 Congress hereby declares, one, its firm intention to provide all necessary support for members of the armed forces of the United States fighting in Vietnam, two, its support of efforts being made by the President of the United States. The President was not in the Clark Second Resolution, and other men of good will throughout the world to prevent an expansion of the war in Vietnam and to bring that conflict to an end through a negotiated settlement which will preserve the honor of the United States, protect the vital interests of the country, and allow the people of South Vietnam to determine the affairs of that nation in their own way, and free its support of the Geneva Courts of 54, and urge is the convening of that conference or any other meeting of nations similarly involved and interested as soon as possible for the purpose of formulating plans for bringing the conflict to an honorable conclusion in the court with the principles of those accords. You have said every one of those things. Yeah. Is that it? That's it. Now, what's going to be your argument? Is there a way that, rather than declare war, we just substitute this? That's right. The other argument goes too far. It infringes upon the executive. It has a lot of loopholes in it, and we're up facing a accomplished fact, and we have to go through with it. We cannot withdraw. We will not withdraw. We'll continue our efforts, and this is it. What we want to do now out there, I talk to you, I think about this once before, and then I'll be through. I'm given serious thought. I've got to meet with them sometime, or six months, as about up, and we are trying to get Key to come on and have an election as quickly as we can after the Constitution comes in. Lodge will be moving out. He can't stay. We've got to move him somewhere else. We are thinking seriously of making Westmoreland, who has the leadership qualities and the respect of everybody with whom he's ever dealt, and particularly our eight people, and particularly our state people and the military people, giving him overall command. He just wears uniform, and he'll be our number one man in Vietnam until they have their presidential election and get a man elected. He'll replace Lodge, in effect, and replace Westmoreland, in effect. But we'll have under him the man that we expect to develop for the younger man, Abrams, who will be Chief of Staff of the Army here, if he stayed here. But we won't send him out there to try to see if we came to put a new touch on our pacification and get a new approach to try to get this country's South Vietnam back on its feet. We're going to make a desperate effort to move Sullivan out of Laos in there to take Porter's job, Porter's tired, and probably move Bob Comer out to do work on the other side of the war, the pacification schools and hospitals. And then we're going to make one desperate pitch, if we can, to get to Elworth Bunker, to go there as Ambassador-at-Large, to work, to really be the midwife, like he did with the Dominican Republic, to try to get the civilian election held, to try to get to see it inspired, to try to get the generals to have a civilian viewpoint and understand that that's more important to have a good election than it is to win a big battle and to try to guide him like he did. He's in perfect health now. He feels good. He's younger than I am, but he does have 72 years old. What I looked last night, I was talking to Mac Mundy. He said, well, Secretary Stimson came down here, Secretary, the greatest Secretary of War at 73 and stayed five years. And this fella ought to have stayed over five months in this transition period. We've got Westmoreland there, so if something happened to the older man, he got a little senile or something. We wouldn't be caught at the same time. We think he has enough stature and enough respect of the whole world, and certainly Westmoreland would respect him enough that he would, in effect, be the political man and the diplomatic man. And we'd just use Westmoreland's stars to keep Key in line. And we had done that and done it pretty effectively since Honolulu. We made him go with the Constituent Assembly, and then Westmoreland's worked his heart out, and we've got him going now with the presidential election. He's agreed to move it up four, five months. And I want to get your reaction to that. It sounds like it has a possibility. I'd sort of like to think it through, Mr. President. I don't know that he'll do it. The weakness is, I don't know whether Westmoreland will take Honolulu a little more responsibility. It's kind of supervised the other. We think we need to do that because of his position. I don't know that Bunker would want to work under somebody, you see, as an older man, but he is not familiar with all these things and the pitfall out there. But he has an approach that nobody in the government has. He's been a good soldier, too. That's right. He does it. That's right. He just goes where the ball is. And he'll go there. He'll go through the line. He goes. He doesn't seem to pick up any barnacles or hurt anybody still in there. He doesn't get in in fights, most of the State Department people have got problems. But he doesn't seem to get in. Thank you, though. We're saying nothing about it. I'm thinking over this weekend I'm going to send for him and see if I can talk him into it. But I've got to do something, and I've got to find something for Lodge. I don't know where I'll put him. Okay, Mr. President, I'll do that. Thanks.