 Welcome everybody, thank you very much for joining us today. The session that you're here to listen to and participate in is going to look at the strategic shifts and the transformational issues that are going to set the global security context for this year and beyond. It's going to be a riveting discussion, knowing these gentlemen, thanks to them and thanks to you, we're looking forward to your questions. We're going to be spotting the emerging patterns that are going to set the trajectory, not just for this year, but really the things that are going to shape our world in the years to come as well. We have a fantastic panel here today, I'm going to introduce them in alphabetical order as there's no other way to do them justice. We have Ian Bremmer, who's the Global Research Professor at the New York University in the United States. We have John Chipman, who's the Chief Executive of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in the United Kingdom. We have Mahmood Sariogalam, who's the Professor of International Relations at the National University of Iran and who's just told me that his name means quick pen, so he was destined to be an academic, clearly. And Dr Xavier Solana, who's President of the Centre for Global Economy and Geopolitics in Spain. And also Professor Wu Sun Bo, who's the Executive Dean at the Institute for International Studies at the Fudan University in the People's Republic of China. So we cover the world today, both in human spirit and in the issues that we're going to cover. The panel is going to take you on an intellectual tour de force of the shifting sands of world power in the implications that this has for human state and geo security. I'm going to ask that the panel start with a few reflections, some of the key issues that we've seen take root over the past few months. And those that really might shape the issues that governments and states will be responding to in geopolitical terms in the months to come. It's been a year, if we look at the past year, of some pretty seismic shifts. We've seen significant changes of leadership across the world, particularly in China and Iran. We've seen turmoil wrought by conflict, by environmental catastrophe, by cyber controversy among many other things. We've seen the hardening of religious schisms, particularly between Sunni and Shia. And the implications that this has had for the factions and geopolitical alliances in the Middle East, but also elsewhere in the world. And so some of the things that we're going to touch on today I hope will sweep across the globe, but also really, really get to grips with the underlying themes that, no matter where we're from, are themes that we're going to have to think about and themes that we are going to have to address. I'm going to turn first, and just before I do, to say this session is recorded live. So it is on the record and social media is permitted. Feel free to let rip on Twitter, et cetera. And I'm going to turn to John first and to ask John to help us set the scene. And John, could you please just chart for us what for you have been three really pivotal shifts that you've seen either having taken root or taking root that you think are going to prove transformative in the months and years ahead? Thank you very much. Well, the challenge of a double session is always to think both extemporaneously and epigramatically. So I shall try to sum up three trends that have been apparent this year and invite people to think whether the opposite trends might be more apparent in 2014. 2013, from a Western point of view, in terms of the larger powers of the West that have traditionally had an interest in international security, 2013 was the year of living tactically. It was a year in which it was very difficult for the United States and its principal allies to think and act strategically about the conflicts with which they had to engage. Everything was really about conflict management, conflict avoidance, occasionally about containment. It was about iterative approaches, about rounds of talks. But a strategic goal was very difficult to fashion and a strategic impetus very difficult to maintain. A classic case of that was, of course, in Syria where I think the response of the outside world to Syria was immensely tactical. And as students used to say, tactics without strategy is usually the noise before defeat and the Syrian problem has defeated the West. At that point it was very much a year of living tactically. The second point I have is that it was also the end of the sort of romantic era of thinking that democratic change would naturally occur in the most difficult parts of the world. Between 2011 and 2012 there was enormous enthusiasm in Western capitals for the promise of the Arab Spring for the possibility that youth movements and civil society would be able to take a political route in these countries and defeat the until then very authoritarian leaderships. And the megalomania of other types of actors in these political spaces was perhaps hugely underestimated. It was, I think, very disturbing for some to see how coldly some Western countries looked at the changes particularly in the Middle East as acts of political science. Is this a military coup or is this not a military coup? Is this true democracy or not true democracy? One was a cold observation of these very heated disputes as if they were removed from real human reality and in the hope that an ideal, perfect world could be shaped around a democratic outcome, especially in Egypt. And I think by the end of 2013 a more realist hold took over Western capitals and an assumption that one had to muddle through and deal with the forces on the ground as they shaped themselves. And I think the third trend that we saw during 2013 was the limits of the more egalitarian international order that people had talked about. Everybody seemed to begin celebrating, except in the United States, the rise of outside powers and the greater role that rising powers would have in the international system. And it is true that powers are rising, but it's not clear that they know what they do once they get to the top. And certain middle powers who were developing a kind of strategic swagger and ability to influence events regionally, Qatar, Turkey, Brazil were seized by different types of domestic imperatives that meant that they could no longer pursue the very extrovert foreign policies that would promise some sort of regional accent to conflict management. So last year was the year of living tactically at the end of the romantic era of democracy and a realisation that an egalitarian world order or a more egalitarian one wouldn't mean better conflict management. And 2014, in much quicker summary, the promise and challenge of 2014 is where the opposite might take hold, where the 2014 might be the year of living strategically, but perhaps the year of strategic conceits in which countries like China, Japan, do develop genuine strategic objectives for themselves in their region more widely, but that strategic competition has unhappy consequences. The obverse of the inspiration that democratic movements inspired is the question of whether authoritarianism might have a resurgence in different parts of the world in 2014, and people will have to stop more frequently with the devil than they were hoping to do in 2013. And the obverse of a more egalitarian world order where smaller powers are able to productively work for conflict management and that some small power might again create some crisis to which others will have to respond, whether it's a North Korea or whether it's actually a power, say, in the Asia Pacific overconfident in the American alliance provoking a larger power by extending its reach further than its own national power would permit. So I think those are the trends that I observe and in the Middle East, in Europe, in Asia and in Latin America they hold in different measure, but I think that's the sort of spirit that frame 2013 and some of the spirit that might frame 2014. Thank you, John, characteristically potent and pertinent. Mum, if I could turn to you and feel free to reflect on any of the things that John has laid out there, but also obviously with the new presidency in Iran it's interesting that John mentioned there the end of the kind of romantic era and the beginning of reality bites and President Rouhani has said explicitly that Iranian policy is going to be based in reality. What does that mean for Iran's role in the world and how particularly do you see that playing out in the new formations that are taking shape in the Middle East post-Arab Spring? Thank you. As a student of Iranian politics, I think the Rouhani presidency is perhaps the only opportunity for Iranians to lift themselves economically and to engage the international community. The Rouhani presidency is perhaps the outcome of 30 years of ideological processes in the country and I think the most important contribution of this presidency is that it is global sensitive. This presidency is very much concerned about Iran's image around the world and I think for the first time we have a president in Iran who understands statistics. On that point, I think Iran's economy is going to be the focal point in the next four years. It took some courage and realism from the political establishment in Iran to engage the P5 plus one in its nuclear negotiations in order to stop Iran's national economic decline. When we compare Iran to other countries in the region, even UAE, let alone Turkey and other Muslim countries like Malaysia and Indonesia, Iran has lost quite a bit economic opportunities in the last years and I think it was not just this presidency. Any presidency would have been coerced into focusing on Iran's national economic development. To do that, it was very clear that Iran had to change its foreign policy orientation and in that context the nuclear problem was the central issue and I think the government moved very quickly in the first month of the administration inauguration to focus on that issue and gladly I think we have come forward quite a bit just in the last few months. But aside from Iran's national economy which needs very close attention and bringing Iran back into the European community, international community and so on, I think there is one major challenge that Iran is facing in its foreign policy. It is not just a reorientation of Iranian-American relations. For the first time Iranian foreign minister and American secretary of state met and talked and engaged one another and that was a great breakthrough in the long history of post-revolutionary Iran but I think the greatest challenge for Iran today in its foreign policy is Iranian-Saudi relations. There is almost no connection between the two countries today and as long as there is no compromise between these two important players in the region I think none of the Middle Eastern issues in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, the Palestinian issue, Persian Gulf security and also even an improvement in the nuclear negotiations cannot be expected. Alongside in parallel with the economic improvements in Iran, I think there is that outstanding challenge that Iran is facing and the sooner we engage Saudi Arabia, the sooner many of the outstanding issues in the region are going to be resolved. Mamlu, thank you. Maybe the Iran-Saudi dynamic is one of the things that we want to return to. I'm sure some of the other panellists would have some very interesting things to say and no doubt the audience as well. Ian, to come to you, we heard there that at least a supposition that part of the motivation for the thawing between Iran and the US is driven from the Iranian side by the need to reverse its current economic fortunes. Do you think that's enough to drive a kind of perestroika and how is that going to play out in the US? If you could talk about relations there and then also look eastwards, particularly in terms of the East Asian relationship and how the much touted and questioned Pacific pivot is going, that would be much appreciated. The pivot's not going. That's a problem. John asked if 2014 might be the year of living strategically. Might not this be the year that we could talk about reshaping the world as the WEF decided to make this the theme? No, we're not. In order to start thinking strategically, you have to at least have the United States that wants to do that on the international stage. It's very clear that the US does not want to do that. The US has capability. It doesn't want to do it. It doesn't want to do it for some good reasons, for some legitimate reasons, and maybe for some not so legitimate, maybe for some short-sighted readings, but we're not even close to having that conversation. We won't be for, I think, at least a couple of years barring something cataclysmic that we don't want to think about on this panel. So I think the answer is no, and that's going to inform my conversation on the pivot and the rest. But let's just talk about Middle East Iran for a second, because my colleague I thought was extremely articulate on this. Saudi Arabia Iran is a big problem. It is. The US relations, US foreign policy is in decline right now. US economy is not in decline. Foreign policy is. We can talk about why. Snowden, Syria, Obama, second term team, Obama shut down, difficulties with orientation alignment with countries like China and Russia. Germany led Europe as opposed to Britain and France led Europe. There are so many reasons why US foreign policy is in decline. It's really over-determined. But in the middle, and the US has lost as a consequence a lot of support of a lot of its allies that are worried. The Germans, the France on Snowden, a lot of the Asians on TPP slowing down that kind of thing. The Saudis are the one relationship that's actually gotten worse in large part because it should be getting worse. American Saudi relations are no longer based on strategic interests of these two countries. That is the problem. The Saudis are right to not want a deal with Iran between the Iranians and the international community. It's very bad for them. They are correct in that understanding of their national interests. They were so upset they decided to walk away from a seat at the Security Council. They don't want the Iranians to produce more oil. They don't want an 80 million person Iranian economy to become dynamic in the region. They don't want a geopolitically in Iraq or in Lebanon or in Syria or anywhere else. This is an unmitigated bad for Saudi Arabia. Now, one place I disagree a little bit is I still think a deal is possible because it's not just the Iranians need the cash that the Americans want out. Americans 56% more oil is being produced by the Americans right now than it was in 2008. The Americans are at least 56% less interested in the Middle East now than they were in 2008. It's not just because of the energy. It's because of Iraq and Afghanistan and it's because of the nature of the Obama administration. It's because of the gap between rich and poor and 50% of Americans at least thinking, what do we get out of all of this? There's plenty of reasons again. But the fact is that what the Americans would really like to do is take this international coalition that you've used to squeeze the Iranians economically very effectively for a number of years right now and use it to get a deal, let them produce, let folks invest, we're not it. We've seen that in Syria, we've seen it in Libya, we've seen it in Egypt. How many places do we need to see it? It's consistent. I guess you could call that thinking strategically. I doubt it's the way that folks want the U.S. to be thinking strategically. It's certainly a problem for China over the long term. So quick points just on that and then I'll cede seed. Which is that Kerry has not mentioned the term pivot and he's told his folks that they shouldn't. So they're not allowed. He talks about rebalancing. Those things are different. Pivot, you take one foot, that's one place, you move it to another place. Rebalancing, you just kind of shift back and forth ineffectually. That's more what we're seeing. This is clearly a team that doesn't have as much the trust of President Obama as Hillary Clinton and Confederates did and Obama isn't as interested in foreign policy himself so that's an issue. It's also a team that doesn't do much on Asia. They don't have much background or expertise on Asia. That's an opportunity for the Chinese. They know it, they see it and certainly we're seeing a Chinese charm offensive towards the U.S. which I think has been somewhat effective both in improving that bilateral relationship but also in helping to drive a bit of a wedge between the U.S. and Japan response to the air defense identification zone, response to Abe's Yasakuni Shrine visit, that kind of thing. Long term what is interesting to me is that the Middle East is becoming vastly more important to China than it is to the U.S. And yet the Chinese don't wear, even with this second aircraft carrier they're now talking about building or nowhere near capable of doing anything with that, that the Americans are. So is there a deal? That for me is the interesting question because the point is the Americans are still putting all of this military cash in Asia because there's no multilateral security deal. The Chinese want the U.S. to continue to play the role of global policemen in the Middle East. They're going to have to come to terms that they need to be multilateral on some security arrangement Asia. I think that is a deal that can be discussed. I don't know if it can be done, but at least it's a fruitful avenue for consideration in terms of a new security environment. Ian, thank you. Does that, Professor Weed, does that accord with your view from the Chinese perspective in terms of that explanation? And do you think such a deal is possible? Maybe you can just talk us through how you're seeing the transformative issues in East Asian security policy at the moment and how again new leadership is affecting China's role in the world at the moment. Well, let me start by sharing with you my observation about the new foreign policy on President Xi Jinping. And in contrast with Ian's frustration with Obama's foreign policy, in China I think most people feel comfortable with the new leadership's foreign policy. The most important feature is that the growing diplomatic activity. If you look at China's, for example, resulting in more pressure on North Korea's nuclear program, China's involvement in South Sudan to try to mediate their conflict. So basically this diplomatic activity is rooted on a recognition of China's responsibility as a rising power and also a realization of the need to protect China's growing of its interests. And related to that is last year the new leadership began to pay more attention to our relations with our neighbors. So partly because of the troubles that come up in the previous years. The challenge is that as China rises, how you want to assure your neighbors that you are not going to be a threat and you are going to share with them the prosperity, you are going to bring more security to this region. So in this regard, I think the new leadership is facing a challenge. How to deal with a neighborhood that sometimes is suspicious of China's rise and sometimes eager to share the benefits of China's economic development. And one more thing with the new diplomacy is how to respond to the public opinion in China as people have more venues to express their opinions about how they want our foreign policy to do a better job in promoting China's overseas interests, including in dealing with the disputes with some other neighbors, including with Japan. So these are not necessarily on the same page. So this is a challenge for the new leadership how you keep a good balance among all those items. Now back to the regional security in East Asia, we are not in a pleasant situation at the moment. You have the shifting balance power because of the rise of China. You have the changing domestic politics in Japan and even in North Korea. And you have the strategic adjustments undertaken by the Obama administration starting from its fourth term, the rebalancing pivot in whatever you call it, at least emphasizing more on the security investment in the Asia Pacific. So all those factors combined, they are making this situation more complex and fluid. However, I'm not that pessimistic about 2014 because I think one, as long as China and the US have a stable strategic relationship and things are not going to get in too bad. And last year, I think the new leadership, President Xi, had a good meeting with President Obama in California and which helped to say to better understand each other and also to build a better mechanism for communication. And more importantly, I think both countries began to realize that they may be able to do a better job to constrain some of the troublemakers in this region, be it Abe in Japan or North Korea. So as long as China and US have a strategic stability in this region, I think that the overall situation will not become too bad in 2014. Thank you very much. Finally, to come to Dr Solana before we probe a couple of these issues further, but you obviously represented the European Union and its foreign policy on all of these issues, in fact, when you were in office. Can you just speak to how you think the world has changed fundamentally from the negotiations you had at that time on Iran, on the Pacific, etc. And what for you would you wish that you'd seen in terms of openings that are happening now when you were in office? And what do you think some of the moments that might be missed unless there's a real kind of concerted international leadership? Thank you very much. I mean, I'm the last to speak it. I can say that I agree just about everything that has been said so far. Being a European and talking about 2014 bring to your mind 100 years ago, 1914. Different from 1914 to 2014 are many. Greece are also, there were many. At that time were unknown. There are many today which are known some others are unknown. But I think that in analysis is a still is intelligent attitude to look at the years of day. One important thing that the Europe is not a problem. In 1914 Europe was the problem. Today I don't know if it's part of the solution. I hope it's part of the solution but in any case it's not part of the problem. That allows for an important part of developed countries to be able to help in the process of peace, not in the process of war. That is very important. Now I think that to my mind when it comes to missing things we could work in the coming years to resolve will be very important. And these missing things are structures of regional integration on security. The two main problems that we have today starting for the first I think is Iran. If we are not able to get Iran resolved in a peaceful manner in the year 2014 we may be in a situation very, very serious. I don't think that we are going to be able to get an structure of security in the Middle East tomorrow. But I think if we don't begin to think strategically and trying to construct structures of security in that region in the Middle East we will be for a long time in very serious pain. And I think if we want to look strategically to think strategically that should be done. Now the second in the other problem in the other region that we may have a problem in the years ahead of us is Asia. Asia is not integrating as we would have liked. I think the big countries of Asia, Japan and China didn't profit from the end of the Second Great War. In Europe we did something fantastic. Germany and France after the Second Great War found a manner of reconciliation. In East Pacific China and Japan didn't profit from that. Mao Zedong opened relations with China but they didn't go any further than that. A sort of reconciliation between China and Japan would be fundamental. It's not easy, it's not going to pay in 24 hours. But I think with engaging that with what we have already in Asia, with East Haseyan which is true that the integration comes from the small countries and not from the big countries in Asia whereas in Europe it was different. But in Europe it was done politically. It was a political decision to integrate. In Asia and East Asia it's been done but driven by market forces. And therefore this lose is not legal, it doesn't have rules of the game but it does the reality which is moving. It's no doubt it is moving. If you look at it in the trades among Europe countries, the European Union is about 60%. In Asia it's about 45%. I mean it's a lot that has been done without rules. Just by the rules of the market. If we were able to get that and taking a step forward into some kinds of rules I think it would be a very, very important thing. And that is the two strategic issue that if I were in power I would try to do. Construct or put all my energy in constructing a structure of security in places where it doesn't exist. Europe is today safe because it found a strategy of security or a solution of security that allowed them to get out of the situation of crisis. Now one thing that I would like to say on East Asia, I'm very concerned related to Iran also to the nuclear issue that if North Korea is not approaching in a much more assertive manner after the Hanoi year, you remember very well the IRF, if that is not resolved my fear is that temptations of South Korea, temptations in Japan to move in the nuclear front and that will be really a catastrophic situation. As you know Japan did something that stopped and South Korea had done much but in any case if it were motion in that direction it would be really catastrophic. So this is what I would like to say. Basically that this will be the most important thing. To finish in a negative note, I think that 2013 has been the year of the end of multilateralism in a way. The United Nations has not functioned. Even today we have the meeting in Geneva has started very badly. I don't think we can have done it in a more unprofessional manner to get the beginning of the Geneva. We are going to enter in two very important trade agreements which are not multilateral. The TTP and the European Union and the United States agreement. It is true that the WTO has been progress but I don't think that compensates that multilateralism is going down. That is another thing to keep in mind. Thank you very much. A collective tour de force there. I want to pick up on a couple of the issues that you've raised and just probe you further collectively on them before opening to the floor with questions. Some very coherent themes came out of all of your comments. I think there is a degree of alignment but it is always interesting to push you on where you might disagree as well. You talked a lot about recalibration both in terms of absolute power and both in terms of regional balances of power. Within that two strands came out quite clearly. One between Iran and Saudi and one between China and Japan. The US's relationship with all those players is pivotal to that. Maybe just starting on the first and to open up to all of you. What is your own prognosis for how the relationship between China and Japan is going to play out over this year? What are going to be the things that enable it to play out constructively and what might be the things that put it in jeopardy? Who would like to take that first? I'll start because then I can give a shorter answer and everybody can add a little bit more nuance. I think political tension at the highest level between China and Japan will be very intense for at least a year to come. The relationship between the two heads of government are very poor and opinion nationally in each of the countries is increasingly nationalistic. I think there will be a lot of political posturing. It will be very difficult to achieve meetings of the two of them in the same room let alone necessarily face to face. The real question is what is going to be done underneath the surface. I think there's been an awful lot of concern as to whether in the East China Sea there would be a war between Japan and China. I'm certain that both governments want to avoid one. The way in which it could be avoided is if the militaries of both countries again having more quiet conversations about what professionals called confidence building measures or avoiding incidents at sea or in the air. My own sense from having talked to the militaries of both countries that there is a willingness to have these quiet discussions is always remarkable to me in whatever area of the world I travel in that it's the militaries of the countries that are naturally opposed to have the best professional understanding of each other whether it's India and Pakistan or any other cup that you might imagine. The militaries tend to understand the severity of war and the way in which accidents can happen. So if we see underneath the surface more military-to-military discussions between Japan and China, which I'm sure the United States and others will seek to encourage then the avoidance of war will be there. But the strategic competition, and this is the sense in which I use the word strategy, I agree with Ian that I'm not certain that the United States will assume a much more ostentatious strategic posture but the United States is not the only country in the world that might think strategically or develop strategic conceits and China and Japan I think are competing strategically and not just in their own region. Japan is travelling a great deal to Africa, China to Latin America. You will see an extra version of these two countries in other regions of the world to live to win votes for their point of view that I think will be important. So enormous strategic competition between the two countries, very difficult personal relations between the two leaders but perhaps professional understandings that avoid war. Ian? Yeah, I agree with that. I think China and Japan are thinking more strategically on these issues and Africa is a great example of it. It's not global in the sense that it can't replace the US and that's Javier's concern at the end which I completely embrace. I want to answer China and Japan but I just want to point out that I think we have agreed on something quite important. I think we all do that the two most important bilateral geopolitical tensions in the world in 2014 are Iran, Saudi Arabia and they're China and Japan. China and Japan is more important in the sense it has more impact even though it's less likely but nonetheless that's where I'd focus. We did not mention Israel. Israel relationship is much more stable and they can deal with an Iranian deal. Their relationship with the US is frankly even though Obama and Netanyahu don't like each other at all, the relationship is much more stable and we didn't mention Russia at all because while Russia annoys all of us and it's irritating in its backyard, nobody cares very much and that's interesting too, right? But on China, Japan, you know, my friend Shinbo here referred to Abe as one of the two troublemakers in the region. The second being Kim Jong-un. I've never heard Abe and Kim Jong-un referred to in the same sentence that way. Maybe we'll promote that. I think there are a lot of people, but to be fair, Shinbo is not an out there crazy extremist in China. This is completely middle of the road thinking which is that the Japanese are crazy nationalist problems and there's overwhelming hatred on the part of the Chinese for Japan. The Japanese don't like the Chinese at all either. Huge stereotyping between these two countries. There's a lot of economic integration. It's important. They'd both be hurt if attention flared. But the level of misunderstanding, the level of stereotyping, I mean the Europeans had great economic integration before they went to war too. I don't think we're going to see military conflict intentionally but we are entering an environment where not only are mistakes possible but the likelihood of overreaction and miscalculation and response to those mistakes given the fact that neither of these two countries have any interest in engaging or trying to understand the perspective from the other country. There is no interest on the part of the Chinese leadership of understanding the security environment from Japan's point of view. That is completely reciprocal. That's a problem. If these guys had religion in the mix, that would be a real problem. They don't have that. But the history is problematic enough. That's where we are. 2014 is looking up. Thanks for that. Shinbo, I've got to bring you in there and ask you what you think. Will there be a war between China and Japan over the Dioriw Islands? No, because China doesn't want to fight a war. Japan does not dare to fight a war and the US is not willing to get involved in a conflict with China over the Dioriw Islands. So strategically speaking, although the temperature is very high, rhetorically, but strategically speaking, the possibility for a military conflict, a serious military conflict over the Dioriw Islands is very low. Having said that, I have to say that the political trust between two countries now is very low. Largely because of Abe's recent visit to the Yasko Nishirai. It's a somewhat different thing that you took a strong, assertive position on the island disputes. It's a different thing that you visited to the Yasko Nishirai and tried to send a different message about the World War II history and all these kinds of things. That did a lot, really, to raise the nationalism in China about relations with Japan. So to some extent, I think China's leaders have already written off Abe as a credible partner in the future. So that means the political relations between our two countries will stay very cool, even frozen for the remaining years of Abe administration. Then the question is, what can be done? One thing that is important is that because neither Beijing nor Tokyo, nor Washington want to see a war in East China Sea, we should do a better job technically to create better mechanism of communication and also crisis management system to manage those issues. Secondly, actually in this regard, the United States can do a better job in spite of, you know, Ian's frustration with Obama's foreign diplomacy. I think the U.S., at least, on two issues can be helpful. One is on the history issue. How we think about the World War II history, what the U.S. should respond to Abe's future visit to Yasukuni Shirai, all these kinds of things. I think the U.S. should further clarify its position on this issue. And secondly, in terms of the island, people in East China say, I think Abe may need this dispute to justify his pushing, his own security agenda, expanding Japan's military and also revising the constitution. So the U.S. should tell the difference between the island dispute, between China and Japan, and also what Japan is going to do on the security front. That's two different things. My suspect is that at the end of the day, Abe wants to pursue a more independent security policy with the United States. Let me just come back to you on that before we then move to Saudi Iran. Is that in the realm of reality in terms of how the U.S. is going to engage on this? No, I mean, the idea that the United States is going to clarify its position on Yasukuni, that's a very smart thing for China to want because, again, it helps to try to drive a wedge between the U.S. and Japan. The United States doesn't like that. That's not a proactive national interest of the Americans, that's just something that the Chinese will continue to try and occasionally they'll pick up a couple points on. But I don't see any one of the Obama administration doing that. OK, so we see a glacially stazer as it's depicted here. And if we move then towards Iran and Saudi, I imagine that has the potential to be more overtly combustible. Mamlu, can you just tell us, just to start with you first from the Iranian perspective and then to bring in Dr Solana. Well, I mean, if this is going to roll out in a way that doesn't prove really fundamentally destructive, what's needed? What do you think are the concessions that will be needed from the Iranian side, looking very frankly at the Iranian side, but also from the Saudi side? And who needs to broker that? I think there are two very interesting, fascinating repercussions of the Arab Spring for the whole region. One is that the public in the Middle East at large and also the elites learned that legitimacy and accountability cannot be outsourced. And secondly, people have learned that they are going to be more autonomous than the past. They have to make their own decisions. And people have become very much empowered. So looking at that, I think Middle East is moving historically speaking in the right path, where national sovereignty is being redefined in terms of non-zero-sum games in the region. I do not believe that Iranian-Saudi rivalry is a religious one. Iranian-Saudi rivalry was there even before the Revolution. I think the fundamental nature of that rivalry is regional supremacy. And until the two sides have a different definition of the region and also their national sovereignty, then we cannot expect to have compromises on any side. That's one, the other issue that both countries need to reach a national consensus about the other party. There was a time in the 1960s when isolationism was equal to national sovereignty during the Soviet and Chinese years. I think that has been broken nowadays in the Middle East. We cannot think of isolationism as an option. The individuals who are shaping the future of the Middle East who have shaped and are still shaping the future of the Middle East are people like Bill Gates, Mark Zuckerberg, and also Steve Jobs. These are the individuals who are empowering the public. I think more and more people are learning about pluralism, diversity, transparency, accountability, legitimacy, and having a collective national identity. Those issues are faced by both Iran and Saudi Arabia. Perhaps because of the wealth of these two countries and also particularly the human resources that Iran has as a country, I think what needs to be taken as an initiative on both sides is to have a regional new definition of politics and geopolitics. I think the ramification of this will be seen in Iraq. A stable Iraq I think will be a consequence of Iranian-Saudi cooperation. I believe there are two levels about Syria, Russian-American relations, and the second level is Iranian-Saudi relations. Unless Iranian-Saudi relations are improved, I think we cannot expect a very clear positive outcome in the Syrian scene. That can take us to Lebanon, to the Palestinian territories, and also the security of the Persian Gulf. I think all those issues will deal with an Iranian-Saudi cooperation. Having said that, I believe at least from an Iranian perspective, from what I can witness about the debates and also the economic exigencies in the country today in Iran, that Iran will ultimately move for a rapprochement with Saudi Arabia. But Saudi Arabia also needs to have a different definition of Iranian regional role and cannot expect Iran to limit itself as a regional power. I think Iranian history, Iranian culture is omnipresent, not only in Iraq but also in Central Asia, in many Arab countries. There is quite a bit of potential for Iranian economy to move on to the region. There is only 6% trade among Middle Eastern countries. Some 94% of the trade is done with the outside world. There is so much potential for Iran to get into the regional trade framework. I think it will happen, at least from the Iranian side, because Iran is moving into an economic mood. This is the mood of the population, which I think the new presidency is resonating. Within the next year, I think there will be a much more solid and sound consensus within Iran to reach a rapprochement with Saudi foreign policy. Thank you. Dr Slun, if we're looking optimistically, one D by this, do you think that that's going to eventuate, and are you so hopeful that the shift in the way that particularly the younger demographic is engaging with politics in their own future could help precipitate a greater open-mindedness here? What's going to be the role of the European Union? Is it irrelevant in brokering this rapprochement, or does it have a role to play still? Then we'll hear from others. Let me first have a couple of comments before I go to the last part of your question. I think that the Saudi Iranian rapprochement is going to be very difficult in the short term because the Saudis do not have an example. The ageing of the leadership in Saudi Arabia is a parallelising element until we don't see a change in the Saudi Arabia, more efficient government, etc. It will be very difficult. Imagine that now the competitors between Iran with a new energetic reformer leader, elected pluralistically. On the other side, you have a situation which is completely the opposite. It's very difficult even in those circumstances to meet. It didn't have the past in the history. The second thing I think is very important to me that has not been brought up is the terrorism. I think the fact that Al Qaeda is there, Al Qaeda is soon, Al Qaeda is financed by who knows whom, but not very far from the countries we are talking about, that has to be clarified. That defeat to Al Qaeda has to be done by the Sunnis. Until Al Qaeda is not defeated by the Sunnis, it will not be defeated. That is the only thing that Saudi Arabia can put on the table to contribute to that. The last thing I would like to say is Russia. In Russia we have put it in the, we have not mentioned it as a local regional problem, but in the backyard of the European Union, but in the Middle East Russia is taking a very important role. I think Russia has gotten a strategy to the Middle East, and I think the Western world has shown that they don't have a strategy. We don't have a strategy. When you look at all the conflict of Syria, you have seen Russia, which had been pim, pim, pim, pim, pim, pim, pim, and got to the end that he wanted. Today is a very important day for Russia, and the Europeans and the Americans, in fact, in a not strategic manner, and not even tactic, it has been just non-professional, as I said before. Now, from the European Union point of view, I think that in 2014 I would like to see after the election of the European Union, et cetera, changing the leadership in the European Union institutionally, I would see a more engagement, I would like to see a much deeper engagement. And outside our European inner looking. I think that the Middle East is our neighbourhood. And we have been in 1919, 1939, I'm sorry, the end of our war is the origin of many of the problems we have today in the Middle East. So we have responsibilities also there, we have to take again our shoulders, that part of the responsibility, and that I try to do and I like to continue doing and helping. Now, what about Iran? My experience with Iran, I've been engaged with Iran since 2002, I knew Rohanian in 2002, I signed with him in 2003, I was in his inauguration in 2013, I spent three days with him, what I can tell you, that everything that he told me in the face of his inauguration has become true. All the things that he promised that he would do, it has been done. Now, the agreement, which is a provisional agreement for six months, is a very important step, but what is ahead is very difficult. It's going to be very difficult, you have to be very careful everybody, and science counts, everything counts, and it's so important that this negotiation comes out right, that I think everybody should put the most on their side to get it too. Okay, thank you very much. We're going to open up for questions, and I'm sure the panellists have remarks on each other's remarks, but if they can build those into questions, I'm sure they'll be deft at doing so. When you ask your question, please can you identify yourself, there are roaming microphones, and please don't feel constrained to ask questions on what we've already covered, there's absolutely anything you want, and put these great minds to you. So, the lady at the front here to start us off. Hi, Catherine Bennell from the New York Times. Thank you very much for a very interesting panel. I've got two questions. I would like to know from you what you think Iran can do to help in Syria. Syria has been called the Vietnam of Iran. You're bleeding human resources, you're bleeding money. Presumably you would like to get out. What is it that you can do and bring to the table? I'd like to know, as a German who grew up in Germany, spent ten years in France, and is very glad that there once was a schoolbook commission that brought our histories together and aligned them and meant that we now have a similar vision, at least on most issues. Is there such a thing, such an initiative underway? Has there ever been an effort to try to reconcile your different histories in such a form? Let's start latterly, and then let's say you first. Well, certainly, there have been some serious efforts between China and Japan to reconcile the history issue. For example, in the 1980s, the Japanese leader, after visiting the Shirai, and then they came to realize that, you know, they should pay more attention to relations with China. So this was no longer an issue at the political level. And also in the 1990s, historians from China, Japan and South Korea began to write a common history book about the modern history of East Asia, so that they can reach some consensus about the modern history in this region. So those are important efforts made by both political leaders as well as the scholars. But this began to change in the last 10 years. Why is that now you have some Japanese politicians who either driven by their understanding of history or even by their own ideology. They just wanted to pay the visit to the Shirai. So that brought the issue up again, reopened the issue. Well, that history issue was mostly about history. It's not particularly about the disputes of the islands. It's about, you know, what happened in the World War II, what Japan did in Korea on the Korean Peninsula in China. Even though the historians couldn't agree with just 100%, but basically they had a parameter of knowledge about what happened and tried to, you know, promote the use of those history books in the Shirai countries. Yes. Back to what I said, you know, in the last 10 years, you had some Japanese politicians who wanted to reopen this issue of your school in Shirai. And also I think partly because the changing regional context, which is maybe the rise of China, makes some Japanese politicians feel very nervous, upset. They wanted to create a stronger Japan. And to get there sometimes to look to the past from Japan's modern history, to get this kind of incentive and inspiration to show Japan's glory is modern history. But it is exactly the wrong thing it should do if you really want to make Japan popular and stronger in this region. And frankly speaking, I think Abe's recent visit to the Yasukuni Shirai really did a lot of damage to Japan's image, simply for his personal belief or ideology, but that's not in Japan's national interest. And Mahmood on Syria. I'm going to ask all the panellists to be as concise as possible so we can get as many questions in as possible on the Syria point. Yeah, I think Geneva II is a sound framework for the ultimate resolution of the conflict. But in parallel to that, I think there needs to be an overall framework of understanding between Iran and Saudi Arabia on regional issues where Syria is going to be the pivotal point in that framework. Iran and Saudi Arabia are supporting the opposite forces in Syria and unless they come to an understanding about facilitating the rise of a nation state in Syria, which is a common ground and underpinning for all the forces within Syria, then we can expect a much more rapid solution to the problem. And I think as long as Iran and Saudi Arabia do not come to that understanding, we're going to be seeing a protracted conflict in Syria. Thank you. I'm going to now take three questions at once. And we will then hand back over to the panel, sir. Jean-Marie Guignol, Columbia University, former Undersecretary for Peacekeeping at the UN. The panellists have spoken very eloquently to the traditional threats of power, clashes of power that what makes the early 21st century look a bit like the early 20th century. I want to ask them about the non-traditional threats. Those situations where the problem is not power against power, but the elusiveness of power, where the state has lost control over its own territory. And we see areas of the world where that's happening in a significant scale. But after the experience of Afghanistan, after the experience of Iraq, after the precarious situation in Libya, there's a kind of scepticism on what can be done about those situations. And nevertheless, they do pose a strategic threat. And so I would want some of the panellists to speak to that issue. Fantastic. That will be the first up. Thanks, Jean-Marie. Gentleman here and then lady here. Tanaka from Japan. Sorry to get onto a sign of Japanese relations too much. But one comment and one question to Ushinbo. One comment, I think even a sophisticated scholar like Ushinbo maintains a very stereotypical view of a fairly complicated issue of Prime Minister's visit to Ysgrinyshwain. It's rather sad for me. There are many in Japan who criticize the Prime Minister because of the difference of opinions. But I would argue that very few believe that he was trying to over topple the international order created after the Second World War. That was totally out of imagination for many of the Japanese who are observing this event. Question to my friend Ushinbois. As you mentioned, I referred to Prime Minister's troublemaker. So do many Chinese ambassadors all over the world now calling Mr Abe troublemakers? How long do you think this continues? Or in order for the Chinese leader or scholars like you or diplomats to stop referring to the Japanese leader troublemaker? What does Mr Abe has to do? Thank you very much. We'll keep questions brief, please. We'll fit them all in. Yes. Amy Kellogg from Fox News. Mack Mood. Just wondering if you think that Iran actually could have been useful at the Geneva talks or whether the situation is just too fraught at this point. Also, what will be the repercussions of Iran having been disinvited, if you will, from the talks of the last minute? Thank you very much. So maybe let's start with Jean-Marie's question. John, do you want to pick up on that on non-traditional threats? You don't have to. You can pass it off if you want to. I think the panellists did what they were asked, which is to talk about these power struggles. I think it's also true that 213, 214 characterised by the sort of revenge of geopolitics. And so, while it was quite right to speak about non-traditional threats, when there weren't very many traditional threats around, the return of national sovereignty and military arms races and non-proliferation meant that these traditional threats couldn't just be called old-fashioned. I think what makes it so much more difficult now for us to deal with these traditional threats is what I've sometimes styled the privatisation of foreign policy. That you have companies and you have NGOs and you have popular movements and the like, all of whom have a say, including in these big power issues. At the last IISS Shangola dialogue that was held in Singapore, the Chinese Deputy Chief of Staff of the People's Liberation Army stated in public what was then the traditional point of view of China, which is perhaps it might be a good idea to shelve the issues of sovereignty between China and Japan for another generation and let another generation solve them and let's get on with economic growth. When he returned to China, about 400,000 netizens criticised him for abandoning the Chinese national strength and he's no longer Deputy Chief of Staff of the PLA with the same responsibilities for military intelligence that he had before. So these popular forces I think are the most challenging elements in having balanced reactions to these traditional threats so there's a non-traditional challenge to traditional conflict management. Maybe Professor Wigg, can you just pick up on John's point specifically when you address the question as to whether it's time for Chinese ambassadors to stop calling Mr Abe a problem, because I think this is very interesting as to the extent to which you think that will be a force in driving Chinese policy going forward. I assume this wave of criticism against Abe has maybe two or three factors behind it. One, of course, to express the Chinese frustration with what Abe did, especially because he didn't do this when he was Prime Minister for the first time in 2007, but now in his second time as Prime Minister he did it so China really feels frustrated with this. I also tried to switch the public opinion in China. Look, even though Abe did this, China is trying to criticize him, condemn him. More importantly, we are trying to prevent Abe from doing this again in the future. That is a big question, whether or not Abe will remain a troublemaker in the future depends on whether he will go back to the Yasukuni Shrine. At this moment he seems to be determined to do that. So, if that is the case, I think you will hear this kind of label being repeated again. I have a feeling it's not going to be solved in the room today, this one. Mahmood, coming back to you on Geneva 2, there's a specific question as to when it would have been good to have brought Iran onto this and into this and etc. So if you could speak to Amy's question. Two points. One, I think Iran's participation would have certainly been constructive. Iran and Saudi Arabia need both bilateral and multilateral settings to bridge their gaps. That's one. Two, I think Americans are looking at Iran's regional behaviour as an element in their larger approach to Iran. It seems to me that their perception was that maybe this is too early to provide Iran with a bargaining chip for a resolution of the Syrian problem. But I think given the fact that Iran's foreign policy, gladly, increasingly is going to be subject to the requirements of Iran's national economic development, I think Americans should welcome that Iran is willing to talk about its foreign policy in a regional setting with the major powers Saudi Arabia included. Thank you. Ian, John, to come in on that. I just want to say that we haven't talked much about economics here, but economics are a very big piece of this. One of the reasons why I'm so negative on Iran and Saudi Arabia is precisely because the economics are moving against bringing these countries together. The Saudis are already under a lot of stress. They don't have a significant ally in the United States. They don't have a lot of folks providing them aid. Their demography is burgeoning and energy prices are going down and they're likely to go down much further as a consequence of a deal. In that environment it is much harder. The Iranians are going to be competing directly against them. It's becoming more zero sum. That makes it hard. China, Japan, the economics cut in the other way. You have two governments that if it weren't for economic integration would probably already be fighting each other in some ways, right? And they're not in part because you have a China that at the same time you have all these issues on the security side, you also have Xi Jinping going and telling his state on enterprises you've got to become more efficient. You have to become more transparent. I'm going to cut capital off and I will tell you that you go one level underneath the central government. You go to local governors. They don't talk about Abe as a troublemaker. No, no, no. They have groups of CEOs that go to Tokyo and say we'd really like some more money, please. The Chinese are very good at understanding that when they want money they don't talk troublemaker language, right? And we all are, but the Chinese are particularly good at it, right? And look, that's not Shinbo's ambit, but that is for other folks. And I think we should recognize that that will help to leaven what otherwise looks like a really divisive geopolitical relationship. I agree completely with John's point that with the return of geopolitics the interest in these non-governed areas that are growing goes way down because they're just bigger fish to fry and less willingness to focus on impact of Libya. I thought the French did a good job in Mali, frankly. Maybe the only thing that Hollanda has done appropriately is that he's actually been elected, but that is an exception. It's not the rule. Okay, we're going to take a couple of last questions before wrapping up. Gentleman here, and lady here first, then gentleman over here will bring in the microphone. Yes. Thank you very much for a very interesting panel. I'm Orzela Ashraf, named from Afghanistan. I'm a social activist. And I'm here to ask that in the context of global security that you have discussed particularly in light of this somehow reconfiguration of the power relations or emergence of new powers, where do you all think Afghanistan and Afghanistan's crisis is going to lead to? I'm sure everyone sitting in this room remembers that Afghanistan is a case indeed of an intensified level of intervention. The job is not done. The security is not there. The peace has not been sustained or assured. I would like to put it as a general question to everyone, but particularly I'm also interested to know what does the Iranian government, Rouhani's government stands on the case of Afghanistan and particularly I'm also interested to know where China is standing. I mean, generally and also specifically about these two countries. Thank you. Thanks. And we'll have the next question as well before we... Yeah. Gentleman, the blue shirt here. Hi, Chris Saple, American with the role on... Council on the Royal Faith. Our Iranian friend said religion is not a factor in the Iranian Saudi competition. I'd like you to explore that just a little bit more. And if it's not a factor, then how does Iranian Saudi rapprochement begin? Are there textbooks and joint research projects and things like that that we saw with the French-German example? The French-German example started with moral rearmament which was a secular process, but based in a common understanding of Christianity. It was a place for Islamic peace-building. Okay, thank you both. Have you had... Can we start with you on Afghanistan in terms of very pertinent questions? I don't know if I can give the answer because it's not... Anybody knows how the answer is going to be, but it's... I prefer to think... I don't know how it's going to be the end. But I think that we should... That makes us... I'd like us to think of how we get started with the Syrian situation. And one of the lessons of this years past probably is that you cannot enter into a situation like that without knowing what is the exit. It's something that we should not repeat in Syria, I think. For instance, if we were to find an agreement on Syria, debasification in Syria without an estate, it would be a mistake. So that's a lesson to be learned from the Syrian situation. It's a mistake to organise. But I cannot tell you the final answer. I wish all the best, but... I'm sorry for that. No, of course not, of course not, of course not. But I don't see the appetite to do it otherwise. It's simply the most likely way. But it's of course not the right solution. Professor Wu, and then we'll move on to... Well, the Americans are leaving Afghanistan and China will miss that. What China has been down so far is trying to consult with Afghanistan's neighbours, Russia, India, Pakistan, and including the United States, two things. One, what can we do after U.S. withdrawal, NATO withdrawal to support the peace process in Afghanistan? And secondly, what we can do to deal with the possible security challenge coming out from it. And one more thing from the Chinese side is that we are trying to help the economic reconstruction. And at the end of the day, the political stability relies very much on the economic development. Back to Iran. Can I just hand back to you for just final, very quick concluding remarks so that we can have a quick wrap up from the panel? So there was particularly, if there's anything you want to add on Afghanistan, but I think also to the last question about the role of faith, and then we'll wrap up. On Afghanistan, I think Iran is going to be acting more multilaterally with regional countries and also Europeans in the U.S. On religion, there are all sorts of governmental and non-governmental institutions with their annual and semi-annual summits in Iran and the Sunni world. Discussing collaboration and understanding, it's been going on for decades between the two sides. I do believe that's not an input into the decision-making process of either country. I think that's a reflection of it, but deep down, these are two countries competing for regional power and supremacy. I think the key to it is a change of perceptions on both sides. It is interesting to me as an Iranian academic, as I go around the world speaking about Iran, the group that understands Iran the most in the world is Europe and then it's Russia and then it's the United States, Asians and the least understood is the Arab world. In the Arab world, there is very little understanding of Iranian nuances, of the domestic structure in Iran. They're very much obsessed by individuals at the very top in Iran. There is very little understanding about the social dynamics in Iran and I think there are more Europeans travelling to Iran than Arabs if you compare, though Iran is a Middle Eastern country. In that respect, I think if we look at the issue historically, you will find very little premise in the region of any country where they have an interest in Iran's empowerment and Iran's national economic development. I think the only way to overcome this is dialogue, cooperation between the two governments. I think now is the greatest opportunity that we have between the Rouhani government and the Saudi government. Actually, Rouhani does have a very positive image among Saudi leadership going back to about a decade ago where he reached a security agreement with them. I think this is the perfect time to reach an agreement. We've had a very strong call there both in terms of the need of dialogue and understanding. I think that's come through from everybody, but also a moment here. Just to go back along the panel from Dr Solana to the end can you each give me one sentence? If you've heard one thing today in the questions or the conversation that you think is an extremely prescient reflection on the time that is to come in the course of 2014, one sentence, what is it? Over to you. One sentence I would say that I would like to see the United States not pulling back. Good one sentence. John. I think one should look also at the promise and not just the challenge of Iran re-entring the international community as an accepted power with a responsible approach to its neighbours and the wider international community. I think this is something not necessarily lost on all Arab states. I think it was noticeable that within the day of the Geneva-Iran non-proliferation talks being concluded successfully, Sheikh Abdullah bin Zaire of the UAE was very quickly in Tehran and very quickly, Foreign Minister Zarif was back in Abu Dhabi. I wonder whether the shift of thinking might start taking place if ever those three island disputes were actually solved and there are some rumours that two out of the three were to be solved. I just wonder what the geopolitical shift might then be if UAE, which has a natural social and economic engagement with Iran, found that there was no structural impediment to them having a stronger relationship with Iran with some of the other Gulf states who are inclined to see Iran as a permanent neighbour and not necessarily a permanent challenge also re-engage more with that country. One sentence, literally, because we're up to time. Yep, thanks. We are on time when what economy is recovering is more important to manage where the political and strategic relations among the major powers, especially to expand their cooperation on major security challenges while managing their differences. Thank you. If the World Economic Forum had been the world security forum, it probably wouldn't still exist. We have to understand whether the economics can trump the lack of mutual understanding in these key issues. Thank you very much. Thank you to you all for coming. Thank you to my fantastic panellists for thrashing out the issues. They'll be at the forum, you can pick their brains in the corridors and elsewhere. Thank you very much, everyone.