 I want to end this section by talking about two ways to characterize virtue epistemology, which I think are misleading. So again, it goes back to, let's say, some of us are more interested in the character virtues, intellectual virtues conceived as character virtues, intellectual courage, open-mindedness, fairness. Virtues are interested in the faculty virtues, conceived as acute perception, sound reasoning, or something like that. So one way in which these two camps are sometimes described as responsible-ist versus reliable-ist, and the idea is that the people who are concerned with character virtues, they're really concerned with questions about intellectual responsibility or epistemic responsibility. And so we should think of them as virtue-responsible-ists, whereas the people who are concerned with faculty virtues are powers. They're really concerned with questions about reliability, where reliability has something to do with, we'll talk about this more later, but reliability has to do with how well you're getting at the truth. So that's a natural way to understand our cognitive faculties in terms of how they're getting us at the truth and how well they're doing that. I think this is a misleading way to divide up the field and what people are doing. The reason it's misleading, I think, is because if you're interested in epistemic responsibility and character virtues, it's not as if questions about reliability are now irrelevant. One reason we're interested in the character virtues is not just because we're interested in what makes us responsible believers, but it's also what makes us reliable believers. Presumably, someone who is intellectually arrogant, for example, is going to be less reliable to someone who is more appropriately epistemically humble. So it's not as if the reliable question and the responsibility, the reliability question and the responsibility questions can be divorced from each other. Same thing happens in the other camp. It's true that when we're thinking about knowledge, we want to know, well, are we reliably getting at truth in a certain domain? But again, you can't just separate reliability from responsibility because one of the main ways we're going to be reliable is that we act responsibly. So irresponsible behavior in the intellectual domain is going to undermine reliability in the intellectual domain. So it's not as if you can just, that's a good way to divide the field. Second way that people characterize the field, which again, I think is somewhat misleading, is to make a distinction between internalists, internalist virtue epistemology and externalist virtue epistemology. That's kind of a technical notion, but I think it's important to have some kind of feel for it just because you might encounter this terminology if you do more reading in virtual epistemology. So if you're talking about what makes a belief justified or what makes a belief rational or what makes a belief epistemically responsible, for example. An internalist is going to try to answer those questions only by referring to what is going on inside the head, so to speak, what the believer can sort of understand about herself. So if I'm justified, I should be able to tell whether I'm justified or whether I have the goods for being justified just by considering things like what evidence I have or what my experiences are like or something like that. An externalist is going to say a certain epistemic standing or epistemic value in question really requires more than that. It's not just about what's going on inside the head or what's going on that I can just reflect on. It might have to do with how I'm hooked up to the world, what relationship I have with other people, what kind of causal mechanisms are involved in, say, my interaction with the world. These are all things that are sort of facts outside my head, facts which I can't know just by reflecting on what's going on on the inside but their facts about what's going on in the outside. So hence externalists think that those sorts of facts are important. Internalists think that only the internal facts are the important facts for figuring out these epistemological issues. So some people talk about internalist virtue epistemology and they say, look, the people who are concerned with character virtues, they're really internalists. The character virtue epistemologists are just about what's going on on the inside, whereas the people who are talking about faculty epistemology and how our faculties are getting at the world, they're externalists. Well, I guess that's right as far as it goes, but I think it's a misleading way of characterizing things because if you ask questions about intellectual character, again, character has to do with habit, which has to do with past performance. It has to do with causal dispositions of how you respond to the world, etc. These are all externalist features and so the character virtue epistemologists can't be concerned only with what's going on inside the head, so to speak. Part of what part of a person's character speaks to how they're interacting with the world and so brings in external factors. Similarly, on the faculty side, certainly external factors about our mind-world relation, for example, are important when we're talking about are our faculties functioning properly or are they functioning reliably, etc. But internal factors, what's going on inside the head, are not going to be just irrelevant, so you can't really talk interestingly about perception or about memory or about what excellent perception involves, what excellent memory involves, what excellent reasoning for that matter involves by just ignoring what's accessible to the to the knower or the believer. So just as character virtue epistemologists are going to be concerned with both internalist and externalist considerations, so our faculty epistemologists are going to be concerned with both internalist and externalist considerations, and so again, I think it's just misleading to divide the field that way as if, you know, character is all about internalist factors and faculty is all about externalist faculties. So I think the better way to sort of divide up the field is really just to recognize that there are two kinds of intellectual excellence or intellectual virtue. There are character virtues, there are faculty virtues, and then we can ask what are they good for, which kinds of questions, which kinds of issues are they going to help us with, and we can use these different theoretical resources as they're available to help us where they can help us. We can also ask how these two kinds of intellectual virtue are related to each other. That's the topic of part three.