 In October 1974, President Gerald Ford signed the Landmark Energy Reorganization Act, splitting the Atomic Energy Commission into two agencies, effective January 19, 1975. The first agency took over the AEC's weapons and energy development programs and later became the Department of Energy. The second agency became the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, responsible for regulating the civilian nuclear power industry. The AEC had been a storied and powerful federal agency, which had taken over the Manhattan Project's weapons development programs and given birth to peaceful applications of nuclear energy. By 1974, however, Congressman Chet Holifield, a loyal patron of the agency, spoke for supporters and critics alike when he noted the AEC was falling apart and it had to go. Hi, I'm Tom Wellock, the historian of the NRC. In this video, I'll explore the historic roots of the AEC's downfall, which led to the birth of the NRC. Stated simply, the AEC was doomed by the historical forces that created it. Those forces produced an agency with three not very complementary parts. One part was a secret weapons agency. Another part publicly promoted the civilian uses of nuclear energy, while the third part was an unbiased regulator to protect the public from nuclear hazards. Over time, it became evident that promotion and protection didn't mix. The AEC began operations in 1946 when keeping atomic secrets from the Soviet Union was a Cold War necessity. When the Soviets exploded their own bomb in 1949, secrecy became less important than persuading allies and the public that the new atomic age could bring substantial benefits to civilian life, not just the terror of nuclear war. The 1954 Atomic Energy Act gave the AEC responsibility for promoting and regulating civilian nuclear power. In other words, the AEC was both nuclear industry salesman and safety watchdog. It was poorly equipped to fulfill these missions in a new era demanding transparency and conflict-free safety regulation. To minimize the conflict, the AEC set up a separate regulatory division housed in separate offices. It proved not to be enough, and after many missteps, distrust of the agency grew. In the late 1950s, above-ground weapons tests produced radioactive fallout thousands of miles away. The AEC attempted to reassure the public that fallout levels were safe. But critics pointed to the discovery that some fallout elements, such as Strontium 90, could be found in milk and lodged in children's teeth. After a treaty banned above-ground testing, the fear of fallout faded. The fear of radiation didn't. Radiation fears spread to civilian reactors. In the early 1960s, electric utilities applied for new reactors at controversial sites near Manhattan, Boston, and next to the San Andreas Fault. The AEC rejected some of these plants, but it approved enough that critics complained about its promotional bias. With the rise of the environmental movement in the late 1960s, the AEC touted nuclear power's Mr. Clean image compared to fossil fuels. It wasn't that simple. Nuclear power didn't have belching smokestacks, but it was not without its own problems. Nuclear plants discharged large amounts of warm water, called thermal pollution, which was a potential danger to aquatic life. And radioactive discharges from nuclear plants made headlines when two AEC scientists argued that the agency's permissible radiation dose to the public might cause an additional 32,000 cancer deaths annually. While there were technical solutions to thermal pollution and the AEC slashed radioactive emission limits, the agency seemed to respond to these problems only when they made headlines. The public and the lawmakers were not pleased. In the early 1970s, new controversies turned the AEC's troubles into a crisis. The AEC took a narrow view of its responsibilities under the National Environmental Policy Act, known as NEPA. NEPA required the agency to develop environmental impact statements for nuclear plant license applications. But the agency sought to limit its direct role and rely on other agencies for non-nuclear hazard assessments. Anti-nuclear activists opposed to the construction of the Calvert-Cliff's nuclear power plant sued the AEC over the plant's environmental impact statement. In January 1971, a federal court ruled the AEC had to take full responsibility for impact statements. The court argued that the AEC's, quote, crabbed interpretation of NEPA makes a mockery of the act. The judicial rebukes stunned and embarrassed the AEC and, once again, it appeared as a reluctant regulator. New commission leadership at that time opened a dialogue with critics such as Ralph Nader and told the nuclear industry it was scaling back its promotional role. The dialogue did not quiet charges of AEC bias. In 1972, the agency opened hearings to set performance standards for emergency cooling systems at power plants. The hearings garnered unflattering press coverage as dissenting AEC experts claim the cooling systems might not work. The press reported that the AEC tried to intimidate these dissenters. Many observers concluded the agency could not be a trusted safety conscious regulator. The White House began drafting legislation to dissolve it. In 1973, the Yom Kippur War in the Middle East touched off an energy crisis that helped shape the legislation to break up the AEC. By then, many alternative energy sources competed with nuclear power as a solution to fossil fuels. Congress proposed replacing the nuclear-only AEC with an agency that promoted diverse energy options. To eliminate the AEC's conflicted mandate, Congress created the NRC as a standalone agency specializing in reactor safety. Even the AEC's commissioners agreed to split the agency. Dixie Lee Ray, the last AEC chairman, said, it is time the responsibility for regulation should be independent from and free from the charges of conflict of interest. The 1974 legislation sought to ensure the NRC's independence with a five-member commission, bipartisan commissioner appointments, an office of regulatory research, and a substantial research budget. The NRC staff also gained greater independence than the AEC staff had on regulatory decisions. The NRC began its operations as a separate agency in January 1975. After the many AEC controversies, the nuclear industry and anti-nuclear activists both greeted the new agency with hope. Trade publications reported the nuclear industry was, quote, positively bubbling over with enthusiasm for an NRC that made rapid, efficient decisions. I may be a Pollyanna on this one, a veteran utility lawyer said, but I really look forward to the new commission. In a rare moment of agreement, anti-nuclear activists also had high hopes for the new agency, believing it would be a stronger safety regulator than the AEC. The NRC was born out of a consensus that independent regulation was essential, but how could the NRC satisfy such divergent expectations of what its independence would mean? Many decades later, that question still confronts the NRC. How the new agency responded to the challenges will be the subject of future installments of moments in NRC history. Stay tuned and thanks for watching.