 15 Progress of the idea of overland advance to the California's 1687-1765 The establishment of the Jesuit missions in Baja California was in conformity with government projects, but was far from being as thoroughgoing and extensive a settlement as the authorities could have wished. The basis of their desires, the strategic importance to the Californias with reference to New Spain, has already been alluded to several times, but in the face of the difficulties in the way of occupying the land, the impelling causes and the motive agencies of conquest had to be very strong in order to achieve the wish-for result. It is well at this point to get these factors clearly in mind before proceeding with the detail as to the governmental plans and activities. The mere lust or vain glory of conquest in itself without the inducement of profits had never appealed to the Spaniards in the Americas. Conquests involved expenditures, and the government had no funds for expeditions that promised no clearly recognizable advantage. The northern mystery still lived in the 18th century in the minds of many individuals, at least in its milder forms of wealth and precious metals, kingdoms of Caviera and Straits of Añan, though fountains of youth and Amazon islands were no longer urged seriously. But the government was utterly unmoved by these tales, or at any rate declined to open the royal purse in order to investigate them. A definite discovery of wealth in precious metals might indeed cause it to assume the expense of a conquest, but the evidences of discovery had to be convincing before it would start. Mere wealth and natural resources of the kind that would require time and capital to develop did not interest a state. Precious metal would yield immediate returns through the exaction of the royal fifth or through the sale of quicksilver, which was a royal monopoly, for extracting gold or silver from the oars, but Spain had other uses for her long-term capital than its employment in a distant frontier province of the Empire. There was one perennial cause for conquest, the fear lest some other European power might occupy lands that would threaten those already possessed by Spain, that is, the element of foreign danger, which had made its appearance as a factor in Spanish imperial councils when Drake's visit to the Pacific Coast had inaugurated the area of the aggressive defensive in California affairs. In this matter, Spain was unceasingly distrustful, and her fear was constant. Indeed, skepticism was thrown to the winds where foreign aggressions were concerned, and mere unauthenticated reports were sufficient to produce expensive efforts from which no financial profit was expected to be derived. Hardly a year passed without some governmental project on this account, but the advances between 1687 and 1769, except for the Jesuit activities in Baja California, were more in the way of improving the eventual line of communications than in taking over new territories. All of this was essential work. If the details are not dwelt upon here, it is not because the founding of a Presidio or the suppression of an Indian war in Sonora was a matter of no importance. What might have happened if incontrovertible evidence of foreign aggression in the Californians had been received is a question, but no such proofs were obtained in this period. Even there was, always, down to 1761 it was directed primarily against the French, but the English were at all times suspected and the fear of Russian encroachments began to be a factor from about the middle of the 18th century. In any event, the government had to have fit instruments to carry out its policies of defensive conquest. The relative importance of the military, the religious, and the civilian settler as agencies of conquest has already been discussed, but it should be emphasized that the conversion of Indians to Christianity is to be regarded distinctly as an agency rather than the cause of conquest. On this point, Father Engelhardt says, quote, The kings, indeed, desired the conversion of the Indians to Christianity and frequently declared this to be the chief aim of the conquest. Nevertheless, the object for which alone expenses were incurred was political, end quote. And again, quote, The man who presumed to guide the destinies of Spain cared not for the success of religion or the welfare of its ministers, except insofar as both could be used to promote political schemes, end quote. Anybody who has made an extensive study of the documents of the period will recognize that these statements are essentially true. Unquestionably, the conversion of the Indians was the principal object to the missionaries, but with the government it was merely a means to an end. If funds were provided for missions, it was because some political advantage was expected or an order that some danger to the state might be averted. As an agency of conquest, however, the work of the religious as already indicated was very important. One other important agency of conquest had to combine with these elements, which were permanently in the field, if a striking advance were to be made toward and into the Californias, especially in the absence of definite information of a foreign invasion to act as an exceptional spur to conquest. The difficulties to be overcome, geographical barriers, the insufficient funds which the government was willing to apply, the hindrances of graft and administrative cumbersomeness, the numerous Indians to be encountered, and the competition of Europeans, were so great that only a leader of extraordinary energy and ability could push ahead of the normal march of conquest. Salvatiera and Ugarte demonstrated the necessary qualities in Baja California, but no other great leader appeared until the arrival of Jose de Galvez in 1765. There were many, however, who paved the way for later conquests by their explorations of little known lands or by their propaganda in favor of an advance. Three factors should be considered then in dealing with the Spanish approach to Alta California, projects for an advance, including the activities of individuals and the plans of the government, the obstacles in the way of an advance, and the normal march of conquest by the land route through Sonora. The initial impulse for the Spanish advance over the last stretch of land that separated New Spain from California was given by father Eusebio Francisco Quino of the Jesuit order. In 1687, when he established the mission Dolores on one of the upper branches of the Sonora River, he took the first step toward bringing Primaria Alta within the frontier and extending the Spanish occupation to its Pacific coast objectives of Baja California and Monterey. His major interest, aside from the immediate problems connected with his missionary labors in Primaria Alta, was the discovery and development of a supply route to Baja California. As a member of the Otondo Colony of 1683 to 1685, as already stated, he had acquired an interest in the peninsula which thereafter he never ceased to have. He it was who inspired Salvatiera to make the attempt which had resulted in the Jesuit occupation of Baja California in 1697. After exploring the Gila and Colorado valleys, Quino became interested in the northern lands as well, hoping to reach Monterey. He trusted that the Manila galleon might be ordered to stop there and send goods overland to Sonora, and he grew to believe that a settlement should be founded on the Colorado River to serve as a base for operations against the Apaches and Mokies to the east and northeast and for the conquest of the Californians on the one hand and the lands intervening between Sonora and New Mexico on the other. These ideas constituted, in effect, the program of Spanish northwestward conquest for the next hundred years. The partial fulfillment of this plan by the Anza expeditions of 1775 to 1776 from Sonora to Monterey was to have tremendous consequences to the eventual advantage of California and the United States. Just as a failure of the Colorado Gila settlements in 1781 was to have equally important and, as it turned out, equally fortunate results. Quino is therefore one of the headlights in the list of those men who contributed to the founding of Spanish California. Not only did he possess these ideas himself, but he also disseminated them in his voluminous writings, including correspondence, memorials, and a volume recounting his experiences. In the quarter of a century following his appearance in Primaria, Alta, Quino and his companions pushed the frontier of mission work and the exploration of the Gila and the lower Colorado. By 1695, Quino had established a chain of missions up and down the valley of the Altar. His repeated journeys of exploration took him, among other places, to the borders of the Californias and enabled him to help clear up the geographical puzzles about those lands. Quino had come to America in the belief that California was a peninsula, but, under the influence of current teachings, had accepted the idea that it was an island. During his last journey to the Gila, however, he had been given some blue shells, such as he had seen on the western coast of Baja California and nowhere else. He now reasoned that California must, after all, be a peninsula and that it might be possible to find a land route over which to send supplies to Salvatiera's struggling missions. To test this view was the principal object of his later explorations. In 1700 he, for the first time, descended the Gila to its junction with the Colorado. In the following year, accompanied by Salvatiera, he tried to reach the head of the gulf by going up the coast from Sanoita. Failing in this, he went to the Gila junction, descended the Colorado nearly to its mouth, and crossed over on a raft. In 1702 he again descended the Colorado, this time reaching the gulf. He had now proved, to his own satisfaction at least, that California was a peninsula. Meanwhile, Quino and his brother Friars had pushed the missionary frontier to the Gila. In 1700 he founded the mission of San Javier del Bach, and within the next two years, those of Tumacacari and Guavali, all in the Santa Cruz Valley and within modern Arizona. Quino's exploring tours were also itinerant missions, and in the course of them he baptized and taught in numerous villages up and down the Gila and Colorado and throughout Primaria, Alta. Quino had blazed the trail. The record of the next half century, after the completion of his own labors in 1711, amounts to accumulation of achievements along the lines that he had already laid down. Fathers Augustine Campos, Juan de Ugarte, Ignacio Keller, Jacobo Settlemeyer, and Fernando Consag of the Jesuit Order carried on explorations in the Colorado Gila country and in the Gulf of California. The most important result of their work was the definite proof obtained by Ugarte and Consag that there was no straight separating the California's from the mainland. Development of overland routes for further settlements and the carrying of supplies was therefore possible. Noteworthy, too, were the problems in imaginary geography arising from Settlemeyer's journey of 1744 when he ascended the Colorado to Bill Williams Fork. Fears arose, lest the French, and after 1763 the English might be near the sources of the Colorado. Settlemeyer had also heard that there was a certain Rio Amarillo a little further on beyond where he had gone and that it flowed westward out of the Colorado. People wondered whether this might be the Carmelo, which emptied near Monterey, a tiny stream which Vizcaino had exaggerated to the proportions of a mighty river. The proximity of the French or of the English and the water courses by which they might advance against New Spain were used henceforth as leading arguments for an occupation of the Colorado-Hila country and Monterey. The names of those who fell heir to Quino's ideas are Legion, the Jesuits Jose de Ortega in 1754, Andres Burrell 1757, and Francisco Javier Alegre 1767, published books in which were set forth similar arguments to those that Quino had made. The same things came out in the memorials of Campos, Settlemeyer, Escobar, head of the Jesuits in New Spain, Pedro Altamirano, head of the order in Spain, and Juan Antonio Balthasar, also of the Jesuit order, and of other individuals such as Captain Juan Bautista de Anza, father of the Anza who headed the expeditions of 1774 and 1775-76 to Alta California, Bishop Benito Crespo Puebla, a certain Jose de Mesa, Captain Fernando Sanchez, and another military officer named Pedro de la Vaquera. Royal officials in Mexico City and Spain were distinctly interested. Nearly every viceroy and the fiscales of the Aodencia of Mexico and the Council of the Indies gave these projects their serious consideration, and so also did Spanish ministers of state, such as Cardinal Albaroni, Fernando Triviño, and the Marques de Ensenada, and Julián de Ariaga. Footnote, the fiscales were individuals attached to the Aodencias and the Councils whom matters were referred to for an opinion. They were lawyers, but their advice was not confined to the legal affairs. In practice, during the 18th century, they were among the most important individuals in the Spanish administrative system, whether in Spain or in the colonies. As a general rule, the opinions of the fiscales were followed verbatim. Particularly was this true of the fiscales of the Council of the Indies. In footnote. King Philip V was so much interested that he attended meetings of the Council of the Indies in which these matters were discussed. Among the outstanding memorialists of the other government officials were Jose Gallardo, Vecitador and Sonora in 1748 to 1749, and the Marques de El Camira, an official of the Aodencia of Mexico. It should be stated that very few of these individuals recognized that they were following in Kino's footsteps, but the fact that so many of them reached virtually the same conclusions, though independently, proves how important the matter of an advance to the California's by way of the Gila and Colorado was regarded. It will not be possible to give in detail the views of these men, but a reference to some of their recommendations may well be made. The entire period under consideration was filled with royal decrees evincing interest in the extension of conquests in the Californias and in the occupation of the Colorado and Gila basins. A specially notable was one of January 29th, 1716, for which Albaroni, then dominant in Spanish politics, is said to have been responsible, although it is likely that he was influenced by the memorials of Kino, whose ideas appear in the decree. The decree itself was like many another, asking information as to the progress of conversions in the Californias, referring to the great importance of promoting the spiritual conquest there, and ordering the viceroy to fulfill the degree of July 26th, 1708, requiring him to take steps in the matter. At the same time, orders were given to promote the advancement of the Sonora missions and verbal instructions were issued to the viceroy to explore the Pacific coasts and to found colonies and procedios there. In addition to these colonies, Albaroni planned, quote, in like manner to advance the Spanish domain with the new settlements in the vast unknown territories to the north of Sonora from the Gila and Colorado rivers onward, end quote. The last name settlements might send their products to the new colonies on the coast and receive in exchange what they needed, he argued. These regions were not to rely on New Spain and Europe for trade, but were to develop commerce with the Philippines. Albaroni was not left in peace to work out his ideas, and a few years later, after a stormy career in power, he found himself in exile from Spain. The viceroy called a junta, however, to act upon the decree of 1716, and all but one member approved a plan to found at least one colony on the west coast to the California's. Footnote, the junta de guiera y real hacienda of the viceroyalty was one of the most important institutions in Spanish colonial administration. Its consent was necessary for the expenditure of royal funds, and it was often called upon to deliberate whether a given project should be ordered or not. It was, however, very human in its workings in that a viceroy could override the law and dominate or even dispense with the junta, if he so desired. Number of members varied, but it was usually about 10 or 12. Most of them held administrative posts connected with financial affairs and were in the capacity of the subordinates of the viceroy. Ordinarily, the viceroy welcomed the councils of the junta and followed them, just as on other matters, he accepted the suggestions of the fiscal. Special juntas of experts in a given matter were also called from time to time, but these bodies were purely consultative. In footnote, the member in opposition was a Jesuit, and his views, supported by others of his order, were allowed to prevail. The Jesuits feared that the new colonies would prove a detriment to the work of conversion, then being carried on by them in Baja, California. The next capital moment along the line of the overland advance came as a result of a most extraordinary incident. In 1736, a remarkable silver mine was discovered at or near a place called Arizona, or Arizona, just south of the border of the present day state of Arizona. The more usual name for the mine at that time was Bolas de Plata, Balls of Silver, or Plunch Estate Plata, Nuggets of Silver, because the precious metal was found in balls or nuggets of almost pure silver. These were on or near the surface, and were of immense size, some of them weighing a ton or more. Accounts differed, but there were several stating that the largest nugget weighed 3,500 pounds. One of the reputed finders, Fermin, spoke of a 4,000 pound nugget and said that there were many of about 500 pounds. There was an immediate rush of miners to that spot. Captain Anza of Fronteras interfered with them, claiming that the Bolas belonged properly to the king. According to the law, one fifth of the silver accrued to the king if the discovery were a mine, but if it were a hidden treasure, the king was entitled to all. Anza claimed that if it were not a hidden treasure, it was at least a criadero, or growing place of silver, and therefore belonged to the national treasury. The viceroy reversed Anza's decision, but the royal decree of 1741 sustained the Fronteras captain. It is doubtful whether Anza could have held back the miners if the mines had proved to be extensive, and it is said that his interference was not very effective anyway, the greater part of the wealth going to the discoverers. Anza himself stated that he had difficulty in saving any for the king. Although the region was rich in mineral wealth of the ordinary type, the Bolas seemed to have been but a superficial deposit, and nothing is heard of them after 1741. Nevertheless, the Bolas incident did lead to an official consideration of Northwestward conquest by way of the Colorado and Gila rivers. The Bolas de Plata were a definitely proved item of wealth, which was infinitely more important than, for example, a fabled mountain of gold. Where so much silver had been found, there was good reason to expect that more existed. It was this incident that gave rise to the memorials of Anza, Bishop Crespo, and Mesa, recommending an extension of the Spanish conquest. Writing to the viceroy on January 14th, 1737, about the discovery of the Bolas, Anza said, quote, the discovery of these balls of silver, most excellent, sir, an unprecedented wealth under the circumstances and right at the limits of Christian conquest, has come so like a bolt from the blue that many learned, zealous and prudent men deem it a sign from the ever merciful God, author of all things that we should push farther into the interior. Though indeed the quantity of wealth discovered is not overwhelming in amount, it is in such form that it is strong evidence that greater riches may be found by which the reduction of souls may be brought about, just as has happened elsewhere in both Americas. I am aware of the fact that many projects which were proposed in entire earnestness and former years have not been successful on account of the difficulties experienced in practice in various provinces and in different cases, and much money has been expended. But in order that there shall be a beginning, and here my project begins, of a discovery up to the Colorado River and some leagues beyond, it need not cost much. The funds can be procured perhaps from pious individuals and I shall contribute horses, cattle, mules and small articles as gifts for the Indians. This project is in my opinion the best way to bring about what shall in the future seem desirable and as the inhabitants of the Colorado Gila country are industrious, it is to be presumed that it will not be difficult to reduce them. It would be otherwise if they lived by hunting with a bow and arrow and upon the wild fruits for it would then be almost impossible to conquer them as I know from experience. End quote. Anza also quoted a number of reports of early explorers and reviewed the evidence for belief in the wealth of the North. The vast ruin on the Gila known as the Casa Grande and an even greater one in Chihuahua built, he thought, by Aztec kings in the course of their migration southward were mentioned by him in support of this belief. Indians of the Gila had told Jesuit visitors of the existence of Quicksilver in the North. Anza had something to say too of the island California, of the straight through the continent and of the seven cities, Grand Teguayo and Caviera and as usual as already indicated the vast number of Indians awaiting conversion was induced as an argument for an expedition. Favorable action was taken on Anza's proposal in 1737, 1738, both in Mexico City and in Spain but before matters had reached the stage of an expedition the Fromteris captain lost his life in 1739 in a battle with the Apaches. It was in any event too early for the execution of this plan with the limited resources Spain would have been willing to apply. The situation in Sonora was not yet favorable for an advance unless the government were ready to make an extraordinary effort or unless a man of exceptional ability should appear on the scene to make slender means serve great ends. Important action was taken however though not precisely what Anza had proposed. The government's hand in Sonora was strengthened through the founding of two precedios and the day of land communications with Alta California was advanced in just the ratio that contributed to the peace of regions along the line of March thereto from New Spain. Meanwhile, the government never lost sight of the project of occupying the California's through the means of Spanish settlements as well as by strengthening the Jesuit missions. George Anson, commander of an English naval vessel had contributed to this attitude on the part of Spain for he had appeared off the west coast of New Spain in 1742 and had subsequently captured the galleon in the Philippines. This period was also one of great activity on the part of the French. At least the Spanish government was much worried lest they should push their conquests to the headwaters of the Colorado and down that river to the Gulf of California. The discussions eventually came to revolve about five memorials drawn up in 1751 by Fernando Sanchez, a captain of Queer Sears in Sinaloa and Sonora, four of them combined in one document and addressed to the king and the fifth directed to Junta which had been called in Mexico City. The first three aimed at the internal development of Sinaloa and Sonora as the necessary prerequisite to an advance of the frontiers. Sanchez recommended the secularization of the missions in Sinaloa and southern Sonora, the removal of unruly elements, undesirable whites and some of the malcontent tribes such as the Ceres, Pimas and Apaches, especially the last name, from the province and a better provision for agricultural and mineral development. Footnote, the secularization of the missions meant the removal from missionary rule and the succession of the secular clergy to spiritual authority. The Indians were emancipated from economic control and given the lands of the missions. In theory, it indicated that the conversion and civilization of the native were reasonably complete. In fact, it meant that the region in question had ceased to have the characteristics of a frontier province, end quote. The fourth memorial, looking toward conquests in the region of the Colorado and Gila, contained the matter of chief interest to Sanchez, who devoted the letter with which he remitted the four representations to a summary mainly of the fourth. In this letter, he said, quote, Sir, Francis secretly taking great strides to extend her settlements to the frontiers of ours, encircling us from our borders on the east until now she finds herself along that of the north in the vicinity of New Mexico. And she has only to turn slightly to the west to come upon the South Sea, the Pacific Ocean, where the Carmelo River empties. It is very important to your crown to resolve upon the founding of strong settlements in the regions of the Colorado and Gila. When this is done, it will serve three ends. One, to prevent the French conquest from ever penetrating to the South Sea. Second, the great advantage it will be as a base of operations for our conquests along those nations of Indians in the regions of the Colorado and Gila. And third, so that we vassals of your majesty shall occupy Alta California, the richest and most abundant land that this vast kingdom contains. In this way, it will follow that within a few years, it will be necessary to place a viceroy in San Juan, Sonora, or the royal mining camp in the city of Xihuahua whose jurisdiction shall comprise the governments of Sonora, New Mexico, Nueva Vizcaya, and the conquests of the Colorado River. According to this arrangement, the troops in those parts will be governed by quick and more efficacious measures to the advantage of your royal service. And in course of time, many other favorable considerations will accrue. End quote. Footnote. The matter in brackets was supplied from the original of the memorial which combines the four representations of the king in a document of 114 pages. End footnote. In the memorial proper, Sanchez referred to a westward branch of the Colorado which might prove to be the Carmelo, thus furnishing the French with an easy route to Monterey. In the document that he directed to the junta, Sanchez urged an expedition to explore a route to the sea at the point where the Carmelo emptied, though the Colorado River settlements should first be made secure. And he added that an establishment on the Carmelo would be useful both for the Manila galleon and as a check against foreign enemies, particularly the French. The French were very near the mother range of the American mountains, and if they ascended that, they would find the Pacific before them. The Spanish government now displayed more interest than ever before. Jose de Goyaneche, fiscal of the Council of the Indies, said of the Sanchez proposals that they seemed to him to be quote, so important, especially that of the prompt conquest in settlement on the Colorado River because of the grave damage that may be occasioned to the kingdom of New Spain and its provinces by any post of vantage that may advance the French nation, that it will be fitting to charge the viceroy to devote his primary attention to the conquest and settlement which Don Fernando Sanchez proposes. In as much as by the conquest and dislodgement of the Seri, Tiberon, Carrizo, and Salonaro Indians, the way to the Colorado and Gila rivers has become free, end quote. The Indians referred to were all resident in Sonora and it had recently been reported that Governor Ortiz, that is Diego Ortiz Barria, often referred to as Barria, had overwhelmed them in 1750. In fact, Ortiz's conquests had far from removed the fangs of these enemies. The Council of the Indies adopted the view of Goyaneche and proceeded to discuss the advantages of occupying Monterey, if only to forestall the French. Meanwhile, the same interest was being shown in Mexico City. One new note appears in a voluminous memorial of 1751 by the Marques de Altamira. He pointed out, correctly, that the problems of occupying the Colorado Gila country could not be separated from those at the frontier as a whole, from the California's to Texas, the conditions of which he reviewed. This, to be sure, was not the first time that Spaniards had grasped the unity of the frontier as a result of the widespread Indian wars. It was this idea that it caused the government to send out Pedro de Rivera in the years 1724 to 1728 to inspect the precedios of the whole northern frontier. Altamira's service lay in pointing out that this problem affected projects of conquest to the northwest, as well as that of directly defending what Spain already possessed. The bulk of his memorial, however, was devoted to the proposed conquest by way of the Colorado and Gila. He favored the founding of settlements there as a nucleus for an advance to the California's and in time to New Mexico. Matters seemed ripe for the extraordinary effort which could have overcome the hindrances to conquest when a revolt to the Pimas of Primaria Alta in 1751 cooled Spanish ardor. On hearing of this, the Fiscal of the Council recommended in 1752 that action on Sanchez's proposal should be postponed until Sonora were restored to peace, and such was the decision of the Council. Several additional precedios were established in Sonora, however. Furthermore, Sanchez had formulated a plan which, with the addition of the suggestion contained in Altamira's memorial, became the program of the government during the next 30 years, though Sanchez's ideas and the credit, therefore, were taken over by Jose de Galas. But Sanchez, in turn, had merely fitted Quino's program to the new circumstances of his own times. After 1752, the authorities gave their principal attention during the next 20 years to the question of establishing good order in Sonora. But the plans for northwestward advance were at no time given up. Between 1753 and 1761, the spur of the French conquest toward New Mexico and the Pacific Coast was more active than ever. In 1757, Father Andres Buriel published anonymously the three-volume Noticia de la California, which has usually been ascribed to Father Miguel Venegas. In addition to the old ideas of the Jesuits as to the necessity of developing the land route to Baja California around the head of the Gulf, Buriel stated more clearly than any other writer ever has why Baja California, the most disagreeable, barren and wretched country in the world, should have been a matter of so much concern to the Spanish crown and the Jesuits. It was because of its location, said Buriel, that the conquest of California had long been preferred to that of any other American country. If the peninsula were unoccupied, the whole western coast of New Spain, quote, from Acapulco to the Colorado River would be unsafe, especially if some European power should erect colonies, forts, and procedos on the coast of the California's, unquote. This consideration led him to desire that the Spanish missions of Sonora and the California's should be connected with those of New Mexico and extended beyond the Gila and Colorado to San Diego, Monterey, and even the reputed Ajuelar's River in Alta, California. Almost as important in its effects as Buriel's suggestions in themselves was the notice which the work attracted in European countries. It was almost at once translated into the leading tongues of Western Europe, and the English translator showed a smug appreciation of the great strategic advantages England would enjoy if his countrymen might discover the Northwest passage and establish themselves in Alta, California, a land of, quote, a pleasant climate and fruitful soil from whence they, the English, may with certainty command the most valuable branches of commerce that have been hitherto discovered, unquote. With the signing of the two treaties of 1761 and 1762, known jointly as the Family Compact, the peril from the French disappeared as France and Spain then leaked themselves together in opposition to England. Danger from the English almost immediately succeeded to the same or even greater place in Spanish councils. For in 1763, England added the vast American possessions of France to her already large colonial domain. England was also a far more threatening enemy by sea than France had been. Nevertheless, it was natural to expect that less attention would be paid to an advance of the Spanish conquest toward Alta, California than in former years. Spain's crushing defeat in the war of 1762 to 1763 against England and her preparations for a renewal of the contest took about all in the way of funds that Spain could get together. Furthermore, it had by this time been proved that Sonora was not in a sufficiently settled state to permit of a normal and reasonably easy advance. So once again Spain confined her efforts for a while to strengthening her garrisons in that rich but restless province along the northwestern border of the kingdom of New Spain. It remains to give brief consideration to those factors on which the permanence of the settlements eventually founded in Alta, California was in fact to depend. The obstacles or more particularly the hostile Indians that stood in the way of an establishment of communications between Sonora and Alta, California and the internal development of Sinaloa and Sonora which were in time to provide the more northwesterly province with a sinews of continuous existence. Indian wars were a continual factor tending to retard the development of the frontier provinces and thereby to check the Spanish northwestward advance. The Apaches began their raids into Sonora before the close of the 17th century, though northern Nueva Vizcaya, modern Chihuahua to the east was their principal object of attack. In 1695 there was a serious revolt to the Pimas of Primaria Alta and in 1699 the wars with the Saris in the region between the Yaqui and Sonora rivers commenced. It would be profitless to recite the many wars of the next half century or more. Hardly a year passed without at least one military campaign and frequently there were serious outbreaks. At every crucial moment in plans for northwestward advance the Indians by the revolts were sure to provide the authorities with unanswerable arguments as to the untimeliness of the projects. In 1737, when Anza of Fronteras made his suggestion of an expedition to the Gila and Colorado, the Pimas of the coast revolted and took refuge in the Serra Prieto at almost impregnable mountain stronghold in the vicinity of Weimas. Anza subdued them, but soon had to turn about to meet the Apaches, losing his life in the battle against them in 1739. In 1740 to 1741 the Miles and Yaqui's in the south rose against the mission system to which they had for many years been reduced. Indian wars in Sonora were even more prominent in the period of the Sanchez representations. Governor Ortiz had to undertake a campaign against the Serres in 1750. Alluding to this in a letter of 1751, the viceroy referred to the Serres and their neighbors as the disturbing factor which for over a century had proved a hindrance to further exploration of the Gila and Colorado rivers and to the establishment of communications between the California's and the mainland. Another letter of the same year made mention of northeastern Sonora as one of the regions where the Apaches were want to commit their depredations. Then came the Pima revolt of 1751 which caused the shelving of Sanchez's projects. All of the missions, villages, mining caps and ranches in the northwest were destroyed and two missionaries and perhaps a hundred other whites lost their lives. Troops were rushed to the scene and the rebellion was crushed in 1752 but it was 20 years before prosperity returned to Primaria-Alta. The Serres had risen again in 1751 and from that time until 1771 they were almost constantly at war with the Spaniards taking refuge when hard-pressed in the Cerro Prieto. Apache warfare was equally continuous and annoying. Indeed, for the frontier provinces as a whole it was far worse for it ranged from Sonora to Texas. One of the best descriptions of Apache warfare was provided by Pedro de la Baquera who probably in 1760 or 1761 petitioned the king for a right to make explorations in the vicinity of Arizobac and for the command of a Presidio in that region. This petition he accompanied by three memorials which make it manifest that he was a direct heir of Sanchez's ideas but as no action seems to have been taken upon them they need not be discussed except as they bear upon the Apaches. The memorial about the Apaches which shows a keen knowledge of frontier conditions in accounting for the failure to conquer these Indians has been summarized in a recent work as follows. Quote, the Apaches when attacked habitually retired to the mountains which were inaccessible to the Presidio troops. This was due not merely to the fact that the latter were cavalrymen but to the nature of the soldiers themselves. Most of them were mulatos, a very low character without ambition and unconquerably unwilling to travel on foot as was necessary in a mountain attack. Moreover, their weapons carried for so short a distance that the Apaches were wont to get just out of range and to make open jest of the Spaniards. Furthermore, some Presidio captains were more interested in making a personal profit out of their troops arising from the fact that part of the latter's wages was paid in effects than they were in subjecting the enemy Nor did the various captains work in harmony when on campaigns. Continuance of the Apaches in Apacharia was in the highest degree prejudicial. Not only were they a hindrance to conquests toward the Colorado and in the direct route between Sonora and New Mexico but also they endangered regions already held by Spain leading subjected Indians either from fear or from natural inclination to abandon missions and villages and whether an alliance with the Apaches are by themselves to commit the same kind of atrocities as the Apaches did. La Bacata recommended that 200 mountain fusiliers of Spanish blood be recruited in Spain equipped among other things with guns of long range and dispatched to New Spain for service against the Apaches. These men under a disinterested leader would quickly subject the Apaches and might then be given lands in that region. Being of a higher stamp than the precedial soldiers they would be eager to develop the lands and would be a permanent source of strength to that country, end quote. In fine, expeditions against the Apaches accomplished little as the Indians could never be brought to a general engagement. Often the Apaches took advantage of the expeditions against them to raid the country about the precedios, thus deprived of its usual guard. It is impossible to estimate the damages suffered in Sonora, writes Buriel, especially since the death of the brave Captain Anza in villages, settlements, farms, roads, pastures, woods and mines, many of which have been abandoned on that account although very rich. Even the mission Indians could no longer be controlled and the Jesuits feared to discipline them lest it should provoke a revolt. The Jesuits had very greatly lost influence since the Pima Revolt of 1751, though this was in a large measure a reflection of the world campaign being waged against them and their conflicts with the military and the settlers had now reached the proportions of a serious problem in itself, affecting the good order of Sonora. The missions themselves showed the effects for a few converts were obtained after 1751. The old and the infirm and the women and children resided at the missions, but the able-bodied men rarely came in unless impelled by hunger or by fear of the Apaches. They remained in the mountains or aided the Ceres and stirring up trouble. Meanwhile, demands of the white settlers for secularization of the missions became more insistent and by 1755, 22 missions of Sinaloa had been taken away from the Jesuits and placed under the authority of the Bishop of Durango. A review of the internal conditions of Sinaloa and Sonora shows that at no time were the affairs in such a state as to warrant an extension of the frontiers unless a more than ordinary effort were to be made. Nevertheless, there was much progress. By 1763, Sinaloa had undergone adjustment to white rule and could no longer be considered a frontier province. Much the same thing could be said for southern Sonora and part of the Sonora River Valley. The advances to the Northwest did not need to be stayed on account of these regions. Northwestern Sonora and the Primaria Alta, though rich in mineral wealth, were far from being adjusted to an orderly state. Either governmental effort or else an unusual impulse to settlement, such as rich discoveries in precious metals, was needed there. The same thing was true of the coast regions where the Ceres and other Malcontents live, but there the problem was in a major more serious as wealth in gold and silver did not exist, wherefore there was no great lure to attract white colonists. Indeed, as already stated, the line of conquest in the Northwest had always followed that of mineral wealth. It would seem, therefore, that the situation in Sonora was not hopelessly bad if only the government would exert itself to conquer the Ceres and repulse the Apaches, but this it did not do at this time. Consequently, the authorities were frequently memorialized as to the best methods of saving the province and many of the writers showed a great deal of pessimism and despondency. Footnote. Internal conditions of Sinaloa and Sonora are well illustrated by the statistics of population obtained by Bishop Tamarón while on the diocesan tour from 1759 to 1763. At that time, there were in the two provinces 32,000 of Spanish or mixed blood and 31,000 Indians professing Christianity of whom 25,000 lived in missions. There were 50 missions, most of them in Sonora. The number of unconverted Indians was very large but no estimate of them was made. The greater part of the white population lived in Sinaloa. White settlements were the rule there, the exception being a few Indian villages along the coast where there was not the inducement of mineral wealth to draw the Spanish settler. There were some considerable towns in Sinaloa. San Felipe de Sinaloa had a white population of 3,500. Fuerte, otherwise San Juan de Montescaros, 1886. Rosario, 2459. San Sebastián, 2,500. Culiacán, 2216. And Mazatlán, 966. These places had nearly half the total white population of the two provinces. Secularization of the missions had taken place in most of Sinaloa. Although the Jesuits were more numerous than the secular clergy, but they usually served as parish priests, the mission system prevailing but little. Much of this change came as a result of the Sanchez memorials having occurred prior to Tamarón's visit. There were probably not many unconverted Indians in Sinaloa, or if they were, they caused no trouble. In Astamuri, as that part of the Sonora below the Yaqui was then called, conditions were almost as good as in Sinaloa. Alamos had a population of 3,400 of white or mixed race. Bayorca, 1,004. Rio Chico, 1,400. Trinidad de Plata, 715. And Sollopa, or San Antonio de la Huerta, 300. All of these were mining towns. Farther north, in the mountain districts near the Sonora Valley, there were a number of mining towns at considerable distances from a presidio, such as Aravici, Sahuripa, Nakori, and Arispe. In northeastern Sonora, where the Apaches were want to make raids, most of the white population was grouped around presidios there and nearby in Nueva Vizcaya. There being 484 at Fronteras. Near the coast, where the Ceres and their allies were numerous and precious metals not plentiful, there were no whites. The case with Primaria Alta was a little better due to the existence of gold and silver. There were eight missions, Suamka, Guelavi, Bach, Sarik, Tubutama, Ati, Caborca, and San Ignacio, and three presidios, Taranate, Dubai, and Altar. Subsidiary to these were a number of lesser settlements. In the mission districts, there were 4,223 Indians and 348 whites, the latter being at the mining camps of Guelavi, Santa Barbara, Buena Vista, Arizona, and Santa Anya. At the presidios, there were no Indians, but there were 1,117 whites, including garrisons of 50 men at each presidio. All of the white settlements of Primaria Alta were within easy reach of the presidios, without which they could not have existed in footnote. Nevertheless, incontrovertible evidence is at hand that if conditions in Sonora were lacking in stability, it was because the government would not go to the expense or rather reduce its profits in order to apply a remedy. The principal financial institution of the government in its dealings with the frontier provinces was the Rial Caja Royal Treasury of Guadalajara. A study of its operations over the period from 1743 to 1781 shows that it sent 86% of its receipts to the parent Caja Rial in Mexico, or occasionally small sums to others. Of this amount, from half to a third was subsequently returned to provide for the expense of the frontier provinces. The rest, from 40 to 60% of the total, was either sent to Spain or at any rate used elsewhere than in the provinces of origin. Sonora, to be sure, was not responsible for any great share of this profit. But if a larger portion of the total might have been applied in that province, it would not have been very difficult to overcome the obstacles that were withholding the Northwestward advance. The reason for Spain's policy is not hard to find. During these years, she was straining every nerve to cope with European problems and especially to defend herself from the imperialism of England. Thus, many other objects which were desirable in themselves had to be sacrificed and the extension of her frontier beyond the Gila and Colorado to Alta California was one of them. Spain's choice, then, was only one more of the myriad of factors tending to hold back the occupation of the rich northern province and to delay its populist development. And all this played into the hands of the as yet unborn United States. End of chapter 15. Chapter 16. A History of California, the Spanish Period. This LibriVox recording is in the public domain. Chapter 16. Jose de Galvez. The coming of Jose de Galvez as Vesitador General of New Spain marks a turning point in the history of Northwestward advance. In him had appeared the long needed, forceful, energetic man who was able to overcome obstacles in the way of conquest and extend the frontiers to the north. Footnote. The Vesitador, or visitor, was one of the most typical of Spanish administrative agencies. The Vesitador, or visit, is defined by Joaquin Escriche, a leading authority on Spanish law, as follows. Quote. The act of jurisdiction through which some superior informs himself of the proceedings of ministers of lower rank or of subjects or of the state of affairs in the districts of his jurisdiction, going in person to investigate or sending some other to do it in his name. End quote. The official making the Vesitador was called a Vesitador, or if engaged in a Vesitador of major importance, a Vesitador General. The Vesitador was frequently employed in the Spanish colonies in military, civil and religious affairs, and for purposes both great and small. No two Vesitas were exactly alike for every one depended on the particular circumstances which the Vesita was designed to meet. Nevertheless, all proceeded on much the same lines, and the Vesitador ordinarily superseded all other powers and authority within the jurisdiction of his Vesita. End footnote. To be sure, the primary aims of his Vesita were financial, with a view to increasing the revenues of the crown, and this caused him to give the larger share of his attention to the already well-settled parts of the vice-royalty. But at no time during the six years of his stay, 1765 to 1771, did he fail to show a moist extraordinary interest in the problems having to do with the advance to the California's. And some two years of his time, from 1768 to 1770, were devoted mainly to those questions. True, even in these matters, he was probably interested chiefly in the possibilities from the standpoint of revenues, believing that the wealth of the frontier provinces and the California's could be developed to the advantage of the royal income if peace might be established and an extension of the frontiers obtained. Perhaps there was just a shade of something quixotic in his occupation of Alta California in 1769. But if so, his tilting at windmills justified itself in the light of history, for the name of Jose de Galvez would almost have passed out of memory in the Americas, had it not been for the expeditions he sent out to take possession of San Diego and Monterey. Who was this man who now appeared as an outstanding figure in the affairs of the California's? Jose de Galvez was an Andalusian Spaniard, possessing many of the lively traits of his native province, together with an energy and ability which had enabled him to rise from obscurity to a position of power and influence. He was born on January 2nd, 1720, at the village of Macharraviaya, near Velezmalaga, on the southern coast of Spain. His family was noble and of ancient lineage, being of the rank Ijos Dalgo or Hidalgo. But that meant little in the land where the nobility of this grade was numbered by the hundreds of thousands. If there were others of lower degree and poor to the verge of poverty, the Galvez family was at least not well endowed with worldly goods and Jose and his brothers were simple country boys without opportunities for education and advancement, eking out a living through tending the paternal flocks. When Jose was only 11 or 12 years old, he had the good fortune to attract the attention of the Bishop of Malaga who took him to Malaga to educate him for the priesthood. It was this that gave Galvez his start in life. With the aid of his clerical sponsors, he at length became enrolled as a student in the University of Salamanca where he began the study of law as stewing the holy calling for which his first patron had wished to educate him. From the university he went to Madrid to practice law. For many years he was inconspicuous but eventually opportunity again knocked at his door apparently as a result of his finding a new and powerful patron. The second wife was a French woman and through her Galvez became acquainted with the most eminent Frenchman in Madrid. His own knowledge of the French tongue and his grace and facility of expression helped him to retain the friendships he had made and it was thus that he became the legal counselor of a secretary in the French Embassy. Utilizing his opportunities in this capacity, he attracted the notice of the Spanish minister of state, the Marquez de Grimaldi, who employed him as one of his secretaries. It was in 1765 when Galvez was in his 45th year that the great chance of his life came to him. A visitation of New Spain for the purpose of increasing the revenues from that kingdom had been determined upon but there was some difficulty in finding a suitable individual to do the work. Several appointments were considered or even made but with the death of the most recent appointee in 1764 the post was still unfilled. It was then that the name of Galvez was brought forward and on February 20th, 1765, he was named Vecita de Hener al of New Spain. In the month of July of the same year he reached Vatacruz and soon afterward took up the work of his visitation. With his manifold activities in the general affairs of the viceroyalty, such as his visitation at Veracruz and Acapulco, his institution of the tobacco monopoly, his expedition to Guanajuato and the expulsion of the Jesuits, this volume has no concern. At the outset he was handicapped by the opposition of the viceroy crueas but the latter was superseded in 1766 by the French descendent Marques Francisco de Croix with whom Galvez was able to work in entire harmony. Indeed, they were the best of friends and it was Galvez rather than Croix who must be considered the virtual ruler of New Spain during Croix's incumbency, 1766 to 1771. Of special concern then is the character of this very human individual to whom the Californians owe so much. Enough has already been said about his ability. This had to combine, however, with certain other traits ordinarily regarded as weaknesses in order to produce the expeditions to Alta California. Just as in later years the same traits served to diminish the value of his work from the standpoint of his own times. Galvez had risen from nothing, partly through currying favor, and had developed an insatiable personal ambition and a kind of egotism, which, if it did not express itself in his ordinary daily speech, was always at hand for the purposes of feathering his own nest. He was also capable of malignant vindictiveness against those who opposed him or belittled his achievements. On the other hand, he was amiable in personality and in some respects generous to a fault. His concern for the advancement of his own relatives, townsmen, and personal friends, if indeed it evidenced a certain kindness and gratitude, was nevertheless of the worst sort of nepotism and not altogether dissociated from what would at the present time be termed graft. It seems likely that Galvez's desire to win personal distinction entered into his plans for conquests in the Californias. He knew from Buriel's noticia of the importance of such conquests, and he also knew that no other region offered him a better opportunity. Therefore, he bent his energies to the accomplishment of this task using methods that savored distinctly of indirection, some instances of which will be given in the course of this in the next chapter, as well as those which were less open to objection. His enterprise was blessed with success, and but for the serious illness of the Vesitador, it would have been an even more striking achievement than it turned out to be. The expeditions of 1769 made use of the sea route from the mainland to Baja California and from there in two divisions, by sea again and up the peninsula, to Alta California. Nobody more than Galvez knew that this was a departure from the normal line of advance by the overland route through Sonora, but the Vesitador felt sure of his own measures in Sonora would soon link up the Alta California extremity with that province. Almost from the moment of his arrival in New Spain, Galvez began to give attention to the problems of the far northwest. Largely through his instrumentality, plans were made in the fall of 1765 for an expedition to Sonora to suppress the Indian insurrectionaries there. At his own request, Galvez was entrusted with a task of obtaining money to finance the expedition, for there was nothing in the royal treasury that the government was willing to devote for this purpose. The funds were to be raised by voluntary subscriptions, troops were to be enlisted, and ships were to be built on the Pacific coast to carry the Spanish forces to Sonora. Once the Indians were defeated, the ground was to be held by the founding of a number of settlements, the human material for which was to be drawn from the hopelessly poor or undesirable elements of the cities. Galvez's quarrel with Creus delayed fulfillment of these plans, but after Croix's arrival in 1766, they were again taken up. The king, meanwhile, had given a reluctant consent, for he did not share in Galvez's belief in the efficacy of a formal expedition or of the particular kind of colonists it was proposed to send. Nevertheless, a force of 350 men was recruited and placed under the command of Colonel Domingo Elizondo, who might also count on enough more Spanish soldiers and Indian auxiliaries in Sonora to swell his numbers to more than a thousand. In April 1767, Elizondo and his men left Mexico City for Tepec, where they were to be quartered until the boats could be gotten ready to take them to Sonora. Not until March 1768 did they at length disembark at Wymas ready to begin the campaign, that the expedition was undertaken at all had been due to Galvez, for there were few who shared his enthusiasm. The visitador, however, had left no stone unturned to gain his ends. A letter by him to Governor Juan Pineda of Sonora in the fall of 1766 shows the trickery he was willing to employ, even to deceive his good friend Croix. After giving some inexpensive flattery to Pineda, Galvez went on to tell of the opposition of his enemies to the project of the Sonora expedition and of the need for some counterbalancing arguments to influence the new viceroy's decision. Continuing, Galvez said, quote, from this information, which I give you informally and confidentially, you will infer how necessary it is that you impress upon his excellency at once the indispensable need of the expedition and inform him that it is not impossible to conquer the Indians once and for all by force if the plan is adopted of sending thither veteran troops. You may add anything else, which will remove the fear or hesitation which perverse envious person's desire to instill into his excellency's mind through sheer malignity. The Marquis de Croix, I repeat to you, esteems my discourse above that of all others, but as he observes that I am of another profession, not military, and as he knows that I have not been in that country, he may lack confidence in the success of the expedition to which he sees me with the greatest ardor committed. Hence, it is fitting that you, in your report to him, express yourself as forcefully as you did for the purpose of arousing enthusiasm in me, a golela, a mere lawyer. In this case, this will be the easier to do as his instincts are all military," end quote. No doubt Pineda complied with this virtual order. Galvas' character was such that it might have gone hard with him if he had not, for the Vesetador did not easily forgive those who opposed him. At any rate, Croix supported the expedition more readily than Galvas had anticipated, and the project was given full and fair trial. Footnote. During his expedition of 1767 to Guanajuato, Galvas punished the inhabitants of that region with a ruthless hand for the rebellion they had engaged in. But even in this case, he did not neglect to employ his usual methods of indirection and self-exculpation. It is said that he would pray long hours and would ask the virgin what to do with their rebels. At length he would lift his hand for a pen to write down the judgment of the virgin and the sentence was one of death. History records few more extreme instances of shifting the burden from one's own shoulders than this. In footnote. The suppression of Indian warfare in Sonora was only an incident in the vast program of the Vesetador who intended to go to Sonora himself to put his ideas into execution as soon as Elizondo should have triumphed in the military campaign. The keynote of his plans was his proposed establishment of a new government independent of the vice royalty of New Spain to embrace the frontier provinces of Nueva Vizcaya, Sonora, Sinaloa, and the California's. Similar plans had frequently been suggested in earlier years on the ground that the viceroy in Mexico City was too far away to give these distant regions their proper share of attention. The direct ancestors of Galvez's plan were the Sanchez recommendations of 1751 and a proposal of 1760 for a vice royalty made up of the provinces within the jurisdiction of the Aodencia of Guadalajara. The Galvez projects were embodied in four important documents of the year 1768. The Vesetador maneuvered so as to make it appear that he was agreeing to suggestions made by others or at least merely sharing in the origination of ideas of which it happened that he heartily approved. In fact, he was the prime mover in all of these matters as is clearly set forth in the correspondence of the viceroy. In the case of the junta of February 25th, which granted wide powers to Galvez, the Vesetador made a showing of modesty by refraining from casting a vote. But his secretary tells us that he had in fact dominated the junta and had dictated its decision three days before it met. The first of the four great documents was the recommendation of the Vesetador on January 15th for the establishment of a system of intendancies in New Spain designed to increase the profits of the crown. This aimed at the collection of internal revenues by officials called intendants, of whom there were to be 11. Three of these were to be in the new frontier government in Durango, Sonora, and the California's. The inclusion of the California's is the noteworthy feature of the plan for that territory had figured here to fore only as a drain on the royal estate. Galvez intended that it should be more thoroughly occupied and developed. On January 21st, a junta was called to decide who should have the expedition to the frontier provinces, and it is not surprising that Galvez was selected since he had so determined. He was to wait until the troops had restored peace and was then to reorganize the government and establish colonies. Two days later the Galvez plan signed also by Croy for a new government of the frontier provinces was ready. As already stated, the Galvez plan provided for a government of the provinces of Nueva Vizcaya, Sinaloa, Sonora, and the California's apart from the vice royalty. It was to be called a Commandancy General, ruled by a Commandant General, who was to be a viceroy in all but the social distinction which went with the latter title. It was expected that the plan would restore peace to the frontier and that then, in a few years, those vast provinces, which were described as undoubtedly richer in mineral products than any that had been discovered in North America, might equal or even surpass those of New Spain. Great emphasis was placed upon the preventative importance of the plan as against the dangers of foreign attack. Attention was called to the opportunity and the keen desire of European powers to establish themselves at Monterey or elsewhere along the coast of the Californias. And the government was reminded of the efforts the French and English had made during two centuries to find a passage to the Pacific from their colonies on the Atlantic. Now that England had taken the colonies of France, said Galvez, she would not rest until she had pushed forward her discoveries to the Lake of the Woods whence a great river flowed westward. If this river should prove to be the Colorado or should reach the Pacific, then the English were already near New Mexico and not far from the Pacific. Reports had also been published in recent years, continued Galvez, showing that the Russians were encroaching upon the California coasts. And since Anson's voyage, the English and the Dutch had been acquiring information about Spain's ports in the Pacific, especially those of the Californias. Any one of these three peoples might easily plant a colony in Monterey, apart with excellent facilities for a settlement. Thus, Spain's possessions in the Pacific might be invaded and exploited as those of the Atlantic, from Virginia to Georgia, had been. Monterey ought to be occupied by Spain at once through the despatch of a sea expedition. Later, the common Nancy General should extend its frontiers in that direction and set up colonies and other ports. The capital of the common Nancy General should not be in Durango as the plan of 1760 had proposed because that was too far from Sonora and farther still from the Californias. The capital ought to be on the Sonora frontier at or near the Gila. While it was being established, the government should set up at Caborca, the nearest settlement to the Californias, or at the junction of the Gila and Colorado rivers. The emphasis on conquering the Californias, it is to be noted, was one of the principal factors in the Galvez plan. Clearly, too, the Vecita door intended to make Sonora the province upon which the new conquest should depend, though as a temporary expedient to sea expedition was to occupy Monterey. On February 25th, a junta was again called to authorize the plans Galvez had made for his visit to the frontier. Among the provisions of the decision of the junta, which confirmed verbatim all that Galvez had asked, were the following. Galvez was to act not only in his capacity of Vecita door, but also with the authority of the viceroy. He was to found a number of frontier settlements with armed colonists. Among these was to be the future capital of the common Nancy general on the Sonora frontier, midway between the Californias and Nueva Vizcaya, and free commerce between Sonora and the Californias was to be permitted. Every one of these important documents received the sanction of the king. The common Nancy general was not actually established until 1776 and the system of intendancies was postponed until 1786, but they formed the basis of Spanish action from the time of their enactment onward. The common Nancy general would very likely have been put into effect in 1769 or 1770 if affairs in Sonora had gone to the Vecita door's liking and if he had maintained his health during his visit there. In the meantime, however, he had planned to wait before going to Sonora until Elizondo's expedition should have triumphed over the Indians. Not understanding the difficulties of frontier warfare, he expected victory would be quickly obtained and he left Mexico City on April 9th, 1768, intending to make his way to the frontier and taking with him a number of persons who were to settle there. Before going to Sonora, he proposed to found a department at the Port of Samblas and pay a visit to Baja California. These activities proved in fact to be preliminary to the great expeditions to Alta California of 1769, which merit separate treatment. Footnote, the principal authority for the material in this chapter is priestly, Herbert Ingram. Jose de Galvez, visitor general of New Spain, 1765 to 1771. Berkeley, California, 1916 in University of California, publications in history, volume five. End of footnote, end of chapter 16.