 Well, good morning everyone. My name is Rick Ozzie Nelson, Director of the Homeland Security and Counterterrorism Program here at the Center for Strategic International Studies. I thank you all for braving the first day of school and the bad weather and this very hectic week that we have in advance here in front of us. We are absolutely honored and thrilled here to have TSA Administrator John Pistol to speak. As you know, TSA obviously since 9-11 and its creation has been the center and the focal point of a lot of discussions about what the appropriate role is for Homeland Security and particular transportation security. We know TSA many times. We relate TSA to only individual that the American public many times has is just the individual who does the screening at the airport. And unfortunately, that's not all the TSA does and TSA's portfolio is much broader, much more deeper than that in itself. And the advances that TSA has made over the years, despite the criticisms and despite the media sometimes wanting to focus on where they went wrong, the advances in TSA's made sense and deception are actually quite remarkable. One of the things going forward in this 21st century threat that we are facing where we're going to see this increase of transnational threats and these threats that are going to cross our borders and testifies themselves inside the United States is this continued struggle between what the right balance is between privacy and security. And TSA in many ways is at the forefront of that debate. Every day their individual officers who are in the field have to deal with that balance between privacy and security. And it's extremely difficult and it's only going to get more difficult going forward. When you have an organization with a charter like that who you don't get a lot of pats on the back when you do a pat down the right way, right? You don't nobody says nice jobs TSA screener. You only get criticized when when something goes wrong. To manage an organization like that when that's what your charter is is you don't get a lot of praise when you do it right, which you get a lot of to come down on you do it wrong requires significant level of leadership management skill. And that's where administrator John pistol comes in why we're honored to have him here. He's been a lifelong in government service lifelong nearly 30 years. Most of those 26 at the FBI that's where he was at 9 11. He brings a type of leadership the type of integrity to an organization that to manage an organization like TSA. So for today, I'd like to introduce administer administer pistol. He's going to come and give about 20 to 30 minutes of remarks. And then we're going to go ahead and go to questions and answers. And again, we appreciate when the microphone comes around to please stand state your name and your affiliation. And we look forward to hearing administrator pistols remarks. Sir, thank you for attending. Good morning. Thank you Ozzie for that introduction. It's a privilege to be here this morning with CSIS. I appreciate the opportunity to focus on some of the issues that we are dealing with today, but also use this time to reflect to look back on where we were on 9 11 and where we have come in the past decade. What we're doing today and then as we look forward to the next 10 years. So that's how my my comments will be focused this morning. We obviously have had the opportunity, especially in this last week and this week as we come up to the 10th anniversary on Sunday to see a lot of coverage about where people were, what was going on, how lives were changed, how lives were lost. Number of you, I'm sure watch some of those over the weekend. And as we look forward to how we can do the best possible job of making sure that a tragedy such as 9 11 doesn't happen again, we have to be very mindful of where we have come from in that context. I think it is critically important. So I'd like to this morning dedicate these comments to to the victims of 9 11 to the heroes who knowing the danger that they faced the hundreds of firefighters, law enforcement officers, first responders, particularly went into the trade center towers to rescue those who were at peril. And I just ask that we just take a moment of silence and remember to them. Thank you. So we talk about the events of 9 11. And it's easy to lose sight of what happened. But as we see some of these memorials, some of the tributes and things, it brings it all back. And just as it was one of those defining events for a certain generation, similar to Pearl Harbor of another generation or the JFK assassination, whatever that defining event has been in your generation. It's easy to think of what you're doing where you were and how you responded to that. And I'm sure that you've had that opportunity. And as you think about this this coming Sunday and the 10th anniversary, I think the context is important for where we have been where we're trying to get to. I was an FBI agent as I mentioned on 9 11. I was assigned to our inspection division out of FBI headquarters, but it was actually in New York, New York State actually in Syracuse to do an inspection of the office there. And I just completed an outside interview with a local media outlet there and had arrived at a local judges office as chambers there to interview him on how that FBI office in Syracuse was doing. When I got to the judges office, the TVs were on and there was talk and coverage of the North Tower being on flames and people trying to figure out what had happened. It was shortly thereafter that realized something was terribly wrong and so I excused myself and went back to the FBI office there. And it was there moments after I arrived there that I watched along with with many of you either on TV along with with millions to see the second plane hit the South Tower there. And just a sense of being surreal that this can't be happening and that but it was happening. I think the real impact was when the first tower collapsed in the sense that two things really came to mind. This changes everything and what is next. And of course what is next part played out over the next minutes as we learned about the plane hitting the Pentagon and of course in Shanksville crashed there. From an FBI perspective the question was what else is out there? Of course the entire US intelligence law enforcement community. What can we do immediately to stop anything further? Are there just four planes? Are there other attacks that are planned and haven't been carried out? And so all those things. And so when we look at what happened there, obviously today's topic is aviation security. We look at the state of aviation security on 9-11. And I've actually seen some commentators waxed nostalgically for the days prior to 9-11 when you could walk out to meet your friends or loved ones at the gate or whatever it may be. And of course no very limited lines and things like that. And that was clearly a different era. If you think to what type of security we had then, it was basically a walk-through metal detector to pick up devices, metal items, knives or guns. That were primarily used for hijackings particularly to Cuba is what the reasons they were initiated decades ago. And then the basic x-ray for your carry-on bag. So streamlined process. As we know from the photograph from the Portland main airport on 9-11 at 5.45 that morning when Muhammad Hada and Abdul Aziz Al-Amari walked through the Portland security with their box cutters and were able to get on the flight to go to Boston where they joined up with three other hijackers on American Airlines Flight 11. The airport security at that time was limited. It was basic and it was insufficient. The response to the attacks obviously was for a number of things to happen. But in regards to TSA on November 19th Congress passed a bill and the President signed the bill creating the Transstitiation Security Administration at that time part of the Department of Transportation. And so when we look at what the mandate was to the entire U.S. defense community, intelligence, law enforcement, security apparatus, the President's mandate was don't let this happen again. And so over the course of the next year TSA ramped up from zero to nearly 50,000 employees. It's one of the greatest mass hirings if you will in U.S. history in terms of a response to an event such as 9-11. And what has happened since then is a refinement in some respects, an expansion in other respects of where aviation security has focused. As Ozzie mentioned, obviously TSA has other responsibilities primarily as a force multiplier to state and local transit agencies and Amtrak for example. So I won't comment on that at this point but be glad to take your questions or comments on that. So that's where we were on 9-11. Since then obviously much has changed and the President's mandate at that time and continuing obviously in this administration is to not let that happen again. It has held true. The challenge has become, as chairs have evolved, how have we evolved and have we been able to stay at least a step ahead of them in terms of their ingenuity, their creativity, their ability to adapt and design, conceal and deploy, improvise explosive devices such as we saw, whether on Richard Reid in December of 01 just a few months later or as we saw with the liquids plot out of the U.K. in August of 06 or as we saw with Abdul Matal on Christmas Day and of course the Yemen cargo plot last year last October where the terrorist see what layers of security we have put in place and then modify their approach to try to ensure that they can get past our security. Of course the latest intelligence now is about surgically implanted devices that suicide bombers would have so we would not be able to detect the small devices such as Abdul Matal had on Christmas Day of 2009. We believe that we have been successful in pushing them to further extremes if you will in terms of their concealment and their capabilities. Mindful that we need to ensure that we don't allow a repeat of a prior attack. So let's just look at some of the things that we have done collectively since 9-11 when it comes to aviation security. If I ask each of you to write down some of those things, a number of things that I'm sure come to mind most notably would be the checkpoint. The checkpoint that you must go through at one of the U.S.'s 450 airports or of course around the world, nearly 275 last points of departure that fly directly to the U.S. There are certain protocols, regimen that you have to go through which have become symbolic of the government's response to 9-11. And with over 1.8 million people every day traveling domestically, the TSA screens 12.5 million a week, 50 million plus a month over 625 million people every year and going up this year. You can see the challenge that the men and women of TSA have to ensure they provide the most effective security in the most efficient way, providing the best customer service if you will but not at the expense of security. The bottom line is we have to make sure we're doing everything we can while respecting privacy and civil liberties. A lot of debate about that as to ensuring that another 9-11 doesn't happen. So think of the checkpoint and think of what happens there now instead of just a walk-through metal detector. That's still available but there's also the advanced imaging technology and I'm very pleased that the technology has developed and we are modifying at least half of those scanners to what we call automatic target recognition. It just gives a generic outline of a person and so in the next 30 days or so we should have half of all of those machines, 450 or so around the country, modified so it just gives that generic outline of person. And so it does not do that more revealing individual image. Contrary to what has been in the press quite a bit, at least things I saw and were of course parodied on shows was not nearly as revealing as what was depicted oftentimes. But the fact of the matter is there are privacy issues there that we are trying to be attuned to while making sure that we provide the best detection capability. And so an Abdulmatalib who perhaps is here in the U.S. inspired by Al Qaeda or some other terrorist group and has gone on the Internet, learned how to devise a device similar to that that is non-metallic that could get through a walk-through metal detector that that type of device will be picked up by the advanced imaging technology. That's one of the noticeable changes. Obviously we have explosive trace detection capabilities. So some of you have traveled, you may have your hands swabbed whether you're in line or if you alarm somehow just have your hands swabbed for explosive trace detection. That's something of course we did not have. We have advanced technology X-ray now for the bags and number of different iterations of that. The bottom line is as passengers pack more of their personal items in their carry-on bags so they don't have to pay a check bag fee. I'm sure none of you have done that here. But as people do that it makes detection frankly more difficult for the security officers who are looking at the screen. And if any of you have not had an opportunity or have done that I would just to see what these items look like. I would just ask that you be patient with those security officers who are looking because it is very challenging to look for an organic mass and an initiator. So the two things that we're looking for in terms of an improvised explosive device. And there's many things that look like either initiator or organic mass. And so the challenge is how do we resolve those issues, those anomalies if you will, in a timely way that provides again the most effective security but in the most efficient way. So we have the advanced technology X-ray. We have bottle liquid scanners where we are working on technology to get to the point where we can allow liquids to come back on planes but we're not there. We've been working closely with the European Union in terms of some of the European Parliament's mandates to allow liquids back on planes by April 2013. The technology is not there yet but we're working on that and also some other risk-based security initiatives which I'll talk about in just a few minutes. And so that's what's happening at the checkpoint. What you do not see hopefully because unless you're down in the cargo area is the inline baggage systems that we have worked with industry to develop a high-speed process for screening of explosives, screening of checked bags for explosives. Obviously pre-9-11 that didn't happen. Now Pan Am 103 did change the procedures for matching the person to the bag on international flights but it did not require, no legislation was enacted to require that those bags then be screened for explosives. And so that's been a major development and a change. Again you probably don't see, you shouldn't see in most instances. But we have millions of bags that we screen every day and both from the checked bags and the carry-on bags to look for those explosives that could be catastrophic to the aircraft. So that's something else that is out there. And then also behavior detection officers. Obviously they didn't exist on 9-11. And the question is if they'd been at Portland Main or Boston or Dallas or Newark, would they have picked up on these individuals? Well hopefully so. That's something we'll obviously never know. But the idea is to give us yet another opportunity in a layered defense to identify, deter and disrupt terrorists who are bent on causing destruction. So how do we best go about doing that? It is through those layers of defenses that we have. That's all on the physical side of things where we are making significant progress is also on the technology intelligence side of things. And Secure Flight was just, is of course our system that just requires the name, date of birth and gender of all travelers. All those 1.8 million people every day. And it allows us to again do some definitive checking against the terrorist watch list. Of course terrorist watch list prior to 9-11. So we're limited at best. And the idea of being able to check with any confidence or any level of accuracy was quite limited frankly prior to last year, about now last October actually. Full rollout of Secure Flight. Previously airlines maintained lists and so we would not know for example if there were half dozen selectees or even some no flies who were wanting to travel. If they're on different airlines we would not know that information perhaps until the last minute if at all. So the advent of Secure Flight was just recognized by the 9-11 commission as being one of the good technology developments. And we use that from an intelligence based perspective to say we want to be a counterterrorism, risk based intelligence driven organization that is informed by intelligence from the community. And this is one of those key enablers that allows us to do that. The other part I'll just touch on briefly is in cargo. And again going back to Pan Am 103 and we see what can happen with cargo that is not thoroughly screened. We see what happened with the human cargo plot from last October when there is some screening but because of the ability for terrorists. Kite in Arabia Peninsula in particular to design and conceal those in such a way that even upon inspection they look like normal computer printers. And so that is a challenge. But when we look at cargo I don't think people realize that there are millions of pounds of cargo that fly in US passenger planes every day. Over nine and a half million pounds of cargo go on US passenger planes. So all that cargo is also screened for explosives and that's done through a partnership with the private sector. But the bottom line is TSA has that responsibility. Again that's something you don't see but it's another layer of security that we're trying to ensure that you and your loved ones are safe. Even if it's cargo vice check bags or anything else a person may have on them. Now that nine and a half million pounds that's just a little more than 10 percent of all the cargo that is screened and uplifted in the US every day for both domestic and overseas locations. So it's not an insignificant amount and it is something that is is required for us to give the highest level of confidence that we are doing everything we can with best training techniques and tactics enabled by the best technology to provide that highest level of security. Recognizing that as we move forward there's no guarantees in this business. So let me transition from where we were on 9 11 to what we've been doing the last 10 years to the way forward. And whether it's the next 10 days weeks months or years there's a lot of work that is being done to try to provide that most effective security in the most efficient way. And the one part of that is recognizing that in order to give 100 percent guarantee of safety and security for each and every passenger flight and cargo flight would require a paradigm shift of what we're doing now to even more stringent security measures both with passengers and with cargo which would frankly inhibit the free movement of goods and people with the best security in significant ways. And we saw that after the human cargo plot we had meetings. I met with the head of the World Customs Organization the head of the Universal Postal Union who of course is affected by any time cargo is the International Civil Aviation Organization IKO. And then the International Maritime Organization to work with them to find a business based model that would provide the most effective security without unduly restricting the global supply chain. Because that's what happened when we put immediate cargo ban hold on anything coming out of Yemen. The ripple effect the impact of that was significant. And so in working with industry we have been heartened by industry's own risk mitigation risk management strategies particularly here in the U.S. to buy down that risk of somebody putting a something in cargo that could cause catastrophic failure and they're doing that without government regulation. So they are taking their own risk mitigation risk management steps again recognizing that they are not in the risk elimination business just as we are not in the risk elimination business. We do what we can to mitigate and to manage risk. And so it's with that construct that we have been working really for the better part of a year now on what we call risk based security initiative. RBS initiative which encompasses a number of different things some of which you've heard about and some we have not talked about publicly yet but will later this fall or next year. Some of the ones that are known are for example what we're doing in terms of identity based screening for pilots those in charge of the aircraft. I worked the Egypt Air 990 crash when I was with the FBI in Boston 1999 where we did the salvage operation with the Navy and others trying to find evidence of what brought down that crash going 231 people. And it wasn't until later that we realized that it was not because of catastrophic failure it was because of individual on board who got control co-pilot and put the aircraft down. That was a stark reminder when I took over this job that no amount of physical screening is going to detect what's in a person's head. And so it made little sense to me that we should require pilots who are literally in charge of the aircraft to go through screening when if they had a prohibited item on them whether it's a small knife or whatever it may be that's not going to be what causes failure to an aircraft it's what's in their mind. So that's one example. We are working with industry both the airlines, the airports and the travel associations to have a known trusted traveler expansion of what Customs Border Protection does with their global entry, sentry and nexus networks where people pay a fee, go through an application process, have a background done. And so we have a higher level of confidence in who those people are because we know more about them. Yeah, not a guarantee, but we know more about them. That's critical because under this risk based security initiative, the whole idea is to focus on those that we know the least about or the most about because they're on a terrorist watch list and then be able to focus our limited resources on those individuals and then to enable us to do that, we need to do something else in terms of more intelligent screening on the front end and then we can excite those who we know a lot about. There's a number of you in the audience who have a security clearance. Secret, top secret. The question is we know a lot about you. You're in a trusted position. Should you have to go through the same type of screening to have somebody without? And that's just an example. Again, no, nothing dispositive there in terms of risk, but it does give us an opportunity with all our other layers of security in place to try to make some advances in that regard with working with the airlines. As I mentioned, we are hoping next month to do some some proof of concepts in at least four airports with frequent flyers at higher elite levels, starting off anyway, who are willing to share information about themselves through their airline to say, Yes, I am willing to share that I am a frequent flyer. And as we look at travel histories and things later on, we'll be able to make even more informed judgments as to what risks this person poses. If you've been flying for 20, 25, 30 years, and you are at this level for all those years or many part of those years, it's possible you're a terrorist, but it's not likely. And so, as we can, again, use more intelligence to shape and inform our judgments and decisions, I think we can make a better process of, again, the most effective security in the most efficient way. We're also looking at ways that we can streamline the screening of children, recognizing that children aren't terrorists, but unfortunately know that people do use them to do bad things. And we have several examples of children ten and under from around the world. Nothing involved in aviation, but we're mindful that terrorists are always looking to exploit societal norms and more as if you will to try to cause us harm. A number of different ways that we are looking at this risk-based security initiative. The bottom line, again, is to use more intelligence on the front end and secure flight enables us to do that in many ways to embed information on the boarding pass in conjunction with the airlines. And to allow us to focus in that way. So there has also been talk about a checkpoint of the future, the International Air Travel Association. IATA has been a strong proponent of that. I am also proponent of that. The technology, again, is not there, but the idea that you could actually just walk through without divesting anything, walk through security scanners which would pick up explosives or anything else that may be caused catastrophic failures. That's a great idea and working, that's something that is being explored, but, again, the technology is not there to do that. So all these opportunities we have to try to shift the paradigm from the one-size-fits-all construct to try to tailor the security screening involving intelligence, involving physical screening, involving random and unpredictable, because we will always maintain that. There will be no guarantees in this risk-based security initiative. I simply refuse to allow terrorists to game the system to say, okay, if I build this legend of travel or whatever it is, then I'm guaranteed expedited screening. We'll always maintain that random and unpredictable aspect of it to ensure that we are doing the best possible job. So with that, let me thank you for your time and attention this morning. I look forward to your questions and comments. Thank you very much. Thank you very much for those comments. We're going to do the question and answer period now, but before I was remiss when I introduced Administrator Pistol, I think one of his greatest achievements, especially considering today's political climate, was the fact that he was confirmed by unanimous consent in the Senate. So in TSA, and to get that after all the controversies and everything, again, is a testament to the kind of leader the TSA currently has. So with that, let's go to questions and answers. Please wait for the microphones to come around because we do have media and they're trying to capture these. State your name, your affiliation if you have one, and a question, no statements. I will ask you to sit down. So who wants to be first? Gentlemen on the red shirt right over here. Thank you. John Brandt, Fox News Channel. With respect to the Christmas Day underwear bomber, is it accurate to say that we were lucky that the explosives didn't ignite because his pants were damp? And more broadly, is it safe? Is it fair to say that we get lucky more than lucky that more of these plots don't succeed? Succeed, excuse me. Thank you. There are a number of unknowns, of course. I think we were fortunate on Christmas Day. The question I would look back at is, is what have our layers of security done to force, if you will, Terrace, to adopt different means of concealment? And so whether there was something either in design, construction, or the fact that he'd been traveling for 17, 18 hours, did that have something to do with it? There are a lot of unknowns. The bottom line is, if it had detonated as intended, it would have likely caused catastrophic failure to the aircraft. Great. Thank you. Gentlemen over here on the right-hand side, please. Thanks. I'm Tony Feinberg from the Institute for Defense Analysis. Along the lines of risk-based approaches to security, you made allusion to four incidents that occurred since 9-11, all of which were on inbound flights from other countries into here, would not a risk-based system emphasize far more and put far more resources on inbound flights than it does on domestic flights? Part of our challenge, obviously, is how we assure with the highest level of confidence that our international partners are doing requisite screening to our levels. And so we work very closely with both our counterparts, but also with the security services, the law enforcement intelligence community agencies and the governments and the airlines and airport authorities in those last points of departure particularly to ensure that they are doing that requisite, at least baseline security. And then as we inform through information sharing, additional information such as the information gleaned after the Christmas Day attack, the Yemen cargo plot and so forth, we look at those opportunities. The risk-based security initiative that we are working on is designed to start here domestically to make sure that we can get it right here. And then we've been in dialogue with a number of foreign governments and private industry who are very much interested in how this works and then for us expanding that to those flights that would be impacted internationally, but we're focused first domestically. Thank you for that question. A gentleman over here in the blue suit, please. Hi, good morning. Mike Goldman for Silverberg, Goldman and Baikoff. You talked a little bit about cargo on passenger carrying aircraft. The question is, is all cargo on inbound international passenger carrying aircraft now being screened? Recognizing that screening may entail more than just X-raying, but there are some other techniques that you have available. Thank you. Right now, 100% of all the high-risk cargo is being screened inbound to the U.S. We don't define that publicly because we don't, again, want to provide a roadmap to the tariff say, okay, if we can just get out of that high-risk category. But it really falls within two constructs. One is known shippers and known shipments. And so if there is an existing relationship with a shipper and that has been existing for a certain amount of time, and we know the products they shipped, whether it's Fortune 500 companies or whomever, that's one of aspects. The other, if it's not in that category, is it a known shipment? And so let's just use the Yemen cargo plot as an example. The fact that a young woman dropped off two computer printers with clothes and books and was paying approximately $500 to send those two packages by different aircraft to Chicago, that doesn't make much sense from an intelligence, from a risk-based security perspective. So it's that type of information. Advanced cargo information is very, very helpful in defining who's a known shipper and a known shipment. So again, without going into too much detail, that's the general construct. Right, who do we have next question? Okay, John, we're here to blue shirt. Good morning, Justin Orrbona, just a private citizen. Question on the RBS, the risk-based security. It seems like you're kind of talking about profiling without really saying the word. How are we going to socialize the American people to accept that? And second part, if I may sure, is are we taking any of the Israeli airlines lessons learned and practices into our own practice? Well, first let me say you're not just an American citizen, you're who we're working for. So look, it's the men and women of TSA who are working every day to keep you and your loved ones safe. And so what we are trying to do is, frankly, under promise and over-deliver in terms of how we can do this in an iterative process. So I mentioned the pilots, to me that's common sense. We also have worked with the World War II veterans who come into DC to see the World War II memorial on charter flights and to work with them to do more of an identity-based screening as opposed to the typical physical screening. Now there's a chance that one of these elderly gentlemen, who the youngest is in his late 80s, is a terrorist, but it's not likely. So how can we just employ some more common sense in the policies that we use? The socialization and acceptance by the American people is critical from the standpoint of making it viable. So if our groups who are trusted or known are such a small group, then that won't make much difference to the 1.8 million people traveling every day. So what we are working with, again, through the airlines and through some outreach is just saying, if it's all voluntary, if you don't want to share any information about yourself, that's fine. You'll just go through the normal screening protocols. But if you like the possibilities, not the probability of expedited physical screening and you're willing to share information about yourself, then we're interested in that and how we can use that in a constructive way to do the best possible security in the most efficient way. Next question. That's right here in the back, the left-hand side. Microphone's coming around. Thank you. Mr. Postola, what is your vision, you know, vis-a-vis the future of this process? You know that we in this country, many people are quite upset about the extensive process that goes on. And what do you foresee that we could evolve into with respect to our end game in terms of being going through the process of screening? Sir, could you state your name and your affiliation? Dan Gebens, Georgetown. Thank you, sir. The whole idea is, again, if we use the needle in the Haystack analogy, so we're looking for that one in a billion or whatever it may be. For example, since Richard Reed December of 01, we've had nearly six billion people travel in the U.S. that TSA is screened. Obviously, we didn't start screening until 02. And there have been no shoe bombs, and simply from a probability standpoint, that's something that we are interested in looking at. What does intelligence tell us? Have shoe bombs been used around the world? No, they haven't, even though the EU has that many people traveling. There's 27 countries in the EU traveling in that same timeframe. So it's using intelligence in an informed way. The end state, I think, will always be evolving. So I don't think it's reasonable for anybody to say two-year plan, three-year plan, five-year plan, ten-year plan to say this is exactly what it's going to look at. Because we are always evolving, again, hopefully ahead of the terrorist as they evolve. But the general approach is to provide more intelligence screening on the front end to expedite the physical screening in as many opportunities as we can. So that we reduce the size of that haystack. So that needle that we're looking for is smaller than what we started with under our previous one-size-fits-all construct. Yeah, Mark in the front row. Thank you. Mark Frey, Steptoe and Johnson. To go back to the trust of traveler expedited screening, I was wondering if you had a sense yet of what that expedited screening is. And I know there's going to be randomness and unpredictability. For a global entry, for example, you get a specific tans will benefit. You go to a kiosk, you don't have to wait in the line. Can we expect maybe we don't have to take off our shoes? Maybe we get to carry a bottle of water on? What's your thoughts about what the average traveler will get? Thank you. What we are doing in the proof of concept in four airports starting next month is really three things. One, a dedicated lane for them so you don't stand in the regular lane. Two, you do get to keep your shoes on. And then three, you can keep your laptop in your briefcase or carrying case. So those are the three tangible benefits that we are looking at. Again, you may end up, you may do that nine times. You're a 1k or 2k flyer and you may, the last nine times, you may have gone through that dedicated lane. Tenth time you may end up going through regular screening simply for random and unpredictable. Yes, right here in the middle. Hi, I'm Caitlin Garmin with BAE Systems. Can you please comment as to whether possible budget cuts would affect TSA, especially when it comes to personnel? Well, we're very mindful. Again, we work for the taxpayers and there's a lot of focus on how every government agency can be more efficient. So the bottom line is that we don't have a diminution of security because of budget cuts. So I, as administrator, have to look at a 60,000 person organization and say how can we achieve efficiencies in a way that does not adversely affect security. And so for the last six months or so, we've been going through a series of reviews, internal reviews and exercises to identify some of those areas that we can be more efficient while not negatively impacting security. I'm going to jump in here with one question. We talk a lot about, I mean, obviously your TSA is on the front lines interacting with the general population on a daily basis throughout the entire transportation system. And there's a lot that's asked of TSA, but I'll put you on the spot and say, what can TSA, what do you need from the American people? What can they do to help improve the transportation security system? Well, at the risk of misquoting a president in a different way, but there's President Jefferson who talked about an informed electorate being the best defense of democracy. For us, a well-informed traveler is the best defense against a terrorist because, one, it's somebody who knows how to prepare for security screening, so it's that partnership. But two, they'll be attuned to things that don't seem right. So the whole, if you see something, say something campaign is particularly for those who are frequent travelers who recognize when somebody's not being what they should be or whatever. And so it's that partnership that I would say is critical for us. And then, frankly, be patient with us as we roll out some of these risk-based security initiatives that will need time to make sure that we get it right and we may need to recalibrate and go back and do things. We're doing a behavior assessment and assessor program at Boston Logan now, and some of you may have been through that. It was just a brief interview, but I just asked for patience and cooperation as, again, the bottom line is to make sure another 9-11 doesn't happen or something else where they come up with a creative scheme that just hasn't been identified. Thank you. Another question from the audience. Paul Ryan, Whitney Bradley and Brown Consulting. In your opening remarks, you mentioned Amtrak is no by the way. If you think about the European terrorist bombings over the last several years, they all seem to be train or subway oriented. If you go to Union Station, you see some place and walking around dogs. If you get on the train in New London, Connecticut, you buy your ticket at a kiosk, you get on the train, there's no inspection, nothing obvious. Are we taking enough actions or is the train transportation system kind of a soft underbelly we're not paying enough attention to? Yeah, so a couple of points. I didn't mean to give a short shrift, just to focus on today's aviation security, so I'd be glad to talk in detail about it. Clearly, terrorists see subways, passenger trains, some freight trains around the world as vulnerable because of the open architecture that you describe. That being said, one of the things in TSA that we do is recognize we can't be all things to all people, all places at all times. So how can we leverage our resources in a smart efficient way to augment or enhance whether it's the Amtrak police or the transit authorities of the major systems around the country? And you just look at the ridership. I mean, you're eight million plus every day around the country on subways and things, so vastly greater numbers. Again, that's where I think the random and unpredictable comes in. Amtrak, Chief of Connor, does a great job in terms of having uniform patrols, canines, random bags, such as things that, again, are designed to throw off the terrorists. We know from the briefings of terrorists who have cooperated that the three things that they focus on as a deterrent are uniformed officers, canine and CCTV, the last one being only if they're not planning to be a suicide bomber. So Madrid bombings in 04, obviously they left the packages and got out. The 7-7 bombers in London in 05, one of them as they were walking down into the tube, looked at the CCTV because, frankly, he didn't care. In 10 minutes he was going to be dead and as many people with him that he could kill. So those are things we have the visible intermodal protection response teams, VIPER teams that are designed to do just that, provide that unpredictable posture. But recognizing that there are challenges that are significant every day and that it's through that partnership with the American people, there's Paul McMillan, the Metro Transit Chief in Boston has done some creative things on the See Something, Say Something campaign, taking, for example, a 10-foot backpack, if you will, and putting it out by different MBTA stops. And it says something like, it won't always be this obvious. So just the idea that, or our huge package, like a FedEx or UPS package, a huge one, bigger than this table. Again, it won't be usually this obvious. And so what can we do in terms of being informed and responsive? So not just enough to be informed, but to be responsive to address those challenges. Good question. Next question. Moving in the back, please. Hi, good morning. Eliana Mintz, Talk Radio News Service. I was, thank you for sharing all this enhanced security measures that TSA has implemented. But I'm curious as to whether we really are safer. I travel regularly, and to be perfectly honest, I get shavers and liquids through regularly. So I was wondering, how do we know terrorists aren't doing the same? The bottom line is, yes, I think the, clearly the consensus is, and I strongly believe that we are safer today than we were. But we recognize, again, it's not a perfect system. It's not 100% guarantee. Both the government accountability office, the DHS Inspector General's office, and our own TSA office of inspection, does covert red team testing to try to get things through a checkpoint and have had successes. A number of successes. And that coupled with the intelligence we know about how terrorists are trying to conceal devices such as Abdul Matab on Christmas Day. That presents the challenges that we say, let's make sure that we are looking at those items that can be catastrophic damage to an aircraft. So that's why I mentioned the organic mass and the initiator of an IED. Those are the two key things that we're looking for because you've got to have something that sometimes is explosive, whether it's liquid. Now, hopefully you're not, when you say you're taking liquids on, you've got a 16 ounce or a pint or a liter bottle of something you're taking through. Hopefully smaller size. But part of it is simply, how do we best position our resources to identify those threats which may be catastrophic? There'll be a law enforcement officer back after this. Any other questions? Anyone else? All right, going once, going twice. Okay, Administrator Pistol, I want to thank you once again. I know this is a very busy week for you, and we really appreciate your time. We appreciate your leadership at the TSA. And thank you very much for coming to CSIS.