 Hi, my name is Monty Johnson. I teach philosophy at the University of California, San Diego And this is the second of my lectures on Aristotle's politics book 5. This one on chapters 10 to 12 where Aristotle treats of monarchy and tyranny. Just a little bit more about the contents of 10 to 12. The subject is monarchy, which literally means soul rule. That's where we get the term monarchy. But here Aristotle discusses also kingship or a king, Basileus, and tyranny or a tyrant, Tyrannos. Chapter 10 is devoted to discussing the causes of stasis or instability, faction, revolution in monarchies. Chapter 11, the means of preserving monarchies. And then in chapter 12 he discusses tyrannies and also offers a critique of Plato's theory of constitutional change. And by the way, I'm using the translation of Benjamin Jowett, Oxford 1921, which is available in the public domain. Now in chapter 10, Aristotle makes a very interesting and important point where he opposes kingship and tyranny to political or constitutional rule. He in effect groups the other kinds of government or polity, the other kinds of constitution, and opposes them to the kind that he generically calls constitutional government, which is usually translated polity or republic. So he says, what I have already said respecting forms of constitutional government applies almost equally to royal or kingly and tyrannical rule. For royal rule is of the nature of an aristocracy and tyranny is a compound of oligarchy and democracy in their most extreme forms. So if we think about that diagram of different constitutional types, we can group all of the corrupt ones and think of them as all being like kinds of tyranny because extreme oligarchies and democracies are essentially tyrannies. And we can also group kingships and aristocracies. Now tyranny, he says, is of course the most injurious to its subjects being made up of two evil forms of government and having the perversions and errors of both. But kingship and aristocracy in fact aren't realistic types of government. They require that you have people that are too excellent. And so they don't work for most peoples political rule that is rule among equals is different from both of these forms, which involve either one or a few people ruling over everyone in political rule. The rule is among equals and all of the equals take turn ruling and being ruled in turn and Aristotle makes this distinction between that one kind of constitution that is true political rule against the other kinds of constitutions in several other places, including book one and book three. Thus, the real opposition in Aristotle's politics is between monarchy and political rule. Political rule understood as the correct form of rule among several equal citizens, according to the structure of a constitution. And this is what we now call a polity or using the Latin terms, a republic. Now to compare kingship and tyranny more closely, kingship is of course a legitimate form of government tyranny and illegitimate form of government or a corrupt or depraved form of government. In a kingship, the king is appointed by the upper class against the lower class. In a tyranny Aristotle says tyrants are appointed by the lower class against the upper class. So they're sort of demagogic rebel rousers who whip up the fury of the lower classes in order to oppose the upper class. The opposite of a situation in a kingship where the upper class appoints a king in order to protect their interests against the basically against the lower class. Although technically a king rules in the interests of both the upper class who appointed them and the lower class who in whose interest they should govern as well. Now another difference is that the legitimacy of a king is based on the king's merit or virtue or the benefits conferred by the king or both of these, whereas a tyrant is not legitimate and does not have to have any kind of merit or virtue or confer any benefits on anyone else. A third difference is that the which I've already mentioned is that a kingship should protect both the rich people against unjust acts of the poor and protect the poor people against the insult and oppression of the rich. Whereas a tyrant acts for the sake of private ends and has no regard for public interests, certainly no regard for the interests of the poor except insofar as they keep him in power and no particular interest in the other rich people besides his own rule. An Aristotle says that a true kingship is personally motivated by honor whereas the tyrant is personally motivated by pleasure. That is getting getting his own things and enjoying them. In the chapter, Aristotle continues discussing the vices of tyranny. Tyranny says combines all the vices of both oligarchy and democracy. This is the reason why tyranny is the worst of all forms of government because it takes the vices of the two other bad kinds, bad and illegitimate kinds of government and combines them and and sort of concentrates them into one person. He says, as of oligarchy so of tyranny the end is wealth for by wealth only can the tyrant maintain either his guard or his luxury. Both mistrust the people and therefore deprive them of their arms. Both agree to, too, in injuring the people and driving them out of the city and dispersing them. And from democracy, tyrants have borrowed the art of making war upon the notables and destroying them secretly or openly. Or of exiling them because they are rivals and stand in the way of their power. And also because of plots against them are contrived by men of this class who either want to rule or to escape subjection. So the tyrants borrow the dirty tricks from both other both of the other kinds of government. And Aristotle is especially concerned with tyrants that have arisen through demagogues and through sort of populist movements. Now both tyrannies and kingships motivate conspiracies against their power and Aristotle is interested in the psychological motivations of those conspirators. The first and most obvious one is greed monarchs have great wealth and honor, which are objects of desire for everyone else for this and other motives Aristotle gives several historical examples. Fear is another motive, which as Aristotle has already said causes conspiracies as well in monarchies and in other more popular forms of government. Other causes are contempt, boldness due to military power or any combination of greed, fear, contempt and boldness. He makes an aside point that desire for fame or glory as opposed to greed is actually a very rare motive for conspirators who commit tyrannicide. They might say that they're doing it for honor or for glory, but generally it caches out into greed and he gives several historical examples to support that point. Now the last part of chapter 10 discusses the causes of the destruction of tyrannies and there are basically two general classes of causes of destruction of tyrannies. First external causes of destruction, meaning the actions of other states. So foreign countries that are kingships, aristocracies or constitutional governments all oppose tyrannies because these forms are naturally opposed to corrupt and illegitimate governments in principle. Democracies, which are technically another corrupt form of government, also tend to oppose tyrannies. Aristotle says on the principle of Hesiod, Potter hates Potter because Aristotle thinks that democracies and tyrannies are nearly akin. The most extreme form of democracy is a tyranny and most tyrants come to power through populist movements. So because they are close together, because they are both vying for populist attention and support, democracy is opposed tyrannies. So that means that all of those other kinds of constitutional governments, which foreign countries are likely to be one of those kinds, will be opposed to a tyranny and will be an external cause of destruction by supporting factions and so forth and conspiracies within a tyranny. But tyrannies also motivate internal causes of their destruction. So Aristotle goes into great detail discussing how internal family divisions, for example, motivate conspiracies and hatred of tyrants is, of course, inevitable. Contempt is also a frequent cause of their destruction for living in luxurious ease. Tyrants become contemptible and offer many opportunities to their assailants. Anger, as well, he says, must be included under hatred and produces the same effects. It is oftentimes even more ready to strike. The angry are more impetuous and making an attack for they don't follow a rational principle. And men are very apt to give way to their passion when they're insulted. So people become very angry when they're insulted by tyrants. This anger motivates them to lash out at tyrants. If they aren't able to lash out very quickly, then the anger converts into a kind of hatred, which leads to support for conspiracies. Now, all of the causes which have been mentioned as destroying the last and unmixed form of oligarchy and the extreme form of democracy, Aristotle says, may be assumed to affect tyranny as well. Because the extreme forms of both oligarchies and democracies are just tyrannies distributed among several persons, he says. Kingships are destroyed by some similar, but also some different factors. So kingly rule is little affected by external causes and is therefore longer lasting. It's generally destroyed from within. And there are two ways in which the destruction from within may come about. First, when the members of the royal family quarrel among themselves, and there are plenty of historical examples of that, but also, second, when kings attempt to administer the state too much like a tyranny, and to extend their authority against the law, then they start motivating to the same motives for conspiracy and revolution that tyrants do. Now, Aristotle points out that in his time, kingship is now virtually extinct as a form of government. And so contemporary monarchies are mostly tyrannies. For, he says, the rule of a king is over voluntary subjects and he is supreme in all important manners. But in our own day, men are more insistent upon inequality. And no one is so immeasurably superior to others as to represent adequately the greatness and dignity of the office. Hence, mankind will not, if they can help it, endure it. And anyone who obtains power by force or fraud is at once thought to be a tyrant. Now, contempt is also a major problem for hereditary kingships, but not so much in tyrannies. In hereditary monarchies, a further cause of destruction is the fact that the kings fall into contempt. And although possessing not tyrannical power, but only royal dignity are apt to outrage others, their overthrow is then readily affected for there is an end to the king when his subjects do not want to have him, but the tyrant lasts whether they like him or not. So kingships are easier to get rid of because people follow along with the laws. But in hereditary kingships, you get these scoff law sons who are no good. And so they tend to motivate contempt. This contempt then leads to efforts to remove them, which are easier to affect than in a tyranny. Now, the next chapter, chapter 11, having discussed the cause of stasis revolution instability in both kinds of monarchy, he now discusses the preservation of monarchies, both kingships and tyrannies. Kingship, he says, is preserved by the limitation of its powers. The more restricted the functions of kings, the longer their power will last unimpaired, for then they're more moderate and not so despotic in their ways, and they're less envied by their subjects. And Aristotle gives a couple of historical examples of this. But by contrast, his treatment of the preservation of tyrannies is much more detailed, both with respect to the number of techniques that he discusses and the historical examples adduced. The following part of book five, chapter 11, has become known as the handbook for tyrants because it lists some very practical things that tyrants should know if they want to maintain their power. So it's notable that Aristotle here provides something that is usually associated with or even attributed to the Italian statesman and political philosopher Nicolo Machiavelli, who lived from 1469 to 1527, and offered clear eyed advice in his work The Prince on how the power of a tyrant may be unethically maintained. But Aristotle, thousands of years earlier, had offered the same kind of advice. Now, his advice about how to preserve tyranny comes into two general kinds. First, traditional techniques of oppression, which remove the means of overthrowing a tyranny. And second, imitating kingship, which is a kind of enlightened way of moderation, which would remove the motives for overthrowing a tyranny. And so let's look at both of those kinds of means in some more detail. First, traditional techniques of oppression. Examples here include sowing quarrels and distrust among the citizens. Friends should be embroiled with friends. The people should be embroiled with the notables and the rich embroiled with one another. Everybody should be fighting, then they can't get organized enough in order to form a coherent conspiracy or revolution against a tyranny. Second, removing their power to act, employing what Aristotle calls quote, Persian and barbaric acts, unquote, which are nonetheless frequently employed in Greek states, as several historical examples show. The concrete pieces of advice lop off those who were too high, put to death men of spirit, do not allow common meals, clubs, education and the like, prohibit literary or philosophical assemblies or other meetings for discussion, and take every means to prevent people from knowing each other, compel all persons staying in the city to appear in public and live at the gates so that he knows what everybody's doing. In general, know what each of his subjects says or does and employ spies to that end for the fear of informers puts prevents people from speaking their minds. And if they do speak their minds, they'll be more easily found out. Finally, make war foreign war in order that the subjects may have something to do and always be in want of a leader. Also, humble the subjects impoverish them. Aristotle says that this will provide the tyrant against the maintenance of a guard by the citizen and the people having to keep hard at work would be prevented from conspiring. The pyramids of Egypt afford an example of this policy. All of these works were alike intended to occupy the people, Aristotle says, and to keep them poor. Also empower women and slaves. The evil practices of the last and worst forms of democracy are all found in tyranny, such as the power given to women in their families and the hope that they'll inform against their husbands and the license which is allowed to slaves in order that they may betray their masters for slaves and women do not conspire against tyrants. And they're of course friendly to tyrants and also to democracies, since under them they have a good time. Also distrust friends, tyrants should distrust their friends because he knows that all men want to overthrow him and they are above all have the power and deny dignity and independence to everyone employ sycophants and bad men who love to be flattered. All of those are very traditional techniques of oppression, time worn and historically evidenced ways of maintaining tyrannies as long as tyrannies can be maintained. But Aristotle also presents this other mode of preserving tyrannies by imitating kingships. He says that the nature of this latter method may be gathered from a comparison of the causes which destroy kingdoms for as one mode of destroying kingly power is to make the office of the king more tyrannical, so the salvation of a tyranny is to make it more like the rule of a king. But if one thing the tyrant must be careful, he must keep power enough to rule over his subjects, whether they like him or not, for if he once gives this up, he gives up his tyranny. But though power must be retained as a foundation in all else the tyrant should act or appear to act in the character of a king. And Aristotle gives several specific suggestions about how a tyrant can act or appear to act like a king. First, pretend to care about public revenues and not wasting money. Second, collect taxes and require public services only for state purposes that are in the public interest. Third, appear dignified and seek to be viewed with reverence. Fourth, avoid sexual scandals, especially those involving the young or women within his family. Fifth, seek only moderate pleasures and do not conspicuously indulge in them. Sixth, adorn and improve the city with public works, buildings, temples, that sort of thing. Seventh, appear to be particularly earnest in the service of the gods, so put on a religious air. Eighth, distribute honors to worthy people himself, but make other people carry out the punishments so that the worthy people will like him even more. And those that have to be punished won't necessarily associate their punishment with the tyrant. Ninth, do not let any other individual person become predominant, but check powerful people with other powerful people and only reduce their power proportionately. Tenth, abstain from outrages and personal violence. And eleventh, lead both the upper and lower classes to think that you're acting to protect their interests. So to give a summary of the means of preserving tyranny, Aristotle says we've given a lot of details, but the general policy for the tyrant is obvious. First, he must show himself to his subjects in the light, not of a tyrant, but a steward and a king. He should also not appropriate what is theirs, but should be their guardian. He should be moderate, not extravagant in his way of life. He should win the notables by companionship, and the multitude or the many, the masses by flattery. For then his rule will of necessity be nobler and happier, because he will rule over better men whose spirits are not crushed over men to whom he himself is not an object of hatred, or of whom he is not afraid. His power to will be more lasting. His disposition his disposition will be virtuous or at least half virtuous, and he will not be wicked, but only half wicked. So this raises a question whether Aristotle is actually advocating that tyrants should moderate the rule and actually become like kings, in which case the tyrannical form of government would actually become a legitimate form of government that is a kingship. Or is he merely offering a kind of cynical advice here about how a tyranny may through deceit take on the appearance of a legitimate form of government in order to preserve its illegitimate power unethically. In light of the fact that he stresses that these means of deceit and the traditional means of oppression do not last very long, and in fact are not over the long run very effective, it seems that he's actually advocating a way that tyrants can become more moderate and more just, and thus have a more legitimate form of government, and that is the purpose of him providing a handbook of tyrants. History shows tyrannies to be short lived. This is detailed, detailed historical examples for this are given in chapter 12. In fact, Aristotle says that no forms of government are so short lived as oligarchy and tyranny. The historical examples show that the three longest lived tyrannies survived due to following a policy of moderation, which is similar to Aristotle's enlightened path as opposed to using the traditional techniques of oppression. So at Sikyan, the longest lived tyranny, the reason it was longest lived is that they treated their subjects with moderation and to a great extent observed the laws and in various ways gained the favor of the people by the care which they took of them. The causes of the preservation of the tyranny at Corinth, the second longest lived were similar. The third longest lived tyranny was that of Posistridus in Athens, but Aristotle points out that that tyranny was interrupted and not continuous. Other examples show that most tyrannies are actually fairly very short lived. So in light of those facts, it seems that Aristotle has provided his advice to actually encourage these tyrants to become more like kingships, more like legitimate form of government. Finally, at the end of chapter 12, Aristotle criticizes Plato's theory of constitutional change. So this is an extension of his criticism of Plato's theories that we read about in book two. Here Aristotle focuses specifically on the theory of constitutional change that Plato presents in Republic book nine. There Plato offers a linear and unidirectional model of decline that essentially proceeds from an aristocracy and through an oligarchy democracy down to tyranny. But Plato mentions no cause of change which peculiarly affects the first or the perfect state. He conceives that nature at certain times just produces bad men who will not submit to education. And in which later particular, he may very likely not be far wrong, says Aristotle, for there may well be some men who cannot be educated and made virtuous. But he points out that kind of cause affects every kind of constitution, not just the perfect state. And Plato also seems to imply that time itself will be the cause of change. But Aristotle points out some metaphysical problems with that view. Plato also gives no reason why the perfect state should transform into this kind of Spartan, democracy, military dictatorship, instead of into some other kind like a democracy or a tyranny, for they often do change into their opposites, nor does he explain why the Spartan kind of constitution becomes an oligarchy or an oligarchy, a democracy or a democracy, a tyranny. For Aristotle says, a democracy is even more likely to change into an oligarchy than a monarchy. He says, based on his own historical studies of these changes and his theory about how the changes take place. Plato doesn't also says nothing about what happens to tyrannies, but tyrannies can turn into any of the other kinds of government, including kingships, as we've just been discussing. Aristotle actually gives concrete advice about how that might happen. He also notes that tyrannies often turn into other kinds of tyrannies, but Plato says nothing of this. Also oligarchies are caused not just as Plato implies by the love of money and luxury, but because of the belief that the poor should not have an equal share of government. And oligarchies do not turn into democracies because of dissipation and debt, as if everyone were already rich. People may cause revolutions because they're wrong, wronged or insulted, regardless of their level of affluence. And Socrates speaks in Plato's Republic nine as if there's only one form of oligarchy, one form of democracy, etc. But as we have seen, there are in fact several forms of each showing and explaining that they're in detail that there are several forms of oligarchy and several forms of democracy is the major purpose of the next book book six. So we should turn to that next. Thank you.