousands of years. It's quite a bold statement. And we actually, we talked about the Chinese CCP's documentation. We know that Xi Jinping's speech, there's a major difference if we're trying to do some content analysis of his speech with Hu Jingtao. So you can find a big difference that his speech, his talking is more straightforward. And some of his saying, for example, he's a trip to Europe, I think a couple of his statement caused controversy. Like in the France, he mentioned about China used to be a line, and now it's wake up. But China is a very friendly line. I think there's a lot of discussion about that friendly, peaceful, gentle line. So that caused a lot of discussion about whether it's possible. So, but I think one of the reasons I use his speech is that he actually, I read some reports about that. When he dropped this speech, he didn't like the Hu Jingtao. Hu Jingtao's speech is more kind of boring. You won't find anything special. But he put a lot of his personal, I read some reports saying that he even dropped some speech by himself. Or he gives very detailed instructions to the assistants to draft this speech. So for that reason, maybe his speech is more useful for us to trying to understand his policy, compare it with Hu Jingtao. There are questions. I might go ahead, sir. In the middle there, Zida. There we go. Coming from there. Hi, Joe Bosco, formerly with the Defense Department. Those are really superb presentations. But I noted that sprinkles throughout all three were the thesis that China is unique, which we readily concede it is in so many ways. But there were also the use of phrases like insecurity, paranoia, grievance, resentment overpass, grievances. Those are characteristics that have not been unique in modern history. And we saw the consequences in the last century. And today we see those kinds of qualities being manifested in places like North Korea and Putin's Russia. So I wonder if you could comment on the implications for China's vision of the future, given its perception of the past. Thank you. So I want to go ahead. I like your question. I think it's also some sort of reading point occurring to China for the Chinese for the to think for example. So first of all, I think the Chinese view of the world is also uniquely for two folks. One is when writing that's the shadow of anguish fear. It's a professor who wise definition. I mean, the Chinese rise completely overshadowed by not just the US preponderance of Western supremacy. So that kind of reality. It's really a very alarming reminder for Chinese. So then you say, yes, why there's an inter, we say change of China's view of the world, its grievances, uniqueness of some sort of pride. The reality is if you look at the past of 400 years, such a non-West power rise just happened two times. One is Japan defeated at all. Now it's China. So this psychology is lingering and the thicker is there. The second, I think just I say China hasn't get through the mass transformation. So my view that the Chinese leader one after another should always keep themselves get stunk in how the China's people's bad off could be adequately and properly addressed. That's a leading priority rather than just how say lingering for some sort of international status and what kind of a rank we could just have finished in the world. That would be very misleading. So then there's also some sort of another domestic angle. What kind of a sense we're really, really added to the China's national pride? It's some sort of great power status, or it's a China's finished the domestic transformation and a full embrace of China's some sort of a democratic such components in the world community. I think such a struggle hasn't been just the end of that with some sort of a proper conclusion. So then in the coming days, the China's response very primary to the world affairs will be still very, very contradictory. For example, with the Lactorpool Cruiser, with the Moscow for some sort of counterbalance-based such relations. Then North Korea's bad guy, but I have to say most of China is see there's a no desirability where they can hand the kill the North Korea. Because North Korea's there, probably is some sort of the way, leveraging the China's influence in the region. So for them, I'm a very internationalized scholar, so I have a lot of international exposure. But most of the challenges, most of the Chinese, they're probably very pro-Kylo, very Chinese, and then very pathetic. So it's harder to just to have some sort of a very decisive movement of the Chinese over to some sort of such a positive conceptualization of Ovalero in the world. It's a very good question. And I think the key implication of China's deep sense of insecurity and powerful sense of its own identity is that difficulty in putting itself in someone else's shoes, understanding another perspective. It's all about explaining a lot of this. And of course, our panel is about explaining how China sees itself, explaining to the world how the world needs to understand China. Well, of course, China needs to understand the world. And I think that certainly it's gone a long way in that regard. But I think what's needed is to put itself in someone else's shoes, there's a lot of discussion about the security dilemma. To me, the security dilemma, the fundamental underlying problem leading to the security dilemma is what I call an empathy deficit. If you don't understand, if you can't put yourself in the shoes of your neighbors, your potential adversary, even your friends, then that's very limiting. And I think that's the challenge, the real challenge for China to up its game, so to speak, is to really start to understand how other countries see China and why there's some skepticism that people wonder whether this peaceful rise, question the peaceful rise given some of China's activities, especially in the maritime realm. Quickly. Yeah, I think when we talk about China's current policy and China's future orientation, we need to understand China's identity because identity determine national interest and national interest determine foreign policy. So that's the reason we're emphasizing, like in my presentation, I'm emphasizing that what you mentioned about the historic grievance, all, like I use the term the trauma means complex, played such an important role because this complex is indeed kind of like a raw material constructing China's national identity and also influence the way they understand the outside world. So that's the reason I use the example of the South China say, it sounds like Professor Zhu mentioned about the contradictions that when the entire outside world somehow believe China's behavior is aggressive, but inside China, many of the people that criticize government being soft. And I think this is a very good example to say the power of nationalism in China. When the government's behavior being evaluated by the whole world as aggressive, his own people still criticize its own government being soft, not tough enough in the South China Sea. And it's also like the reason I use the geography textbook for people growing up in this country, for people receiving the education and the narrative, the social discourse in this country, when people strongly believe this is our land, this is our territory, this is our rights, it's, of course, for them it's quite difficult for them to understand how the outside world is saying China. And that's also the reason why they have such kind of strong conspiracy theory, they believe that is everything United States is behind that. And that's also the reason they believe China is a weak team, because China is one country dealing with the whole group of the country, United, put together Japan, Philippines to make trouble to China. And also because they believe this is China's territory, so they believe that China's resources being stealing by the other countries, China's territory, China's islands, rocks being occupied by other countries. So that's probably the reason that, you know, this kind of weak team identity they have. Well, thank you for that. Unfortunately, our time has come to an end. It seems to me that U.S.-China relations can be aptly characterized by the metaphor of a marriage. And I often wonder at what stage of the marriage are we in? Or are we in the beginning stage in which you have fights and tensions? But both sides, the main argument is, I just didn't know that you were going to see it that way. Or are we at the later stage in which, perhaps, you know how the other side sees it, but you just don't care. I hope, and I think everyone on this panel, we've held this panel with the hope that we're currently in the situation of the former and not of the latter. So at that note, I'd like to thank all the panelists for the great remarks.