 And the viewpoint, Nai Gama, Naya, the collective viewpoint, Samgraha, the empirical viewpoint, Vyavara, the instantaneous viewpoint, Riju Sutra, the synonymous viewpoint, Shabda, the etymological viewpoint, Samabiruda, and the factual viewpoint, Evambutha or Itambutha. The multilateral approach that features the Naya Vada is especially underlined by the structural distinctions between substantial viewpoints, Draviartika Naya, and modal viewpoints, Yajartika Naya. Distinction, which relies on one of the most fundamental ontological tenets of Jainism, namely the necessary coexistence of permanence and change in every existing being. The other division among the seven viewpoints attested in the most ancient philosophical texts is based on the difference between Arta Naya and Shabda Naya. Whereas the Arta Naya, or object-bound viewpoints, are statements that are concerned with ontological matters only, the Shabda Naya, or word-bound viewpoints, mainly focus on linguistic matters. However, this opposition cannot be ascribed to a mere difference of content between both kinds of utterance, as it seems to be implied by the fact that this second difference is generally left aside by scholars dealing with the seven Nayas from a structural perspective. In contradiction to this usual trend, the present paper aims at laying stress on parallels between the three word-bound viewpoints and three of the object-bound viewpoints, namely the Sangha Naya, the Vyavara Naya, and the Rijutsu Tra Naya, respectively. We then should be able to bring to the fore an underlying structural pattern. In order to carry out this investigation, I have focused on many texts, but for the sake of today's presentation, I selected only a few passages among the very extensive literature developed by Jainas on the Naya topic. My quotation are here mainly borrowed from the commentary on Akalanka's Lagia Straya by the Digambara Abayachandra, who flourished during the 13th century. So let us have a closer look at the three kinds of the Shabda Naya. Here is Akalanka's Tansa, in which the three word-bound Nayas are described. I translate the synonymous viewpoint, distinguishes objects, thanks to a difference of tense, of karakar, of gender. The etymological viewpoint distinguishes objects, thanks to synonyms, the factual viewpoint distinguishes objects on the basis of action. The fifth viewpoint, also is called Shabda Naya, but here the technical term is used in its limited meaning and refers to the synonymous viewpoint. When a statement is uttered from this viewpoint, the speaker is allowed to choose any word from a set of synonyms, because in this perspective, synonyms are considered to be similar as far as denotation is concerned, albeit differing in connotation. If changing words does not entail a change in denotation, distinctions among various objects must lay on other criteria. Thus, as it is pointed out by Jaina logicians, the Shabda Naya enables us to distinguish objects thanks to differences pertaining to gender, to karakar, to tense. I by Chandra's commentary on the first half of the stanza runs as follows. I translate, there is a viewpoint named synonymous. How is it characterized? It distinguishes objects. Karoti, it aims at bedam, the variety, artasia, of the objects of knowledge. Thanks to what does it distinguish objects? Bedat, thanks to a difference. A difference of what things? Of tense, of karakar, of gender. The absolute necessity of using such criteria reveals that a single word is notable by itself to draw distinctions between particulars that are usually designated by the same term. Therefore, the synonymous viewpoint deals with the words as mere universals. An instance based on the karakar criterion will enlighten this parallel. So this is my own instance. It is not to be found in the Jaina sources, but I think that for the sake of the understanding it should be explained. Let us imagine two farmers who would have each one left one of their cows in the same cowman's care. If the cowman lets both cows graze in the same meadow, whereas they look so similar, but only the owners are able to recognize which one belongs to each of them, but not the cowman. When evening falls, both farmers come to pick up their cows. If one of them just says, I want to get my cow back, the cowman will not be able to determine which animal is the right one. So the word cow is uttered by the speaker, so as to point out a single being only, his own cow, namely, it will be understood by the ear, our cowman, as pointing out any cow of the group, reduced to two individuals in the present case. But if one farmer asks, my cow is grazing, and the other one, a child is talking my cow, identifying which cow belongs to whom, will become possible. Thus, thanks to a difference of carcass, the cowman will be able to give unmistakably each animal to its owner back, because in the first statement, the word cow is a subject, whereas it is object in the second case. The ambiguity does not disappear if we use in this context two different synonymous instead of one and the same word. Let us now imagine two horses instead of our cows. If our farmers say respectively, I want to get my steed back, and I want to get my stallion back. The groom will not better know than our cowman, whom he should give back each horse to, inasmuch of the words steed and stallion can be considered as interchangeable, since they can be held to some extent as synonymous. One could easily put forward similar examples, showing how the other criterions mentioned above, gender, tense, number, are operative as well. So, since the synonymic viewpoints, viewpoints, sorry, deals with words as mere universals, it is strictly parallel to the collective viewpoint, sangranaya, according to which the object is considered under its general aspect, inasmuch as it can be integrated into the samanya. The second kind of world-born viewpoint is the etymological viewpoint, samabirudhanaya. According to this viewpoint, distinctions can be drawn between objects by choosing among a list of synonyms one word rather than another one. And the term used in Sanskrit to convey the meaning of synonym is a word paraya, one may be tempted to compare the etymological viewpoint with the ordinarya concern with paraya, namely the instantaneous viewpoint, rijusutranaya. However, such a comparison proves asti and irrelevant. Synonyms enable us to individualize an object. Thus, we apprehend the object as endowed with a set of peculia characteristics, vishesha, thanks to which this object is perceived as different from other objects. But it does not follow that the aforesaid object is presented to the cognizer from the standpoint of modality and transitoriness, as it is supposed to be the case in the rijusutranaya. On the other hand, trying to distinguish between two synonymous terms makes sense only because even though they share some similar denotations, which lays ground to the fact that they generally are interchangeable and such what the perspective adopted by the synonymous viewpoint, there is at least a slight difference between them. And because of this difference, in some given context, the two words express two distinct realities. The instance that traditionally illustrates the etymological viewpoint consents the names of deities. So you have Aria-Chanla's commentary on this part of the stanza. Two, only on the hand, the viewpoint named etymological distinguishes objects, pariaiais, thanks to synonymous term. For instance, is indra because of his sovereignty, is chakra because of his might, is purandhara because it destroys a citadel. If there is no distinction between prosperity and the other characteristics, the name indra cannot be used. Here, the different names are held as theonyms. It means that indra, chakra, and purandhara are conceived of as three distinct divine substances of the various avatars of Vishnu and be considered by the various sects who worship them to be distinct deities, even though they are finally the different incarnations of one and the same God. Therefore, in the case of the etymological viewpoint, a word is not conceived as a universal which can pervade all individuals belonging to one and the same class, but expresses a single individual. In this respect, a parallel can be drawn between the samabirudhanaya and the vyavaharanaya because the vyavaharanaya considers an object from the perspective of its individuality instead of the perspective of its belonging to a class as in the case of the collective viewpoint, samvahanaya. The third and last word born viewpoint is the factual one, evambuta or etambutanaya. It is well known that this naya goes one step further in as much as it takes into account the differences between various synonyms, but it is far more respective than the samabirudhanaya in the way each synonym has to be employed. According to the etambutanaya, a name applies to an object only if the object is actually performing the action expressed by the root of the foresight word. Such if the import of the passage of avyachandra quoted here, I do not translate because it's the same as I just said to keep in mind the time. For instance, the god Indra can be named Puandara during the very time is destroying citadels. Thus, the factual aspect that was expressed on the ontological level by the vijusutranaya is dealt with on the linguistic level by the factual viewpoint. For the factual viewpoint does nothing but transpose on the linguistic level the same restriction at the one which is operated on the ontological level in the case of the vijusutranaya. In this respect, the etambutanaya can be analyzed as tantamon to the vijusutranaya despite a difference of perspective. The instance usually provided in order to illustrate the factual viewpoint is the same as in the samabibudanaya but it is dealt with in a different way. Here, the name Indra, Shakva and Puandara are no longer names but divine epithets or epicleses according to the term used concerning the Daivan epithets in ancient Greece. One and the same god in other words, a single individual substance can be called by various names. Thus, a name does not match an individual entity, in the present case a god, but only an aspect of deity, namely a mode. Various names can be used at different points of time in order to refer to a single substance. One and the same god can sometimes destroy citadels, sometimes embody the sovereignty and sometimes be the master, the owner of might. The choice of the epithet is not insignificant when it comes to praying the deity. Using different epicleses implies invoking different apostatuses of the god. For example, and this example also is mine, to address a prayer to such or such form of the goddess does not fulfill the same goal. A warrior who wants to propitiate Durga before going into the battlefield, and his young wife invoking Gauri in order to live happily with her husband will pray the goddess in two different ways, but it's the same god. Nevertheless, since different kinds of prayer can coexist in the same cult observed by one and the same sect, one can worship the goddess sometimes as Durga, sometimes as Gauri, and so on. The three parallels that we have drawn so far can be summarized by the table reproduced here. It is not worthy. Now the first viewpoint of the traditional list of Naya, namely the comprehensive viewpoint, Naya Naya stands alone and can be linked with no world-bound viewpoint. This peculiarity is easy to understand. It follows from the ontological perspective adopted by the Naya Naya that each entity is apprehended in its totality as having universal as well as specific characteristics. Giving a name to a thing would set the limitations to it, and thus would imply a negation of one, of both, of its aspects, which obviously contradicts the comprehensive nature of Naya Gama viewpoint. Therefore, it is impossible to associate a world-bound viewpoint with this peculiar Naya. What can we conclude from these comparisons? Firstly, that instead of being merely concerned with linguistic matters, each of the Shabda Nayas provides an ontological content that is respectively tantamount to the last three Arta Nayas. Moreover, our inquiry sheds new light on the opposition between Arta Naya and Shabda Naya. That is why the Sanskrit terms Arta Naya and Shabda Naya should not be literally translating by the expression object viewpoints and word viewpoints respectively, as it is sometimes attested for the sake of convenience. Because it may lead us to a wrong interpretation. The distinction between the object-bound viewpoints, Arta Naya, and the word-bound viewpoints, Shabda Naya, makes sense in a structural perspective, which is in fact even deeper and stronger than the structure involved by the distinction between Traviartika Naya and Pariyartika Naya. Beyond the obvious fact that the two divisions do not provide the same repetition of the various viewpoints, their nature itself highly differs. Classifying the Nayas according to the kind of characteristic aimed at by the speaker, either substantial or modal, leads to the division in Traviartika Naya and Pariyartika Naya. On the other hand, the opposition between Arta Naya and Shabda Naya does not merely take into account the content of the statement, but the means by which the cognizer operates in order to utter a statement. Whatever perspective is adopted, either ontological or linguistic, all the Nayas, without any exception, in other words, even the Shabda Nayas, deal with the being, a thing, a matter of fact. The ultimate goal always consists in establishing distinctions among different beings. In contra-distinction, two authors, like the Shvetambara Mališina and Karikam, 28, would draw a distinction between the case represented by the synonymous viewpoint in which only the denotation, Dvani, is different, and the case embodied by the etymological and the factual viewpoints in which the denotation, Arta, is different. Prabha Chandra and Abhaya Chandra are unanimous in glossing the word Arta in the compound Arta-Bedakrit used by Akalanka in La Giastvaya 44. They make it clear that the world-born viewpoints ultimately aim at differentiating one thing from another. First, occurence. Artaśa is glossed by Čivādhe, and second one by Abhaya Chandra, Artaśa by Pramayasya. For linguistic investigation for itself is the very purpose of the Nikšepas, but not of the Nāyās. Thus, as it has been luminously expressed by some scholars, for instance Dundas, I quote, the last three Nāyā demonstrate the manner in which language is implicated in ontological analysis. In this respect, the statements expressed through the four Arta-Nāyās can be said as purely ontological because they are limited to ontological descriptions. Whereas the Šabdā-Nāyās can be characterized as linguistic critic. They are firstly endured with a meta-linguistic value since they consider to which extent the word is appropriate for expressing a particular thing. But while reflecting upon the proper use of words, the speaker is aware that language conveys ontological distinctions. While examining the accuracy of a word in a given context and with a specific intention, the cognizer ultimately comes back to the ontological analysis all by indirectly. Thus, the Šabdā-Nāyās obviously embody a critic approach towards language as well as towards ontology. Thank you very much for your attention.